BGP FlowSpec Payload Matching
draft-khare-idr-bgp-flowspec-payload-match-02

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Last updated 2018-11-05
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Internet Engineering Task Force                            A. Khare, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                J. Scudder
Intended status: Standards Track                  Juniper Networks, Inc.
Expires: May 9, 2019                                            L. Jalil
                                                            M. Gallagher
                                                                 Verizon
                                                        November 5, 2018

                     BGP FlowSpec Payload Matching
             draft-khare-idr-bgp-flowspec-payload-match-02

Abstract

   The rise in frequency, volume, and pernicious effects of DDoS attacks
   has elevated them from fare for the specialist to generalist press.
   Numerous reports detail the taxonomy of DDoS types, the varying
   motivations of their attackers, as well as the resulting business and
   reputation loss of their targets.

   BGP FlowSpec (RFC 5575, "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules")
   can be used to rapidly disseminate filters that thwart attacks, being
   particularly effective against the volumetric type.  Operators can
   use existing FlowSpec components to match on pre-defined packet
   header fields.  However recent enhancements to forwarding plane
   filter implementations allow matches at arbitary locations within the
   packet header and, to some extent, the payload.  This capability can
   be used to detect highly amplified attacks, whose attack signature
   remains relatively constant.

   We define a new FlowSpec component, "Flexible Match Conditions", with
   similar matching semantics to those of existing components.  This
   component will allow the operator to define bounded match conditions
   using offsets and bitmasks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any

Khare, et al.              Expires May 9, 2019                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        BGP FlowSpec Payload Matching        November 2018

   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 9, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Volumetric attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Tunneled traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Non-IP traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Flexible Match Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.1.  Operator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
         3.1.2.1.  String Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
         3.1.2.2.  Numeric Range Comparison  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.3.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

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