BGP FlowSpec Payload Matching
draft-khare-idr-bgp-flowspec-payload-match-07

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Anurag Khare  , Philippe BERGEON  , John Scudder  , Luay Jalil  , Michael Gallagher  , Kirill Kasavchenko 
Last updated 2020-09-01
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Internet Engineering Task Force                            A. Khare, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                         Ciena Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track                         P. Bergeon, Ed.
Expires: March 4, 2021                                             Nokia
                                                              J. Scudder
                                                  Juniper Networks, Inc.
                                                                L. Jalil
                                                                 Verizon
                                                          K. Kasavchenko
                                                                NetScout
                                                         August 31, 2020

                     BGP FlowSpec Payload Matching
             draft-khare-idr-bgp-flowspec-payload-match-07

Abstract

   The rise in frequency, volume, and pernicious effects of DDoS attacks
   has elevated them from fare for the specialist to generalist press.
   Numerous reports detail the taxonomy of DDoS attacks, the varying
   motivations of their attackers, as well as the resulting impact for
   their targets ranging from internet or business services to network
   infrastrutures.

   BGP FlowSpec (RFC 5575, "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules")
   can be used to rapidly disseminate filtering rules to mitigate
   (distributed) denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.  Operators can use
   existing FlowSpec components to match typical n-tuple criteria in
   pre-defined packet header fields such as IP protocol, IP prefix or
   port number.  Recent enhancements to IP Router forwarding plane
   filter implementations also allow matches at arbitrary locations
   within the packet header or payload.  This capability can be used to
   essentially match a signature for the attack traffic and can be
   combined with traditional n-tuple filter criteria to mitigate
   volumetric DDoS attacks and reduce false positive to a minimum.

   To support this new filtering capability we define a new FlowSpec
   component, "Flexible Match Conditions", with similar matching
   semantics to those of existing components.  This component will allow
   the operator to define a new match condition using a combination of
   offset and pattern values.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Khare, et al.             Expires March 4, 2021                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        BGP FlowSpec Payload Matching          August 2020

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 4, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Definitions of Terms Used in This Memo  . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Machine analysis of DDoS attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  Matching based on payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.2.  Matching based on any protocol header field or across
               fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Tunneled traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Non-IP traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Offset-type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Offset-value  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Pattern-type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  Pattern-value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.4.1.  Bitmask match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
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