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claimSigning Extended Key Usage (EKU)

Document type: Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Document stream: No stream defined
Last updated: 2012-06-29 (latest revision 2011-12-27)
Intended RFC status: Unknown
Other versions: (expired, archived): plain text, pdf, html

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IESG State: Expired
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found here:


This document specifies an Extended Key Usage (EKU) value which indicates that the certificate holder is authorized to sign security tokens to assert claims, or attributes, about a subject. When a certificate that asserts the claimSigning EKU signs a claim, the owner of the service holding that certificate is asserting that a statement about the subject is true. For example, a IdP secure token service (STS) would use an X.509 certificate containing the claimSigning EKU to sign SAML assertions containing an identifier and attributes about a user. This EKU value would allow for a separation between the designation that a given Identity belongs within a given Federation, and the empowerment of that entity within the federation to sign claims.. This approach allows for greater flexibility for the operators of Federated systems and for Certification Authorities and avoids the overloading of other, already established methods (such as Assurance Level designation via certificatePolicy OID).


Chris Louden <>
Dave Silver <>
Matt King <>
Matt Tebo <>
Patrick Patterson <>
Wendy Brown <>

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid)