Separating Crypto Negotiation and Communication
draft-kuehlewind-taps-crypto-sep-00

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Last updated 2017-09-11 (latest revision 2017-07-03)
Replaces draft-kuehlewind-crypto-sep
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Network Working Group                                      M. Kuehlewind
Internet-Draft                                                ETH Zurich
Intended status: Informational                                  T. Pauly
Expires: January 4, 2018                                         C. Wood
                                                              Apple Inc.
                                                           July 03, 2017

            Separating Crypto Negotiation and Communication
                  draft-kuehlewind-taps-crypto-sep-00

Abstract

   Due to the latency involved in connection setup and security
   handshakes, there is an increasing deployment of cryptographic
   session resumption mechanisms.  While cryptographic context and
   endpoint capabilities need to be be known before encrypted
   application data can be sent, there is otherwise no technical
   constraint that the crypto handshake must be performed on the same
   transport connection.  This document recommends a logical separation
   between the mechanism(s) used to negotiate capabilities and set up
   encryption context (handshake protocol), the application of
   encryption and authentication state to data (record protocol), and
   the associated transport connection(s).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Protocol Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Handshake-Transport Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Handshake-Record Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Transport-Record Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Existing Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Benefits of Separation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Reducing Connection Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Protocol Flexibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Protocol Capability Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Secure transport protocols are generally composed of three pieces:

   1.  A transport protocol to control the transfer of data.

   2.  A record protocol to frame, encrypt and/or authenticate data

   3.  A handshake protocol to negotiate cryptographic secrets.

   For ease of deployment and standardization, among other reasons,
   these constituents are often tightly coupled.  For example, in TLS
   [RFC5246], the handshake protocol depends on the record protocol, and
   vice versa.  However, more recent transport protocols such as QUIC
   [I-D.ietf-quic-tls] keep these pieces separate.  QUIC uses TLS to
   negotiate secrets, and _exports_ those secrets to encrypt packets
   directly.

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