WiMAX Forum / 3GPP2 Proxy Mobile IPv4
draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-10
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
---|---|---|---|
2008-12-08
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10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to RFC-Ed-Ack from Waiting on RFC Editor |
2008-12-05
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10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on RFC Editor from In Progress |
2008-12-05
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10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors |
2008-12-05
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10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress |
2008-12-05
|
10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors |
2008-12-01
|
10 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-10.txt |
2008-11-05
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10 | Amy Vezza | State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Amy Vezza |
2008-10-03
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10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress |
2008-10-03
|
10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors |
2008-10-02
|
10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress |
2008-09-22
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10 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress |
2008-09-15
|
10 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent |
2008-09-15
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10 | Amy Vezza | IESG has approved the document |
2008-09-15
|
10 | Amy Vezza | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2008-09-12
|
10 | (System) | Removed from agenda for telechat - 2008-09-11 |
2008-09-11
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10 | Amy Vezza | State Changes to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation by Amy Vezza |
2008-09-11
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10 | Cullen Jennings | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Cullen Jennings |
2008-09-11
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10 | David Ward | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by David Ward |
2008-09-11
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10 | Tim Polk | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Tim Polk |
2008-09-11
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10 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Dan Romascanu |
2008-09-11
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10 | Magnus Westerlund | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Magnus Westerlund |
2008-09-11
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10 | Mark Townsley | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Mark Townsley |
2008-09-10
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10 | Amanda Baber | IANA Evaluation comments: IANA has questions for the authors: - in Section 5.1, do you want a registry for the Authentication Methods? - in Section … IANA Evaluation comments: IANA has questions for the authors: - in Section 5.1, do you want a registry for the Authentication Methods? - in Section 5.3, do you want a registry for the Device ID Type? - in Section 5.4, do you want a registry for the Subscriber ID Type? - in Section 5.5, do you want a registry for the Access Technology Type? Action 1: Upon approval of this document, the IANA will make the following changes in the "Extensions appearing in Mobile IP control messages" registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/mobileip-numbers OLD: Value Name Reference ------- ---------------------------------- --------- 47 PMIPv4 Non-skippable Extension [draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-05.txt] ... 147 PMIPv4 Skippable Extension [draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-05.txt] NEW: Value Name Reference ------- ---------------------------------- --------- 47 PMIPv4 Non-skippable Extension [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] ... 147 PMIPv4 Skippable Extension [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] Action 2: Upon approval of this document, the IANA will create the following new sub-registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/mobileip-numbers Registry Name: PMIPv4 Non-skippable Extension Registration Procedures: Expert Review Initial contents of this sub-registry will be: Subtype Value Name Reference ------- ---------------------------------------- --------- 1 PMIPv4 Per-Node Authentication Method [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] Action 3: Upon approval of this document, the IANA will create the following sub-registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/mobileip-numbers Registry Name: PMIPv4 Skippable Extension Registration Procedures: Expert Review Initial contents of this sub-registry will be: Subtype Value Name Reference ------- ----------------------------------------- --------- 1 PMIPv4 Interface ID [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] 2 PMIPv4 Device ID [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] 3 PMIPv4 Subscriber ID [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] 4 Access Technology Type [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] Action 4: Upon approval of this document, the IANA will make the following assignments in the "Code Values for Mobile IP Registration Reply Messages" registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/mobileip-numbers Registration denied by the home agent: TBD PMIP_UNSUPPORTED [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] TBD PMIP_DISALLOWED [RFC-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09] We understand the above to be the only IANA Actions for this document. |
2008-09-10
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10 | Ron Bonica | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Ron Bonica |
2008-09-10
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10 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Pasi Eronen |
2008-09-08
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10 | Chris Newman | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Chris Newman |
2008-09-05
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10 | Russ Housley | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Russ Housley |
2008-09-04
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10 | Jari Arkko | authors confirm that they are willing to do the three changes |
2008-09-02
|
10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Three of the comments below are blocking (process issues and the EAP keying framework issue) in the sense that I would like to … [Ballot comment] Three of the comments below are blocking (process issues and the EAP keying framework issue) in the sense that I would like to see them resolved before the IESG approves this spec according to RFC 3932 criteria. Given the small importance of those three issues, I am assuming that the authors are willing to do this. There is a fair number of other comments, which are not blocking but could affect interoperability, correctness of behaviour, or clarity of the specification. I am hoping that the authors are willing to revise the specification one more time in order to address these. Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 4.3 explanation of IPsec usage is sketchy. Please provide a complete explanation of how IPsec is used, what policies will match on, etc. See draft-bellovin-useipsec. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. Section 10 mentions that the relevant keys will be "derived by the EAP keying framework". This seems incorrect in a number of ways. First, EAP keying framework (RFC 5247) is not a mechanism that can be applied, it is an explanation of the properties and requirements for the security of EAP keys. Perhaps saying something along the lines of "... derived from EAP authentication as specified in [WIMAX-DOC]" would be better. This resolves the issue for this document, but really hope that the Wimax specification employs MSK or draft-ietf-hokey-emsk and does not use EMSK directly. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. There is no discussion of the implications of using Mobile IPv4 as defined and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for the same nodes. Perhaps this should be raised as an issue, declared something not supported, or properly explained. It seems clear that per-MN security would be hard to support in any proper way, for instance. Wouldn't that require sharing the MN - HA secret with FAs as well? I understand the behaviour of this spec over Ethernet-like interfaces. IP stacks attempt to verify that their IP address is still valid. However, if you run this over PPP, bringing down the previous PPP connection and creating a new one would appear to cause the host to lose the IP address (and consequently, all ongoing sessions). There is no "confirm my address is valid" operation in PPP. The document does not at all discuss the role of the various identifiers (interface ID, device ID, subscriber ID, authentication NAI) and the access technology type. Note that RFC 5213 includes similar identifiers, but spends an extremely big part of the document in explaining what kind of logic rules are used to decide the behaviour of the PMIP nodes when faced with different situations. Is this not needed in PMIPv4 at all? Or is the document underspecified? Please clarify/extend the specification. In particular, it is unclear what happens when hosts have multiple interfaces. Note that RFC 5213 was built to be safe in these situations, is PMIPv4 safe? The document is silent on this and I cannot tell, but I suspect that the same issues apply. Section 3 claims IPv6 will work with PMIPv4 merely by the use of PMIPv4 and DSMIPv4 together. I find this hard to believe. To cite two examples where additional behavior might be needed: similar to RFC 5213, wouldn't MTU changes in the tunnel have to result in sending RAs with changed MTU options? And what about carrying the link-local address of the router? Or maybe that does not apply given that PMIPv4 supports only L2 LMAs? In any case, the document is too silent on this. Process issues: For full disclosure, I think it would be useful to mention somewhere that there exists an IETF standard proxy mobile, RFC 5213. Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well. |
2008-09-02
|
10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Two of the comments below are blocking (process issue and the EAP keying framework issue) in the sense that I would like to … [Ballot comment] Two of the comments below are blocking (process issue and the EAP keying framework issue) in the sense that I would like to see them resolved before the IESG approves this spec according to RFC 3932 criteria. Given the small importance of those two issues, I am assuming that the authors are willing to do this. There is a fair number of other comments, which are not blocking but could affect interoperability, correctness of behaviour, or clarity of the specification. I am hoping that the authors are willing to revise the specification one more time in order to address these. Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 4.3 explanation of IPsec usage is sketchy. Please provide a complete explanation of how IPsec is used, what policies will match on, etc. See draft-bellovin-useipsec. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. Section 10 mentions that the relevant keys will be "derived by the EAP keying framework". This seems incorrect in a number of ways. First, EAP keying framework (RFC 5247) is not a mechanism that can be applied, it is an explanation of the properties and requirements for the security of EAP keys. Perhaps saying something along the lines of "... derived from EAP authentication as specified in [WIMAX-DOC]" would be better. This resolves the issue for this document, but really hope that the Wimax specification employs MSK or draft-ietf-hokey-emsk and does not use EMSK directly. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. There is no discussion of the implications of using Mobile IPv4 as defined and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for the same nodes. Perhaps this should be raised as an issue, declared something not supported, or properly explained. It seems clear that per-MN security would be hard to support in any proper way, for instance. Wouldn't that require sharing the MN - HA secret with FAs as well? I understand the behaviour of this spec over Ethernet-like interfaces. IP stacks attempt to verify that their IP address is still valid. However, if you run this over PPP, bringing down the previous PPP connection and creating a new one would appear to cause the host to lose the IP address (and consequently, all ongoing sessions). There is no "confirm my address is valid" operation in PPP. The document does not at all discuss the role of the various identifiers (interface ID, device ID, subscriber ID, authentication NAI) and the access technology type. Note that RFC 5213 includes similar identifiers, but spends an extremely big part of the document in explaining what kind of logic rules are used to decide the behaviour of the PMIP nodes when faced with different situations. Is this not needed in PMIPv4 at all? Or is the document underspecified? Please clarify/extend the specification. In particular, it is unclear what happens when hosts have multiple interfaces. Note that RFC 5213 was built to be safe in these situations, is PMIPv4 safe? The document is silent on this and I cannot tell, but I suspect that the same issues apply. Section 3 claims IPv6 will work with PMIPv4 merely by the use of PMIPv4 and DSMIPv4 together. I find this hard to believe. To cite two examples where additional behavior might be needed: similar to RFC 5213, wouldn't MTU changes in the tunnel have to result in sending RAs with changed MTU options? And what about carrying the link-local address of the router? Or maybe that does not apply given that PMIPv4 supports only L2 LMAs? In any case, the document is too silent on this. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well. |
2008-09-02
|
10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 4.3 explanation of IPsec usage is sketchy. Please provide a complete explanation of how IPsec is used, what policies will match on, etc. See draft-bellovin-useipsec. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. Section 10 mentions that the relevant keys will be "derived by the EAP keying framework". This seems incorrect in a number of ways. First, EAP keying framework (RFC 5247) is not a mechanism that can be applied, it is an explanation of the properties and requirements for the security of EAP keys. Perhaps saying something along the lines of "... derived from EAP authentication as specified in [WIMAX-DOC]" would be better. This resolves the issue for this document, but really hope that the Wimax specification employs MSK or draft-ietf-hokey-emsk and does not use EMSK directly. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. There is no discussion of the implications of using Mobile IPv4 as defined and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for the same nodes. Perhaps this should be raised as an issue, declared something not supported, or properly explained. It seems clear that per-MN security would be hard to support in any proper way, for instance. Wouldn't that require sharing the MN - HA secret with FAs as well? I understand the behaviour of this spec over Ethernet-like interfaces. IP stacks attempt to verify that their IP address is still valid. However, if you run this over PPP, bringing down the previous PPP connection and creating a new one would appear to cause the host to lose the IP address (and consequently, all ongoing sessions). There is no "confirm my address is valid" operation in PPP. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well. |
2008-09-02
|
10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 4.3 explanation of IPsec usage is sketchy. Please provide a complete explanation of how IPsec is used, what policies will match on, etc. See draft-bellovin-useipsec. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. There is no discussion of the implications of using Mobile IPv4 as defined and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for the same nodes. Perhaps this should be raised as an issue, declared something not supported, or properly explained. It seems clear that per-MN security would be hard to support in any proper way, for instance. Wouldn't that require sharing the MN - HA secret with FAs as well? I understand the behaviour of this spec over Ethernet-like interfaces. IP stacks attempt to verify that their IP address is still valid. However, if you run this over PPP, bringing down the previous PPP connection and creating a new one would appear to cause the host to lose the IP address (and consequently, all ongoing sessions). There is no "confirm my address is valid" operation in PPP. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well. |
2008-09-02
|
10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 4.3 explanation of IPsec usage is sketchy. Please provide a complete explanation of how IPsec is used, what policies will match on, etc. See draft-bellovin-useipsec. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. There is no discussion of the implications of using Mobile IPv4 as defined and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for the same nodes. Perhaps this should be raised as an issue, declared something not supported, or properly explained. It seems clear that per-MN security would be hard to support in any proper way, for instance. Wouldn't that require sharing the MN - HA secret with FAs as well? Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well. |
2008-09-02
|
10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 4.3 explanation of IPsec usage is sketchy. Please provide a complete explanation of how IPsec is used, what policies will match on, etc. See draft-bellovin-useipsec. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. There is no discussion of the implications of using Mobile IPv4 as defined and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for the same nodes. Perhaps this should be raised as an issue, declared something not supported, or properly explained. It seems clear that per-MN security would be hard to support in any proper way, for instance. Wouldn't that require sharing the MN - HA secret with FAs as well? Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well. |
2008-09-02
|
10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. There is no discussion of the implications of using Mobile IPv4 as defined and Proxy Mobile IPv4 for the same nodes. Perhaps this should be raised as an issue, declared something not supported, or properly explained. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well. |
2008-09-02
|
10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, get MIP4 WG to publish the GRE keying spec, or reword the text to make clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. The last sentence of the first paragraph in Section 4.1.4 does not read well. |
2008-09-02
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, or reword to make it clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). The RFC 4436 reference should also go into Section 4.1.3. There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. |
2008-09-02
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, or reword to make it clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. See RFC 5213 for an example (a different example, given that MTU treatment in IPv6 is different). There is no discussion of the requirements for the identification of a mobile node. Compare with RFC 5213. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. |
2008-09-02
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, or reword to make it clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). There is no discussion of MTU issues in the document at all. Please add such a discussion. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. |
2008-09-02
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, or reword to make it clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 4.1.1 Step 6 claims that at this point the host has an address and DNS config. However, you did not mention earlier in the DHCP or IPCP cases that the DNS configs are exchanged; the claim comes out of the blue for the reader. Perhaps you could add text to the earlier steps. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. |
2008-09-02
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 4.1.1 refers to an expired ID about the usage of GRE keying, in a manner that appears normative. Please remove, submit the other document to the RFC Editor as well, or reword to make it clear that GRE keying is not a normative part of this spec. Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Please make it clear that RFC 4436 can be employed (even if some existing networks might use ICMP). Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. |
2008-09-02
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436 … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Process issues: Section 3 says "In addition, the solution leverages standardized specification and highly available implementations." This could be mis-interpreted as PMIPv4 being a standard. I would like to see this rewritten, e.g., as "In addition, while this specification and Proxy Mobile IPv4 are not standards, they employ a standard, Mobile IPv4. Implementations of Mobile IPv4 can be re-used at least to an extent." Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. |
2008-09-02
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436 … [Ballot comment] Technical: Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. Editorial: The document lacks separate sections for Informative/Normative references. There are too long lines in the document. Weird indentation between first and second paragraphs of Section 2. Reference [1] does not exist. References 3011 and 3519 are unused. No information found for draft-yegani-gre-key - is the name correct? Obsoleted documents referenced: 1331, 1334, 2401, 2434. |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Section 6.2 appears to propose an ICMP-based movement detection scheme which is likely inferior to the standard schemed defined in RFC 4436. |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | Intended Status has been changed to Informational from None |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Jari Arkko |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | Ballot has been issued by Jari Arkko |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | Created "Approve" ballot |
2008-09-01
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10 | (System) | Ballot writeup text was added |
2008-09-01
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10 | (System) | Last call text was added |
2008-09-01
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10 | (System) | Ballot approval text was added |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | Placed on the next telechat agenda. |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2008-09-11 by Jari Arkko |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | State Changes to IESG Evaluation from Publication Requested by Jari Arkko |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | The authors have finally submitted their work via the RFC Editor. Sending this forward to the rest of the IESG. |
2008-09-01
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10 | Jari Arkko | Note field has been cleared by Jari Arkko |
2008-08-29
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10 | Cindy Morgan | State Changes to Publication Requested from AD is watching by Cindy Morgan |
2008-08-29
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10 | Cindy Morgan | IESG, This document was submitted to the RFC Editor to be published as an Informational Independent Submission: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09.txt. Please let us know if this document … IESG, This document was submitted to the RFC Editor to be published as an Informational Independent Submission: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09.txt. Please let us know if this document conflicts with the IETF standards process or other work being done in the IETF community. Four week timeout expires on 26 September 2008. WiMAX Forum/3GPP2 Proxy Mobile IPv4 Mobile IPv4 is a standard mobility protocol that enables IPv4 device to move among networks while maintaining its IP address. The mobile device has the Mobile IPv4 client function to signal its location to the routing anchor, known as the Home Agent. However, there are many IPv4 devices without such capability due to various reasons. This document describes Proxy Mobile IPv4 (PMIPv4), a scheme based on having the Mobile IPv4 client function in a network entity to provide mobility support for an unaltered and mobility-unaware IPv4 device. This document also describes a particular application of PMIPv4 as specified in the WiMAX Forum and another application that is to be adopted in 3GPP2. This independent submision was reviewed by George Tsirtsis. Sincerely, Sandy Ginoza - USC/ISI Request for Comments Documents |
2008-08-04
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09 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-09.txt |
2008-04-01
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08 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-08.txt |
2008-02-14
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07 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-07.txt |
2007-12-21
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06 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-06.txt |
2007-12-18
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05 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-05.txt |
2007-10-12
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04 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-04.txt |
2007-07-05
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03 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-03.txt |
2007-04-23
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10 | Jari Arkko | Authors, MIP4 chairs, ADs, Wimax liaison, and the IESG talked about this when it came clear that the authors want to publish this as an … Authors, MIP4 chairs, ADs, Wimax liaison, and the IESG talked about this when it came clear that the authors want to publish this as an RFC. Given ongoing standardization work in NETLMM, lack of time, lack of IETF change control of a deployed protocol, it has been suggested that the authors take this to the RFC Editor as a vendor-specific protocol. |
2007-04-23
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10 | Jari Arkko | Draft Added by Jari Arkko in state AD is watching |
2007-04-23
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10 | Jari Arkko | [Note]: 'Suggested the author talks to RFC-Editor about this' added by Jari Arkko |
2007-01-11
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02 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-02.txt |
2007-01-11
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(System) | Posted related IPR disclosure: Cisco's Statement about IPR Claimed in draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-00.txt | |
2006-06-29
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01 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-01.txt |
2006-02-28
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00 | (System) | New version available: draft-leung-mip4-proxy-mode-00.txt |