Soure Address Validation: Gap Analysis
draft-li-opsec-sav-gap-analysis-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Dan Li  , Jianping Wu  , Yunan Gu  , Lancheng Qin  , Tao Lin 
Last updated 2020-09-22
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Network Working Group                                              D. Li
Internet-Draft                                                     J. Wu
Intended status: Informational                                  Tsinghua
Expires: March 26, 2021                                            Y. Gu
                                                                  Huawei
                                                                  L. Qin
                                                                Tsinghua
                                                                  T. Lin
                                                                     H3C
                                                      September 22, 2020

                 Soure Address Validation: Gap Analysis
                   draft-li-opsec-sav-gap-analysis-00

Abstract

   This document identifies scenarios where existing IP spoofing
   approaches for detection and mitigation don't perform perfectly.
   Exsiting SAV (source address validation) approaches, either Ingress
   ACL filtering [RFC2827], unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)
   [RFC3704], Feasible Path uRPF [RFC 3704], or Enhanced Feasible-Path
   uRPF [RFC8704] has limitations regarding eihter automated
   implemetation objective or detection accuracy objective (0% false
   positive and 0% false negative).  This document provides the gap
   analysis of the exsting SAV approaches, and also provides solution
   discussions.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Li, et al.               Expires March 26, 2021                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              SAV Gap Analysis              September 2020

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 26, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Source Address Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Existing SAV Techniques Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Use Case 1: Inter-AS Multi-homing . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Use Case 2: Intra-AS Multi-homing . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Solution Discussions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Source Address Validation

   The Internet is open to traffic, which means that a sender can
   generate traffic and send to any receiver in the Internet as long as
   the address is reachable.  Although this openness design improves the
   scalability of the Internet, it also leaves security risks, e.g., a
   sender can forge the source address when sending the packets, which
   is also known as IP spoofing.  IP spoofing is constantly used in
   Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which seriously compromise network
   security.  DOS attacks using IP spoofing makes it difficult for
   operators to locate the attacker's actual source address.  [RFC6959]
   identifies different types of DOS attacks with IP spoofing, i.e.,
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