OAuth Security Topics
draft-lodderstedt-oauth-security-topics-00

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Open Authentication Protocol                         T. Lodderstedt, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                       Deutsche Telekom AG
Intended status: Informational                                J. Bradley
Expires: May 16, 2017                                      Ping Identity
                                                             A. Labunets
                                                                Facebook
                                                       November 12, 2016

                         OAuth Security Topics
               draft-lodderstedt-oauth-security-topics-00

Abstract

   This draft gives a comprehensive overview on open OAuth security
   topics.  It is intended to serve as a tool for the OAuth working
   group to systematically address these open security topics,
   recommending mitigations, and potentially also defining OAuth
   extensions needed to cope with the respective security threats.  This
   draft will potentially become a BCP over time.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 16, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Lodderstedt, et al.       Expires May 16, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               Security Topics               November 2016

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  OAuth Credentials Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Redirect URI validation of authorization requests . . . .   3
       2.1.1.  Authorization Code Grant  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.1.2.  Implicit Grant  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.3.  Countermeasure: exact redirect URI matching . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Authorization code leakage via referrer headers . . . . .   7
       2.2.1.  Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Code in browser history (TBD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.4.  Access token in browser history (TBD) . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  Access token on bad resource servers (TBD)  . . . . . . .   8
     2.6.  Mix-Up (TBD)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  OAuth Credentials Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Code Injection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.1.  Proposed Counter Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.2.  Access Token Injection (TBD)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       3.1.3.  XSRF (TBD)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  Other Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   It's been a while since OAuth has been published in RFC 6749
   [RFC6749] and RFC 6750 [RFC6750].  Since publication, OAuth 2.0 has
   gotten massive traction in the market and became the standard for API
   protection and, as foundation of OpenID Connect, identity providing.

   o  OAuth implementations are being attacked through known
      implementation weaknesses and anti-patterns (XSRF, referrer
      header).  Although most of these threats are discussed in RFC 6819
      [RFC6819], continued exploitation demonstrates there may be a need
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