Explicitly Authenticated Proxy in HTTP/2.0
draft-loreto-httpbis-explicitly-auth-proxy-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Salvatore Loreto , John Preuß Mattsson , Robert Skog , Hans Spaak, Gus Bourg , Dan Druta , Mohammad Hafeez | ||
| Last updated | 2014-05-04 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-loreto-httpbis-explicitly-auth-proxy-00
Network Working Group S. Loreto, Ed.
Internet-Draft J. Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Skog
Expires: November 6, 2014 H. Spaak
Ericsson
G. Bourg
D. Druta
M. Hafeez
AT&T
May 5, 2014
Explicitly Authenticated Proxy in HTTP/2.0
draft-loreto-httpbis-explicitly-auth-proxy-00
Abstract
This document proposes the definition of an Explicitly Authenticated
Proxy as intermediary of normally unprotected "http://" URI scheme
requests and responses of HTTP2 traffic.
An Explicitly Authenticated Proxy is a message forwarding agent that
is selected, with explicit user's consent, and configured by the user
agent to receive exclusively "http" URI scheme requests and attempt
to satisfy those requests on behalf of the user agent. A client is
connected to an Explicitly Authenticated Proxy through an
authenticated TLS secured connection.
This document describes a method for a user agent to automatically
discover and authenticate, and for an user to provide consent for an
Explicitly Authenticated Proxy. This enables proxied communication
to be encrypted and authenticated, explicitly acknowledged by the
user agent and visible to the server end point.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 6, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Explicitly Authenticated Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Establishing proxy connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Proxy certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. TLS Handshake with Proxy certificate . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Opt Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Connection with prior knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Explicit Proxy behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Explicitly Authenticated Forward Proxy towards HTTP2
origin server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Explicitly Authenticated Forward Proxy towards HTTP/1.1
Origin Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Explicitly Authenticated Forward Proxy and https URIs . . 11
5. Signalling the presence of a Proxy in between . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
HTTP/1.1 and earlier allowed for the use of proxies and gateways to
satisfy requests through a chain of connections. This has made
possible a Web ecosystem of various kinds of proxies and gateways:
cache servers, security gateways, web accelerators, content filters,
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
and many others. In some cases their presence is explicit
(configured proxies), and in other they are completely transparent to
the end user (interception proxies, and gateways such as reverse
proxies).
The success and the presence of the proxies and gateways is also a
problem for the evolution of the HTTP as their behaviour on protocol
extensions, and especially on alternative wire formats of the
protocol, is not predictable. This unpredictable behaviour can lead
to difficulties to deploy new versions of the protocol before the
intermediaries are themselves updated. As an example, see the
difficulties in deploying the WebSocket Protocol [RFC6455] in clear.
It can also lead to potentially problematic trust models where
proxies are accessing traffic content without the user being aware.
Relying on establishing an HTTPS tunnel has then become the popular
way to bypass the intermediate proxies as it provides reliable
deployment model for web protocols. The encrypted tunnel obfuscates
the data from all intermediaries and provides integrity validation.
HTTPS tunnels, while speeding up the deployment, make it difficult
for a forward proxy and other gateways to be used to enable caching,
enhance anonymity for a user agent, or enhance security by scanning
content for virus and malware. HTTPS tunnels also remove the
possibility to enhance delivery performance based on the knowledge of
the network status, and this become an important limitation
especially with HTTP2 when multiple streams are multiplexed on top of
the same TCP connection.
Several drafts analysing the role and the requirements for proxy have
been submitted:
1. [I-D.nottingham-http-proxy-problem] discusses the use and
configuration of proxies in HTTP, pointing out problems in the
currently deployed Web infrastructure along the way
2. [I-D.vidya-httpbis-explicit-proxy-ps] describes the issues with
HTTP proxies for TLS protected traffic and motivates the need for
explicit proxying capability in HTTP. It also presents the goals
that such a solution would need to satisfy and some example
solution directions.
3. [I-D.rpeon-httpbis-exproxy] describes a method for connecting to
a proxy via a secure channel, allowing, disallowing, and
detecting any transforms that the proxy may perform, and allowing
the proxy to connect via secure channel to another site on the
user's behalf.
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
Use cases in form of stories for proxies are also listed in the wiki
Proxy-User-Stories [1] and analysed in a matrix form in Trusted Proxy
Use Case Analysis and Alternatives [2].
This draft explicitly narrows down the general discussion to the role
of Proxy as intermediary of "http" scheme URIs of HTTP2 traffic.
1.1. Explicitly Authenticated Proxy
An "Explicitly Authenticated", as defined in this document, is an
HTTP Proxy (see section 2.3 [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]) that is
certificate authenticated, user acknowledged and connected to over a
TLS encrypted (and possibly integrity protected) connection. An
Explicitly Authenticated Proxy is configured by the user agent to
exclusively receive "http" URI scheme requests and attempt to satisfy
those requests on behalf of the user agent.
The presence of a configured Explicitly Authenticated Proxy MUST NOT
change the user agent behaviour for the "https" URI scheme requests.
To distinguish between an HTTP2 connection meant to transport "https"
URIs resources and an HTTP2 connection meant to transport "http" URIs
resource, this document defines the ALPN
[I-D.ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg] identifier "h2c" to signal that HTTP2
transports "http://" URI requests and resources over TLS.
This document describes a method for an user agent to automatically
discover and then for an user to accept or reject (i.e. to provide
consent for) an Explicitly Authenticated Proxy to be securely
involved when a request to an "http" URI resource is made.
Section 3.1 defines a solution based on sending a proxy certificate
in the TLS handshake.
Section 4 describes the role of the Explicitly Authenticated Proxy in
helping the user to fetch "http" URIs resource when the user has
provided consent to the Explicitly Authenticated Proxy to be
involved.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This document defines the following terms:
Explicit proxy: an intercepting proxy that communicates its
presence to the user agent and destination server.
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
Explicitly Authenticated Proxy: a message forwarding agent that is
certificate authenticated, user acknowledged and connected to over
a TLS encrypted connection. A Explicitly Authenticated Proxy is
configured by the user agent to exclusively receive "http" URI
scheme request and attempt to satisfy those request on behalf of
the user agent.
3. Establishing proxy connection
An Explicitly Authenticated Proxy indicates its presence, identity
and willingness to serve the user agent by intercepting TLS
ClientHello message containing "h2c" value (a new ALPN protocol type
assigned for this purpose) in the ALPN
[I-D.ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg] negotiation extension field. It
answers the TLS initiation with a TLS ServerHello message containing
the Proxy certificate.
3.1. Proxy certificate
To help HTTP user agents identify and distinguish Explicitly
Authenticated proxies from other servers (e.g. web servers),
Explicitly Authenticated proxies should have a certification
authority issued public key certificate.
More specifically, the certification authority SHOULD use the
Extended Key Usage extension as specified in [RFC5280] to indicate a
key purpose "proxyAuthentication" (a new object identifier needs to
be assigned by IANA for this key purpose). The certification
authority also marks this Extended Key Usage extension as critical.
As the user needs to have high trust in the Proxy, it is desirable
that the validation procedure for issuing proxy certificates be more
rigorous than for issuing ordinary SSL certificates.
A proxy certificate MUST contain the SubjectAltName extension as
defined in [RFC5280]. A name identifying the legal entity that is
operating the proxy should be given in this extension.
To help end users understand the reason why the proxy is offered (in
other words, the benefits of having the proxy in the path), a new
X.509 certificate extension ProxyFunctions is introduced to list the
functions the proxy is performing. More specifically, the
ProxyFunction extension consists of a sequence of ProxyFunctionId
which are object identifiers. The user agent should check the
presence of this extension in the proxy certificate and present the
proxy functions in a human readable format.
The user agent will provide the user with an opportunity to
graphically view the results of a successful proxy certificate-based
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
identification process leveraging on the usage of logotypes in public
key certificates and attribute certificates as specified in
[RFC3709].
3.2. TLS Handshake with Proxy certificate
When a (TLS and HTTP) user agent receives a Server Certificate
message, it checks whether the certificate contains an Extended Key
Usage extension and if so whether the "proxyAuthentication" key
purpose id is included. If it is included, the user agent concludes
that the certificate belongs to a proxy. The user agent then SHOULD
ensure user consent.
The user selection can be cached by the user agent. A consent SHOULD
however be limited to the specific network access (such as APN or
SSID) and may be limited to a single connection to that access or
limited in time. How the consent information is stored is
implementation specific, but as a network may have several proxies
(for network resilience) it is RECOMMENDED that the consent is only
tied to the Subject field of the proxy certificate so that the
consent applies to all proxy certificates with the same name.
If the user provides consent, the user agent continues the TLS
handshake with the proxy.
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
+--------------+ +------------+ +-------------+
| User agent | | Proxy | | Server |
+--------------+ +------------+ +-------------+
| | |
| | |
| (1) ClientHello | |
|---------------------------->| |
| ALPN Protocol Name: h2c | |
| | |
| | |
| (2) ServerHello, ServerCert | |
|<----------------------------| |
| (Proxy cert) | |
| | |
| | |
(3) User consent | |
| | |
| (4) Rest of TLS handshake | |
|<--------------------------->| |
| | |
| (5) HTTP2 over TLS | (5) HTTP2 over TLS |
|<--------------------------->|<-------------------------->|
| | |
| | |
Figure 1: TLS Handshake with Proxy certificate
3.3. Opt Out
If the user does not give consent, or decides to opt out from the
proxy for a specific connection, the user agent will negotiate HTTP2
connection using "h2" value in the ALPN extension field. The proxy
will then treat the connection as an "https" connection and will
forward the ClientHello message to the Server, establishing an end-
to-end TLS connection between the user agent and the destination
server.
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
+--------------+ +------------+ +-------------+
| User agent | | Proxy | | Server |
+--------------+ +------------+ +-------------+
| |
| (1) ClientHello |
|---------------------------------------------------------->|
| (ALPN ProtocolName: h2) |
| |
| (2) ServerHello, ServerCert |
|<----------------------------------------------------------|
| (3) Rest of TLS handshake |
|<--------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| (4) HTTP2 over TLS |
|<--------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
Figure 2: Opt Out
3.4. Connection with prior knowledge
The HTTP2 user agent can discover the presence of a HTTP2 proxy for
http:// resources before it starts the creation of the TLS
connection. As an example, for a mobile handset, the discovery might
occur at the network attachment.
Then the user agent validates the proxy certificate as per section
Section 3.1 and requests "http://" resources as per Section 4.
4. Explicit Proxy behaviour
This section describes the role of the Explicitly Authenticated Proxy
in helping the user to fetch http URI resources when the user has
provided consent to the Explicitly Authenticated Proxy to be
involved.
4.1. Explicitly Authenticated Forward Proxy towards HTTP2 origin server
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| User agent | | Proxy | | Server |
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| | |
(TLS Proxy certificate ) | |
(mechanism has taken place) | |
| | |
| (1) ClientHello | |
|--------------------------->| |
| (2) ServerHello | |
|<---------------------------| |
| (3) ChangeCipherSpec | |
|--------------------------->| |
| (4) ChangeCipherSpec | |
|<---------------------------| |
| | |
| | |
|/========= HTTP2 ==========\| |
| | |
|--(5)-stream(X)---GET------>| |
| | (6) TLS ClientHello |
| |----------------------------->|
| | (7) TLS ServerHello |
| |<-----------------------------|
| | (8) ChangeCipherSpec |
| |----------------------------->|
| | (9) ChangeCipherSpec |
| |<-----------------------------|
| | |
| |/========= HTTP2 ============\|
| |--(10)--stream(Z)---GET------>|
| | |
| | |
| |<-(11)--stream(Z)---200 OK----|
|<-(12)--stream(X)---200 OK--| |
| | |
|\======== HTTP2 ===========/|\========== HTTP2 ===========/|
| | |
Figure 3: Requesting an HTTP resource
(0) The TLS Proxy Announcement (Section 3.1) mechanism has already
taken place, so the user agent is now configured in the proxy
mode.
(1)...(4) For each "http" URI resource towards a not yet contacted
Server Origin, the user agent negotiates a new TLS session, using
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
the ALPN extension containing the "h2c" tag, to establish an HTTP2
connection.
(5) The user agent will then use the streams in the HTTP2 connection
to request any resources hosted on that Origin Server.
(6)...(9) In the case the Proxy receives a request for a resource
towards a not yet contacted Server Origin, the Explicitly
Authenticated Proxy negotiates a new TLS session, using the ALPN
extension containing the "h2c" ALPN identifier, to establish an
HTTP2 connection.
(10) Once the Proxy has established the HTTP2 connection toward the
origin, it picks one stream to forward the request
(11), (12) The Proxy forwards the answer it receives from the Origin
Server to the user agent.
4.2. Explicitly Authenticated Forward Proxy towards HTTP/1.1 Origin
Server
In the case the "http" URI resources requested by the user agent will
be only available over HTTP/1.1 or the proxy does not have a previous
knowledge about it, the proxy will then attempt to contact the
resource based on its knowledge.
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| User agent | | Proxy | | Server |
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| | |
(TLS Proxy announcement ) | |
(mechanism has taken place) | |
| | |
| (1) TLS ClientHello | |
|--------------------------->| |
| (2) ServerHello | |
|<---------------------------| |
| (3) ChangeCipherSpec | |
|--------------------------->| |
| (4) ChangeCipherSpec | |
|<---------------------------| |
| | |
|/--------------------------\| |
|--(5)-stream(X)---GET------>| |
| | |
| HTTP2 |--(6)------GET /1.1---------->|
| | |
| |<-(7)-------200 OK------------|
|<-(8)--stream(X)---200 OK---| |
| | |
|\--------------------------/| |
| | |
Figure 4: Origin server with only HTTP/1.1 support
4.3. Explicitly Authenticated Forward Proxy and https URIs
A user agent MUST NOT use "h2c" as ALPN extension field in request
for https resources.
The Proxy that intercepts the TLS ClientHello analyses the ALPN
extension field and if it does not contain the "h2c" value it does
not do anything and lets the TLS handshake continue and the TLS
session be established between the user agent and the Server (see
Figure 5).
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
+--------------+ +------------+ +-------------+
| User agent | | Proxy | | Server |
+--------------+ +------------+ +-------------+
| | |
| | |
| (1) TLS ClientHello |
|----------------------------------------------------------->|
| (ALPN ProtocolName: h2) |
| (2) ServerHello |
|<-----------------------------------------------------------|
| (3) ChangeCipherSpec |
|----------------------------------------------------------->|
| (4) ChangeCipherSpec |
|<-----------------------------------------------------------|
| |
|---(5)-stream(X)---GET------------------------------------->|
| |
|<-------------------------(6)--stream(X)---200 OK-----------|
Figure 5: Explicitly Authenticated Proxy and https URI resources
5. Signalling the presence of a Proxy in between
The presence of Explicitly Authenticated Proxy in between an user
agent and the origin server must be signalled to the origin server
using an already defined HTTP header.
The Explicitly Authenticated proxy MUST add, or update when already
present, the Forwarded HTTP header field
[I-D.ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded] "for" parameter.
6. Security Considerations
This document addresses Explicitly Authenticated proxies that act as
intermediary for HTTP2 traffic and therefore the security and privacy
implications of having those proxies in the path need to be
considered. MITM [3], [I-D.nottingham-http-proxy-problem] and
[I-D.vidya-httpbis-explicit-proxy-ps] discuss various security and
privacy issues associated with the use of proxies.
It should however be noticed that the presence of the Explicitly
Authenticated proxy as discussed in this document does not in any way
affect "https" URI resources. Those resources are protected end-to-
end between user agent and origin server as usual. Only for "http"
URI resources the achievable security level of hop-by-hop protection
may be different than end-to-end protection, because it is now also
dependent on the security features/capabilities of the proxy as to
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
what cipher suites it supports, which root CA certificates it trusts,
how it checks certificate revocation status, etc. Users should also
be made aware that the proxy has visibility to the actual content
they exchange with Web servers, including personal and sensitive
information.
The TLS connection from the user agent to the Explicitly
Authenticated proxy is always authenticated. In case the origin
server only offers unauthenticated TLS (e.g. by using a self-signed
certificate) the explicit Explicitly Authenticated proxy increases
the security in the access network (e.g. an unencrypted hotspot) by
ensuring that there is no unwanted MITMs in this part of the network.
To ensure the trustfulness of proxies, certification authorities
validation procedure for issuing proxy certificates should be more
rigorous than for issuing normal certificates and may also include
technical details and processes relevant for the security assurance.
The owner of the proxy could for example be obliged to apply security
patches in a timely fashion.
When negotiating ciphersuite with the server, the Explicitly
Authenticated proxy SHALL offer the ciphersuite negotiated between
the user-agent and the proxy. Ciphersuites with a higher security
level that the ciphersuite negotiated between the user-agent and
proxy MAY be given a higher preference than the ciphersuite
negotiated between the user-agent and proxy. Ciphersuites with a
lower security level that the ciphersuite negotiated between the
user-agent and proxy SHALL NOT be given a higher preference than the
ciphersuite negotiated between the user-agent and proxy. While
AES-256 is no weaker (an most probably much stronger) than AES-128,
the relative security between different algorithm e.g SHA-256 vs
Keccak-256 is not that clear. With security level we mean the
complexity of the best known attack on that ciphersuite. The
Explicitly Authenticated proxy SHOULD therefore be up to date with
the best current practices regarding TLS.
This document proposes an approach to making the presence of proxy
explicit to users and letting them decide whether they accept that.
A user can opt out and choose to bypass the proxy. This ensures that
a proxy never acts as intermediary for HTTP2 traffic unless
authorised by the user.
When the user has given consent to the presence of the proxy, the
user agent switches to a Proxy mode in which it does not check the
hostname of the origin server against the server's identity as
presented in the Server Certificate message. However if any of the
following checks fails the user agent should immediately exit this
Proxy mode:
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
1. the server's certificate is issued by a trusted CA and the
certificate is valid;
2. the Extended Key Usage extension is present in the certificate
and indicates the owner of this certificate is a proxy;
3. the server possesses the private key corresponding to the
certificate.
7. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Yi Cheng, Goran Eriksson, Stefan Hakansson,
Nicolas Mailhot, Martin Nilsson, Emile Stephan (Connection with prior
knowledge) and Salman Taj for their ideas, technical suggestions and
comments.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded]
Petersson, A. and M. Nilsson, "Forwarded HTTP Extension",
draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-10 (work in progress),
October 2012.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2]
Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol version 2", draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-12 (work in
progress), April 2014.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]
Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", draft-ietf-
httpbis-p1-messaging-26 (work in progress), February 2014.
[I-D.ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg]
Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and S. Emile,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", draft-ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg-05
(work in progress), March 2014.
[I-D.nottingham-http-proxy-problem]
Nottingham, M., "Problems with Proxies in HTTP", draft-
nottingham-http-proxy-problem-00 (work in progress),
October 2013.
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
[I-D.rpeon-httpbis-exproxy]
Peon, R., "Explicit Proxies for HTTP/2.0", draft-rpeon-
httpbis-exproxy-00 (work in progress), June 2012.
[I-D.vidya-httpbis-explicit-proxy-ps]
Narayanan, V., "Explicit Proxying in HTTP - Problem
Statement And Goals", draft-vidya-httpbis-explicit-proxy-
ps-00 (work in progress), October 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3709] Santesson, S., Housley, R., and T. Freeman, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509
Certificates", RFC 3709, February 2004.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC6455] Fette, I. and A. Melnikov, "The WebSocket Protocol", RFC
6455, December 2011.
8.3. URIs
[1] https://github.com/http2/http2-spec/wiki/Proxy-User-Stories
[2] https://github.com/bizzbyster/TrustedProxy/wiki/Trusted-Proxy-
Use-Case-Analysis-and-Alternatives
[3] Jarmoc, J., SSL/TLS Interception Proxies and Transitive Trust,
2012 https://www.grc.com/miscfiles/HTTPS_Interception_Proxies.pdf
Authors' Addresses
Salvatore Loreto (editor)
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
Jorvas 02420
Finland
Email: salvatore.loreto@ericsson.com
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Explicitly Authenticated Proxy May 2014
John Mattsson
Ericsson
Kista
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Robert Skog
Ericsson
Kista
Sweden
Email: robert.skog@ericsson.com
Hans Spaak
Ericsson
Kista
Sweden
Email: hans.spaak@ericsson.com
Gus Bourg
AT&T
Email: gb3635@att.com
Dan Druta
AT&T
Email: dd5826@att.com
Mohammad Hafeez
AT&T
Email: mh2897@att.com
Loreto, et al. Expires November 6, 2014 [Page 16]