Security Extensions for RELOAD
draft-lowekamp-p2psip-reload-security-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Bruce Lowekamp , James Deverick | ||
| Last updated | 2007-07-10 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
P2PSIP deployments require the ability to authenticate both peers and resources (users) without the active presence of a trusted entity in the system. We describe how to use signature attributes in RELOAD messages to ensure authentication and integrity for communications between peers and to authenticate resource registrations. We describe a shared-secret implementation and a public-key implementation, each intended for a different deployment scenario. Administrators can be select an implementation as appropriate for an overlay's security requirements.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)