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A Reference Implementation of Ascertaining RPKI Signed Objects to be Validated in Incremental Updates
draft-madi-sidrops-partial-validation-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Di Ma , Yu Zhang
Last updated 2024-03-04
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draft-madi-sidrops-partial-validation-00
sidrops                                                            D. Ma
Internet-Draft                                                      ZDNS
Intended status: Informational                                  Y. Zhang
Expires: 5 September 2024                          Peng Cheng Laboratory
                                                            4 March 2024

  A Reference Implementation of Ascertaining RPKI Signed Objects to be
                    Validated in Incremental Updates
                draft-madi-sidrops-partial-validation-00

Abstract

   This document describes a reference implementation of how an RP
   ascertains which RPKI signed objects that need to be validated during
   a transaction of RPKI incremental update from the perspective of this
   RP.

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2024.

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   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Correlations of RPKI Signed Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Horizontal Correlation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.1.1.  Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.1.2.  Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.1.3.  Horizontal Involvement Discovery  . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Vertical Correlation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.2.1.  Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.2.2.  Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.3.  Vertical Involvement Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Involvement Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.3.1.  Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.3.2.  Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.3.3.  Target Object Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Procedure of Target Object Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Due to the hierarchical allocation of the Internet number resources
   and the trust model in the RPKI, an update to a RPKI signed object
   (resource certificate, ROA, CRL or Manifest for instance) in the RPKI
   might lead to change of validation status of other RPKI signed
   objects.  It is desirable to ascertain all the affected parts of the
   RPKI trees and perform the corresponding validation tasks as quickly
   as possible in order to inform the routing system of those changes in
   time.

   Note that RPKI signed object (so called "RSO") in the context of this
   document generally includes resource certificate, CRL, manifest, ROA
   and any other signed data derived from the RPKI.The RPKI Relying
   Party (RP) periodically takes incremental updates.  The validation
   status of an RSO might be subject to change due to another updated
   RSO.  RFC6487[RFC6487] and RFC8360[RFC8360] specifies the certificate
   validation procedure in terms of syntax, leaving all the software
   engineering issue to private implementations such as
   RFC8488[RFC8488].

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   Comprehending the characteristics of different RPKI signed objects
   and the correlations among them, this document describes a reference
   implementation of ascertaining RSOs that need to be validated after a
   transaction of RPKI incremental update from the perspective of this
   RP, before performing the RPKI validation specified by
   RFC6487[RFC6487] and RFC8360[RFC8360].

   It is important to note that this document does not syntactically
   bring changes to validation of RPKI signed objects in any sense.

2.  Correlations of RPKI Signed Objects

   In order to ascertain RSOs to be validated in incremental updates,
   the reference implementation (so called "the process" in this
   document) establishes some structured data in the memory.

2.1.  Horizontal Correlation

2.1.1.  Definition

   RSOs with the same AKI value and the very AKI constitutes a specific
   correlation called the RPKI horizontal correlation.  The union set of
   those horizontal correlations are defined as the Horizontal
   Correlation Set (HCS).

2.1.2.  Implementation

   The process utilizes a mapping table to implement a horizontal
   correlation.  The AKI value serves as the key of the mapping table,
   the elements of which are the memory pointers of those RSOs in this
   horizontal correlation, constructed in an unordered array.

   HCS is always maintained in the memory by the process.

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      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |                                   |
      +                                   +
      |           Key=AKI                 |
      +                                   +
      |                                   |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[0]=0xa1   |-------> |      ROA/EE     |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      | Value=Array  |    array[1]=0xb1   |-------> |       CRL       |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[2]=0xc1   |-------> |      MFT/EE     |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

       Figure 1: Example of an element of Horizontal Correlation Set

2.1.3.  Horizontal Involvement Discovery

   If the validation status of an RSO X needs to be verified due to the
   update of an RSO Y that is in the same horizontal correlation with X,
   X is considered to be horizontally involved with Y, the discovery of
   which is called Horizontal Involvement Discovery.

2.2.  Vertical Correlation

2.2.1.  Definition

   An RSO (Primary Object) and its all adjacent child RSOs constitutes a
   specific correlation called the RPKI vertical correlation.  The union
   set of those vertical correlations are defined as the Vertical
   Correlation Set (VCS).  The process establishes the vertical
   correlation for every resource certificate in the RPKI.

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2.2.2.  Implementation

   The process utilizes a mapping table to implement a vertical
   correlation.  The SKI value of the Primary Object in this vertical
   correlation serves as the key of the mapping table, the elements of
   which are the memory pointers of its adjacent child RSOs in this
   vertical correlation, constructed in an unordered array.

   VCS is always maintained in the memory by the process.

      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |                                   |
      +                                   +
      |           Key=SKI                 |
      +                                   +
      |                                   |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[0]=0xa2   |-------> |      ROA/EE     |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      | Value=Array  |    array[1]=0xb2   |-------> |       CRL       |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[2]=0xc2   |-------> |      MFT/EE     |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

       Figure 2: Example of an element of Horizontal Correlation Set

2.2.3.  Vertical Involvement Discovery

   If the validation status of an RSO X needs to be verified due to the
   update of the primary object Z in the vertical correlation, X is
   considered to be vertically involved with Z, the discovery of which
   is called Vertical Involvement Discovery.

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2.3.  Involvement Correlation

2.3.1.  Definition

   All the RSOs that are either horizontally or vertically involved with
   an RSO X, together with the RSO X itself, constitute a specific
   correlation called the RPKI involvement correlation.  X is defined as
   the primary object of this correlation and the others defined as
   target object of this correlation.  The union set of those
   involvement correlations are defined as the Involvement Correlation
   Set (ICS).

2.3.2.  Implementation

   The process utilizes a mapping container to implement an involvement
   correlation.  The unique identifier of this correlation is generated
   with hash of download path, filename, and other information, serves
   as the key of the mapping container, the elements of which are the
   memory pointers of these target objects in this involvement
   correlation, constructed in an unordered array.

   ICS is deleted from memory by the process after a transaction of RPKI
   incremental update from the perspective of this RP.

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      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |                                   |
      +                                   +
      |           Key=Hash                |
      +                                   +
      |                                   |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[0]=0xa1   |-------> |       ROA       |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[1]=0xb1   |-------> |       CRL       |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[2]=0xc1   |-------> |       MFT       |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      + Value=Array  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[3]=0xa2   |-------> |       ROA       |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[4]=0xb2   |-------> |       CRL       |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |    array[5]=0xc2   |-------> |       MFT       |
      +              +                    +         +--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |              |                    |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

       Figure 3: Example of an element of Involvement Correlation Set

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2.3.3.  Target Object Discovery

   For a given updated RSO X, the task of establishing the involvement
   correlation of X is called Target Object Discovery of X.

3.  Procedure of Target Object Discovery

   The procedure of target object discovery is as follows:

   0) Bootstrapping

   The RP performs full update synchronizing with RPKI repositories,
   validates RSOs and constructs HCS and VCS in the memory, according to
   section 2.1 and section 2.2 respectively.

   1) Performing incremental update

   The RP performs incremental update, synchronizing with RPKI
   repositories.

   2) Constructing the ICS

   The RP updates the HCS and VCS by checking the deleted and added RSOs
   compared with the current local cache stored and then executes target
   object discovery of those updated and newly added RSOs, constructing
   the ICS in the memory.

   Note that given different types of RSOs are semantically different
   and have got different functions in the RPKI context, the procedure
   of target object discovery of RSOs with different types vary from one
   to another.

   3) Validating Target Objects

   The RP validates all the target objects in ICS, following the
   standardized RPKI certificate path validation, updating RTR output.

   4) Deleting the ICS

   The RP deletes the ICS from memory.

   5) Updating the local cache

   The RP updates the local cache as a new version stored.

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      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |                                         |
      +              Bootstrapping              +
      |                                         |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
                           |
                           |
                           v
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
      |                                         |
      +      Performing incremental update      +-----------+
      |                                         |           |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+           |
                           |                                |
                           |                                |
                           v                                ^
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+           |
      |                                         |           |
      +           Constructing the ICS          +           |
      |                                         |           |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+           |
                           |                                ^
                           |                                |
                           v                                |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+           |
      |                                         |           |
      +         Validating Target Objects       +           |
      |                                         |           |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+           ^
                           |                                |
                           |                                |
                           v                                |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+           |
      |                                         |           |
      +            Deleting the ICS             +           |
      |                                         |           |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+           ^
                           |                                |
                           v                                |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+           |
      |                                         |           |
      +         Updating the local cache        +----->-----+
      |                                         |
      +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

               Figure 4: Procedure of Target Object Discovery

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4.  Security Considerations

   TBD

5.  IANA Considerations

   None.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank tbd for their helpful review of this
   document.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC8360]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Martinez, C., Bruijnzeels, T.,
              Newton, A., and D. Shaw, "Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered", RFC 8360,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8360, April 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8360>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC8488]  Muravskiy, O. and T. Bruijnzeels, "RIPE NCC's
              Implementation of Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI) Certificate Tree Validation", RFC 8488,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8488, December 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8488>.

Authors' Addresses

   Di Ma
   ZDNS
   Floor 21, Block B, Greenland Center
   Chaoyang
   Beijing, 100102
   China
   Email: madi@zdns.cn

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   Yu Zhang
   Peng Cheng Laboratory
   Nanshan
   Shenzhen, 518055
   China
   Email: zhangy08@pcl.ac.cn

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