OSPF LSA sequence number generation
draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Manjul Khandelwal , Ramakrishna Rao TV Desetti | ||
| Last updated | 2016-11-14 (Latest revision 2016-05-09) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The mechanism for LS sequence number generation as specified in RFC 2328 and RFC 5340 is completely predictable. This makes it prone to certain security attacks which exploit the predictable nature of LS sequence numbers. This draft updates the RFC 2328 to make LS sequence number generation an implementation choice rather than a fixed increment by 1 for successive LSAs.
Authors
Manjul Khandelwal
Ramakrishna Rao TV Desetti
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)