Issues with existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols
draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Vishwas Manral 
Last updated 2008-02-11
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-05.txt

Abstract

Routing protocols are designed to use cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate data being received from a neighboring router to ensure that it has not been modified in transit, and actually originated from the neighboring router purporting to have originating the data. Most of the cryptographic mechanisms defined to date rely on hash algorithms applied to the data in the routing protocol packet, which means the data is transported, in the clear, along with a signature based on the data itself. These mechanisms rely on the manual configuration of the keys used to seed, or build, these hash based signatures. This document outlines some of the problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms.

Authors

Vishwas Manral (vishwas@ipinfusion.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)