Compliance Profile of Signed Action Receipts for AI Agents
draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts-05
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | João André Gomes Marques | ||
| Last updated | 2026-05-31 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts-05
Network Working Group J. A. Gomes Marques
Internet-Draft Asqav
Intended status: Informational 31 May 2026
Expires: 2 December 2026
Compliance Profile of Signed Action Receipts for AI Agents
draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts-05
Abstract
This document defines a multi-jurisdiction compliance profile of the
signed action receipt format used by AI agents to record machine-
readable evidence of access-control decisions. The profile binds
receipt fields to two regulatory surfaces: on the European Union
side, Articles 12 and 26 of the EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689)
and Article 17 of DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554); on the United
States side, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, the Colorado AI
Act, the Texas Responsible AI Governance Act, the New York Department
of Financial Services Cybersecurity Regulation (23 NYCRR Part 500),
the HIPAA Security Rule, SEC Rule 17a-4, and the Cyber Incident
Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA). Working
entirely within the existing wire format, canonicalization
transformation, and signing algorithms of the underlying receipt
format, the profile tightens a subset of the OPTIONAL fields to
REQUIRED, imposes a retention floor, and requires at least one
timestamping anchor (RFC 3161 or OpenTimestamps). It registers
OPTIONAL extension fields for risk and incident classification,
cross-agent envelope binding, per-action freshness and integrity,
build provenance, threat-framework taxonomy, and server-built
enforcement attestation, each subject to false-attestation guards
where applicable, and registers receipt type namespaces for passive-
telemetry and result-bound observation receipts. The full field set
and its normative requirements are defined in the body of this
document.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 December 2026.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Profile, Not Fork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Relationship to ACTA-RECEIPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Canonicalization Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Receipt Field Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Common Payload Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.1. type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.2. issued_at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.3. issuer_id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.4. payload_digest (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED in this
profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.5. action_ref (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED in this
profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.6. sandbox_state (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED for
High-Risk in this profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.7. iteration_id (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED for
multi-step in this profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Decision Receipt Fields (type protectmcp:decision) . . . 13
5.2.1. reason (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED for deny/rate_limit
in this profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.2. policy_digest (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED in this
profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.3. scanner_decisions (OPTIONAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Hash-Chain Linkage (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED in this
profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4. Anchoring (No Upstream Equivalent) . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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5.5. Extension Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.6. Counterparty Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.6.1. Wire Shape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.6.2. Emitter Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.6.3. Verifier Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.7. Result-Bound and Freshness Extensions . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.8. Build-Provenance Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.9. Enforcement-Attestation Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.10. Threat-Framework Taxonomy Extensions . . . . . . . . . . 28
6. European Union Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1. EU AI Act Article 12 Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1.1. Article 12(1), automatic recording of events . . . . 30
6.1.2. Article 12(2)(a), identifying situations that may
result in the high-risk AI system presenting a risk
within the meaning of Article 79(1) or in a substantial
modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1.3. Article 12(2)(b), facilitating the post-market
monitoring referred to in Article 72 . . . . . . . . 31
6.1.4. Article 12(2)(c), monitoring the operation of high-risk
AI systems referred to in Article 26(5) . . . . . . . 31
6.1.5. Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2. EU AI Act Article 26 Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2.1. Article 26(1), in accordance with the instructions for
use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2.2. Article 26(2), assign human oversight . . . . . . . . 32
6.2.3. Article 26(5), monitor the operation . . . . . . . . 32
6.2.4. Article 26(6), keep the logs for at least six
months . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.3. DORA Article 17 Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.3.1. Article 17(1), ICT-related incident management
process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.3.2. Article 17(2), record all ICT-related incidents and
significant cyber threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3.3. Article 17(3)(b), establish procedures to identify,
track, log, categorise and classify ICT-related
incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3.4. Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7. United States Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1. NIST AI RMF Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1.1. GOVERN function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1.2. MAP function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1.3. MEASURE function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1.4. MANAGE function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2. Colorado AI Act (SB 24-205) Binding . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2.1. Section 6-1-1703(2), risk management policy and
program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2.2. Section 6-1-1703(3), impact assessment . . . . . . . 35
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7.2.3. Section 6-1-1703(7), notice of algorithmic
discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3. Texas Responsible AI Governance Act (HB 149) Binding . . 36
7.3.1. Safe-harbor evidentiary support . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3.2. Prohibited-use detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.4. HIPAA Security Rule Binding (45 CFR Part 164, Subpart
C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.4.1. 45 CFR 164.312(b), audit controls . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.4.2. 45 CFR 164.316(b)(2), six-year retention . . . . . . 37
7.5. NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation Binding (23 NYCRR Part
500) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.5.1. 23 NYCRR 500.6, audit trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.5.2. 23 NYCRR 500.17, notices to superintendent . . . . . 38
7.5.3. 23 NYCRR 500.6 retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.6. SEC Broker-Dealer Recordkeeping Binding (17 CFR
240.17a-4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.6.1. 17 CFR 240.17a-4(f), electronic recordkeeping
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.6.2. 17 CFR 240.17a-4(a) and (b) retention . . . . . . . . 39
7.7. CIRCIA Binding (Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.7.1. Covered Cyber Incident reporting support . . . . . . 39
7.7.2. Records related to a Covered Cyber Incident report . 40
8. Audit Pack Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9. Verifier Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
9.1. Mandatory Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9.2. Optional Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9.3. Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10.1. Tamper Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10.2. Chain Availability Under Single-Linear Per-Agent
Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.3. Key Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.4. Retention and Long-Term Verifiability . . . . . . . . . 46
10.5. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.6. Anchor Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.7. Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.8. Cross-Regime Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.9. Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.10. Issuer-Misrepresentation Residual . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.11. Cross-Agent Integrity Trust Boundary . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.12. Compromised Intermediary Between Two Honest Endpoints . 50
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
11.1. Compliance Receipt Extension Fields Registry . . . . . . 53
11.2. Compliance Receipt Type Namespaces Registry . . . . . . 58
12. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
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15. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Worked Example (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Changes in draft -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Changes in draft -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Changes in draft -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Changes in draft -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Changes in draft -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Changes in draft -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Appendix - Capture Topologies for Compliance Receipt Emission . . 83
In-Process SDK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Network-Layer Egress Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Browser Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
eBPF SNI Observer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
MCP Transparent Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Passive Telemetry Ingestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
capture_topology Vocabulary and Considerations for a Future IANA
Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
1. Introduction
1.1. Profile, Not Fork
[ACTA-RECEIPTS] specifies a generic, signed receipt envelope for
recording machine-to-machine access control decisions made by AI
agents. Section 2.2 of [ACTA-RECEIPTS] defines a common payload
field set in which all fields except type, issued_at, and issuer_id
are OPTIONAL. Section 5.7 of [ACTA-RECEIPTS] introduces hash
chaining (previousReceiptHash) inside an optional Commitment Mode
extension. [ACTA-RECEIPTS] does not define receipt retention, does
not require timestamping anchors, and does not bind to any regulatory
regime.
This document is an additive overlay on [ACTA-RECEIPTS]: it
constrains fields the upstream draft leaves OPTIONAL, fixes their
values where regulation requires, and registers a set of extension
fields with reserved names spanning regulatory classification, cross-
agent envelope binding, per-action freshness and integrity, build
provenance, threat-framework taxonomy, and server-built enforcement
attestation. The full extension-field set is defined in Section 5.5
and the sections that follow it. A Compliance Receipt remains a
conformant [ACTA-RECEIPTS] receipt. Field references use upstream
field names rather than section numbers, to reduce maintenance hazard
if upstream re-numbers in a future revision.
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1.2. Scope
This document fills the regulatory binding gap on two surfaces.
Section 5 binds the receipt to European Union obligations: Article 12
(record-keeping) and Article 26 (deployer obligations) of the EU AI
Act, and Article 17 (ICT-related incident management) of DORA.
Section 6 binds the receipt to United States obligations: the
voluntary functions of the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, the
deployer obligations of the Colorado AI Act and the Texas Responsible
AI Governance Act, the audit-trail and incident-reporting obligations
of NYDFS Part 500, the audit controls and documentation retention of
the HIPAA Security Rule, the broker-dealer recordkeeping requirements
of SEC Rule 17a-4, and the covered-incident reporting requirements of
CIRCIA.
The bindings are written from the Deployer's perspective, where
Deployer is used in the regime-specific sense (Article 3(4) of
[EU-AI-ACT] for EU bindings; Section 6-1-1701(6) of the Colorado
Revised Statutes for Colorado bindings). Where another statute uses
a different term (Provider, Financial Entity, Covered Entity for
HIPAA, Covered Entity for NYDFS, Broker-Dealer for SEC, Covered
Entity for CIRCIA), the binding section names the term as the source
statute uses it.
A verifier that implements only [ACTA-RECEIPTS] can cryptographically
validate a profile receipt but cannot attest the additional
compliance bindings of this document.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The following terms are used in this document.
Action: An operation performed by an AI agent that is subject to a
policy evaluation. Examples include a tool invocation, an
external API call, a write to durable storage, and the issuance of
an irreversible instruction to another system.
Action Receipt: A signed envelope conforming to [ACTA-RECEIPTS] that
records the policy evaluation result for a single Action.
Compliance Receipt: An Action Receipt that additionally satisfies
the requirements of this profile.
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Deployer (EU AI Act): As defined in Article 3(4) of [EU-AI-ACT].
Deployer (Colorado AI Act): As defined in Section 6-1-1701(6) of the
Colorado Revised Statutes, as enacted by [COLORADO-AI-ACT].
High-Risk AI System (EU AI Act): As defined in Article 6 of
[EU-AI-ACT].
High-Risk AI System (Colorado AI Act): As defined in
Section 6-1-1701(9) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, as enacted
by [COLORADO-AI-ACT].
Financial Entity: As defined in Article 2(2) of [DORA], for entities
listed in Article 2(1).
Covered Entity (HIPAA): As defined in 45 CFR 160.103, namely a
health plan, a health care clearinghouse, or a health care
provider that transmits health information in electronic form in
connection with a covered transaction.
Covered Entity (NYDFS): As defined in 23 NYCRR 500.1(e), namely any
person operating under or required to operate under a license,
registration, charter, certificate, permit, accreditation or
similar authorization under the Banking Law, the Insurance Law or
the Financial Services Law, regardless of whether the covered
entity is also regulated by other government agencies.
Broker-Dealer: As defined in section 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, subject to recordkeeping under
[SEC-17A-4].
Covered Entity (CIRCIA): As to be defined in the final rule
promulgated under the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022. Pending publication of the final
rule, the term is interpreted in accordance with the statutory
definition at 6 U.S.C. 681 and CISA's notice of proposed
rulemaking.
Audit Pack: A bundle of Compliance Receipts, the chain commitments
that link them, the public verification keys, the trust anchor
metadata, and the regime mapping required by Sections 5 and 6 of
this document, packaged for delivery to a regulator or auditor.
3. Relationship to ACTA-RECEIPTS
This profile is an additive overlay on [ACTA-RECEIPTS]. It does not
modify the envelope, the canonicalization rule, the signature object,
or the algorithm registry of [ACTA-RECEIPTS].
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The following normative statements apply.
* Implementations of this profile MUST produce receipts that are
cryptographically verifiable by a conformant [ACTA-RECEIPTS]
verifier under the canonicalization rules (JCS, [RFC8785]) and the
signature scope of [ACTA-RECEIPTS] Section 5.6.
* Implementations of this profile MUST NOT introduce new top-level
fields in the signed payload that conflict with names reserved by
[ACTA-RECEIPTS].
* Implementations of this profile MAY use any signature algorithm
permitted by [ACTA-RECEIPTS]: EdDSA (Ed25519, mandatory-to-
implement, [RFC8032]), ES256 (ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256,
[RFC7518]), and ML-DSA-65 ([FIPS204]).
* Where [ACTA-RECEIPTS] marks a field OPTIONAL and this profile
marks the same field REQUIRED, the stricter requirement applies to
Compliance Receipts.
A receipt that fails any MUST clause of this profile is not a
Compliance Receipt. It MAY still be a valid [ACTA-RECEIPTS] receipt.
This profile differentiates from [ACTA-RECEIPTS] on three axes:
mandatory hash-chain linkage (upstream Commitment Mode is OPTIONAL),
mandatory anchoring with RFC 3161 or OpenTimestamps (both
RECOMMENDED; upstream lists Sigstore Rekor in its Implementation
Status appendix as an OPTIONAL temporal anchor), and a retention
floor tied to specific regulatory articles (upstream is silent on
retention).
4. Canonicalization Scope
This section is normative. The canonicalization rule itself (JCS,
[RFC8785]) is inherited unchanged from [ACTA-RECEIPTS]; this section
bounds the inputs the rule is applied to, so that the cross-
implementation byte equality on which the hash chain of Section 5.3,
the anchor scope of Section 5.4, and the cross-agent binding of
Section 5.6 all depend is achievable in practice.
IEEE-754 floating-point numbers MUST NOT appear in the canonical form
covered by a SHA-256 digest under this profile. Callers MUST
serialize numeric values that are not exact integers in the IEEE-754
safe integer range (the closed interval from minus (2 to the 53 minus
1) to plus (2 to the 53 minus 1) inclusive) either as JSON strings or
as integer-rational pairs (numerator and denominator as JSON numbers
within that safe integer range) before the canonicalization step.
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Rationale: Section 3.2.2.3 of [RFC8785] specifies, by reference to
Section 7.1.12.1 of ECMA-262, a byte-stable serialization that in
principle covers all IEEE-754 double-precision values, integer or
fractional. In practice, several widely deployed JSON serializers do
not implement the ECMA-262 Number-to-String algorithm with byte
fidelity: Python json.dumps, Go encoding/json, and Java Jackson
(without explicit configuration) all produce different byte sequences
from the same IEEE-754 double in documented cases (round-to-even
ties, subnormal values, large-magnitude values requiring scientific
notation). Compliance and regulatory contexts (monetary amounts,
retention thresholds, anchoring intervals) additionally prefer exact
integer or string-encoded decimal representations because float
rounding loses the exact bytes that auditors quote. This profile
therefore shifts the canonicalization burden off implementers (who
would otherwise have to verify ECMA-262 conformance of an underlying
JSON library) and onto callers, who are in a better position to
choose a portable representation for the use case at hand. A receipt
that carries a floating-point number in a digest-covered field is not
guaranteed to verify across implementations even when each
implementation independently conforms to [RFC8785], because the
conformance burden has not been met by every mainstream JSON library.
Tool-version-specific semantic equivalence is OUT OF SCOPE for the
chain layer of this profile. The chain layer guarantees byte
equality only. Examples of semantic equivalence that this profile
does not assert and does not require a verifier to assert: SQL
keyword case folding (SELECT vs select), filesystem path
normalization (trailing slash, redundant separators, symlink
resolution), Unicode normalization in any form (NFC, NFD, NFKC,
NFKD); Section 3.1 of [RFC8785] requires that all components
depending on JCS preserve Unicode string data as-is, and
Section 3.2.2.2 of [RFC8785] serializes each code point without
normalization, so callers MUST NOT rely on a verifier normalizing
strings before comparison, locale-aware string collation (Turkish
dotted-i, German sharp-s case folding, ICU collation tables), numeric
tolerance (1.0 vs 1, 1e3 vs 1000), or URL percent-encoding choices
below the RFC 3986 unreserved set. Higher-level semantic equivalence
is a per-tool concern and, where required by a regulator, MUST be
expressed in the policy artefact resolved through policy_digest
(Section 5.2.2) rather than in the chain.
The chain layer of this profile answers a single question for a
verifier or a regulator: did the same canonicalized bytes pass
through agent X at wall-clock time T, as fixed by the anchor evidence
of Section 5.4. Anything beyond that question, including whether two
byte sequences are semantically equivalent under a downstream tool,
whether a policy update materially changed the meaning of a
previously accepted Action, or whether a counterparty's
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interpretation of the same bytes matched the originator's, is the
verifier's concern and is supported by the Audit Pack manifest
(Section 8) and the verifier reporting fields of Section 9.3, not by
the chain itself.
5. Receipt Field Profile
This section enumerates fields defined by [ACTA-RECEIPTS] and states
the additional requirements that this profile places on them. Field
names follow [ACTA-RECEIPTS] exactly.
Compliance Receipts MUST use the upstream wire field name signature
for the signature object, exactly as defined in Sections 2.1 and
2.1.1 of [ACTA-RECEIPTS]. The keys inside that object are alg, kid,
sig. Implementations whose internal storage uses a different field
name MUST translate to signature on emission and on canonicalization
for verification; receipts that appear on the wire under any other
top-level field name are non-conformant to [ACTA-RECEIPTS] and to
this profile. Anchors MUST be projected into a top-level anchors
array with a type discriminator and a value field carrying the anchor
bytes (base64-encoded for binary payloads). Flat-column
implementations MUST project on emission and Audit Pack export.
5.1. Common Payload Fields
5.1.1. type
Compliance Receipts MUST set type to a value drawn from the namespace
protectmcp:decision, protectmcp:restraint, or protectmcp:lifecycle,
or to an extension namespace registered for use with this profile.
5.1.2. issued_at
REQUIRED upstream and in this profile. The value MUST be an ISO 8601
timestamp with an explicit timezone. The producing system MUST
source the value from a clock synchronized to a recognized time
authority and MUST NOT backdate the value. Verifiers MUST reject
receipts whose issued_at is more than 300 seconds ahead of the
verifier's own clock. Verifiers MUST NOT reject a receipt solely
because issued_at lies in the past; past skew is bounded by the
applicable retention floor in Sections 5 and 6, not by freshness.
Historical receipts within retention MUST verify on the same path as
fresh ones.
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5.1.3. issuer_id
REQUIRED upstream and in this profile. The value MUST identify a
legal entity, not a natural person. Where the producing system is
operated by a Deployer, the issuer_id MUST resolve, through the trust
anchor metadata in the Audit Pack, to a record naming the Deployer.
To preserve the upstream Section 2.2 invariant that issuer_id MUST
match the kid field of the signature object, Compliance Receipts MUST
place the same value in both issuer_id and kid; the verifier resolves
that value to a public key through the Audit Pack trust-anchor
metadata rather than through the well-known JWK Set endpoint or the
RECOMMENDED sb:issuer:<base58-fingerprint> form of [ACTA-RECEIPTS]
Section 2.1.1. This profile thereby supersedes the upstream
RECOMMENDED kid format for Compliance Receipts; the upstream
RECOMMENDED format remains valid for non-Compliance receipts.
Implementations SHOULD use a Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) as defined
by [ISO17442] where one is allocated to the Deployer. Examples and
test fixtures MUST use a placeholder whose four-character LOU prefix
(positions 1-4) is not allocated in the GLEIF Local Operating Unit
code list, whose positions 5-6 are the ISO 17442 reserved value 00,
and whose two trailing characters (positions 19-20) are the ISO 7064
mod 97-10 check digits computed over positions 1-18 (for example
00000000000000000098, where the all-zero 18-character base produces
the check digits 98 per the ISO 17442-1:2020 Annex A check-digit
algorithm, which converts any letters in positions 1-18 to digits
A=10 ... Z=35 before the mod 97-10 computation; for an all-zero base
the conversion is a no-op); implementations MUST NOT use a real
third-party LEI in documentation or test data. Where no LEI is
allocated and the Deployer is a US entity, an Employer Identification
Number (EIN) issued by the United States Internal Revenue Service or
a Central Index Key (CIK) issued by the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission MAY be used, expressed as the bare numeric
string. Decentralized Identifiers ([W3C-DID]) MAY be used otherwise.
Implementations MUST treat the value as opaque on verification;
identifier resolution is out of scope for this profile.
issuer_id values MUST be bare identifiers without a scheme prefix
where the scheme is unambiguous from the value's syntactic form. An
LEI is the 20-character alphanumeric string defined by [ISO17442] and
is self-identifying through its length and check-digit structure;
implementations MUST emit the bare 20-character LEI without a lei: or
other scheme prefix. EINs and CIKs are likewise emitted as the bare
numeric string. Decentralized Identifiers ([W3C-DID]) carry their
own scheme prefix (did:) as defined by the DID specification and that
prefix is intrinsic to the identifier syntax rather than an added
scheme tag. The same kid-equals-issuer_id invariant requires
signature.kid to be the bare identifier in the same form. The worked
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example in Appendix "Worked Example (Informative)" uses the bare
20-character placeholder LEI 00000000000000000098; conformant cloud
emitters and SDK clients MUST match this form on the wire.
5.1.4. payload_digest (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED in this profile)
REQUIRED for Compliance Receipts. The value MUST follow the upstream
object form (hash, size, optional preview) defined in Section 2.2 of
[ACTA-RECEIPTS]; this profile does not redefine the wire shape. The
associated payload that this digest covers MUST be retained for the
period mandated by the most restrictive applicable regime in Sections
5 and 6 of this document. Implementations MUST NOT discard the
underlying payload while a receipt that references it is still within
its retention window.
5.1.5. action_ref (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED in this profile)
REQUIRED for Compliance Receipts. The value is a SHA-256 hash of the
canonical Action representation as defined in [ACTA-RECEIPTS]. This
profile uses action_ref as the primary join key for cross-engine
reconstruction during an audit.
5.1.6. sandbox_state (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED for High-Risk in this
profile)
REQUIRED for receipts produced by High-Risk AI Systems under either
[EU-AI-ACT] or [COLORADO-AI-ACT]. Upstream defines sandbox_state as
an OS-level containment status and restricts the value to one of
enabled, disabled, or unavailable; this profile inherits that
enumeration unchanged. A Deployer that operates a High-Risk AI
System and produces a stream of receipts in which sandbox_state is
consistently disabled SHOULD treat that stream as a finding under the
applicable risk-management documentation requirement (Article 9 of
[EU-AI-ACT] for the Provider's risk management system, with which a
Deployer operating per Article 26(1) is required to be consistent;
Section 6-1-1703(2) of the Colorado Revised Statutes) and document
the rationale in the Audit Pack metadata.
5.1.7. iteration_id (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED for multi-step in this
profile)
REQUIRED for multi-step agent workflows. The value MUST be stable
across all receipts emitted within the same logical task or session
so that a regulator can reconstruct the full chain of Actions.
iteration_id is distinct from the upstream session_id field defined
in [ACTA-RECEIPTS] Section 3.1.1, which is an opaque MCP session
identifier. A Compliance Receipt MAY carry both: session_id for MCP-
session correlation and iteration_id for logical-task correlation.
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5.2. Decision Receipt Fields (type protectmcp:decision)
The decision field value MUST be allow, deny, rate_limit, or
observation. Implementations using a different internal vocabulary
(e.g. permit for allow) MUST normalise on emission and on Audit Pack
export. The observation value records that an Action was observed
and the receipt was signed without any policy evaluation having taken
place; it is the regulator-honest alternative to emitting allow when
no policy matched, and MUST NOT appear in a receipt of type
protectmcp:decision. A producing system that has not evaluated a
policy for an Action MUST either refuse to issue a Compliance Receipt
for that Action or MUST emit the receipt with type
protectmcp:lifecycle and decision observation; in the latter case the
upstream policy_decision internal field, if present in the producing
system's internal vocabulary, takes the literal value none, which the
emitter MUST map to observation on the wire. Verifiers MUST reject a
Compliance Receipt that carries decision observation together with
type protectmcp:decision; conversely, a Compliance Receipt of type
protectmcp:lifecycle MAY carry decision observation in addition to
the other three vocabulary values. The policy_digest requirement of
Section 5.2.2 applies to observation receipts in the form of a digest
of the producing system's "no policy matched" sentinel policy
artefact, which the Deployer MUST retain alongside its other policy
artefacts for the applicable retention window.
The upstream tool_name field (REQUIRED in [ACTA-RECEIPTS]
Section 3.1.1) is REQUIRED for Compliance Receipts of type
protectmcp:decision.
5.2.1. reason (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED for deny/rate_limit in this
profile)
REQUIRED for Compliance Receipts where decision is deny or
rate_limit. The value MUST be a machine-readable reason code drawn
from a vocabulary documented in the Deployer's Audit Pack metadata.
5.2.2. policy_digest (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED in this profile)
REQUIRED for Compliance Receipts. The value MUST be of the form
sha256:<hex> and MUST reference a policy artefact that the Deployer
retains for the applicable retention window. Verifiers MUST reject
Compliance Receipts whose policy_digest does not resolve in the Audit
Pack.
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5.2.3. scanner_decisions (OPTIONAL)
An OPTIONAL scanner_decisions field MAY appear in a Compliance
Receipt of type protectmcp:decision. When present, its value MUST be
a JSON array of objects, where each object records the outcome of one
content scanner plug-in that ran during policy evaluation. Each
object has the following members:
* scanner_id (string, REQUIRED): stable identifier for the scanner
plug-in (e.g. presidio, llm-guard, cedar).
* scanner_version (string, REQUIRED): vendor-reported version string
for the scanner instance that produced the outcome.
* scanner_decision (string, REQUIRED): one of allow, scan_blocked,
or observation; matches the wire vocabulary of the parent decision
field where applicable.
* latency_ms (integer, OPTIONAL): wall-clock time in milliseconds
the scanner took to produce the outcome.
* signature (string, OPTIONAL): vendor-supplied detached signature
over the scanner outcome, used by Deployers that require non-
repudiation per scanner instance.
The field is OPTIONAL because Deployers running a single in-process
scanner (the common starter deployment) gain no auditing value from
echoing the outcome and would only pay an envelope-size cost. The
per-scanner signature member is OPTIONAL for the same reason:
cryptographic non-repudiation across multiple independent scanner
vendors is an Enterprise-tier concern and not mandated by this
profile. Verifiers MUST tolerate the absence of scanner_decisions
and MUST NOT infer that no scanners ran from its absence.
5.3. Hash-Chain Linkage (OPTIONAL upstream, REQUIRED in this profile)
Upstream Commitment Mode introduces previousReceiptHash as part of an
optional extension. This profile makes the linkage REQUIRED.
Implementations MUST emit a previousReceiptHash field, populated per
the digest-scope rule of Section 5.7 of [ACTA-RECEIPTS]: the
lowercase hex encoding of SHA-256 over the canonical signing-input
bytes of the immediately prior receipt emitted by the same issuer_id,
where the canonical signing-input bytes are the JCS-canonical
serialization ([RFC8785]) of the predecessor's signed payload object
(the same bytes the predecessor's cryptographic signature covers),
NOT the envelope object that additionally includes the signature or
anchors top-level keys. The first receipt in a chain MUST set this
field to the all-zero SHA-256 value (this profile's stipulation;
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[ACTA-RECEIPTS] Section 5.7 specifies only the digest scope of
subsequent links). JSON key is the literal previousReceiptHash
(camelCase, case-sensitive); snake_case aliases MUST NOT appear on
the wire.
Rationale for the payload-bytes (signing-input) digest scope rather
than the envelope-including-signature digest scope: the chain layer's
purpose is to make after-the-fact alteration of the predecessor's
signed content detectable, and the predecessor's signed content is
exactly the bytes its signature covers (the canonical payload
object). Digesting those bytes binds the chain to what A actually
attested to, is recomputable offline from the predecessor's payload
alone, and matches Section 5.7 of [ACTA-RECEIPTS]. The chain does
not need to bind the predecessor's signature value directly because
the predecessor's signature is verified independently under
Section 9.1, and cross-agent envelope integrity (where binding the
peer's signature value matters) is the role of counterparty_binding
per Section 5.6, which digests at the envelope-including-signature
scope precisely because the peer signature is the load-bearing
artefact in the cross-agent case. Implementations that previously
digested the envelope-including-signature object MUST migrate to the
signing-input scope before emitting chained receipts under this
profile; verifiers MUST recompute under the signing-input scope when
checking previousReceiptHash.
Each issuer MUST maintain a single linear per-agent chain. When one
agent identity emits receipts from multiple concurrent execution
paths (for example parallel tool calls dispatched within a single
agent loop, or fan-out work performed by a thread pool inside one
issuer), the issuer MUST serialize emission through a single
predecessor pointer at a time: each newly emitted receipt's
previousReceiptHash MUST resolve to the SHA-256(JCS(receipt)) of the
immediately prior receipt emitted by that same issuer_id, taken in
emission order, regardless of which concurrent execution path
produced it. Parallel sub-chains within one agent identity (for
example, a per-receipt chain_id discriminator that would partition
one issuer's stream into multiple independently advancing chains) are
NOT defined by this profile. An issuer that requires parallel sub-
chains MUST express each parallel path as a distinct agent identity,
with its own issuer_id value, its own signing key, and its own per-
agent chain rooted at the all-zero SHA-256 genesis value. Rationale:
deterministic verification of the chain segment covering an audit
window, as required by the regime bindings of Sections 5 and 6 (in
particular Section 6.3.2, Section 7.5.1, and Section 7.6.1), depends
on a single linear total order over the receipts emitted under each
agent identity; a verifier reconstructing the chain from a regulator-
supplied issuer_id needs that ordering to be well-defined without
out-of-band metadata.
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5.4. Anchoring (No Upstream Equivalent)
[ACTA-RECEIPTS] lists Sigstore Rekor in its Implementation Status
appendix as an OPTIONAL temporal anchor. This profile imposes a
normative anchoring requirement.
Compliance Receipts MUST be anchored. An anchor is an [RFC3161]
timestamp token covering the signed envelope, an [OPENTIMESTAMPS]
commitment covering the envelope, or both; implementations SHOULD
emit both forms. For both anchor types, the bytes committed are SHA-
256(JCS(envelope_minus_anchors)), where envelope_minus_anchors is the
wire envelope object with the anchors top-level key removed prior to
canonicalization, leaving the two-key object {payload, signature}.
The anchors key MUST be removed from the object, not set to null or
to an empty array; these produce different JCS output and break
interoperability (mirroring the upstream Section 5.6 stripping rule).
The anchor thereby binds payload and signature without being self-
referential. The anchor evidence MUST be retained alongside the
receipt for the applicable retention window. Verifiers MUST reject
Compliance Receipts that lack at least one valid anchor.
An anchor MAY be attached after issuance if the receipt is persisted
with an unambiguous pending marker and the anchor lands within a
documented bound. For [OPENTIMESTAMPS], this profile imposes a 7-day
deadline; this is a profile-imposed bound, not a property of the
OpenTimestamps protocol, whose calendar-to-block upgrade time depends
on the calendar operator's publication interval. [RFC3161] tokens
MUST be obtained synchronously. A verifier MUST treat a pending
receipt as non-conformant once the bound elapses.
The anchor MAY cover an aggregate of receipts (for example, a Merkle
root over a batch) rather than each receipt individually, provided
that the inclusion proof linking the receipt to the aggregate is
retained alongside the receipt and the aggregate anchor.
Where the anchor type is [RFC3161], the full TimeStampResp DER bytes
MUST be retained, sufficient for offline verification by a holder
with access to the TSA's published public key. Time-stamp tokens
carrying ESSCertIDv2 per [RFC5816] MUST be accepted by Compliance
Verifiers. Where the anchor type is [OPENTIMESTAMPS], the upgrade
from the initial calendar attestation to the Bitcoin block
attestation MUST be completed within the 7-day profile-imposed bound,
and the upgraded proof MUST be retained for the applicable retention
window per the second paragraph of this section.
Each entry in the top-level anchors array is an object with the
following members.
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type: REQUIRED string discriminator. MUST be one of rfc3161 or
opentimestamps.
value: REQUIRED on every anchor entry. The anchor token bytes,
base64-encoded. For rfc3161 the value is the base64 encoding of
the full TimeStampResp DER bytes (sufficient for offline
cryptographic re-verification by a holder with access to the TSA's
published public key). For opentimestamps the value is the base64
encoding of the OpenTimestamps proof blob (the .ots
serialization). A verifier MUST cryptographically re-verify the
anchor against the signed envelope using these bytes per
Section 9.1; anchor entries served without value MUST NOT be
reported as anchor_valid_*=true.
status: OPTIONAL informational string. When present, MUST be one of
anchored (the anchor has reached its final attestation state: an
[RFC3161] token has been obtained, or an [OPENTIMESTAMPS]
commitment has upgraded to its Bitcoin block attestation), pending
(the anchor has been requested but the final attestation state has
not yet been reached, e.g. an OpenTimestamps commitment that has
been submitted to a calendar but has not yet upgraded to a Bitcoin
block within the 7-day bound of this section), or failed (the
anchor submission was attempted and did not produce a usable
attestation, e.g. a TSA returned an error response or an
OpenTimestamps calendar refused the commitment). status is
operational metadata; a verifier MUST NOT derive cryptographic
validity from status alone, and MUST always re-verify the value
bytes per Section 9.1.
bitcoin_block: OPTIONAL informational string. The Bitcoin block
hash at which an [OPENTIMESTAMPS] commitment was anchored.
Present only on entries with type=opentimestamps and
status=anchored; absent on rfc3161 entries and on pending or
failed OpenTimestamps entries. bitcoin_block is operational
metadata; a verifier MUST NOT derive cryptographic validity from
bitcoin_block alone, and MUST always re-verify the value bytes
against the OpenTimestamps proof per Section 9.1.
An OPTIONAL envelope-level witness_policy member, a sibling of
payload, signature, and anchors, declares an N-of-M durable-anchoring
quorum over the anchors array. witness_policy is an object with two
members: required, a REQUIRED integer in the closed range [1, length
of witnesses]; and witnesses, a REQUIRED non-empty JSON array whose
values are a subset of the anchor type vocabulary {rfc3161,
opentimestamps}. The witnesses array MUST NOT contain duplicate
values and MUST NOT contain any value outside that vocabulary; in
particular a transparency-log pointer such as Rekor is NOT a witness
type and MUST be rejected if it appears in witnesses. The policy
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declares that the receipt's durable anchoring is satisfied only when
at least required distinct witness types named in witnesses each hold
a verifiable inclusion proof, that is, an anchor entry of that type
whose value bytes re-verify against SHA-
256(JCS(envelope_minus_anchors)) per Section 9.1 and, for
opentimestamps, has upgraded to its Bitcoin block attestation within
the 7-day bound of this section.
A receipt reaches the quorum-met state (the reference implementation
reports this as witness_quorum_met) only when the count of distinct
witness types satisfying the preceding paragraph is greater than or
equal to required. A Compliance Receipt MUST NOT assert that durable
anchoring has been achieved, and a producer MUST NOT set or report
witness_quorum_met, unless required witnesses each hold a real,
verifiable inclusion proof; an anchors entry with status=pending or
status=failed, or with absent or non-verifying value bytes, does NOT
count toward the quorum. This is the same false-attestation
principle that governs the rest of this profile: a receipt MUST NOT
claim a cryptographic property it cannot prove from retained bytes,
and a verifier MUST recompute the quorum from the re-verified anchors
entries rather than trust any producer-asserted quorum flag.
witness_policy places no constraint on a receipt that carries no such
member; the baseline single-anchor requirement of this section
continues to apply to every Compliance Receipt regardless of whether
witness_policy is present.
5.5. Extension Fields
This profile registers extension fields across five groupings that
MAY appear in the signed payload object alongside the fields defined
by [ACTA-RECEIPTS]: (a) regulatory classification fields (risk_class,
incident_class) defined in this section; (b) the cross-agent
envelope-binding field counterparty_binding defined in Section 5.6;
(c) per-action freshness and integrity fields (result_digest,
expires_at, nonce, tool_fingerprint, config_manifest_digest,
cve_inventory_digest) and build-provenance fields (executable_hash,
sbom_digest, slsa_provenance_pointer, supply_chain_pointer) defined
in Section 5.7 and Section 5.8; (d) server-built enforcement-
attestation fields (authorized_under_mandate, controls_evaluated)
defined in Section 5.9; and (e) self-declared threat-framework
taxonomy fields (mitre_techniques, mitre_atlas, owasp_llm_top10,
nist_ai_rmf, iso_42001, eu_ai_act_articles), the opaque caller-
supplied rfc3161_timestamp token, and the platform-set guard
framework_mappings_self_declared defined in Section 5.10. All
extension fields appear inside the signed payload object and are
therefore covered by the upstream Section 5.6 signature scope.
risk_class: A vocabulary term identifying the risk classification of
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the Action under the Deployer's risk management documentation.
The vocabulary MUST be referenced in the Audit Pack metadata.
Where the Deployer operates under [EU-AI-ACT], the documentation
is the Provider's Article 9 risk management system as referenced
via the instructions for use under Article 26(1); where the
Deployer operates under [COLORADO-AI-ACT], the documentation is
the Section 6-1-1703(2) risk management policy and program.
incident_class: A vocabulary term identifying the incident
classification of the Action under the applicable regime: an ICT-
related incident under [DORA], with classification criteria in
[REG-2024-1772] and the canonical reporting enumeration of Annex
II data glossary, field 3.23 (Type of the incident) of
[REG-2025-302] (verifiers MUST resolve the canonical values from
the regulation directly); a Cybersecurity Event under 23 NYCRR
500.1(f) (or, where the Section 500.17(a) reporting threshold is
met, a Cybersecurity Incident under 23 NYCRR 500.1(g)) for Covered
Entities of [NYDFS-500]; a Covered Cyber Incident under [CIRCIA]
once the final rule takes effect; or a security incident under 45
CFR 164.304 for Covered Entities of [HIPAA-SECURITY].
Implementations MAY refine the set, provided the flattened mapping
in the Audit Pack manifest (Section 8) projects each refinement to
the applicable canonical category for each in-scope regime.
risk_class MUST be encoded as a JSON string. incident_class MUST be
encoded as a JSON string drawn from the canonical vocabulary
referenced in the Audit Pack, OR as a JSON array of such strings to
preserve cross-regime classification (for example, a single Action
that is both a DORA ICT-related incident and a CIRCIA Covered Cyber
Incident, or both a NYDFS Cybersecurity Incident and a CIRCIA Covered
Cyber Incident). Both fields are OPTIONAL at the syntactic level but
MAY be REQUIRED by the regime bindings in Sections 5 and 6 of this
document.
Implementations MAY define additional extension fields. Such fields
MUST NOT collide with names defined by [ACTA-RECEIPTS] or by this
document. Implementations defining extension fields SHOULD register
them in the registry described in Section 11.
5.6. Counterparty Binding
This section is normative. counterparty_binding is an in-payload
object an acknowledging agent ("B") emits to carry a cryptographic
digest of the full signed envelope of an originating agent ("A"). It
provides cross-agent byte-equality evidence when a shared
intermediary sits between two honest agents and the per-agent hash
chains of Section 5.3 validate independently regardless of whether
B's observed bytes equal A's signed bytes. action_ref is a
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correlation anchor, not a cryptographic binding ([ACTA-RECEIPTS]
Section 2.2); counterparty_binding moves the evidence onto B's own
COSE or JWS signature, which the verifier already trusts.
5.6.1. Wire Shape
The field MUST appear inside the signed payload object. It MUST NOT
appear in unprotected COSE or JWS header parameters, or in
external_aad per [RFC9052] Section 4.3 when the receipt is used for
audit (external_aad is permissible only in transport-optimized modes
out of scope for Compliance Receipts). For COSE-framed receipts the
field sits inside the COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Sign payload per [RFC9052]
Section 4.1; for JWS-framed receipts it is a top-level claim per
[RFC7515].
The field is an object with the following members.
envelope_hash: REQUIRED string. Base64-encoded SHA-256 digest
computed over A's entire serialized signed envelope, including A's
signature bytes. The digest input is framing-specific:
* JSON-framed (this profile's default for receipts not
transported under COSE or JWS, and mandatory-to-implement for
any conformant Compliance Receipt implementation): the JCS-
canonical UTF-8 byte sequence of A's signed envelope JSON
object per [RFC8785], where the envelope is the three-key
object {"payload": <signed payload object>, "signature":
<signature object with alg, kid, sig members>, "anchors":
<array of anchor objects, OPTIONAL>}. The payload object
carries the signed fields A emitted (including type, issuer_id,
issued_at, action_ref, payload_digest, previousReceiptHash,
decision, and any extension fields under Section 5.5); the
signature object carries the algorithm identifier, key
identifier, and base64- or base64url-encoded signature bytes
exactly as A emitted them. B MUST NOT re-canonicalize A's
payload or strip the anchors array before computing the digest.
* COSE-framed: the full COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Sign byte string per
[RFC8949] Section 4.2 (deterministic encoding).
* JWS-framed: the full JWS Compact Serialization
(header.payload.signature) after payload canonicalization per
[RFC8785].
The digest algorithm is SHA-256 (mandatory-to-implement). The
encoding MUST be standard base64 per [RFC4648] Section 4 on
emission, OR base64url per Section 5 where the surrounding
transport requires URL-safe encoding; verifiers MUST accept both
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alphabets and MUST normalise to a single alphabet (typically
standard base64) before byte-comparing to a recomputed value.
Including A's signature in the digest scope binds the signed-over
content of A's receipt at the envelope level and prevents an
intermediary that re-signs A's claims with a different key from
escaping detection.
The framing in which A's envelope was emitted MUST be preserved
through B's binding. The value of envelope_hash is framing-
specific because JCS-canonical JSON (UTF-16 code-unit
lexicographic key ordering per [RFC8785]), COSE deterministic
encoding (length-then-byte map-key ordering per [RFC8949]
Section 4.2), and JWS Compact Serialization with JCS-canonical
payload (UTF-16 code-unit lexicographic ordering per [RFC8785])
produce different byte sequences from the same semantic payload-
and-signature, and the three framings therefore yield different
envelope_hash values for the same underlying receipt. A
transcoding intermediary that re-frames A's envelope (JSON to
COSE, COSE to JWS, or any other pairing) changes the digest input
and MUST be treated as a tampering event by the verifier;
verifiers MUST NOT reframe an envelope before recomputing
envelope_hash.
Future revisions MAY extend to additional digest algorithms drawn
from the [ACTA-RECEIPTS] digest algorithm registry;
implementations that require algorithm negotiation SHOULD carry
the algorithm identifier out of band in the Audit Pack manifest
rather than in the wire field.
receipt_ref: REQUIRED opaque content-addressed locator the verifier
resolves through the Audit Pack or a Deployer-published index to
A's full signed envelope. The value is an opaque string from the
verifier's perspective; producers MAY use any stable identifier
scheme (URI, content-addressed digest, opaque database id) so long
as the Audit Pack resolution layer returns the correct envelope
bytes. Future profiles (for example, a SCITT-style inclusion-
proof profile under [ACTA-RECEIPTS] Section 4.2 extension
semantics) MAY layer on this field.
expect_ack_from: OPTIONAL string. The expected acknowledging-party
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identifier, expressed as a kid or issuer_id value matching the
same bare-identifier form required by Section 5.1.3. When
present, the field declares which acknowledging party A or the
producer expects to sign over this receipt's bytes; a verifier MAY
use expect_ack_from to cross-check that the acknowledging
receipt's kid matches the expected identifier. Verifiers MUST NOT
reject solely on absence of an acknowledging receipt; absence is a
liveness-loss signal observable through Audit Pack metadata rather
than a non-conformance condition on the current receipt.
transport_label: OPTIONAL string (mcp, bus, orchestrator, http).
Operational only; verifiers MUST NOT derive trust from this label.
"counterparty_binding": {
"envelope_hash": "bDqg...5PE=",
"receipt_ref": "asqav-receipt://org/123/agent_A/seq/4811",
"expect_ack_from": "00000000000000000098",
"transport_label": "mcp"
}
The COSE form follows the same member set under deterministic CBOR
map ordering per [RFC8949] Section 4.2.
5.6.2. Emitter Behaviour
B SHOULD emit counterparty_binding when any of the following hold:
A's signing request flagged the action as requiring acknowledgment
(for example, by populating an expect_ack_from list); the Deployer's
risk management documentation requires bilateral byte-binding; or B
is operating under the guidance of Section 10.11. B MUST compute
envelope_hash over the exact byte stream it received and accepted,
not over a re-canonicalization at B; re-canonicalizing at B masks
intermediary tampering whenever the tampered bytes canonicalize to
the same payload object, which is the threat case this section
addresses. Where one acknowledgment receipt confirms envelopes from
N originators, the field MAY be an array of objects; pairwise
bindings cannot prove all N originators emitted identical bytes (see
Section 10.10).
5.6.3. Verifier Behaviour
A Compliance Verifier processing a receipt carrying
counterparty_binding MUST, in addition to Section 9.1, resolve
receipt_ref through the Audit Pack or a Deployer-published index to
A's full signed envelope, recompute the SHA-256 digest of that
envelope under the scope rule of Section 5.6.1, base64-encode the
result, and compare to envelope_hash. A non-resolving receipt_ref or
a digest mismatch MUST cause the acknowledging receipt to be reported
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non-conformant; liveness loss at A MUST NOT be silently treated as
success. Where expect_ack_from is present, the verifier SHOULD
additionally check that the acknowledging receipt's signature.kid
matches the declared identifier (under the bare-identifier form
required by Section 5.1.3); mismatch SHOULD be reported as an axis
flag rather than as outright non-conformance because the field is
OPTIONAL.
The Deployer or Audit Pack producer MUST retain A's signed envelope
for at least as long as any acknowledging receipt binding it remains
within retention under Sections 5 and 6. For chains of three or more
agents, this profile defaults to pairwise bindings; multi-signer co-
presence under [RFC9052] Section 4.1 is OPTIONAL, and verifiers MUST
NOT treat a co-signed envelope as a substitute for a pairwise binding
chain.
5.7. Result-Bound and Freshness Extensions
This section is normative. It defines six OPTIONAL extension fields
that may appear inside the signed payload object to bind the receipt
to the byte-equality of a downstream result, to bound the freshness
of a decision, to declare the tool and configuration that produced
the action, and to record the supply-chain Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) inventory in effect at signing time. The fields are
independently OPTIONAL; an implementation MAY emit any subset. All
six are covered by the upstream Section 5.6 signature scope under
[ACTA-RECEIPTS].
result_digest: OPTIONAL object of the same shape as payload_digest
defined in Section 2.2 of [ACTA-RECEIPTS]: REQUIRED string hash
formatted sha256:<64 lowercase hex chars>, REQUIRED integer size
in bytes, OPTIONAL string preview. The digest covers the
canonicalized bytes of the downstream Action's result body
(response payload, tool output, model completion). The field is
emitted on a follow-up protectmcp:observation:result_bound receipt
that references the originating protectmcp:decision via
action_ref; a verifier processing a result-bound observation MUST
treat a digest mismatch between result_digest and the verifier's
local recomputation over retained result bytes as a non-
conformance condition. Result bytes covered by result_digest are
subject to the same retention floor as the originating decision
receipt under Sections 5 and 6.
expires_at: OPTIONAL ISO 8601 timestamp with explicit timezone,
encoded as a JSON string. Declares the wall-clock time after
which the producing system considers the decision result stale and
not safe to replay. The field provides an upper freshness bound
that is additive to the 300-second forward-skew bound on issued_at
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of Section 5.1.2; expires_at bounds replay safety from above, the
forward-skew rule bounds emission honesty from above. A verifier
MUST reject a downstream action that replays a decision whose
expires_at lies in the past relative to the replay's wall clock;
verifiers MUST NOT reject the originating receipt itself solely
because expires_at has elapsed (the receipt remains valid as a
record of the decision at issued_at).
nonce: OPTIONAL JSON string carrying a producer-generated value that
is unique across the producer's emission stream for the lifetime
of the cryptographic key identified by kid. The field SHOULD be a
base64url-encoded random value of at least 16 bytes, OR a
structured identifier (UUIDv4, UUIDv7, ULID) the producer
guarantees globally unique. Verifiers SHOULD reject a second
receipt that carries the same nonce under the same issuer_id as a
replay candidate; the rejection is informational where the bound
action is idempotent and load-bearing where the bound action is
not. The field is OPTIONAL at the syntactic level but is a
SHOULD-emit for any producer whose downstream actions are not
idempotent.
tool_fingerprint: OPTIONAL JSON string formatted sha256:<64
lowercase hex chars> over the canonical declaration of the tool
that produced the Action, including the tool's name, version,
declared input schema, declared output schema, and any tool-
specific configuration the producer treats as part of the tool's
identity. The canonicalization rule for the declaration MUST be
JCS per [RFC8785]. The field binds a receipt to a specific tool
identity; a verifier or auditor reproducing the Action can detect
tool drift (the same tool name with a different version, schema,
or configuration) by comparing fingerprints across receipts in the
same chain. The field is OPTIONAL and complementary to
action_ref: action_ref identifies the call, tool_fingerprint
identifies the callee.
config_manifest_digest: OPTIONAL JSON string formatted sha256:<64
lowercase hex chars> over the canonical bytes of the producer's
configuration manifest in effect at the time the Action was
signed. The manifest content is operator-defined and SHOULD
include the producer's policy bundle reference, model identifiers
and versions, prompt template digests, retrieval index
identifiers, and any other inputs whose change would constitute a
substantial modification of the producing system under Article 43
of [EU-AI-ACT] or under Section 6-1-1701 of [COLORADO-AI-ACT].
The field is OPTIONAL but, when emitted, SHOULD resolve through
the Audit Pack to retained manifest bytes for the duration of the
longest applicable retention floor in Sections 5 and 6.
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cve_inventory_digest: OPTIONAL JSON string formatted sha256:<64
lowercase hex chars> over the canonical bytes of the producer's
CVE inventory at the time the Action was signed. The inventory
content SHOULD list the CVE identifiers known to apply to the
producer's executing image and its declared runtime dependencies,
plus the producer's accepted-residual rationale per [EU-AI-ACT]
Article 15 robustness obligations or the equivalent obligations
under Sections 5 and 6. The field binds a snapshot of the
producer's known-vulnerability surface to the receipt; a regulator
examining the receipt can resolve the digest through the Audit
Pack to the canonical inventory bytes that were in effect when the
Action was signed, rather than relying on a later-time inventory
that may have been updated after the Action was performed.
Implementations emitting result_digest SHOULD use the dedicated
protectmcp:observation:result_bound type registered in Section 11.2
for the follow-up receipt that carries the bound digest.
Implementations MAY emit expires_at, nonce, tool_fingerprint,
config_manifest_digest, and cve_inventory_digest on any receipt type
defined by this profile; the fields are type-agnostic.
5.8. Build-Provenance Extensions
This section is normative. It defines four OPTIONAL extension fields
that bind the receipt to the supply-chain provenance of the
executable that produced the Action. The four fields form a layered
subsumption set: executable_hash binds the running binary,
sbom_digest binds the dependency manifest the binary was built from,
slsa_provenance_pointer resolves to the SLSA attestation envelope for
that build, and supply_chain_pointer resolves to a transparency-log
entry (in-toto, Sigstore, or Rekor) covering the build. An
implementation MAY emit any subset. All four are covered by the
upstream Section 5.6 signature scope under [ACTA-RECEIPTS].
executable_hash: OPTIONAL JSON string formatted sha256:<64 lowercase
hex chars> over the canonical bytes of the executable that invoked
the Action. For container-based producers the canonical bytes are
the immutable image manifest digest of the running image (the
value an OCI registry returns under the same name plus tag,
computed under the OCI Image Manifest Specification). For non-
container executables the canonical bytes are the SHA-256 of the
on-disk binary file at the path the producer's runtime resolved.
The field binds build-side provenance into the signed receipt: a
regulator examining the receipt can recover the exact executable
identity that produced the Action without trusting any side-
channel attestation. A verifier MAY cross-check executable_hash
against the executable identity declared in the SLSA attestation
resolved through slsa_provenance_pointer; mismatch SHOULD be
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reported as an axis flag rather than as non-conformance because
the two fields may identify the same artefact under different
addressing schemes.
sbom_digest: OPTIONAL JSON string formatted sha256:<64 lowercase hex
chars> over the canonical bytes of the Software Bill of Materials
(SBOM) document covering the executing image. The canonical form
MUST be either CycloneDX (any 1.x specification version, JSON
form, with the canonicalization rule defined by CycloneDX itself)
or SPDX (version 2.x or later, JSON form, with the
canonicalization rule defined by SPDX itself); the producer SHOULD
record the chosen format and version in the Audit Pack manifest
entry for the receipt so a verifier can recompute the digest. The
field complements executable_hash: executable_hash identifies the
artefact, sbom_digest identifies the dependency closure of that
artefact.
slsa_provenance_pointer: OPTIONAL JSON string carrying an https URL
that resolves to the Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts
(SLSA) provenance attestation envelope for the build that produced
the executable identified by executable_hash. The pointer target
SHOULD be the SLSA Provenance v1.0 in-toto statement form;
producers MAY emit earlier SLSA versions where toolchain support
is incomplete, and verifiers SHOULD accept any SLSA version they
implement. The field shifts the trust root for build-side
provenance off the producer's self-attestation and onto the build
platform's attestation; the verifier's confidence in the resolved
attestation is bounded by the verifier's trust in the build
platform's signing root.
supply_chain_pointer: OPTIONAL JSON string carrying an https URL
that resolves to a transparency-log entry covering the build that
produced the executable identified by executable_hash. The
pointer target SHOULD be an in-toto attestation, a Sigstore entry,
or a Rekor entry, in that preference order where the producer can
choose; verifiers SHOULD accept any of the three. The field
provides a transparency-log-backed audit path for the build,
independent of the SLSA attestation envelope referenced by
slsa_provenance_pointer; the two fields are complementary because
a transparency-log entry attests inclusion under a public log,
while a SLSA attestation attests build-platform output bytes.
The four fields are type-agnostic and MAY appear on any receipt type
defined by this profile. Where a Deployer operates under a
regulatory regime that requires build-side traceability (Article 12
of [EU-AI-ACT] read together with Article 17 of [DORA]; the audit-
controls obligation of 45 CFR 164.312(b) of [HIPAA-SECURITY]; the
recordkeeping rule of [SEC-17A-4] read with [NYDFS-500] 23 NYCRR
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500.6), the Deployer SHOULD emit at least executable_hash on every
protectmcp:decision receipt and SHOULD retain the SBOM, the SLSA
attestation, and the transparency-log entry through the longest
applicable retention floor in Sections 5 and 6.
5.9. Enforcement-Attestation Extensions
This section is normative. It defines two OPTIONAL extension fields
that record, inside the signed payload object, which authorization
and enforcement controls the issuing platform genuinely evaluated
when it signed the receipt. Both fields are server-built: they are
populated by the issuing platform at signing time, never carried in
the producer's signing request, and a caller-supplied value for
either field MUST be dropped by the issuing platform before signing.
Both fields are covered by the upstream Section 5.6 signature scope
under [ACTA-RECEIPTS]. The design rule for both fields is omission-
over-false attestation: a control that did not run is represented by
the absence of its key, never by a present key asserting a result the
control did not produce. The two fields each carry a false-
attestation guard that rejects a present-but-malformed attestation,
in the same spirit as the framework_mappings_self_declared guard of
Section 5.5 and the witness_policy quorum guard of Section 5.4.
authorized_under_mandate: OPTIONAL object recording that the Action
was signed under a self-declared authorizing mandate. The object
carries four members: mandate_id (REQUIRED string, the issuer-
scoped identifier of the mandate the Action was authorized under),
issuer_id (REQUIRED string, the identifier of the party that
issued the mandate, in the bare-identifier form required by
Section 5.1.3), scope_digest (REQUIRED string formatted sha256:<64
lowercase hex chars> over the canonical bytes of the mandate's
authorized-action-types scope), and verified (REQUIRED boolean).
The trust semantics are deliberately narrow: verified=true asserts
self-declared issuer authority, the same trust level as
framework_mappings_self_declared of Section 5.5, and is NEVER an
issuing-platform attestation of verified third-party
authorization. The mandate binding is self-declared by the
issuer, is evaluated against the issuing platform's own clock at
signing time, and scopes the Action to a set of authorized action
types; this profile does NOT define a value cap, a counterparty
restriction, or any other constraint on the mandate, and a
verifier MUST NOT infer one from the presence of this field. A
verifier resolves scope_digest by retrieving the mandate
identified by mandate_id through the Audit Pack or a Deployer-
published mandate index and recomputing the digest over the
canonical scope bytes; a mismatch MUST be reported as a non-
conformance condition. The false-attestation guard for this field
rejects an authorized_under_mandate object that is present but
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does not carry all of mandate_id, issuer_id, verified=true, and a
well-formed scope_digest: a present-but-malformed attestation is
rejected at signing time rather than signed and surfaced as truth.
controls_evaluated: OPTIONAL object enumerating the enforcement
controls that genuinely fired when the issuing platform signed the
Action, plus the allow result. The member keys are drawn from a
closed set: emergency_halt, delegation_scope, quorum, mandate,
policy, content_scan, and result; an unknown key MUST be rejected.
Each control key is present ONLY when its control actually ran on
this sign; an absent key means the control never ran on this sign,
and a verifier MUST NOT infer from an absent key that the control
ran and passed silently. The quorum member, when present, MUST
carry fired=true together with a 64-lowercase-hex attestation_hash
proving the quorum evaluation; the policy member, when present and
asserting a policy was evaluated, MUST carry matched_count greater
than or equal to 1. The false-attestation guard for this field
rejects a present-but-malformed controls_evaluated object: an
unknown control key, a quorum member lacking fired=true plus a
64-hex attestation_hash, or a policy member asserting evaluation
without matched_count greater than or equal to 1, is rejected at
signing time. Because the field is server-built and a caller-
supplied controls_evaluated is dropped before signing, a verifier
MAY treat the enumerated keys as the issuing platform's own record
of which controls it ran.
Both fields are type-agnostic and MAY appear on any receipt type
defined by this profile, though they are most commonly emitted on
protectmcp:decision receipts where an authorization or enforcement
evaluation produced the recorded decision. Neither field replaces
the policy-evaluation honesty rule that an issuing platform MUST NOT
assert a control ran when it did not (the design note carried under
Section 10): controls_evaluated records which controls ran, not that
any control blocked, and an absent control key is the conformant
representation of a control that did not run.
5.10. Threat-Framework Taxonomy Extensions
This section is normative. It defines six OPTIONAL caller-supplied
taxonomy fields, one OPTIONAL caller-supplied opaque timestamp token,
and one platform-set false-attestation guard boolean, all of which
MAY appear inside the signed payload object. The six taxonomy fields
record producer-asserted mappings of the Action into established
threat-and-control catalogues; they are self-declared and are NOT
verified by the issuing platform. The guard boolean exists so that a
verifier can tell a self-declared classification apart from a
platform-verified one. All eight fields are covered by the upstream
Section 5.6 signature scope under [ACTA-RECEIPTS], and an
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implementation MAY emit any subset.
mitre_techniques: OPTIONAL JSON array of MITRE ATT&CK technique
identifiers (for example T1059, T1078) self-declared by the
producer. The values are referenced by identifier from the MITRE
ATT&CK enterprise matrix. The field is not verifier-checked by
the issuing platform; when the array is populated the issuing
platform MUST set framework_mappings_self_declared to true.
mitre_atlas: OPTIONAL JSON array of MITRE ATLAS identifiers (for
example AML.T0051) covering AI-system-specific adversary
techniques, self-declared by the producer and referenced by
identifier from the MITRE ATLAS catalogue. When populated the
issuing platform MUST set framework_mappings_self_declared to
true.
owasp_llm_top10: OPTIONAL JSON array of OWASP Top 10 for LLM
Applications identifiers (for example LLM01, LLM02), self-declared
by the producer and referenced by identifier from the OWASP Top 10
for LLM Applications publication. When populated the issuing
platform MUST set framework_mappings_self_declared to true.
nist_ai_rmf: OPTIONAL JSON array of NIST AI Risk Management
Framework function identifiers and subcategories (for example
GOVERN-1.1, MEASURE-2.7), self-declared by the producer and
referenced from [NIST-AI-RMF]. When populated the issuing
platform MUST set framework_mappings_self_declared to true.
iso_42001: OPTIONAL JSON array of ISO/IEC 42001:2023 control
identifiers (for example A.6.2.6), self-declared by the producer
and referenced from ISO/IEC 42001:2023. When populated the
issuing platform MUST set framework_mappings_self_declared to
true.
eu_ai_act_articles: OPTIONAL JSON array of EU AI Act article
identifiers (for example Article-12, Article-15), self-declared by
the producer and referenced from [EU-AI-ACT]. When populated the
issuing platform MUST set framework_mappings_self_declared to
true.
rfc3161_timestamp: OPTIONAL JSON string carrying a base64-encoded
[RFC3161] TimeStampResp (DER) supplied by the producer at signing
time and preserved verbatim on the receipt for offline TSA chain
verification independent of any platform-issued anchors. The
payload entry is an opaque caller-supplied token, NOT the per-
receipt anchor produced by the platform under Section 5.4; the
base64 encoding is per [RFC4648]. This field does not flip
framework_mappings_self_declared.
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framework_mappings_self_declared: OPTIONAL JSON boolean false-
attestation guard set by the issuing platform. The platform MUST
set it to true whenever any of mitre_techniques, mitre_atlas,
owasp_llm_top10, nist_ai_rmf, iso_42001, or eu_ai_act_articles is
populated. A producer-supplied value of false alongside a
populated taxonomy field MUST be overridden by the issuing
platform, in the same spirit as the false-attestation guards of
Section 5.9 and the witness_policy quorum guard of Section 5.4.
The guard does not assert that the self-declared mappings are
correct; it asserts only that they are self-declared rather than
platform-verified, and a verifier MUST NOT treat a populated
taxonomy field as platform-verified.
The eight fields are type-agnostic and MAY appear on any receipt type
defined by this profile.
6. European Union Bindings
6.1. EU AI Act Article 12 Binding
Each subsection cites the operative phrase of Article 12 and binds it
to the receipt field that satisfies it.
6.1.1. Article 12(1), automatic recording of events
Article 12(1) requires High-Risk AI Systems to technically allow for
the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the
system. The signed-receipt format provides one mechanism that
satisfies that logging capability; alternative mechanisms remain
valid. Where this profile is chosen, a Compliance Receipt SHOULD be
produced for every Action against an external resource, and a
configuration change that disables receipt generation SHOULD be
recorded as a protectmcp:lifecycle Compliance Receipt.
Implementations MAY emit at finer or coarser granularity so long as
the log set, taken together, satisfies Article 12(2)(a) through (c).
6.1.2. Article 12(2)(a), identifying situations that may result in the
high-risk AI system presenting a risk within the meaning of
Article 79(1) or in a substantial modification
The combination of type, decision, reason, and policy_digest MUST be
sufficient for an auditor to identify, by query alone, receipts that
correspond to risk situations enumerated in the Deployer's risk
management documentation. Where the Deployer classifies an Action as
risk-bearing, the receipt MUST carry a risk_class extension field.
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6.1.3. Article 12(2)(b), facilitating the post-market monitoring
referred to in Article 72
The hash-chain linkage required by Section 5.3 satisfies post-market
monitoring traceability. The chain head MUST be made available to
the Provider and to the competent authority on request.
6.1.4. Article 12(2)(c), monitoring the operation of high-risk AI
systems referred to in Article 26(5)
Any change to the policy artefact referenced by policy_digest MUST
produce a new digest. A change in policy_digest between two
otherwise-comparable Actions may be examined by the Deployer or by a
regulator as a candidate substantial-modification event under Article
43, and MUST be retained at least as long as the longest receipt in
the chain that references either digest.
6.1.5. Retention
Article 12 itself sets no retention period; the operative deployer
floor is Article 26(6) ("at least six months"). The parallel
provider floor in Article 19(1) sets the same six-month minimum on
Providers; this profile's retention bindings are written from the
Deployer perspective, and a Provider that wishes to use Compliance
Receipts as its Article 19(1) record SHOULD adopt the Deployer floor
explicitly through a separate Provider-role binding (deferred to a
future revision).
EU AI Act Article 26(6) requires six months of logs (interpreted as
184 days when expressed as a day-count floor for hash-chain anchoring
intervals). The normative requirement on Compliance Receipts is:
implementations MUST retain receipts until the later of (a) the day
six calendar months after the date of the Action, computed calendar-
arithmetically per [ISO8601-2] duration arithmetic, and (b) any
longer Union or national law floor. The six-month period is read
calendar-month-wise (the receipt expiry day is the same day-of-month
six months later, with end-of-month rollover where the target month
is shorter), not as a fixed day count.
The 184-day figure (the maximum number of days in any rolling six-
calendar-month window, worst case Aug-Jan, 31+30+31+30+31+31) is
informative only; it expresses a safe day-count floor for hash-chain
anchoring intervals and Audit Pack export windows where calendar-
arithmetic is impractical at the producer layer. A Deployer that
retains receipts strictly under the calendar-month rule above
satisfies Article 26(6); a Deployer that uses 184 days as an internal
day-count overestimate also satisfies it. A 183-day day-count floor
is not endorsed by this profile: under a rolling six-calendar-month
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window 1 August to 31 January spans 184 days and 183 days is one day
short. Where the Deployer is also a Financial Entity, the sectoral
floor in Section 6.3.4 applies.
6.2. EU AI Act Article 26 Binding
6.2.1. Article 26(1), in accordance with the instructions for use
policy_digest MUST resolve through Section 8 to a retained artefact
(machine check). The Deployer SHOULD demonstrate consistency with
the Provider's instructions for use (process check). Inability to
perform the machine check is presumed non-compliance.
6.2.2. Article 26(2), assign human oversight
For any Action whose decision is allow and which the Deployer's risk
management documentation marks as requiring human oversight, the
Deployer MUST ensure that the receipt is either reviewed by a
designated natural person within the period required by national law,
or that a follow-on protectmcp:lifecycle Compliance Receipt records
the absence of such review with a reason code. Both records MUST
themselves be Compliance Receipts. This profile addresses the
trigger and record of oversight; the competence, training, authority,
and necessary support of the reviewer required by Article 26(2)
remain the Deployer's separate responsibility.
6.2.3. Article 26(5), monitor the operation
A Deployer MUST be able to produce an Audit Pack covering any
contiguous time window since the High-Risk AI System became
operational.
6.2.4. Article 26(6), keep the logs for at least six months
Compliance Receipts under this binding MUST be retained for at least
the period stated in Section 6.1.5. Where the Deployer is also a
Financial Entity, the longer sectoral floor in Section 6.3.4 applies.
6.3. DORA Article 17 Binding
6.3.1. Article 17(1), ICT-related incident management process
A Compliance Receipt produced inside a Financial Entity's ICT
environment may serve as the canonical record of an Action that
triggered an ICT-related incident. action_ref MUST be carried into
the Financial Entity's incident workflow as the primary correlation
key.
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6.3.2. Article 17(2), record all ICT-related incidents and significant
cyber threats
The hash chain required by Section 5.3 supports the recording
obligation of Article 17(2) by making after-the-fact alteration of
recorded incidents detectable. The Financial Entity MUST be able to
produce, on request, the chain segment covering the period of an
incident, together with the anchor evidence that fixes the chain to
wall-clock time.
6.3.3. Article 17(3)(b), establish procedures to identify, track, log,
categorise and classify ICT-related incidents
For Actions identified as part of an ICT-related incident, the
producing system MUST emit incident_class. The classification
criteria are those set out in Article 18(1) of [DORA], with further
specification in [REG-2024-1772]. The canonical reporting
enumeration to which incident_class flattens is bound by Annex II
field 3.23 of [REG-2025-302] (see Section 5.5). Implementations MUST
publish a flattened mapping in the Audit Pack manifest as required by
Section 5.5.
6.3.4. Retention
Article 17 of [DORA] does not itself set a uniform numeric retention
floor. The five-year (1827-day) figure used by this profile derives
from sectoral instruments that overlap DORA-scoped Financial
Entities. Investment firms keep records of all services, activities
and transactions under Article 16(6) of [MIFID2], with Article 72 and
Annex I of [REG-2017-565] fixing the form and content of those
records. The explicit five-year retention period in [MIFID2] is set
by Article 16(7) for records of telephone conversations and
electronic communications, kept for a period of five years and, where
requested by the competent authority, for a period of up to seven
years.
Records of customer due diligence and of transactions under Article
40 of [AMLD] are kept for five years after the end of the business
relationship. The AMLD record-keeping regime is superseded, in
respect of record retention, by Article 77 of [AMLR] from 10 July
2027, which preserves the five-year floor and adds a case-by-case
extension up to a further five years where the competent authority so
requires. Implementations operating across the AMLD-to-AMLR
transition MUST satisfy whichever instrument is in force on the date
of the Action.
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Compliance Receipts MUST be retained for the period required by
applicable Union or national law; where a sectoral floor applies,
retention MUST equal or exceed the longest applicable floor. Absent
a more specific rule, this profile RECOMMENDS 1827 days from the date
of the Action (the worst-case rolling five-calendar-year window
contains two leap days, so 1827 days satisfies "five years"
regardless of the calendar years over which the window falls).
Anchor evidence MUST be retained for the same period. Verification
keys whose lifetime expires within the retention window MUST have
their public components retained so that historical signatures remain
verifiable.
7. United States Bindings
7.1. NIST AI RMF Binding
[NIST-AI-RMF] is a voluntary framework. Adoption of this profile, on
its own, does not establish conformity with the AI RMF; it provides a
tamper-evident receipt substrate that an AI RMF program can use as
evidence under the MEASURE function and as a structured input to the
GOVERN, MAP, and MANAGE functions. [NIST-GENAI-PROFILE] applies the
AI RMF functions to generative AI; the profile bindings below apply
to generative and non-generative AI agent deployments alike unless
explicitly noted.
7.1.1. GOVERN function
The GOVERN function requires that organizations document AI policies
and procedures. The combination of policy_digest and the Audit Pack
manifest provides a machine-readable binding between every Action and
the policy artefact in force at the time of the Action. A change to
the policy artefact MUST produce a new policy_digest value (per
Section 5.2.2); the Audit Pack therefore records every policy change
in a tamper-evident manner.
7.1.2. MAP function
The MAP function requires that the context, capabilities, and risks
of an AI system be characterised. The combination of type,
tool_name, action_ref, and iteration_id SHOULD be sufficient for an
auditor to reconstruct the operational context of any Action without
dereferencing the underlying payload.
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7.1.3. MEASURE function
The MEASURE function requires that AI risks and impacts be analysed
and tracked over time. The hash-chain linkage required by
Section 5.3 provides tamper-evident continuity of the receipt stream
over the AI system's operational lifetime, satisfying the
traceability prerequisite of MEASURE.
7.1.4. MANAGE function
The MANAGE function requires that AI risks be prioritised and acted
upon based on projected impact. The risk_class extension field
carries the Deployer's risk classification of the Action; together
with decision, reason, and policy_digest, it supports prioritisation
and incident response without requiring the verifier to re-derive
risk from the underlying payload.
7.2. Colorado AI Act (SB 24-205) Binding
[COLORADO-AI-ACT] imposes deployer obligations effective June 30,
2026 (per Senate Bill 25B-004, which postponed the original February
1, 2026 effective date). The Act regulates the deployment of High-
Risk AI Systems and the prevention of algorithmic discrimination.
7.2.1. Section 6-1-1703(2), risk management policy and program
Section 6-1-1703(2) requires deployers to implement a risk management
policy and program for the High-Risk AI System. policy_digest MUST
resolve through Section 8 to the deployer's risk management policy
artefact in force at the time of the Action. Where the Deployer
classifies an Action as risk-bearing under that policy, the receipt
MUST carry a risk_class extension field.
7.2.2. Section 6-1-1703(3), impact assessment
Section 6-1-1703(3) requires deployers to complete an impact
assessment annually and within 90 days after any intentional and
substantial modification of the High-Risk AI System. The combination
of type, policy_digest, and previousReceiptHash MUST be sufficient
for an auditor to identify, by query alone, the receipts that span
the period covered by an impact assessment, including any policy
changes within that period.
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7.2.3. Section 6-1-1703(7), notice of algorithmic discrimination
Where a Deployer determines that a High-Risk AI System has caused or
is reasonably likely to have caused algorithmic discrimination, the
producing system SHOULD record that determination as a
protectmcp:lifecycle Compliance Receipt naming the determination, the
affected receipts by action_ref, and the policy or risk-management
response with a reason code.
7.3. Texas Responsible AI Governance Act (HB 149) Binding
[TEXAS-TRAIGA] takes effect January 1, 2026. The Act adopts an
intent-based liability framework for the development and deployment
of AI systems and provides a safe harbor at Section 552.105(e)(2)(D)
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code for organisations that
substantially comply with the most recent version of
[NIST-GENAI-PROFILE], or another nationally or internationally
recognized risk management framework for AI systems, and operate an
internal review process.
7.3.1. Safe-harbor evidentiary support
Where a Deployer relies on the safe-harbor provision of HB 149 by
substantially complying with [NIST-GENAI-PROFILE], the Audit Pack MAY
be presented as evidence of that compliance. The bindings of
Section 7.1 apply, with the additional Generative AI Profile bindings
of [NIST-GENAI-PROFILE].
7.3.2. Prohibited-use detection
Receipts whose decision is deny with a reason code drawn from a
vocabulary documenting the Act's prohibited-use categories under
Section 552.052 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code added by HB
149 (incitement or encouragement of physical self-harm including
suicide, harm to another person, or engagement in criminal activity)
MUST be retained for the period stated in Section 7.4.2 or the longer
period required by Texas law, whichever is greater.
7.4. HIPAA Security Rule Binding (45 CFR Part 164, Subpart C)
[HIPAA-SECURITY] applies to Covered Entities (HIPAA) that handle
electronic protected health information. The bindings below apply
only to receipts whose underlying Actions reference electronic
protected health information.
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7.4.1. 45 CFR 164.312(b), audit controls
45 CFR 164.312(b) requires implementation of "hardware, software,
and/or procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in
information systems that contain or use electronic protected health
information". The combination of type, action_ref, tool_name, and
the hash-chain linkage required by Section 5.3 satisfies the
recording requirement; the verification rules of Section 9.1 satisfy
the examination requirement.
7.4.2. 45 CFR 164.316(b)(2), six-year retention
45 CFR 164.316(b)(2) (and in particular the subparagraph
164.316(b)(2)(i)) requires that the documentation required by 45 CFR
164.316(b)(1) be retained "for 6 years from the date of its creation
or the date when it last was in effect, whichever is later". The
audit-log content produced under 45 CFR 164.312(b) is not itself
documentation required by 164.316(b)(1); the Security Rule does not
set an explicit retention floor for individual audit-log records. By
analogy with the six-year floor that 164.316(b)(2) places on the
policies and procedures that govern audit-log generation, this
profile applies the same six-year floor to Compliance Receipts whose
underlying Actions reference electronic protected health information.
Records covered by the HIPAA Security Rule audit-trail retention MUST
be retained for six years from the date of creation or the date when
last in effect, whichever is later, per 45 CFR 164.316(b)(2). This
profile expresses that floor as 2192 days from the later of (a) the
date of the Action and (b) the date the policy artefact referenced by
policy_digest ceased to be in effect: 2192 is the maximum number of
days in any rolling six-calendar-year window (worst case spans two
leap days, e.g. 2024-2030 contains February 29 of 2024 and 2028,
yielding 6*365+2 = 2192 days). The six-year analogy floor is
grounded in 164.316(b)(2); a Covered Entity that retains receipts
strictly under 164.316(b)(2)(i) bound only to the policy artefact's
creation-or-cessation date MAY do so when no longer audit-log floor
is established by separate Union, state, or sectoral law.
Verification keys whose lifetime expires within the retention window
MUST have their public components retained so that historical
signatures remain verifiable.
7.5. NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation Binding (23 NYCRR Part 500)
[NYDFS-500] applies to Covered Entities (NYDFS) operating under New
York Banking, Insurance, or Financial Services Law. The bindings
below apply only to receipts produced by such Covered Entities.
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7.5.1. 23 NYCRR 500.6, audit trail
23 NYCRR 500.6(a) requires Covered Entities to securely maintain
systems that, to the extent applicable and based on its risk
assessment, (1) are designed to reconstruct material financial
transactions, and (2) include audit trails designed to detect and
respond to cybersecurity events that have a reasonable likelihood of
materially harming any material part of the normal operations of the
Covered Entity. The hash chain required by Section 5.3 together with
the anchor evidence required by Section 5.4 satisfies the tamper-
evidence prerequisite of the audit-trail obligation.
7.5.2. 23 NYCRR 500.17, notices to superintendent
23 NYCRR 500.17(a)(1) requires that "Each covered entity shall notify
the superintendent electronically in the form set forth on the
department's website as promptly as possible but in no event later
than 72 hours after determining that a cybersecurity incident has
occurred at the covered entity, its affiliates, or a third-party
service provider." The reporting trigger is a Cybersecurity Incident
under 23 NYCRR 500.1(g), not any Cybersecurity Event under 500.1(f).
For Actions identified as part of such an Incident, the producing
system MUST emit incident_class with a value indicating Cybersecurity
Incident under 23 NYCRR 500.1(g), and the Covered Entity MUST be able
to produce, on request, the chain segment covering the period of the
Incident together with the anchor evidence that fixes the chain to
wall-clock time.
7.5.3. 23 NYCRR 500.6 retention
23 NYCRR 500.6(b) requires that "Each Covered Entity shall maintain
records required by this section for not fewer than five years." The
five-year floor applies uniformly to records required by paragraph
(a)(1) (designed to reconstruct material financial transactions) and
to records required by paragraph (a)(2) (audit trails designed to
detect and respond to cybersecurity events that have a reasonable
likelihood of materially harming any material part of the normal
operations of the Covered Entity). Compliance Receipts produced
under this binding MUST be retained for at least 1827 days from the
date of the Action (the worst-case rolling five-calendar-year window
contains two leap days).
7.6. SEC Broker-Dealer Recordkeeping Binding (17 CFR 240.17a-4)
[SEC-17A-4] applies to Broker-Dealers, Security-Based Swap Dealers,
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants. The bindings below apply
only to receipts produced inside such entities.
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7.6.1. 17 CFR 240.17a-4(f), electronic recordkeeping system
The November 3, 2022 amendments to 17 CFR 240.17a-4 (compliance date
May 3, 2023) added an audit-trail alternative to the prior write-
once-read-many (WORM) electronic recordkeeping requirement. The
audit-trail alternative requires that the electronic recordkeeping
system permit the recreation of an original record if it is modified
or deleted. The hash-chain linkage required by Section 5.3 together
with the retention rule in Section 7.6.2 and the anchor evidence
required by Section 5.4 satisfies the audit-trail alternative when
the Compliance Receipt is the system-of-record for a regulated
record.
7.6.2. 17 CFR 240.17a-4(a) and (b) retention
17 CFR 240.17a-4(a) requires preservation of certain records for not
less than 6 years, the first two years in an easily accessible place.
17 CFR 240.17a-4(b) requires preservation of a different list of
records for not less than three years, the first two years in an
easily accessible place. Compliance Receipts that constitute or
support a record listed in 17 CFR 240.17a-4(a) MUST be retained for
at least 2192 days from the date of the Action, applying the same
six-year worst-case methodology as Section 7.4.2; receipts that
constitute or support a record listed only in 17 CFR 240.17a-4(b)
MUST be retained for at least 1096 days from the date of the Action
(the worst-case rolling three-calendar-year window contains one leap
day). Where both apply, the longer period applies.
7.7. CIRCIA Binding (Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022)
[CIRCIA] requires Covered Entities (CIRCIA) to report Covered Cyber
Incidents to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
within 72 hours of reasonable belief that the incident has occurred,
and to report ransom payments within 24 hours. The reporting
obligations take effect upon publication of the final rule. Pending
publication, the bindings below apply on a voluntary basis.
7.7.1. Covered Cyber Incident reporting support
For Actions identified as part of a Covered Cyber Incident, the
producing system MUST emit incident_class with a value indicating
Covered Cyber Incident under [CIRCIA]. The Covered Entity MUST be
able to produce, on request, the chain segment covering the period of
the incident together with the anchor evidence that fixes the chain
to wall-clock time.
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7.7.2. Records related to a Covered Cyber Incident report
Section 2242(a)(4) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as enacted
by [CIRCIA] and codified at 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(4), requires Covered
Entities to preserve data relevant to a Covered Cyber Incident or
ransom payment in accordance with procedures established in the final
rule. CISA's notice of proposed rulemaking at 89 FR 23644 (April 4,
2024), proposed Section 226.13(c), proposes a preservation period of
not less than two years measured from the submission of the most
recently required CIRCIA report (or the date that submission would
have been required absent a preservation exception under proposed
Section 226.4(a)); this profile uses that proposed floor pending
publication of the final rule.
Records covered by CIRCIA preservation MUST be retained for two years
from the submission of the most recently required CIRCIA report under
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2). Compliance Receipts that are referenced in a
CIRCIA report or that the Covered Entity reasonably anticipates will
be so referenced MUST be retained for the longer of (a) the period
established by the final rule and (b) two years from the submission
of the most recently required CIRCIA report (or the date that
submission would have been required absent a preservation exception),
per proposed Section 226.13(c) of the CIRCIA NPRM at 89 FR 23644
(April 4, 2024). Covered Entities MUST NOT measure the retention
floor from the date of the underlying Action; an Action detected and
reported months later carries a preservation window that runs forward
from the report submission date.
8. Audit Pack Composition
This section is informative. It describes the contents of an Audit
Pack as introduced in Section 2.
An Audit Pack contains the following items.
* The set of Compliance Receipts covered by the requested time
window, in the canonical envelope form defined by [ACTA-RECEIPTS].
* The chain commitments that link the receipts: for each receipt,
the value of previousReceiptHash and the recomputed digest of the
predecessor envelope.
* The anchor evidence: [RFC3161] tokens, OpenTimestamps proofs, or
both. Each anchor item MUST be associated, by hash, with the
receipt or aggregate it covers.
* The trust anchor metadata that identifies the Deployer or other
regulated entity associated with each issuer_id value.
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* The verification key material for every kid value present, in a
form that does not require online retrieval.
* Vocabularies referenced by reason, risk_class, incident_class, and
extension fields, embedded as JSON arrays with a stable
identifier. The Audit Pack MUST expose a digest-resolution
facility that, given a policy_digest, returns the retained
artefact.
* A regime mapping document that names which receipts the producer
asserts as evidence under any of the regimes addressed by Sections
5 and 6 of this document (EU AI Act Article 12, EU AI Act Article
26, DORA Article 17, NIST AI RMF, Colorado AI Act, Texas
Responsible AI Governance Act, NYDFS Part 500, HIPAA Security
Rule, SEC Rule 17a-4, CIRCIA).
* The chain heads valid at the start and end of the time window,
signed by the Deployer or other regulated entity.
An Audit Pack MUST itself be signed per the [ACTA-RECEIPTS] algorithm
registry. The manifest MUST include bundle_digest, bundle_signature,
bundle_public_key, and algorithm_registry_version.
The following manifest-level fields SHOULD appear on an Audit Pack
bundle when the underlying receipt stream exposes the corresponding
semantics. Each is informative and does not alter the wire shape of
individual receipts.
regime_mapping_disclaimer: String emitted on bundles whose per-
receipt regime predicates derive from mapping logic the original
producing system did not sign. The value identifies the producer
of the mapping, the document version under which it was computed,
and a disclaimer that the regime-satisfaction flags are advisory
and remain subject to the verifier's own check against Sections 5
and 6.
stale_pending: Boolean flag set per bundle entry whose anchor
evidence is still pending after the bound of Section 5.4 (7 days
for OpenTimestamps; synchronous for RFC 3161). When true, the
bundled receipt is non-conformant per Section 5.4, and a
Compliance Verifier consumes the flag to drive anchor_valid_*
false in its per-axis report (see Section 9.3). A verify endpoint
over the same bundle SHOULD surface stale_pending in its response.
9. Verifier Behaviour
A verifier conformant to this profile is referred to as a Compliance
Verifier.
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9.1. Mandatory Checks
A Compliance Verifier MUST perform all of the following checks before
treating a receipt as a Compliance Receipt.
* Verify the signature using the algorithm declared in
signature.alg, in accordance with [ACTA-RECEIPTS].
* Resolve the verification key through one of the key-distribution
mechanisms described in Section 4.3 of [ACTA-RECEIPTS] (well-known
JWK Set or out-of-band distribution), or through Audit Pack trust-
anchor metadata. The verifier MUST NOT trust a verification key
embedded in the receipt envelope.
* Verify that all fields marked REQUIRED by Section 5 are present
and well-formed.
* Verify the hash-chain linkage by recomputing SHA-256 over the
canonical signing-input bytes of the immediately preceding receipt
(the JCS-canonical serialization of the predecessor's signed
payload object, per Section 5.3) and comparing the lowercase hex
encoding to previousReceiptHash.
* Verify at least one anchor: an [RFC3161] token, an
[OPENTIMESTAMPS] commitment, or both. The anchor MUST cover the
signed envelope as it appears in the receipt. The verifier MUST
cryptographically re-verify the anchor against the signed
envelope; presence of anchor metadata without a successful
cryptographic check MUST NOT yield "valid".
* Verify the future-skew bound on issued_at per Section 5.1.2. Past
skew MUST NOT cause non-conformance when the receipt is within
retention.
* Verify that policy_digest resolves through Section 8. A digest
computed over a nonced or otherwise mixed-input form (for example,
SHA-256(nonce || JCS(artefact))) MUST NOT be treated as
policy_digest; the digest scope is the canonical form of the
artefact alone. The verifier MUST recompute SHA-256 over the
canonical form of the resolved artefact as documented in the Audit
Pack manifest, and compare; for JSON artefacts the canonical form
is JCS per [RFC8785].
A receipt that fails any of these checks MUST be reported as non-
conformant.
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9.2. Optional Checks
A Compliance Verifier MAY additionally perform any of the following.
* Cross-check the issuer_id against an external registry (LEI, EIN,
CIK, NPI, GLEIF, or a Deployer-published list).
* Resolve the policy artefact referenced by policy_digest and
compare it to a Provider-supplied or Deployer-supplied reference
policy.
* Recompute the chain head and compare it to a Deployer-published
value.
* Validate incident_class (each element if encoded as an array) and
risk_class extension values against the vocabularies referenced in
the Audit Pack.
9.3. Reporting
A Compliance Verifier SHOULD produce a structured per-receipt report
that names the regime bindings the receipt satisfies and the outcome
of the per-axis checks the verifier performed. The following fields
SHOULD be emitted; the axes are independent and consumers MUST NOT
collapse them into a single boolean before display.
regimes_satisfied: Array of short stable regime identifiers drawn
from the regimes listed in Section 8 (for example eu_ai_act, dora,
nist_ai_rmf, colorado_ai, texas_traiga, hipaa_security, nydfs_500,
sec_17a4a, sec_17a4b, circia). The set is open-ended; consumers
MUST treat unknown identifiers as informational. Where this field
is inherited from a producer-side mapping in the bundle, the
bundle-level regime_mapping_disclaimer of Section 8 applies.
anchor_valid_ots: Boolean. true when an [OPENTIMESTAMPS] anchor is
present, has upgraded to the Bitcoin block attestation within the
7-day bound of Section 5.4, and re-verifies cryptographically
against the signed envelope; otherwise false (including the case
where the only present anchor is RFC 3161).
anchor_valid_rfc3161: Boolean. true when an [RFC3161] token is
present, carries an ESSCertIDv2 per [RFC5816] where required, and
re-verifies cryptographically against the signed envelope;
otherwise false.
policy_digest_resolved: Boolean. true when policy_digest resolved to
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a retained artefact whose JCS-canonical SHA-256 matches the
receipt value, per Section 9.1; false on absence, resolution
failure, or digest mismatch.
duplicate_emission_candidate: Boolean. true when at least one other
receipt sharing action_ref and issuer_id has been observed in the
same Audit Pack or in a verifier-maintained index; otherwise
false. The axis is informational; this profile does not require
verifiers to maintain a cross-receipt index. An absent index MUST
report false rather than omit the axis, so consumers learn "no
duplicate" from the value and learn "axis unknown" only from the
verifier's documented capability set.
A receipt may carry anchor_valid_ots=true and
anchor_valid_rfc3161=false (or vice versa) and still satisfy the
mandatory anchor check of Section 5.4, which requires only one valid
anchor. Where a receipt carries counterparty_binding per
Section 5.6, the verifier SHOULD additionally emit the outcome of the
check of Section 5.6.3; this profile reserves a stable field
identifier for that axis pending implementation experience.
10. Security Considerations
This profile inherits all of the security considerations of
[ACTA-RECEIPTS]. The following considerations are specific to the
compliance binding.
10.1. Tamper Resistance
The hash-chain linkage required by Section 5.3 provides tamper-
evidence at the chain level. An adversary who removes a receipt from
the middle of the chain MUST recompute and re-sign every subsequent
envelope. The anchor evidence required by Section 5.4 binds segments
of the chain to wall-clock time, raising the cost of a re-signing
attack.
Implementations SHOULD anchor at intervals no longer than 24 hours.
Implementations operating under DORA Article 17, 23 NYCRR 500.17, or
[CIRCIA] SHOULD anchor at intervals no longer than one hour, given
the four-hour initial-notice deadline (with 72-hour intermediate-
report and one-month final-report bounds) per DORA Article 17 and the
RTS in [REG-2025-301], the 72-hour notification clock under 23 NYCRR
500.17, and the 72-hour CIRCIA covered-cyber-incident reporting
deadline that will apply once the CIRCIA final rule takes effect.
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A deployment that uses only the signature, without chain linkage and
anchoring, can be rolled back by an insider with control of the
signing key for the period between the deletion and the next anchor.
The MUST clauses of Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 close that window.
10.2. Chain Availability Under Single-Linear Per-Agent Serialization
This section is informative. The single-linear per-agent chain
requirement of Section 5.3 serializes receipt emission for a given
issuer_id through a single predecessor pointer. A denial-of-service
against the predecessor pointer (database row lock contention,
network partition between the emitter and the predecessor store, slow
IO, or an adversary deliberately holding the chain-tail lock)
therefore bounds the per-agent emission throughput, because every new
receipt MUST resolve the digest of the immediately prior receipt
before it can be linked. A partial-write failure between
predecessor-pointer commit and signature commit can additionally
produce chain-head ambiguity if not handled defensively.
Issuers SHOULD use a bounded predecessor-lookup timeout (operator-
tuned, typically on the order of seconds rather than tens of seconds)
and SHOULD emit a structured audit event with type
protectmcp:lifecycle and a stable reason code (RECOMMENDED:
chain_emission_blocked) when the timeout fires, rather than silently
dropping the receipt or stalling caller threads. Issuers SHOULD
additionally document a chain-head recovery procedure for crashed
emitters: on restart, the issuer re-reads the predecessor row,
verifies that no orphan signature exists for the next sequence
position, and resumes emission. Operators that require parallel per-
issuer throughput beyond what a single linear chain sustains MUST use
distinct issuer_id values per parallel path, with separate signing
keys and chains rooted at the all-zero genesis value, per the rule in
Section 5.3.
The threat profile here is availability, not confidentiality or
integrity: a successful chain-availability attack delays or drops
emission, but it cannot tamper with already-emitted receipts (those
are protected by Section 10.1) and it cannot forge receipts (those
are protected by Section 10.3). The chain_emission_blocked lifecycle
receipt is itself a Compliance Receipt and therefore links into the
chain once emission resumes, so the gap is detectable rather than
silent.
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10.3. Key Compromise
A Compliance Receipt is only as trustworthy as the key that signed
it. On suspected compromise of an issuer key, the Deployer MUST
publish a revocation notice that names the key, the time of suspected
compromise, and the chain head at that time. Receipts signed by the
compromised key after the named time MUST NOT be treated as
Compliance Receipts.
Verifiers MUST consult revocation metadata supplied with the Audit
Pack and MUST reject Compliance Receipts whose signing key was
revoked at or before issued_at.
10.4. Retention and Long-Term Verifiability
The longest retention floor in this profile is 2192 days (six
calendar years), set by Section 7.4 and Section 7.6; the EU side has
a parallel five-year (1827-day) floor under Section 6.3. Both exceed
the typical operational crypto-period of a signing key under
recommended key-management practice. Implementations SHOULD use ML-
DSA-65 from the [ACTA-RECEIPTS] algorithm registry ([FIPS204]) for
receipts expected to be verified after the cryptographic lifetime of
classical signature schemes ends. Implementations MUST retain public
key material for the entire retention window.
10.5. Privacy
[ACTA-RECEIPTS] prohibits the inclusion of raw prompts, tool
arguments, and credentials in the signed payload. This profile
extends that prohibition to the extension fields defined in this
document. The risk_class and incident_class values MUST be drawn
from controlled vocabularies and MUST NOT carry free-text personal
data.
Where the underlying Action references a data subject, the
payload_digest field MUST cover the data; the data itself MUST be
held in a separate store that respects the data subject's rights
under applicable law (including but not limited to the General Data
Protection Regulation for EU data subjects, the California Consumer
Privacy Act and Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act for the
corresponding US states, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule where electronic
protected health information is involved). A request for erasure
that is granted under applicable data protection law MUST be
reflected by deletion of the referenced payload, not by deletion of
the receipt; the receipt remains as evidence that an Action occurred
and was governed by a named policy at a named time.
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10.6. Anchor Trust
The trust assumptions of an anchor depend on the anchor type.
[RFC3161] timestamp tokens depend on the trust placed in the named
Time Stamping Authority. OpenTimestamps commitments depend on the
inclusion of the commitment in a public Bitcoin block. A Compliance
Verifier SHOULD treat the simultaneous presence of both anchor types
as stronger evidence than the presence of only one.
10.7. Replay
A Compliance Receipt is bound to a single Action via action_ref.
Replay of a Compliance Receipt against a different Action is
detectable by action_ref mismatch. The 300-second issued_at skew
bound stated in Section 5.1.2 limits the window in which a freshly-
replayed receipt can be presented as recent.
Where the verifier supports it, two receipts sharing action_ref and
issuer_id SHOULD be flagged as a candidate duplicate-emission event
for human review. This profile does not require verifiers to
maintain a cross-receipt index; deployers needing duplicate-emission
detection should arrange it at the Audit Pack production layer.
10.8. Cross-Regime Conflict
Where the same Action is in scope of more than one regime addressed
by this document, the producing system MUST satisfy the union of the
applicable requirements. Where a SHOULD clause in one regime
conflicts with a MUST clause in another, the MUST clause prevails.
Where two MUST clauses conflict, the producing system MUST refuse to
issue the receipt and MUST log the refusal as a protectmcp:lifecycle
Compliance Receipt.
10.9. Algorithm Agility
This profile inherits its algorithm registry from [ACTA-RECEIPTS].
Implementations MUST treat the verification of a historical receipt
according to the algorithm registry that was in force at issued_at,
not the registry in force at the time of verification, provided that
the signing key was not revoked.
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10.10. Issuer-Misrepresentation Residual
Per-agent hash chains under Section 5.3 detect tampering inside a
single issuer's stream but not the cross-agent attack in which a
compromised intermediary silently swaps payload bytes between two
honest agents. Both per-agent chains validate; action_ref is a
correlation anchor, not a cryptographic binding ([ACTA-RECEIPTS]
Section 2.2). Without a cross-agent binding primitive, a regulator
obtains no cryptographic answer to "did the acknowledging agent
acknowledge the bytes the originating agent actually sent". This
profile defines counterparty_binding (Section 5.6) as the partial
mitigation; the following residuals remain.
* Endpoint collusion. If both signing keys are compromised by the
same attacker, the attacker produces a coordinated forgery; no
signature scheme defends against this case.
* Intermediary holds the originating agent's key. In hosted-agent
deployments where the intermediary possesses the originating
agent's private key, it can sign anything as either party. Remote
attestation of key origin is the appropriate countermeasure and is
out of scope here.
* Originator offline at verification time. Section 5.6.3 requires
the originating envelope to be retrievable; if unpublished,
offline, or rate-limited, the binding becomes unverifiable
(liveness loss, observable as failure).
* Fan-out witness gap. When an originator broadcasts to N
acknowledgers, each emits an independent pairwise binding; none
witnesses any other. Append-only log profiles (future SCITT-style
transparency) are deferred to a later revision.
* Key rotation orphan. If the originating agent rotates keys after
emission but before an acknowledger binds it, the storage
obligation of Section 5.6.3 still requires the old envelope to
remain retrievable; if retention discipline fails, the binding
orphans.
* Privacy of envelope hashes. envelope_hash is computed over the
full signed bytes including A's signature; an observer of B's
receipt learns a stable identifier for A's exact action and
therefore can correlate B's behaviour across receipts even when
A's payload is otherwise confidential. Where this correlation is
unacceptable, a commitment scheme (for example, HMAC over the
envelope with a per-counterparty key disclosed only to the
verifier) is appropriate; this profile does not specify one.
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* Real-time prevention. counterparty_binding is detective, not
preventive: B has already accepted the bytes by the time the
binding is signed. Verifiers detect tampering only at audit time;
the in-flight bytes were not blocked. Where prevention is
required, transport-level integrity per Section 10.11 is the
appropriate primitive in addition to (not instead of) this
profile.
* Payload-content semantics. The binding proves byte equality, not
semantic equality. An intermediary that re-encodes A's bytes into
a different but JCS-equivalent canonical form is detected (the
SHA-256 differs); an intermediary that swaps A's bytes for
entirely different bytes that B's policy happens to interpret as
semantically equivalent is detected too. But an intermediary that
swaps A's bytes for an A-signed REPLAY of a prior valid envelope
from A is not detected by this binding alone; replay protection
requires that the verifier also check action_ref and
previousReceiptHash uniqueness within the chain segment.
10.11. Cross-Agent Integrity Trust Boundary
This section is informative. It records operator guidance for cases
where channel-level protection is the only available defence and
counterparty_binding per Section 5.6 has not yet been adopted by both
endpoints. For channels between named principals, implementers
SHOULD secure the channel using mutually authenticated TLS 1.3 per
[RFC8446]; MAY use the tls-exporter channel binding per [RFC9266]
derived via [RFC5705] where higher channel uniqueness is required;
and MAY layer HTTP Message Signatures per [RFC9421] where
intermediaries perform legitimate transformations.
Operators MUST NOT interpret transport-layer security alone as
evidence of cross-agent byte equality. Only counterparty_binding
produces application-layer, signed, replay-after-the-fact evidence
answering that question. Topologies where the intermediary
terminates TLS (CDN edges, MCP servers, message buses, orchestrators)
defeat transport-layer integrity against the threat case of
Section 10.10; in those topologies counterparty_binding is the only
defence this profile offers, and the absence of channel-binding
evidence in the Audit Pack SHOULD be documented as a known residual.
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10.12. Compromised Intermediary Between Two Honest Endpoints
This section is informative. Where an Action travels from a sending
agent A to a receiving agent B through one or more intermediary
processes M, and where M is compromised in such a way that M presents
byte sequence X to A and a different byte sequence X' to B, neither
A's nor B's cryptographic signature detects the divergence in
isolation: each endpoint signs the bytes it observed, and each
endpoint's per-agent hash chain per Section 5.3 remains internally
valid. Absent the counterparty_binding primitive this profile
introduces, the only available cross-agent primitive is action_ref as
a SHA-256 join key per Section 5.1.5; both A's chain and B's chain
remain valid in isolation, and divergence is only recoverable through
a regulator-driven post-hoc comparison of the two chains.
counterparty_binding introduced in Section 5.6 closes the case where
M silently swaps bytes between two honest endpoints A and B. An
acknowledging receipt under this binding is REQUIRED to carry an
envelope_hash computed over the exact byte stream B received (SHA-
256(A's envelope) under the digest-scope rule of Section 5.6.1). A
verifier resolves receipt_ref to A's stored envelope, recomputes the
digest, and compares; a mismatch indicates that the bytes B signed
are not the bytes A signed, and the acknowledging receipt MUST be
reported non-conformant per Section 5.6.3. The binding is detective
rather than preventive: it does not stop M from performing the swap
in flight, but it produces signed, replay-after-the-fact evidence
that the swap occurred.
The following residuals remain and are not closed by
counterparty_binding alone. The list is intentionally honest about
the audit-time, not sign-time, nature of the detective evidence: a
verifier resolves receipt_ref to A's retained envelope and recomputes
the digest at audit time, so any residual reasoning that depends on
"A is not in the loop at sign time" is rhetorical, not load-bearing.
* Collusion of M and B. If M and B are jointly compromised, M swaps
the bytes in flight and B issues an acknowledging receipt carrying
an envelope_hash computed over the altered bytes that B signs as
if they were A's. Under counterparty_binding the audit-time
verifier resolves receipt_ref to A's retained envelope and
recomputes the digest, so the binding is reported non-conformant
when A's storage is honest and reachable; M+B collusion alone does
NOT silently succeed. M+B collusion silently succeeds only when
the collusion ALSO extends to corrupting A's retained envelope,
suppressing A's chain segment, or making A's storage unreachable
to the auditor; that is, the true residual is M+B+(A's-storage
compromise or unavailability). Operator mitigation: anchor A's
chain on independent witnesses (combined [RFC3161] +
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[OPENTIMESTAMPS] anchors per Section 5.4, and OPTIONAL deployer-
operated transparency logs) so that A's anchored chain-segment
digests are independently recoverable from public evidence;
regulator-side comparison of A's anchored chain against B's stored
chain detects the divergence even when A's local storage is
impeached.
* Collusion of M and A. If M and A are jointly compromised, A signs
a fabricated envelope at M's direction and M relays it to B; B
verifies M's relay normally, B's counterparty_binding correctly
digests the bytes A signed, A's per-agent chain validates, and B's
per-agent chain validates. Every cryptographic invariant in this
profile holds because the binding correctly attests that the bytes
B received were the bytes A signed; the fraud is in A's intent,
not in any byte mismatch. This residual is fundamentally outside
the receipt model's threat surface: no application-layer
cryptographic primitive in this profile distinguishes a fraudulent
A-signed envelope from an honest A-signed envelope when M is also
colluding to corroborate plausibility (relay logs, timestamping,
message ordering). Operator mitigation: separation of duties
between issuer (A) and intermediary (M) so that the same operator
cannot control both signing keys and relay logs; anchor evidence
on independent witnesses under different trust roots so that an
attacker controlling A and M still cannot retroactively coordinate
anchor inclusion across uncolluding timestamping authorities; out-
of-band attestation by the regulator or auditor of A's operational
context (provenance, code signing, runtime attestation) where the
policy regime authorises it.
* Compromise of B itself. A B that has been compromised (private
key extraction, supply-chain compromise, or insider operation) can
sign any envelope_hash the attacker chooses; counterparty_binding
proves only that the signing key acknowledged some bytes, not that
those bytes match what an honest B would have observed.
* Loss of A's stored envelope. counterparty_binding requires the
verifier to resolve receipt_ref to A's full signed envelope; if
A's chain segment is unavailable (retention discipline failure,
key rotation orphan, deliberate withholding), the binding becomes
unverifiable and the receipt is reported non-conformant on
liveness grounds rather than on byte-equality grounds. An
adversary who can arrange A-envelope unavailability and then re-
emit colluding bytes can degrade the binding from a byte-equality
check to a liveness-loss flag.
Operators concerned about these residuals in the absence of single-
point cryptographic defence SHOULD:
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* Anchor receipts to multiple independent witnesses. Where both
[RFC3161] and [OPENTIMESTAMPS] anchors are present per
Section 5.4, a coordinated M-B collusion attack must also induce
both timestamping authorities to anchor the colluding bytes within
the operator's anchor interval, raising the conjunction-cost of
the attack. Operators MAY add further anchors (e.g. a Deployer-
operated transparency log or a witness service) without changing
the wire format defined here.
* Use side-by-side chain comparison under regulator subpoena. The
audit-trail alternative semantics established for SEC 17a-4
recordkeeping (see Section 7.6.1) and the post-market surveillance
regime of EU AI Act Articles 12 and 26 (see Section 6.1 and
Section 6.2) authorise the regulator to compel both A's and B's
Audit Packs and to reconstruct the relay by joining on action_ref
per Section 5.1.5. counterparty_binding reduces the regulator's
workload from "compare both chains and detect divergence" to
"verify B's bound digest against A's stored envelope"; the
underlying subpoena-and-compare workflow remains the regulator's
ultimate authority and remains operative when the binding is
unverifiable.
* Document M's relay logs out-of-band. Where the intermediary M is
identifiable (a named MCP server, message bus, orchestrator, or
relay), the operator SHOULD require M to produce signed relay logs
covering the time window of the Action and SHOULD submit those
logs to the same Audit Pack production layer as A's and B's
chains. Out-of-band relay logs do not require a wire-format
change in this profile; they are operational evidence that
complements counterparty_binding rather than replacing it.
The worst-case latency to detection for an M-only compromise (not M-B
collusion) is bounded by the anchor interval recommended in
Section 10.1: 24 hours by default, one hour for Deployers operating
under [DORA] Article 17, 23 NYCRR 500.17, or [CIRCIA]. After the
next anchor commits, the divergence between A's anchored chain
segment and the digest carried in B's counterparty_binding is
permanently recoverable from the anchored evidence alone, without
trust in M.
11. IANA Considerations
This document requests two new IANA registries to support stable,
machine-checkable extensions to the Compliance Receipt format.
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11.1. Compliance Receipt Extension Fields Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "Compliance Receipt
Extension Fields" under a new "Compliance Receipts" registry group.
This registry covers both signed-payload fields and envelope-level
fields (siblings of payload and signature); each entry's Description
identifies which.
Each entry contains:
* Field Name: a JSON object key, lowercase ASCII letters, digits,
and underscore.
* Description: a one-line summary of the field's purpose.
* Reference: the document that defines the field's semantics.
* Vocabulary: a URL or registry pointer for the controlled
vocabulary that field values are drawn from, or "free-form" if
none.
The registration policy is Specification Required, per [RFC8126].
The Designated Expert(s) SHOULD verify that the field name does not
collide with any field defined by [ACTA-RECEIPTS], that the Reference
is a stable, dereferenceable specification, and that the Vocabulary
is documented sufficiently for an independent verifier to validate
values.
Initial registry contents (each entry labelled with Scope to
disambiguate signed-payload fields from envelope-level fields per the
registry description above):
* risk_class - Scope: signed-payload - Risk classification term
under the Deployer's risk management documentation - This document
- Vocabulary referenced in Audit Pack metadata.
* incident_class - Scope: signed-payload - Incident classification
term spanning DORA Article 18(1) (with further specification in
[REG-2024-1772] and the canonical reporting enumeration of Annex
II field 3.23 of [REG-2025-302]), 23 NYCRR 500.1 Cybersecurity
Event/Incident, [CIRCIA] Covered Cyber Incident, and HIPAA
security incident under 45 CFR 164.304 - This document - Audit
Pack metadata.
* counterparty_binding - Scope: signed-payload - Signed-payload
object carrying a base64-encoded SHA-256 digest (envelope_hash) of
a peer agent's full signed envelope including signature bytes, a
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resolvable opaque locator (receipt_ref), an OPTIONAL expected-
acknowledger identifier (expect_ack_from), and an OPTIONAL
operational transport_label; see Section 5.6 for the full member
set and the digest-scope rule - This document - Member vocabulary
defined in Section 5.6.1; digest algorithm is SHA-256 per
[ACTA-RECEIPTS] with base64 encoding per [RFC4648].
* result_digest - Scope: signed-payload - Object of the upstream
payload_digest shape (hash, size, OPTIONAL preview) carrying a
SHA-256 digest of the downstream Action's result body; defined in
Section 5.7 - This document - Digest algorithm is SHA-256 with hex
encoding under the sha256:<64 hex> form.
* expires_at - Scope: signed-payload - ISO 8601 timestamp with
explicit timezone declaring the wall-clock time after which the
decision result is stale and not safe to replay; defined in
Section 5.7 - This document - Free-form ISO 8601 string.
* nonce - Scope: signed-payload - Producer-generated string unique
across the producer's emission stream for the lifetime of kid;
defined in Section 5.7 - This document - Free-form (base64url-
encoded random value of at least 16 bytes, or a structured
identifier such as UUIDv4, UUIDv7, ULID).
* tool_fingerprint - Scope: signed-payload - JSON string formatted
sha256:<64 hex> over the JCS-canonical declaration of the tool
that produced the Action; defined in Section 5.7 - This document -
Digest algorithm is SHA-256 per [RFC8785] canonicalization.
* config_manifest_digest - Scope: signed-payload - JSON string
formatted sha256:<64 hex> over the canonical bytes of the
producer's configuration manifest in effect at signing time;
defined in Section 5.7 - This document - Manifest content is
operator-defined; canonicalization rule is operator-declared in
the Audit Pack manifest entry.
* cve_inventory_digest - Scope: signed-payload - JSON string
formatted sha256:<64 hex> over the canonical bytes of the
producer's CVE inventory at signing time; defined in Section 5.7 -
This document - Inventory content lists CVE identifiers per the
producer's accepted-residual rationale.
* executable_hash - Scope: signed-payload - JSON string formatted
sha256:<64 hex> over the canonical bytes of the executable that
invoked the Action (OCI image manifest digest for container
producers, on-disk SHA-256 for non-container executables); defined
in Section 5.8 - This document - Digest algorithm is SHA-256.
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* sbom_digest - Scope: signed-payload - JSON string formatted
sha256:<64 hex> over the canonical bytes of the CycloneDX or SPDX
SBOM document covering the executing image; defined in Section 5.8
- This document - SBOM format and version declared in the Audit
Pack manifest entry.
* slsa_provenance_pointer - Scope: signed-payload - JSON string
carrying an https URL resolving to the SLSA provenance attestation
envelope for the build of the executable identified by
executable_hash; defined in Section 5.8 - This document - Target
SHOULD be SLSA Provenance v1.0 in-toto statement form.
* supply_chain_pointer - Scope: signed-payload - JSON string
carrying an https URL resolving to a transparency-log entry (in-
toto, Sigstore, or Rekor) covering the build of the executable
identified by executable_hash; defined in Section 5.8 - This
document - Verifier acceptance is SHOULD across the three log
formats.
* anchors - Scope: envelope-level - Envelope-level array of
timestamp / transparency-log anchors covering the signed envelope;
entries carry a REQUIRED type discriminator (rfc3161 or
opentimestamps) and a REQUIRED value field, plus OPTIONAL
informational members status (anchored / pending / failed) and
bitcoin_block (string Bitcoin block hash for upgraded
OpenTimestamps entries); full schema is defined in Section 5.4 -
This document - Anchor type vocabulary: rfc3161 per [RFC3161],
opentimestamps per [OPENTIMESTAMPS].
* witness_policy - Scope: envelope-level - Envelope-level object
declaring an N-of-M durable-anchoring quorum over the anchors
array; carries a REQUIRED integer required in the closed range [1,
length of witnesses] and a REQUIRED non-empty array witnesses
whose distinct values are a subset of {rfc3161, opentimestamps}
(Rekor and other transparency-log pointers are NOT witness types
and MUST be rejected). The receipt reaches the quorum-met state
only when at least required distinct witness types each hold a
verifiable inclusion proof; a producer MUST NOT assert durable
anchoring unless that holds, per the false-attestation rule of
Section 5.4 - This document - Witness type vocabulary: rfc3161 per
[RFC3161], opentimestamps per [OPENTIMESTAMPS]; inclusion-proof
prior art per [DRAFT-IETF-SCITT] and [RFC6962].
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* mitre_techniques - Scope: signed-payload - JSON array of MITRE
ATT&CK technique identifiers (for example T1059, T1078) self-
declared by the producer; not verifier-checked by the issuing
platform; flips framework_mappings_self_declared to true when
populated; defined in Section 5.10 - This document - Vocabulary
referenced by id from the MITRE ATT&CK enterprise matrix.
* mitre_atlas - Scope: signed-payload - JSON array of MITRE ATLAS
identifiers (for example AML.T0051) covering AI-system-specific
adversary techniques; self-declared; flips
framework_mappings_self_declared to true when populated; defined
in Section 5.10 - This document - Vocabulary referenced by id from
the MITRE ATLAS catalogue.
* owasp_llm_top10 - Scope: signed-payload - JSON array of OWASP Top
10 for LLM Applications identifiers (for example LLM01, LLM02);
self-declared; flips framework_mappings_self_declared to true when
populated; defined in Section 5.10 - This document - Vocabulary
referenced by id from the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
publication.
* nist_ai_rmf - Scope: signed-payload - JSON array of NIST AI Risk
Management Framework function identifiers and subcategories (for
example GOVERN-1.1, MEASURE-2.7); self-declared; flips
framework_mappings_self_declared to true when populated; defined
in Section 5.10 - This document - Vocabulary referenced from NIST
AI RMF 1.0.
* iso_42001 - Scope: signed-payload - JSON array of ISO/IEC
42001:2023 control identifiers (for example A.6.2.6); self-
declared; flips framework_mappings_self_declared to true when
populated; defined in Section 5.10 - This document - Vocabulary
referenced from ISO/IEC 42001:2023.
* eu_ai_act_articles - Scope: signed-payload - JSON array of EU AI
Act article identifiers (for example Article-12, Article-15);
self-declared; flips framework_mappings_self_declared to true when
populated; defined in Section 5.10 - This document - Vocabulary
referenced from [EU-AI-ACT].
* rfc3161_timestamp - Scope: signed-payload - JSON string carrying a
base64-encoded RFC 3161 TimeStampResp (DER) supplied by the
producer at signing time and preserved verbatim on the receipt for
offline TSA chain verification independent of any platform-issued
anchors; payload entry is an opaque caller-supplied token, not the
per-receipt anchor produced by the platform; defined in
Section 5.10 - This document - Bytes are an RFC 3161 TimeStampResp
per [RFC3161]; base64 encoding per [RFC4648].
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* framework_mappings_self_declared - Scope: signed-payload - JSON
boolean false-attestation guard set by the issuing platform to
true whenever any of mitre_techniques, mitre_atlas,
owasp_llm_top10, nist_ai_rmf, iso_42001, or eu_ai_act_articles is
populated; a producer-supplied value of false alongside a
populated taxonomy field MUST be overridden by the issuing
platform; defined in Section 5.10 - This document - Boolean.
* authorized_under_mandate - Scope: signed-payload - Server-built
object recording a self-declared authorizing mandate the Action
was signed under; carries REQUIRED mandate_id, REQUIRED issuer_id,
a REQUIRED scope_digest formatted sha256:<64 hex> over the
mandate's authorized-action-types scope, and a REQUIRED verified
boolean whose true value asserts self-declared issuer authority
(the same trust level as framework_mappings_self_declared, never
issuing-platform-verified third-party authorization); a present-
but-malformed object is rejected by the false-attestation guard at
signing time; defined in Section 5.9 - This document - Member
vocabulary defined in Section 5.9; scope_digest digest algorithm
is SHA-256.
* controls_evaluated - Scope: signed-payload - Server-built object
enumerating the enforcement controls that genuinely fired on this
sign plus the allow result; member keys are a closed set
(emergency_halt, delegation_scope, quorum, mandate, policy,
content_scan, result) and an unknown key is rejected; a key is
present only when its control ran (omission-over-false
attestation), quorum requires fired=true plus a 64-hex
attestation_hash, and a policy member asserting evaluation
requires matched_count at least 1; a caller-supplied value is
dropped before signing; defined in Section 5.9 - This document -
Control-key vocabulary defined in Section 5.9.
This document additionally requests that IANA register
counterparty_binding as a new claim in the CBOR Web Token (CWT)
Claims registry established by [RFC8392], with this document as the
reference and the semantics defined in Section 5.6. The requested
CWT claim key is TBD by IANA; this document proposes allocation from
the IANA First Come First Served range (claim keys greater than or
equal to -65536 and less than -256, or greater than or equal to
65536, per [RFC8392] Section 9.1) so as not to consume Expert Review
or Standards Action space. The JSON-form claim name is the literal
string counterparty_binding as registered above in the Compliance
Receipt Extension Fields Registry.
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11.2. Compliance Receipt Type Namespaces Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "Compliance Receipt
Type Namespaces" under the same "Compliance Receipts" registry group.
Each entry contains:
* Namespace: a colon-separated identifier prefix used as a value of
the type field, lowercase ASCII letters, digits, hyphen,
underscore, and colon.
* Description: a one-line summary of the receipt category.
* Reference: the document that defines the namespace.
The registration policy is Specification Required, per [RFC8126].
The Designated Expert(s) SHOULD verify that the namespace does not
collide with any namespace already registered or any namespace
reserved by [ACTA-RECEIPTS], and that the Reference is a stable
specification.
Initial registry contents:
* protectmcp:acknowledgment - A receipt emitted by the B-party in a
counterparty_binding pair, confirming receipt of the A-party
action and carrying a digest of the bound envelope per Section 5.6
- This document.
* protectmcp:decision - A receipt recording a policy evaluation
outcome (allow, deny, rate_limit) for an MCP-mediated tool call
where a policy was actually evaluated; observation is reserved to
protectmcp:lifecycle and protectmcp:observation per Section 5.2 -
This document.
* protectmcp:restraint - A receipt recording the application or
release of a restraint on an agent (e.g., quota, rate limit,
sandbox tightening) - This document.
* protectmcp:lifecycle - A receipt recording an agent or system
lifecycle event (e.g., configuration change, key rotation,
oversight review, or a decision=observation record indicating an
Action was signed without policy evaluation per Section 5.2) -
This document.
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* protectmcp:lifecycle:configuration_change - A receipt recording a
configuration change to an agent or producing system, including
changes that disable or re-enable receipt generation (see
Section 6.1.1); a registered sub-namespace under
protectmcp:lifecycle that the reference cloud implementation emits
today - This document.
* protectmcp:observation - A receipt recording passive telemetry
about an Action that was signed without a policy evaluation,
emitted under one of the capture topologies catalogued in
Appendix "Appendix - Capture Topologies for Compliance Receipt
Emission" (typically network_proxy, browser_extension,
ebpf_observer, or mcp_proxy) where the originating application
could not call the receipt-emitting SDK directly - This document.
* protectmcp:observation:result_bound - A sub-namespace under
protectmcp:observation for a follow-up observation receipt that
carries a result_digest (Section 5.7) binding the byte-equality of
a downstream Action's result to the originating
protectmcp:decision receipt identified by action_ref; the
reference cloud implementation emits this type for tool calls
whose downstream result is regulator-relevant (LLM completions
under EU AI Act Article 12, audit-log entries under HIPAA
164.312(b), broker-dealer communications under SEC 17a-4) - This
document.
12. Related Work
This section catalogues parallel proposals that overlap the problem
space of signed records for AI-agent actions. The intent is to
position this profile within the broader Independent Submissions and
individual drafts landscape so that an implementer can choose the
surface that matches the trust model and the regulator that the
implementer is bound by. The citations follow the RFC 7322 form and
are informative; this section places no normative constraint on a
Compliance Receipt implementation.
* [DRAFT-SHARIF-APKI] defines a certificate-based Public Key
Infrastructure for autonomous AI agents, with X.509 certificate
profiles, naming conventions, and revocation considerations. Its
scope is identity issuance and trust-root anchoring for agent
principals; it does not define a per-action receipt format. This
profile is complementary to [DRAFT-SHARIF-APKI]: an implementer
that anchors agent identity through APKI can express the resulting
kid and issuer_id values in Compliance Receipts under
Section 5.1.3, with the trust-anchor metadata of the Audit Pack
resolving through the APKI certificate chain.
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* [DRAFT-SHARIF-AML] defines cryptographic attestation across the AI
model lifecycle, from training-data provenance to inference-time
output binding. Its scope is the model-build and model-evaluation
surface, addressing what evidence a model producer or model
consumer SHOULD retain about the model's lineage and behaviour.
This profile is complementary at the per-action layer: a Deployer
that consumes a model whose lifecycle attestations are produced
under [DRAFT-SHARIF-AML] can reference those attestation digests
in Compliance Receipts via config_manifest_digest (Section 5.7) or
via the build-provenance four-tuple of Section 5.8 where the model
is delivered as a containerized executable.
* [PIPELOCK-ER2] proposes an alternative receipt format for AI agent
actions under the EvidenceReceipt v2 schema. The Pipelock format
is published as a public reference outside the IETF process and
addresses overlapping evidence-class requirements with a different
envelope, a different canonicalization choice, and a different
anchoring posture. This profile and the Pipelock format are
bidding for the same regulator audience under different design
tradeoffs; an implementer that already deploys EvidenceReceipt v2
receipts can map the field set across the two surfaces, though
byte-equality across the formats is not preserved (the
canonicalization rules differ) and a cross-format verifier would
have to recompute digests under each format's rule.
* [DRAFT-IETF-SCITT] defines the Supply Chain Integrity,
Transparency, and Trust architecture: an append-only Transparency
Service that admits signed statements about an artefact and
returns a receipt proving inclusion in the log, with verification
reducing to a Merkle inclusion proof in the tradition of [RFC6962]
Certificate Transparency. SCITT and RFC 6962 are the canonical
inclusion-proof prior art that this profile's witness_policy
(Section 5.4) generalizes from a single log to an N-of-M quorum
over heterogeneous durable-anchoring witnesses. This profile is
complementary to SCITT rather than competitive with it: a SCITT
Transparent Statement MAY carry a Compliance Receipt as its signed
payload, so that a Deployer operating a SCITT Transparency Service
obtains a SCITT receipt whose inclusion proof can be named as one
witness in a Compliance Receipt's witness_policy, while the
Compliance Receipt continues to carry the regulator-facing field
bindings that SCITT's artefact-neutral envelope does not define.
This closes the append-only-log gap deferred under Section 10.12.
* [A2A] defines the Agent2Agent protocol, a vendor-neutral
horizontal protocol for communication between independent agents,
hosted as a Linux Foundation project. A2A defines an Agent Card,
an extension mechanism (data-only, profile, method, and state-
machine extension classes declared inside the Agent Card
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capabilities and activated by clients through a request header),
and an Agent Card signature that carries a detached JSON Web
Signature over the Agent Card document itself. A2A is
complementary to this profile rather than competitive with it:
A2A's Agent Card signature attests the integrity of the card, not
the execution of a per-action authorization decision, and A2A is
explicitly method-agnostic on identity verification. A Deployer
can reference a Compliance Receipt from an A2A Agent Card through
a verifier-issued attestation pointer (a resolvable URL, a content
hash over the referenced receipt, and the verifier identity
expressed as a decentralized identifier), so that the Compliance
Receipt's issuer_id (Section 5.1.3) is the receipt subject and the
per-action regulator-facing bindings of Sections 5 and 6 compose
on top of A2A's identity layer without either layer redefining the
other.
* [A2A-IDF] is the Agent Identity Verification and Trust Framework
proposal under the A2A protocol's contribution process, defining
tiered identity verification levels (self-asserted, domain-
verified, organization-verified), Agent Card signing for
production agents, revocation endpoints, delegation-chain
verification, and per-message signing. Its scope is the identity
and trust-anchoring layer beneath per-action receipts; it does not
define a regulator-facing per-action receipt format, and its post-
quantum cryptography work is scheduled for a later cycle. This
profile is complementary to [A2A-IDF] at the per-action layer: an
implementer that anchors agent identity through an A2A-IDF
verification level can express the resulting identity as the
issuer_id and kid of Compliance Receipts under Section 5.1.3,
while this profile already signs receipts with the ML-DSA-65 post-
quantum signature algorithm of [FIPS204] that the surrounding
agent-identity ecosystem largely defers.
* [DRAFT-HOPLEY-X402] is the closest parallel receipt format: it
defines a Compliance Receipt minted at admission time under a
payment-gate remote procedure call, carrying an ALLOW, REFER, or
DENY verdict bound to a payment mandate. The format canonicalizes
under [RFC8785] JCS, digests under SHA-256, and links receipts in
a monotonic hash chain (position plus content hash plus previous-
hash), in the same family of design primitives as this profile
(JCS canonicalization, SHA-256 digests, hash-chain linkage under
Section 5.3, and a categorical decision under Section 5.2 bound to
an authorizing mandate under Section 5.9). The two drafts differ
in scope and trust model. [DRAFT-HOPLEY-X402] is narrowed to
payment anti-money-laundering and sanctions-screening admission
decisions, is bound to a payment-settlement substrate, and its
REFER verdict carries a jurisdiction-specific suspicious-activity-
reporting meaning. This profile is the broader superset: it
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covers general agent-action receipts across regulatory regimes
rather than payment screening alone (Sections 5 and 6), it is
signed by a neutral third party rather than by the screening party
itself (the unaffiliated-custodian posture the recordkeeping
bindings of Sections 5 and 6 anchor), it carries the organization-
wide enforcement controls enumerated in controls_evaluated
(Section 5.9) rather than a single admission verdict, and it signs
with the ML-DSA-65 post-quantum algorithm of [FIPS204]. An
implementer deploying both can map the verdict and mandate-binding
fields across the two surfaces, though byte-equality is not
preserved because the envelope shapes differ.
This section is non-exhaustive. The Independent Submissions stream
and the individual-draft search surface of the IETF Datatracker host
additional proposals whose scope intersects the Compliance Receipt
problem space; an implementer evaluating the field is encouraged to
re-query the Datatracker against the keywords "agent", "receipt",
"attestation", and "audit trail" at the time of implementation. The
author welcomes pull requests against the source repository of this
draft naming additional active parallel work.
13. Acknowledgements
The author thanks Tom Farley for [ACTA-RECEIPTS], on which this
profile is built. This profile would not exist without the field
catalogue and envelope structure that the upstream draft defines.
The author also thanks the Asqav community for review of early
drafts.
14. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
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[FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 204,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204, 13 August 2024,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final>.
[RFC5816] Santesson, S. and N. Pope, "ESSCertIDv2 Update for RFC
3161", RFC 5816, DOI 10.17487/RFC5816, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5816>.
[RFC3161] Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp
Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, DOI 10.17487/RFC3161, August
2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3161>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[OPENTIMESTAMPS]
OpenTimestamps, "OpenTimestamps Server", September 2016,
<https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-server>.
[ACTA-RECEIPTS]
Farley, T., "Signed Decision Receipts for Machine-to-
Machine Access Control", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-01, 25 April 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-farley-acta-
signed-receipts-01>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[ISO17442] ISO, "Financial services - Legal entity identifier (LEI) -
Part 1: Assignment", ISO 17442-1:2020, August 2020,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/78829.html>.
[W3C-DID] W3C, "Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0", 19 July
2022, <https://www.w3.org/TR/did-1.0/>.
[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
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[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[NIST-GENAI-PROFILE]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework:
Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile", NIST AI
600-1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.AI.600-1, 26 July 2024,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf>.
15. Informative References
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
[RFC9266] Whited, S., "Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3", RFC 9266,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9266, July 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9266>.
[RFC9421] Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421>.
[ISO8601-2]
ISO, "Date and time - Representations for information
interchange - Part 2: Extensions", ISO 8601-2:2019,
February 2019, <https://www.iso.org/standard/70908.html>.
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[EU-AI-ACT]
European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (EU)
2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial
intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008,
(EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU)
2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU,
(EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence
Act) (Text with EEA relevance)", 12 July 2024,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>.
[DORA] European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (EU)
2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the
financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No
1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No
909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011 (Text with EEA relevance)", 27
December 2022,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj>.
[REG-2025-301]
European Commission, "Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2025/301 of 23 October 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU)
2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council
with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying
the content, timelines and templates on the reporting of
major ICT-related incidents and significant cyber threats
(Text with EEA relevance)", 20 February 2025,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/301/oj>.
[REG-2025-302]
European Commission, "Commission Implementing Regulation
(EU) 2025/302 of 23 October 2024 laying down implementing
technical standards for the application of Regulation (EU)
2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council
with regard to the standard forms, templates, and
procedures for financial entities to report a major ICT-
related incident and to notify a significant cyber threat
(Text with EEA relevance)", 20 February 2025,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/302/oj>.
[REG-2024-1772]
European Commission, "Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2024/1772 of 13 March 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU)
2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council
with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying
the criteria for the classification of ICT-related
incidents and cyber threats, setting out materiality
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thresholds and specifying the details of reports of major
incidents (Text with EEA relevance)", 25 June 2024,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1772/oj>.
[MIFID2] European Parliament and Council, "Directive 2014/65/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast) (Text with
EEA relevance)", 12 June 2014,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/65/oj>.
[REG-2017-565]
European Commission, "Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2017/565 of 25 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as
regards organisational requirements and operating
conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the
purposes of that Directive (Text with EEA relevance)", 31
March 2017,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2017/565/oj>.
[AMLD] European Parliament and Council, "Directive (EU) 2015/849
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May
2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist
financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA
relevance)", 5 June 2015,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj>.
[AMLR] European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (EU)
2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist
financing (Text with EEA relevance)", 19 June 2024,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj>.
[NIST-AI-RMF]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF
1.0)", NIST AI 100-1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1, 26
January 2023,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.100-1.pdf>.
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[COLORADO-AI-ACT]
State of Colorado, Seventy-Fourth General Assembly,
"Senate Bill 24-205, Consumer Protections for Artificial
Intelligence", 17 May 2024,
<https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb24-205>.
[TEXAS-TRAIGA]
State of Texas, 89th Legislature, Regular Session, "House
Bill 149, Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence
Governance Act", 22 June 2025,
<https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/
History.aspx?LegSess=89R&Bill=HB149>.
[HIPAA-SECURITY]
United States Department of Health and Human Services,
"HIPAA Security Rule, 45 CFR Part 164, Subpart C, Security
Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected
Health Information", 20 February 2003,
<https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/subtitle-A/
subchapter-C/part-164>.
[NYDFS-500]
New York State Department of Financial Services, "23 NYCRR
Part 500, Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial
Services Companies", 1 March 2017,
<https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry-guidance/cybersecurity>.
[SEC-17A-4]
United States Securities and Exchange Commission,
"Electronic Recordkeeping Requirements for Broker-Dealers,
Security-Based Swap Dealers, and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants (Rule 17a-4 Amendments)", 3 November 2022,
<https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2022/11/03/2022-22670/electronic-recordkeeping-
requirements-for-broker-dealers-security-based-swap-
dealers-and-major>. Effective date January 3, 2023;
compliance date for amendments to 17 CFR 240.17a-4 May 3,
2023.
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[CIRCIA] United States Congress, "Cyber Incident Reporting for
Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, enacted as Division Y
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (Public Law
117-103); statutory authority codified at 6 U.S.C. 681 et
seq.", 15 March 2022,
<https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ103/PLAW-
117publ103.pdf>. Public Law 117-103 was enacted on March
15, 2022. Implementing regulations are proceeding under a
CISA notice of proposed rulemaking at 89 FR 23644 (April
4, 2024); the final rule is pending publication.
[DRAFT-SHARIF-APKI]
Independent, "Agent Public Key Infrastructure (APKI):
Certificate-Based Identity and Trust for Autonomous AI
Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-sharif-
apki-agent-pki-00, 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sharif-apki-agent-
pki/>. Active Independent Submission on the IETF
Datatracker; defines a certificate-based PKI for
autonomous AI agents. Cited under Section 12 as parallel
work on the identity-anchoring surface complementary to
this profile's per-action receipt format.
[DRAFT-SHARIF-AML]
Independent, "Cryptographic Attestation for AI Model
Lifecycle: From Training Data to Inference Output", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-sharif-ai-model-
lifecycle-attestation-00, 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sharif-ai-model-
lifecycle-attestation/>. Active Independent Submission on
the IETF Datatracker; defines cryptographic attestation
across the AI model lifecycle from training- data
provenance to inference-time output binding. Cited under
Section 12 as parallel work on the model-build and model-
evaluation surface complementary to this profile's per-
action receipt format.
[PIPELOCK-ER2]
Pipelock, "EvidenceReceipt v2: An Alternative Receipt
Format for AI Agent Actions", 2025,
<https://pipelock.ai/evidence-receipt-v2>. Public
reference published outside the IETF process. Cited under
Section 12 as an alternative receipt-format proposal under
different envelope, canonicalization, and anchoring
choices; byte-equality across the two formats is not
preserved.
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[A2A] A2A Project, a Linux Foundation project, "Agent2Agent
(A2A) Protocol", 2025,
<https://github.com/a2aproject/A2A>. Vendor-neutral
horizontal protocol for communication between independent
agents, hosted as a Linux Foundation project. Defines an
Agent Card, an extension mechanism, and a JSON Web
Signature over the Agent Card document. Cited under
Section 12 as parallel work on the agent- interoperation
surface complementary to this profile's per-action receipt
format; A2A is method-agnostic on identity verification
and does not define a regulator-facing per-action receipt
format.
[A2A-IDF] A2A Project contributors, "Agent Identity Verification and
Trust Framework (A2A-IDF)", 2026,
<https://github.com/a2aproject/A2A/issues/1497>. Identity
and trust-framework proposal under the A2A protocol
contribution process, defining tiered verification levels,
Agent Card signing, revocation, and delegation-chain
verification. Cited under Section 12 as parallel work on
the identity-anchoring layer beneath this profile's per-
action receipts; post-quantum cryptography is scheduled
for a later cycle.
[DRAFT-HOPLEY-X402]
Hopley, C., "x402 Compliance Receipt", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt-02,
25 May 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
hopley-x402-compliance-receipt/>. Independent Submission,
Informational. Defines a JCS-canonicalized, SHA-256 hash-
chained Compliance Receipt carrying an ALLOW, REFER, or
DENY admission verdict bound to a payment mandate under
the x402 payment substrate. Cited under Section 12 as the
closest parallel receipt format; this profile is the
broader superset (general agent-action receipts, neutral
third-party signing, organization-wide control
attestation, ML-DSA-65) and that draft is narrowed to
payment anti- money-laundering and sanctions-screening
admission decisions.
[DRAFT-IETF-SCITT]
IETF SCITT Working Group, "An Architecture for Trustworthy
and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-scitt-architecture, 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-scitt-
architecture/>. IETF SCITT Working Group draft defining
an append-only Transparency Service that issues inclusion-
proof receipts over signed statements. Cited under
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Section 12 as canonical inclusion-proof prior art
complementary to this profile's witness_policy; a SCITT
Transparent Statement can carry a Compliance Receipt as
its payload.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>. Defines the
Merkle-tree inclusion-proof model for an append-only
public log. Cited under Section 12 as the foundational
inclusion-proof prior art that this profile's
witness_policy generalizes to an N-of-M quorum over
heterogeneous durable-anchoring witnesses.
Worked Example (Informative)
This appendix illustrates a Compliance Receipt that satisfies the EU
AI Act Article 26 binding for a tool invocation by a High-Risk AI
System deployed by a Financial Entity. The wire shape applies
identically to United States bindings; the only differences are the
values placed in issuer_id (LEI, EIN, or CIK depending on the regime)
and in the risk_class and incident_class vocabularies referenced in
the Audit Pack manifest. Field values are abbreviated for
readability and are not cryptographically valid. The example shows a
mid-chain receipt; a chain-genesis receipt would carry a
previousReceiptHash of 64 zero hex characters per Section 5.3.
The worked example below is illustrative. The digest-valued fields
(action_ref, policy_digest, the hash member of payload_digest, and
previousReceiptHash) are shown abbreviated with an internal ellipsis
so each line fits the column width; a real receipt carries the full
64-character lowercase hex digest. The keys are shown in human-
readable order rather than JCS-canonical lexicographic order; the
JCS-canonical bytes used as input to SHA-256 reorder keys
lexicographically (so the on-the-wire byte order for hashing is
action_ref, decision, issued_at, issuer_id, iteration_id,
payload_digest, policy_digest, previousReceiptHash, reason,
risk_class, sandbox_state, tool_name, type, with each nested object's
keys also lexicographically sorted, per [RFC8785]). The sig value,
the anchors value entries, and the hash hex values are deterministic
placeholders chosen for shape rather than cryptographic validity.
Implementations MUST NOT replay or trust this example as a real
receipt; the example is not signed by any allocated issuer_id, is not
anchored against any TSA or OpenTimestamps calendar, and does not
chain into any retained predecessor.
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{
"payload": {
"type": "protectmcp:decision",
"issued_at": "2026-05-04T09:14:22.118Z",
"issuer_id": "00000000000000000098",
"action_ref": "c1f3a09a4d2e7f6b8c5a91e3d7b04f2a...3c5e7f9d",
"tool_name": "deploy",
"iteration_id": "task-2026-05-04-01a3",
"decision": "allow",
"reason": "policy:within_limits",
"policy_digest": "sha256:7b214e8c3d9f4a2b1e6c8f5a...1f3a5d7b",
"sandbox_state": "enabled",
"payload_digest": {
"hash": "0a44d2c8e3f5b7a9d1c4e6f8b2a5d7c9...e7f9b2a4",
"size": 1024
},
"previousReceiptHash": "f80c11a3b5d7e9c2f4a6b8d1...b8d1e3c5",
"risk_class": "deployer:financial:medium"
},
"signature": {
"alg": "EdDSA",
"kid": "00000000000000000098",
"sig": "..."
},
"anchors": [
{
"type": "rfc3161",
"value": "..."
},
{
"type": "opentimestamps",
"value": "..."
}
]
}
The above receipt satisfies the Article 26 binding because:
* issuer_id is a 20-character ISO 17442 Legal Entity Identifier
(LEI) that resolves through the trust anchor metadata in the Audit
Pack to the named Deployer;
* policy_digest resolves to a retained policy artefact;
* sandbox_state is enabled, satisfying the High-Risk system
constraint of Section 5.1.6;
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* previousReceiptHash links the receipt into the chain per
Section 5.3;
* both an [RFC3161] anchor and an [OPENTIMESTAMPS] anchor are
present per Section 5.4.
Under the DORA Article 17 binding a Compliance Verifier additionally
checks the longest applicable sectoral retention floor (1827 days as
the default, per Section 6.3.4) and, where present, that
incident_class flattens to the canonical vocabulary referenced in
Section 5.5 (resolved from [REG-2025-302] Annex II field 3.23
directly). Under the United States bindings of Section 6 the same
verifier additionally checks the longest applicable retention floor
(2192 days as the default for receipts under Section 7.4 or
Section 7.6) and, where the Deployer is a NYDFS Covered Entity, a
HIPAA Covered Entity, or a CIRCIA Covered Entity, that incident_class
resolves to the applicable canonical category for each in-scope
regime.
Change Log
[RFC Editor: please remove this appendix and its subsections before
publication.]
Changes in draft -05
Build-provenance and result-bound extension revision. This revision
registers vocabulary that the reference cloud implementation, the
asqav-sdk Python and TypeScript halves, and the published /.well-
known/governance.json already emit and accept, bringing the IETF
surface back into parity with deployed reality.
* New normative Section 5.7 defines six OPTIONAL signed-payload
extension fields: result_digest (object of the upstream
payload_digest shape carrying the downstream Action's result-body
SHA-256), expires_at (ISO 8601 staleness bound additive to the
300-second forward-skew rule of Section 5.1.2), nonce (producer-
unique replay-resistance value), tool_fingerprint (JCS-
canonicalized tool-declaration SHA-256), config_manifest_digest
(operator-defined configuration manifest SHA-256), and
cve_inventory_digest (CVE inventory SHA-256 in effect at signing
time). The six fields are type-agnostic; result_digest typically
appears on receipts of the newly registered
protectmcp:observation:result_bound namespace.
* New normative Section 5.8 defines a four-tuple of OPTIONAL signed-
payload extension fields binding the executing build to the
receipt: executable_hash (OCI image manifest digest for container
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producers, on-disk SHA-256 for non-container executables),
sbom_digest (CycloneDX or SPDX SBOM SHA-256),
slsa_provenance_pointer (https URL to the SLSA Provenance v1.0 in-
toto attestation envelope), and supply_chain_pointer (https URL to
an in-toto, Sigstore, or Rekor transparency-log entry covering the
build). The four fields form a layered subsumption set; an
implementation MAY emit any subset.
* Section 11.1 Initial registry contents are extended with the ten
new fields registered in this revision (result_digest, expires_at,
nonce, tool_fingerprint, config_manifest_digest,
cve_inventory_digest, executable_hash, sbom_digest,
slsa_provenance_pointer, supply_chain_pointer), each labelled
Scope: signed-payload. The four pre-existing entries (risk_class,
incident_class, counterparty_binding, anchors) are unchanged.
* Section 11.2 Initial registry contents are extended with
protectmcp:observation (a passive-telemetry receipt emitted under
one of the capture topologies of Appendix "Appendix - Capture
Topologies for Compliance Receipt Emission" when the originating
application could not call the SDK directly) and
protectmcp:observation:result_bound (a follow-up sub-namespace
under protectmcp:observation for receipts carrying result_digest
bindings to an originating protectmcp:decision receipt via
action_ref).
* The abstract and Section 1.1 overview text are rewritten to
enumerate the full extension-field set in five groupings
(regulatory classification; cross-agent envelope binding; per-
action freshness and integrity plus build-provenance; server-built
enforcement attestation; and self-declared threat-framework
taxonomy) rather than the legacy "three extension fields" phrasing
carried forward from -02 through -04. The wire shape, the
signature scope, the canonicalization rule, the hash chain, and
the anchoring rules of earlier revisions are unchanged.
* New informative Section 12 cites parallel proposals under the
Independent Submissions and individual-draft surfaces of the IETF
Datatracker: [DRAFT-SHARIF-APKI] (certificate-based PKI for
autonomous AI agents), [DRAFT-SHARIF-AML] (cryptographic
attestation across the AI model lifecycle), and [PIPELOCK-ER2]
(the Pipelock EvidenceReceipt v2 alternative receipt-format
proposal, published as a public reference outside the IETF
process). The section is non-exhaustive and is informative; this
profile places no normative constraint on a Compliance Receipt
implementation by virtue of citing parallel work.
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* New informative references: [DRAFT-SHARIF-APKI],
[DRAFT-SHARIF-AML], [PIPELOCK-ER2].
* The four-tuple of build-provenance extensions in Section 5.8 is
the wire-level surface of the supply-chain notary use case;
Deployers under [EU-AI-ACT] Article 12 read together with [DORA]
Article 17, under 45 CFR 164.312(b) of [HIPAA-SECURITY], and under
[SEC-17A-4] read with [NYDFS-500] 23 NYCRR 500.6, SHOULD emit at
least executable_hash on every protectmcp:decision receipt. The
wording is hortatory; the underlying regime obligations remain the
load-bearing requirement.
* No changes to the signing algorithms, the canonicalization
transformation (JCS), the hash-chain scope corrected in
Appendix "Changes in draft -04", the anchor type set, the
retention floors of Sections 5 and 6, the Audit Pack manifest
fields, or the verifier reporting fields. A -04 receipt that
omits all ten new extensions is a conformant -05 receipt. A -05
receipt that carries any of the ten new extensions remains a
conformant [ACTA-RECEIPTS] receipt under the upstream extension
semantics of Section 4.2 (verifiers that do not implement the
extension ignore it).
* Threat-framework taxonomy subsumption. New normative Section 5.10
defines, and Section 11.1 Initial registry contents are further
extended with, eight additional signed-payload entries that the
reference cloud implementation, both SDK halves, and the published
/.well-known/governance.json emit and accept: six caller-supplied
taxonomy lists (mitre_techniques, mitre_atlas, owasp_llm_top10,
nist_ai_rmf, iso_42001, eu_ai_act_articles), one caller-supplied
opaque token (rfc3161_timestamp, a base64-encoded TimeStampResp
per [RFC3161] preserved verbatim on the receipt for offline TSA
chain verification independent of any platform-issued anchors),
and one platform-set false-attestation guard boolean
(framework_mappings_self_declared, set to true by the issuing
platform whenever any of the six taxonomy lists is populated; a
producer-supplied false alongside a populated taxonomy field MUST
be overridden). The taxonomy fields are not platform-verified;
the guard exists so verifiers can tell self-declared
classifications apart from platform-verified ones. Pre-existing
entries are unchanged. The total Initial registry contents now
enumerate twenty-two signed-payload-or-envelope-level fields.
* Durable-anchoring quorum. Section 5.4 is extended with a
normative OPTIONAL envelope-level witness_policy member (a sibling
of payload, signature, and anchors) that the reference cloud
implementation, both SDK halves, and the published /.well-known/
governance.json emit and accept. witness_policy declares an N-of-M
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quorum over the anchors array: required (integer in [1, length of
witnesses]) and witnesses (non-empty array, distinct subset of
{rfc3161, opentimestamps}; Rekor and other transparency-log
pointers are rejected). The quorum-met state (reported by the
reference implementation as witness_quorum_met) is reached only
when at least required distinct witness types each hold a
verifiable inclusion proof; a receipt MUST NOT claim durable
anchoring otherwise, extending the false-attestation principle to
the anchoring quorum. Section 11.1 Initial registry contents are
extended with the witness_policy entry, labelled Scope: envelope-
level, bringing the total to twenty-three signed-payload-or-
envelope-level fields. The baseline single-anchor requirement of
Section 5.4 is unchanged and continues to apply to every
Compliance Receipt regardless of whether witness_policy is
present.
* Section 12 is extended with a cite of [DRAFT-IETF-SCITT] (IETF
SCITT architecture) and [RFC6962] (Certificate Transparency Merkle
inclusion) as the canonical inclusion-proof prior art that
witness_policy generalizes; SCITT is framed as complementary (a
SCITT Transparent Statement can carry a Compliance Receipt as its
payload), closing the append-only-log gap deferred under
Section 10.12. New informative references: [DRAFT-IETF-SCITT],
[RFC6962].
* Enforcement-attestation extensions. New normative Section 5.9
defines two OPTIONAL server-built signed-payload extension fields
that the reference cloud implementation and the published /.well-
known/governance.json emit: authorized_under_mandate (an object
recording a self-declared authorizing mandate with mandate_id,
issuer_id, a scope_digest over the mandate's authorized-action-
types scope, and a verified boolean whose true value asserts self-
declared issuer authority, never platform-verified third-party
authorization; the binding is evaluated against the issuing
platform's clock and scoped to action types, with no value cap and
no counterparty restriction) and controls_evaluated (a server-
built enumeration of which enforcement controls genuinely fired on
the sign, drawn from the closed key set emergency_halt,
delegation_scope, quorum, mandate, policy, content_scan, result,
where an absent key means the control did not run rather than that
it passed silently). Both fields are server-built, never request
inputs; a caller-supplied value is dropped before signing. Each
field carries a false-attestation guard that rejects a present-
but-malformed attestation at signing time. Section 11.1 Initial
registry contents are extended with the two new entries, each
labelled Scope: signed-payload, bringing the total to twenty-five
signed-payload-or-envelope-level fields.
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* Section 12 is further extended with a cite of [A2A] (the
Agent2Agent protocol, a Linux Foundation project with an Agent
Card, an extension mechanism, and an Agent Card JSON Web
Signature), [A2A-IDF] (the Agent Identity Verification and Trust
Framework proposal under the A2A contribution process, framed as
the identity-anchoring layer beneath this profile's per-action
receipts), and [DRAFT-HOPLEY-X402] (the closest parallel receipt
format: a JCS-canonicalized, SHA-256 hash-chained Compliance
Receipt with an ALLOW, REFER, or DENY admission verdict bound to a
payment mandate under the x402 substrate). This profile is framed
as the broader superset of the x402 format: general agent-action
receipts across regulatory regimes rather than payment screening
alone, neutral third-party signing rather than self-signing by the
screening party, organization-wide control attestation via
controls_evaluated rather than a single admission verdict, and ML-
DSA-65 post-quantum signing. New informative references: [A2A],
[A2A-IDF], [DRAFT-HOPLEY-X402].
Changes in draft -04
Cross-agent integrity revision. The threat case is a compromised
intermediary that swaps payload bytes between two honest agents while
both per-agent hash chains validate independently.
* Section 5.3 digest-scope correction. The chain-link digest scope
is the canonical signing-input bytes (the JCS-canonical
serialization of the predecessor's signed payload object, the same
bytes the predecessor's signature covers), NOT the envelope object
that additionally includes the signature or anchors top-level
keys. The earlier -04 text that said the digest covers "the
entire signed receipt object including the signature field" was a
Security Considerations over-reach that did not match the
reference implementation and would have required every deployed
chain to be re-issued. The corrected scope matches both the
reference implementation and the upstream [ACTA-RECEIPTS]
Section 5.7 rule. The security rationale is updated accordingly:
the chain binds the signed-over content of the predecessor
(recomputable offline from the predecessor's payload alone), and
cross-agent envelope-including-signature integrity is delegated to
counterparty_binding (Section 5.6), which IS at the envelope-
including-signature scope precisely because the peer signature is
the load-bearing artefact in that case. Section 9.1 is updated to
match.
* New informative Section 10.2 in Security Considerations
acknowledges that the single-linear per-agent chain rule of
Section 5.3 creates a per-issuer serialization bottleneck: a
denial-of-service against the predecessor pointer (database lock,
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network partition, slow IO) bounds chain throughput. Mitigation:
issuers SHOULD use bounded predecessor-lookup timeouts, emit a
structured protectmcp:lifecycle audit event with a stable
chain_emission_blocked reason code when the timeout fires, and
document a chain-head recovery procedure for crashed emitters.
Parallel per-issuer throughput beyond a single linear chain
remains the existing distinct-issuer_id escape hatch.
* Section 10.12 residual list is rewritten for honesty. The M+B
collusion residual is downgraded from "M+B alone defeats
counterparty_binding" to "M+B+(A's-storage compromise or
unavailability) defeats counterparty_binding": the audit-time
verifier resolves receipt_ref to A's retained envelope and
recomputes the digest, so an honest reachable A's storage defeats
M+B collusion alone. A new M+A collusion residual is added: M and
A coordinating to produce a fraudulent A-signed envelope is
fundamentally outside the receipt model's threat surface because
every cryptographic invariant holds; mitigation is separation of
duties between issuer and intermediary plus anchor evidence on
independent witnesses under different trust roots.
* The worked-example appendix carries an explicit disclaimer that
the keys are shown in human-readable order (not JCS-canonical
lexicographic order), the sig/value/hash bytes are deterministic
placeholders, and implementations MUST NOT replay or trust the
example as a real receipt. The disclaimer states the JCS-
canonical key ordering that an implementer would derive on the
wire.
* Section 5.6.1 envelope_hash rule is tightened on three axes.
First, the base64 alphabet is no longer ambiguous: standard base64
per [RFC4648] Section 4 on emission, OR base64url per Section 5
where the transport requires URL-safe encoding, and verifiers MUST
accept both and normalise before comparison. Second, JSON-framed
digest scope is now normative and mandatory-to-implement: the JCS-
canonical UTF-8 byte sequence of A's signed envelope JSON object
per [RFC8785], where the envelope is the three-key object
{"payload", "signature", "anchors"} with anchors OPTIONAL and B
forbidden from re-canonicalizing or stripping any of the three
keys before computing the digest. Third, cross-framing
equivalence is explicitly addressed: JCS-canonical JSON, COSE
deterministic encoding, and JWS Compact Serialization with JCS-
canonical payload produce different byte sequences from the same
semantic payload-and-signature, so envelope_hash is framing-
specific; a transcoding intermediary that re-frames A's envelope
MUST be treated as a tampering event, and verifiers MUST NOT
reframe before recomputing.
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* Section 11.1 entries now carry an explicit Scope tag (signed-
payload for risk_class, incident_class, counterparty_binding;
envelope-level for anchors). The CWT claim request for
counterparty_binding now proposes allocation from the IANA First
Come First Served range of [RFC8392] Section 9.1 rather than the
unqualified "unassigned integer range" placeholder, so as not to
consume Expert Review or Standards Action space.
* The [CIRCIA] reference is corrected to cite the statutory
authority (Public Law 117-103 Division Y, codified at 6 U.S.C. 681
et seq.) rather than CISA's general topic page; the March 15, 2022
enactment date is retained, and the pending NPRM at 89 FR 23644
(April 4, 2024) is named in the reference annotation.
* New normative Section 4.6 (Section 5.6) defines the
counterparty_binding extension field, an in-payload object
carrying a base64-encoded SHA-256 digest (envelope_hash) over the
full signed envelope of a peer agent (including the peer's
signature bytes), a resolvable opaque receipt_ref, an OPTIONAL
expect_ack_from identifier (kid/issuer_id of the expected
acknowledger), and an OPTIONAL operational transport_label.
Section 4.6.3 (Section 5.6.3) defines the MUST-reject rule when
the bound digest does not resolve, the storage obligation on the
Audit Pack production layer, and the pairwise default for N-
greater-than-2 chains.
* The anchors top-level array schema is now defined inline in
Section 5.4: each entry MUST carry type and value (base64-encoded
anchor token bytes), with OPTIONAL informational status (anchored
/ pending / failed) and bitcoin_block (Bitcoin block hash for
upgraded OpenTimestamps entries). The IANA Extension Fields
Registry entry for anchors is updated to reflect the four-member
schema.
* The IANA Type Namespaces Registry initial contents now include the
registered sub-namespace protectmcp:lifecycle:configuration_change
emitted by the reference cloud implementation for configuration-
change receipts under Section 6.1.1.
* CIRCIA retention floor (Section 7.7.2) is rewritten to measure two
years from the submission of the most recently required CIRCIA
report per proposed Section 226.13(c) of the CIRCIA NPRM at 89 FR
23644 (April 4, 2024), not from the date of the underlying Action.
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* HIPAA retention (Section 7.4.2) is rewritten to cite 45 CFR
164.316(b)(2) with the six-year floor expressed as "six years from
the date of creation or the date when last in effect, whichever is
later" and the analogy basis for applying that floor to audit-log
content explicitly named.
* EU AI Act Article 26(6) retention (Section 6.1.5) is rewritten to
express the six-month floor in calendar-arithmetic terms per
[ISO8601-2]; the 184-day day-count figure is retained as an
informative anchoring-interval floor, and the previously-endorsed
183-day pick is withdrawn.
* Section 5.1.3 now states explicitly that issuer_id values MUST be
bare identifiers without a scheme prefix where the scheme is
unambiguous (LEI: 20-character alphanumeric self-identifying
form), aligning the spec with the reference cloud emitter under
the cloud-wire-conformance change.
* New informative Section 9.11 (Section 10.12) documents the
residual threat that counterparty_binding partially mitigates (M
silently swaps bytes between honest A and B) and names three
operational mitigations Operators SHOULD adopt: multiple
independent anchor witnesses, regulator-driven side-by-side chain
comparison under SEC 17a-4 audit-trail workflow, and out-of-band M
relay logs.
* Section 7 (Section 8) records two manifest-level fields shipped in
the reference Audit Pack producer: regime_mapping_disclaimer (when
per-receipt regime predicates derive from a producer-side mapping
the original signer did not co-sign) and stale_pending (per-entry
flag set when anchor evidence remains pending after the bound of
Section 5.4).
* Section 8.3 (Section 9.3) replaces the prior one-paragraph clause
with five SHOULD-emit per-axis fields: regimes_satisfied,
anchor_valid_ots, anchor_valid_rfc3161, policy_digest_resolved,
duplicate_emission_candidate.
* New informative Section 9.9 (Section 10.10) enumerates the
residuals counterparty_binding does not solve. New informative
Section 9.10 (Section 10.11) records channel-level operator
guidance citing [RFC8446], [RFC9266], [RFC5705], and [RFC9421] and
disclaims transport-layer security as a substitute for
application-layer byte equality.
* Section 11 (Section 11) adds counterparty_binding to the Extension
Fields Registry and requests registration as a CWT claim per
[RFC8392].
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* New normative references: [RFC9052], [RFC8949], [RFC7515],
[RFC8392]. New informative references for channel-level guidance
only: [RFC8446], [RFC5705], [RFC9266], [RFC9421].
* New normative Section 4 bounds the inputs to which the inherited
JCS rule of [RFC8785] is applied: IEEE-754 floating-point numbers
MUST NOT appear in the digest-covered canonical form (callers
SHOULD serialize numerics as JSON strings or as integer-rational
pairs in the IEEE-754 safe range), and tool-version-specific
semantic equivalence (SQL case folding, path normalization,
locale-aware string collation, numeric tolerance, URL percent-
encoding choices) is OUT OF SCOPE for the chain layer. The chain
answers byte equality for one agent identity at one wall-clock
time only; semantic equivalence belongs in the policy_digest
artefact and the Audit Pack manifest.
* Section 5.3 now states explicitly that each issuer MUST maintain a
single linear per-agent chain and MUST serialize concurrent in-
agent emission (parallel tool calls, thread-pool fan-out) through
a single predecessor pointer in emission order. Parallel sub-
chains within one agent identity (a per-receipt chain_id
discriminator) are NOT defined by this profile; an issuer that
requires parallel sub-chains MUST express each parallel path as a
distinct agent identity with its own issuer_id, signing key, and
chain rooted at the all-zero genesis value.
* Wire tightenings introduced in this revision (additive at the
message level, restrictive at the verifier level): (a) the anchors
entry value member is now REQUIRED where the upstream profile
leaves it OPTIONAL; (b) issuer chains are normatively single-
linear per issuer (no parallel chain_id discriminator), so a -03
producer that ran parallel sub-chains under one issuer_id emits
non-conformant -04 receipts; and (c) IEEE-754 floating-point
numbers MUST NOT appear in the canonical form covered by SHA-256
digests. A -03 receipt with a missing anchor value, parallel sub-
chains, or a digest-covered float is not a conformant -04 receipt.
Implementations targeting -04 SHOULD re-emit -03 receipts under
-04 emission rules. The signing algorithms, the canonicalization
transformation itself (JCS), the anchor types, and the regime
bindings of Sections 5 and 6 are unchanged. A -03 verifier
remains conformant for receipts that do not carry
counterparty_binding; -03 verifiers encountering the field will
ignore it per [ACTA-RECEIPTS] Section 4.2 extension semantics.
* Rationale paragraph of Section 4 is rewritten to ground the
IEEE-754 float ban on documented divergence between mainstream
JSON serializers (Python json.dumps, Go encoding/json, Java
Jackson) and the ECMA-262 Number-to-String algorithm referenced by
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Section 3.2.2.3 of [RFC8785], rather than on a misstated claim
that JCS itself fails to specify float serialization outside the
safe integer range. The Unicode-normalization bullet of Section 4
is corrected to acknowledge that Section 3.1 of [RFC8785] mandates
as-is preservation of Unicode strings (no NFC default).
* Security Considerations Section 10.1 is corrected to reflect the
tiered DORA deadlines: the four-hour initial-notice clock (with
72-hour intermediate-report and one-month final-report bounds) per
DORA Article 17 and the RTS in [REG-2025-301], rather than a flat
72-hour reporting deadline. New informative reference
[REG-2025-301] added.
* The Annex II field 3.23 (Type of the incident) citation in
Section 5.5 and the incident_class initial-registry entry of
Section 11.1 no longer reproduces the enumeration verbatim;
verifiers MUST resolve the canonical values from [REG-2025-302]
directly.
* Section 5.2 extends the wire decision vocabulary with observation,
a fourth value reserved to type protectmcp:lifecycle for receipts
emitted when an Action was signed without any policy evaluation.
The new value is the regulator-honest alternative to a misleading
allow on the "no policy matched" path; emitters MUST refuse to
issue a protectmcp:decision receipt that carries observation, and
verifiers MUST reject the combination. The vocabulary-namespace
registry entry for protectmcp:decision in Section 11.2 is updated
to reflect that observation is reserved to protectmcp:lifecycle.
* New informative appendix (Appendix "Appendix - Capture Topologies
for Compliance Receipt Emission") catalogues six capture
topologies an operator can use to emit conformant Compliance
Receipts in environments where the originating application code
cannot be modified to call the receipt-emitting SDK directly:
in_process_sdk, network_proxy, browser_extension, ebpf_observer,
mcp_proxy, passive_telemetry. The appendix is non-normative; the
capture_topology attribute it defines is OPTIONAL at the wire
layer and, where present, lives in the Audit Pack manifest entry
rather than inside the signed payload object, so the topology
declaration does not alter signed bytes. The six values form a
closed initial vocabulary at this revision;
Appendix "capture_topology Vocabulary and Considerations for a
Future IANA Registry" sketches a future "Compliance Receipt
Capture Topologies" IANA registry under the "Compliance Receipts"
registry group with Specification Required registration policy per
[RFC8126] for a follow-on revision, and names reserved-value
avoidance guidance for early extenders.
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Changes in draft -03
Multi-jurisdiction consolidation. The European Union profile
(formerly the only profile in -02) and the United States profile
(formerly the separate draft draft-marques-asqav-us-compliance-
receipts-00) are merged into a single document with two regional
bindings sections: Section 5 (European Union) and Section 6 (United
States). Sections 1 through 4 (Introduction, Conventions,
Relationship to upstream, Receipt Field Profile) and Sections 7
through 11 (Audit Pack, Verifier, Security, IANA, Acknowledgements)
are shared across both regimes. Conventions terms that differ across
regimes are now disambiguated with regime suffixes (Deployer (EU AI
Act) vs Deployer (Colorado AI Act); High-Risk AI System (EU AI Act)
vs High-Risk AI System (Colorado AI Act)). The incident_class
extension field now lists every applicable canonical category in one
place: ICT-related incident under [DORA] with the Annex II reporting
enumeration, Cybersecurity Event/Incident under [NYDFS-500], Covered
Cyber Incident under [CIRCIA], and security incident under
[HIPAA-SECURITY]. The issuer_id rule now permits EIN or CIK as
alternatives to LEI for US Deployers without an allocated LEI. The
Tamper Resistance security consideration extends the one-hour
anchoring SHOULD to NYDFS 500.17 and CIRCIA in addition to DORA
Article 17. The Privacy security consideration extends to GDPR for
EU data subjects and CCPA / VCDPA / HIPAA Privacy Rule for US data
subjects. The Worked Example notes that the wire shape applies
identically to US bindings, with only the issuer_id identifier and
the vocabularies differing. IANA registries are unchanged; the
Initial registry contents for incident_class now describe the multi-
regime category set. No changes to the wire format, the field
profile, the hash chain, the anchoring rules, the Audit Pack
contents, or the Verifier checks. Section 4.1.6 (sandbox_state) and
Section 4.5 (risk_class) corrected to attribute the EU risk-
management documentation requirement to Article 9 of [EU-AI-ACT]
(Provider's risk management system) rather than Article 26, with
Article 26(1) cited as the deployer's instructions-for-use obligation
that links to the Provider's Article 9 documentation. Section 6.5.3
(nydfs-retention) corrected to a single-tier five-year floor under 23
NYCRR 500.6(b) (verified verbatim against LII Cornell); the prior
tiered 5-year/3-year split (claimed against the DFS Second Amendment)
was incorrect because the Second Amendment does not amend
Section 500.6, leaving the 2017 single-tier text in force. The
1096-day three-year audit-trail floor previously stated for NYDFS is
removed.
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Changes in draft -02
Submission-ready EU-only profile. Wire-shape alignment with upstream
[ACTA-RECEIPTS] (payload/signature/anchors envelope; payload_digest
object form; tool_name REQUIRED for protectmcp:decision; issuer_id
equals kid). EU AI Act and DORA bindings authored against Official
Journal text. Anchor MUST (at least one of RFC 3161 or
OpenTimestamps); both RECOMMENDED; 7-day OpenTimestamps upgrade
deadline profile-imposed. Six-month AI Act floor expressed as 184
days; DORA-bound default expressed as 1827 days. IANA registries
created.
Changes in draft -01
Initial wire-shape alignment with upstream and addition of dual-
anchor, hash-chain, retention, and DORA classification bindings.
Subsequent revisions superseded the specific values introduced here.
Changes in draft -00
Initial version. Defines a profile of [ACTA-RECEIPTS] that binds
receipt fields to EU AI Act Article 12, EU AI Act Article 26, and
DORA Article 17.
Appendix - Capture Topologies for Compliance Receipt Emission
This appendix is informational and non-normative. It catalogues six
capture topologies an operator can use to emit conformant Compliance
Receipts in environments where the originating application code
cannot be modified to call the receipt-emitting SDK directly. The
topologies are listed in order of payload fidelity, from highest (in-
process SDK, full payload digest) to lowest (passive telemetry, post-
hoc log ingestion only). All six emit receipts that satisfy the wire
profile of Sections 3 and 4; they differ in trust boundary, payload
coverage, and the operational identity that the receipt binds. The
intent is to give an operator vocabulary for declaring which topology
produced a given receipt, so that a verifier or auditor can interpret
the receipt's evidentiary weight without re-deriving the architecture
from out-of-band documentation.
An operator MAY declare the producing topology by including a
capture_topology attribute in the Audit Pack manifest entry for the
receipt. The attribute is informational at the wire layer and
OPTIONAL. The vocabulary defined below is closed for the topologies
catalogued in this appendix; future revisions or third-party profiles
MAY extend it through the future-IANA-registry mechanism noted at the
end of this appendix.
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In-Process SDK
The originating application links the receipt-emitting SDK directly
and calls it inline with the action being recorded. This is the
baseline pattern [ACTA-RECEIPTS] and Sections 3 and 4 of this
document are written against. The receipt carries a full
payload_digest covering the action's request bytes; the SDK has
direct access to the application's principal identity, the policy
decision, and the request body. Vocabulary value: in_process_sdk.
Trust boundary: the application process itself; the SDK runs inside
the application's memory space and inherits its principal. Threat-
model note: captures the full request and response payloads, the
deciding principal, and the policy context; does NOT capture out-of-
process side effects or actions taken by sibling processes that do
not link the SDK. Reference implementation hint: the Asqav Python
and TypeScript SDKs published under the asqav-sdk umbrella (Apache-
2.0) implement this pattern; an operator MAY substitute any other
conformant [ACTA-RECEIPTS] implementation.
Network-Layer Egress Proxy
A customer-owned reverse proxy or egress gateway (Envoy, NGINX, or an
equivalent forward proxy) sits in the network path between the
application and the downstream LLM provider. The proxy tees the
request to a co-located Compliance Signer process, which receives the
request bytes, applies the policy evaluation, and emits a receipt via
a signer RPC. A DNS-rewrite on-ramp (CoreDNS rewriting the LLM
hostname to the proxy address) or a Server Name Indication (SNI)
router (SNIProxy at Layer 4) MAY be used to force application traffic
onto the proxy without per-application configuration. Vocabulary
value: network_proxy. Trust boundary: the customer's network egress;
the proxy and signer run under the customer's operational control,
and the receipt is signed by a key the customer's signer holds.
Threat-model note: captures the request and response bytes that
traverse the proxy and the network-layer principal identity (source
IP, mTLS client cert if present); does NOT capture traffic that
bypasses the proxy (direct outbound from a non-routed host, DNS-over-
HTTPS to a hard-coded resolver, or TLS connections to certificate-
pinned endpoints that the customer's enterprise CA cannot inspect).
The receipt's issuer_id binds the customer's signer, not the
originating application; the application's identity, where captured,
appears as an attribute resolved through the Audit Pack manifest.
Reference implementation hint: CoreDNS (Apache-2.0) for the DNS on-
ramp, SNIProxy by dlundquist (BSD-2-Clause) for the SNI router, and
Envoy (Apache-2.0) for the Layer-7 reverse proxy plane; none of these
are normative requirements.
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Browser Extension
A managed-browser Manifest V3 (MV3) extension installed on employee
workstations via the enterprise Mobile Device Management (MDM) system
intercepts fetch, XMLHttpRequest, and EventSource requests to a
configured list of LLM hostnames. The extension POSTs the
intercepted request and response bytes to a Compliance Signer
endpoint, which emits the receipt. For LLM hosts that pin their TLS
certificates, the customer's enterprise root Certificate Authority
(CA) MUST be installed in the browser trust store via MDM so that the
extension's content-script interception can observe decrypted bytes.
Vocabulary value: browser_extension. Trust boundary: the managed
browser process on the employee workstation; the extension runs under
the browser's sandbox and the employee's interactive session.
Threat-model note: captures the full request and response payload for
LLM calls initiated from the browser by the human user, and binds the
receipt to the browser's principal identity (the user's enterprise
single-sign-on subject, where the extension can read it). Does NOT
capture LLM calls made by native desktop applications, server-side
daemons, or browsers without the extension installed; does NOT
capture traffic in incognito or private-window modes unless the
extension is explicitly authorised for those contexts. Reference
implementation hint: the open-source Chrome MV3 extension scaffolding
published by Google under the chrome-extensions-samples repository
(Apache-2.0) is a useful starting point; the customer's signer
endpoint is the Asqav signer or any conformant [ACTA-RECEIPTS]
implementation.
eBPF SNI Observer
A kernel-level extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) probe attached
to the host's network stack observes outbound TLS ClientHello
records. The probe extracts the SNI hostname, the JA3 client
fingerprint, the source and destination addresses and ports, and the
connection timestamp, and emits a lower-fidelity receipt that binds
the employee, the device, the wall-clock time, and the LLM host
without observing payload content. Vocabulary value: ebpf_observer.
The receipt SHOULD carry an informational payload_capture attribute
set to false in the Audit Pack manifest, so that a verifier or
auditor does not assume payload-level evidence is recoverable. Trust
boundary: the kernel of the host on which the probe runs; the probe
operates below the application's user-space process and observes
traffic regardless of application configuration. Threat-model note:
captures the existence and counterparty of an LLM call (the "did the
call happen" evidence class) and the device-and-employee binding
through host attestation; does NOT capture request or response bytes,
the prompt content, the model parameters, or the decision-relevant
context. Useful when payload capture is operationally infeasible
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(TLS certificate pinning that the enterprise CA cannot defeat, third-
party SaaS that egresses outside the customer's proxy plane) but the
operator still needs evidence that a regulated LLM interaction
occurred. Reference implementation hint: Inspektor Gadget (Apache-
2.0) and Tetragon (Apache-2.0) both expose SNI and connection-
metadata events from eBPF probes; neither is a normative requirement.
MCP Transparent Proxy
A transparent proxy sits in-path between a Model Context Protocol
(MCP) client and one or more downstream MCP servers, terminating the
client's stdio, Server-Sent Events (SSE), or streamable-HTTP
transport on one side and re-establishing the same transport to each
downstream server on the other side. The proxy observes every tools/
call and resources/read JSON-RPC method invocation, signs a receipt
at the moment the call is forwarded, and emits a second acknowledging
receipt carrying a counterparty_binding (see Section 5.6) at the
moment the downstream server's response returns. Both sides of the
call are therefore bound bilaterally, with the proxy's signing key
serving as the integrity anchor for the pair. Vocabulary value:
mcp_proxy. The receipt SHOULD carry the invoked MCP method (for
example, tools/call or resources/read) as an attribute in the Audit
Pack manifest entry, so that a verifier can filter by call type
without re-parsing payload bytes. Trust boundary: the proxy process
and its signing key; the upstream MCP client and the downstream MCP
server are both treated as honest endpoints under the threat model of
Section 10.12, with the proxy itself being the named intermediary
whose tampering risk counterparty_binding mitigates. Threat-model
note: captures the full MCP request and response payload, the method
name, and the client and server principal identities visible at the
transport boundary; does NOT capture MCP traffic that bypasses the
proxy or that uses a transport the proxy does not implement.
Reference implementation hint: the Asqav MCP transparent proxy
published under the asqav-mcp repository (Apache-2.0) and the
upstream FastMCP project (MIT) on which it builds; neither is a
normative requirement.
Passive Telemetry Ingestion
A passive ingestion pipeline reads structured records the originating
application or its runtime has already emitted (for example,
OpenTelemetry spans, application access logs, vendor-managed
observability exports, or batch CSV drops) and synthesises a
Compliance Receipt for each record after the fact. The synthesiser
holds the signing key, applies the receipt-format wire profile, and
emits the receipt to the same downstream sink that the in-process SDK
and network-proxy paths feed. Vocabulary value: passive_telemetry.
The receipt SHOULD carry an informational payload_capture attribute
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set to the value the underlying telemetry source actually preserved
(full body, headers only, or none), so that a verifier or auditor can
interpret the receipt's evidentiary weight against the upstream
pipeline's retention policy. Trust boundary: the telemetry pipeline
operator's signing key plus the integrity of the upstream
observability source; the receipt binds the producer of the
telemetry, not the originating application's per-request principal.
Threat-model note: captures whatever the upstream telemetry source
preserved (typically a subset of the action's bytes and metadata,
often without request or response payload) plus the wall-clock and
counterparty identifiers visible in the telemetry record; does NOT
capture data the upstream source dropped, sampled out, or never
emitted, and inherits any tampering risk the upstream source carries
between emission and ingestion. Useful when the in-process SDK,
network proxy, browser extension, eBPF observer, and MCP proxy
topologies are all operationally infeasible (legacy applications
without instrumentation hooks, third-party SaaS with read-only
export, fleet migrations where the producer has only logs to work
from) but the operator still needs a signed evidence artefact tied to
the historical action. Reference implementation hint: any
OpenTelemetry collector exporter (Apache-2.0) feeding a conformant
receipt-emitting signer; the upstream telemetry source is out of
scope of this profile.
capture_topology Vocabulary and Considerations for a Future IANA
Registry
The six values defined in this appendix (in_process_sdk,
network_proxy, browser_extension, ebpf_observer, mcp_proxy,
passive_telemetry) form the closed initial vocabulary for the
capture_topology attribute. The attribute is OPTIONAL at the wire
layer and, where present, MUST appear in the Audit Pack manifest
entry for the receipt rather than inside the signed payload object,
so that the topology declaration is producer-side metadata that does
not alter the receipt's signed bytes. A verifier MUST NOT treat the
absence of a capture_topology attribute as a non-conformance
condition; absence simply means the producer did not declare a
topology.
This document is an Independent Submission and does not request IANA
action for the capture_topology vocabulary at this revision. A
future revision MAY request creation of a "Compliance Receipt Capture
Topologies" registry under the same "Compliance Receipts" registry
group described in Section 11, with the registration policy of
Specification Required per [RFC8126] and an initial set populated
from the six values above. Until such a registry exists,
implementations that extend the vocabulary SHOULD document the new
value in a reference specification and SHOULD avoid colliding with
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the six reserved values above. The Designated Expert(s) for any
future registry SHOULD verify that a candidate value names a distinct
topology (a different trust boundary or a materially different
payload-fidelity class) rather than a variant of an existing one, and
that the candidate's threat-model note states what is captured and
what is not, in the form used by the six entries in this appendix.
Author's Address
Joao Andre Gomes Marques
Asqav
Portugal
Email: joaoagm90@gmail.com
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