pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Contact and Channel Authentication through Handshake
draft-marques-pep-handshake-00

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Network Working Group                                         H. Marques
Internet-Draft                                            pEp Foundation
Intended status: Informational                              B. Hoeneisen
Expires: January 1, 2019                                         Ucom.ch
                                                           June 30, 2018

 pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Contact and Channel Authentication through
                               Handshake
                     draft-marques-pep-handshake-00

Abstract

   In interpersonal messaging end-to-end encryption means for public key
   distribution and verification of its authenticity are needed; the
   latter to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

   This document proposes a new method to easily verify a public key is
   authentic by a Handshake process that allows users to easily verify
   their communication channel.  The new method is targeted to
   Opportunistic Security scenarios and is already implemented in
   several applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Existing Solutions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  The pEp Handshake Proposal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Verification Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.1.1.  Partial and Full Trustword Mapping  . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.1.2.  Display Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Running Code  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Open Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   In interpersonal messaging end-to-end encryption means for public key
   distribution and verification of its authenticity are needed.

   Examples for key distribution include:

   o  Exchange keys out-of-band before encrypted communication

   o  Use of centralized public key stores (e.g., OpenPGP Key Servers)

   o  Ship the public key in-band when communicating

   To prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, additionally the
   authenticity of a public key needs to be verified.  Methods to
   authenticate public keys of peers include, e.g., verify digital
   signatures of public keys (which may be signed in an hierarchical or
   flat manner, e.g., by a Web of Trust (WoT)), compare the public key's

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   fingerprints via a suitable independent channel, or scan a QR mapping
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