Opportunistic Encryption
draft-mattsson-opportunistic-encryption-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | John Preuß Mattsson | ||
| Last updated | 2014-08-18 (Latest revision 2014-02-14) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
plain text
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bibtex
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mattsson-opportunistic-encryption-00.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mattsson-opportunistic-encryption-00.txt
Abstract
Following the recent pervasive monitoring revelations, one of the discussed remedies has been opportunistic encryption. In this paper, we give an overview of various opportunistic and unauthenticated encryption techniques, discuss their benefits, limits, and disadvantages, and try to conclude how effective they are as a mean to thwart pervasive monitoring.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)