Distributing OpenPGP Keys with Signed Keylist Subscriptions
draft-mccain-keylist-02

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Network Working Group                                          M. McCain
Internet-Draft                                                       FLM
Intended status: Experimental                                     M. Lee
Expires: April 16, 2019                                               TI
                                                                N. Welch
                                                                     FLM
                                                        October 13, 2018

      Distributing OpenPGP Keys with Signed Keylist Subscriptions
                        draft-mccain-keylist-02

Abstract

   This document specifies a system by which an OpenPGP client may
   subscribe to an organization's keylist to keep its internal keystore
   up-to-date.  Ensuring that all members of an organization have their
   colleagues' most recent PGP public keys is critical to maintaining
   operational security.  Without the most recent keys and a source of
   trust for those keys (as this document specifies), users must
   manually update and sign each others keys -- a system that is
   untenable in larger organizations.  This document proposes a
   experimental format for the keylist file as well as requirements for
   clients who wish to implement this experimental keylist subscription
   functionality.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 16, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

McCain, et al.           Expires April 16, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        OpenPGP Keylist Subscriptions         October 2018

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Note to Readers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Functions and Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Subscribing to Keylists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Periodic Updates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Cryptographic Verification of Keylists  . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Data Element Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Keylist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  In Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Security Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Security Drawbacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies a system by which clients may subscribe to
   cryptographically signed keylists.  This system allows for seamless
   key rotation across entire organizations and enhances operational
   security.  To enable cross-client compatibility, this document
   provides a experimental format for the keylist, its cryptographic
   verification, and the method by which it is retreived by the client.
   The user interface by which a client provides this functionality to
   the user is out of scope, as is the process by which the client
   retrieves public keys.  Other non-security-related implementation