Generation of Deterministic Initialization Vectors (IVs) and Nonces
draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-02

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Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Author David McGrew 
Last updated 2013-02-10 (latest revision 2012-08-09)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-02.txt

Abstract

Many cryptographic algorithms use deterministic IVs, including CTR, GCM, CCM, GMAC. This type of IV is also called a (deterministic) nonce. Deterministic IVs must be distinct, for each fixed key, to guarantee the security of the algorithm. This note describes best practices for the generation of such IVs, and summarizes how they are generated and used in different protocols. Some problem areas are highlighted, and test considerations are outlined. This note will be useful to implementers of algorithms using deterministic IVs, and to protocol or system designers using them.

Authors

David McGrew (mcgrew@cisco.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)