Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
draft-meyer-gre-update-02

Network Working Group                              Dino Farinacci
Internet Draft                                     Tony Li
                                                   Procket Networks
                                                   Stan Hanks
                                                   Enron Communications
                                                   David Meyer
                                                   Cisco Systems
                                                   Paul Traina
                                                   Juniper Networks
Category                                           Standards Track
draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt                      January, 2000

                  Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
                    <draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt>

1. Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
   groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

David Meyer                                                     [Page 1]

Internet Draft       draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt         January, 2000

2.  Abstract

   This document specifies a protocol for encapsulation of an arbitrary
   network layer protocol over another arbitrary network layer protocol.

3.  Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999).  All Rights Reserved

4.  Introduction

   A number of different proposals [RFC1234, RFC1226] currently exist
   for the encapsulation of one protocol over another protocol. Other
   types of encapsulations [RFC1241, RFC1479] have been proposed for
   transporting IP over IP for policy purposes. This memo describes a
   protocol which is very similar to, but is more general than, the
   above proposals.  In attempting to be more general, many protocol
   specific nuances have been ignored.  The result is that this proposal
   may be less suitable for a situation where a specific "X over Y"
   problem of encapsulation from its current O(n^2) problem to a more
   manageable state. This memo purposely does not address the issue of
   when a packet should be encapsulated.  This memo acknowledges, but
   does not address problems such as mutual encapsulation [RFC1326].

   In the most general case, a system has a packet that needs to be
   encapsulated and delivered to some destination.  We will call this
   the payload packet.  The payload is first encapsulated in a GRE
   packet.  The resulting GRE packet can then be encapsulated in some
   other protocol and then forwarded.  We will call this outer protocol
   the delivery protocol. The algorithms for processing this packet are
   discussed later.

   The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, MAY, OPTIONAL, REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED,
   SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT are to be interpreted as defined
   in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

David Meyer                                                     [Page 2]

Internet Draft       draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt         January, 2000

5. Structure of a GRE Encapsulated Packet

   A GRE encapsulated packet has the form:

    ---------------------------------
    |                               |
    |       Delivery Header         |
    |                               |
    ---------------------------------
    |                               |
    |       GRE Header              |
    |                               |
    ---------------------------------
    |                               |
    |       Payload packet          |
    |                               |
    ---------------------------------

   This specification is generally concerned with the structure of the
   GRE header, although special consideration is given to some of the
   issues surrounding IPv4 payloads.

5.1. GRE Header

   The GRE packet header has the form:

    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |C|       Reserved0       | Ver |         Protocol Type         |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |      Checksum (optional)      |       Reserved1 (Optional)    |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

5.2. Checksum Present (bit 0)

   If the Checksum Present bit is set to one, then the Checksum and the
   Reserved1 fields are present and the Checksum field contains valid
   information. Note that a compliant implementation MUST accept and
   process this field.

David Meyer                                                     [Page 3]

Internet Draft       draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt         January, 2000

5.3. Reserved0 (bits 1-12)

   Bits 1 through 12 are reserved for future use. A sender MUST set them
   to zero while a recipient MUST be prepared to deal with non-zero data
   as specified in section 7.

5.3.1. Version Number (bits 13-15)

   The Version Number field MUST contain the value zero.

5.4. Protocol Type (2 octets)

   The Protocol Type field contains the protocol type of the payload
   packet. These Protocol Types are defined in [RFC1700] as "ETHER
   TYPES" and in [ETYPES]. An implementation receiving a packet
   containing a Protocol Type which is not listed in [RFC1700] or
   [ETYPES] SHOULD discard the packet.

5.5. Checksum (2 octets)

   The Checksum field contains the IP (one's complement) checksum sum of
   the all the 16 bit words in the GRE header and the payload packet.
   For purposes of computing the checksum, the value of the checksum
   field is zero. This field is present only if the Checksum Present bit
   is set to one.

5.6. Reserved1 (2 octets)

   The Reserved1 field is reserved for future use, and if present, MUST
   be transmitted as zero. The Reserved1 field is present only when the
   Checksum field is present (that is, Checksum Present bit is set to
   one).

David Meyer                                                     [Page 4]

Internet Draft       draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt         January, 2000

6. IPv4 as a Payload

   When IPv4 is being carried as the GRE payload, the Protocol Type
   field MUST be set to 0x800.

6.1. Forwarding Decapsulated IPv4 Payload Packets

   When a tunnel endpoint decapsulates a GRE packet which has an IPv4
   packet as the payload, the destination address in the IPv4 payload
   packet header MUST be used to forward the packet and the TTL of the
   payload packet MUST be decremented. Care should be taken when
   forwarding such a packet, since if the destination address of the
   payload packet is the encapsulator of the packet (i.e., the other end
   of the tunnel), looping can occur. In this case, the packet MUST be
   discarded.

7. IPv4 as a Delivery Protocol

   The IPv4 protocol 47 [RFC1700] is used when GRE packets are
   enapsulated in IPv4. See [RFC1122] for requirements relating to the
   delivery of packets over IPv4 networks.

8. Interoperation with RFC 1701 Compliant Implementations

   In RFC 1701, the field described here as Reserved0 contained a number
   of flag bits which this specification deprecates. In particular, the
   Routing Present, Key Present, Sequence Number Present, and Strict
   Source Route bits have been deprecated, along with the Recursion
   Control field. As a result, the GRE header will never contain the
   Key, Sequence Number or Routing fields specified in RFC 1701.

   There are, however, existing implementations of the RFC 1701.  The
   following sections describe correct interoperation with such
   implementations.

8.1. RFC 1701 Compliant Receiver

   An implementation complying to this specification will transmit the
   Reserved0 field set to zero. An RFC 1701 compliant receiver will
   interpret this as having the Routing Present, Key Present, Sequence
   Number Present, and Strict Source Route bits set to zero, and will
   not expect the RFC 1701 Key, Sequence Number or Routing fields to be
   present.

David Meyer                                                     [Page 5]

Internet Draft       draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt         January, 2000

8.2. RFC 1701 Compliant Transmitter

   An RFC 1701 transmitter may set any of the Routing Present, Key
   Present, Sequence Number Present, and Strict Source Route bits set to
   one, and thus may transmit the RFC 1701 Key, Sequence Number or
   Routing fields in the GRE header. In this case, an implementation
   compliant with this specification MAY discard the packet.

9. Security Considerations

   Security in a network using GRE should be relatively similar to
   security in a normal IPv4 network, as routing using GRE follows the
   same routing that IPv4 uses natively. Route filtering will remain
   unchanged. However packet filtering requires either that a firewall
   look inside the GRE packet or that the filtering is done on the GRE
   tunnel endpoints. In those environments in which this is considered
   to be a security issue it may be desirable to terminate the tunnel at
   the firewall.

10. IANA Considerations for Assignment of Protocol Types

   New ETHER TYPES as assigned by Xerox Systems Institute [RFC1700]. The
   IANA SHOULD NOT encourage the assignment of additional ETHER TYPES
   (GRE Protocol Types) for use with GRE.

11. Acknowledgments

   This document is derived from the original ideas of the authors of
   RFC 1701 and RFC 1702. Hitoshi Asaeda, Scott Bradner, Randy Bush,
   Brian Carpenter, Bill Fenner, Andy Malis, Thomas Narten, and Dave
   Thaler and provided many constructive and insightful comments.

David Meyer                                                     [Page 6]

Internet Draft       draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt         January, 2000

12. Appendix -- Known Issues

   This document specifies the behavior of currently deployed GRE
   implementations. As such, it does not attempt to address the
   following known issues:

12.1. Interaction Path MTU Discovery (PMTU) [RFC1191]

   Existing implementations of GRE, when using IPv4 as the Delivery
   Header, do not implement Path MTU discovery and do not set the Don't
   Fragment bit in the Delivery Header.  This can cause large packets to
   become fragmented within the tunnel and reassembled at the tunnel
   exit (independent of whether the payload packet is using PMTU).  If a
   tunnel entry point were to use Path MTU discovery, however, that
   tunnel entry point would also need to relay ICMP unreachable error
   messages (in particular the "fragmentation needed and DF set" code)
   back to the originator of the packet, which is not a requirement in
   this specification. Failure to properly relay Path MTU information to
   an originator can result in the following behavior: the originator
   sets the don't fragment bit, the packet gets dropped within the
   tunnel, but since the originator doesn't receive proper feedback, it
   retransmits with the same PMTU, causing subsequently transmitted
   packets to be dropped.

12.2. IPv6 as Delivery and/or Payload Protocol

   This specification describes the intersection of GRE currently
   deployed by multiple vendors. IPv6 as delivery and/or payload
   protocol is not included in the currently deployed versions of GRE.

12.3. Interaction with ICMP

12.4. Interaction with the Differentiated Services Architecture

12.5. Multiple and Looping Encapsulations

David Meyer                                                     [Page 7]

Internet Draft       draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt         January, 2000

13. REFERENCES

   [ETYPES]  ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/ethernet-numbers

   [RFC1122] R.T. Braden, "Requirements for Internet hosts -
             communication layers", RFC1122, Octber 1989

   [RFC1191] Mogul, J., and S. Deering, "Path MTU Discovery",
             RFC 1191, November 1990.

   [RFC1226] Kantor, B. "Internet Protocol Encapsulation of AX.25
             Frames", RFC 1226, University of California, San Diego,
             May 1991.

   [RFC1234] Provan, D. "Tunneling IPX Traffic through IP Networks",
             RFC 1234, Novell, Inc., June 1991.

   [RFC1241] Woodburn, R., and D. Mills, "Scheme for an Internet
             Encapsulation Protocol: Version 1", RFC 1241, SAIC,
             University of Delaware, July 1991.

   [RFC1326] Tsuchiya, P., "Mutual Encapsulation Considered
             Dangerous", RFC 1326, Bellcore, May 1992.

   [RFC1479] Steenstrup, M. "Inter-Domain Policy Routing Protocol
             Specification: Version 1", RFC 1479, BBN Systems and
             Technologies, July 1993.

   [RFC1700] J. Reynolds and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers",
             RFC 1700, October 1994.

   [RFC1701] Hanks, S., Li, T, Farinacci, D., and P. Traina, "Generic
             Routing Encapsulation", RFC 1701, NetSmiths, Ltd., and
             cisco Systems, October 1994.

   [RFC1702] Hanks, S., Li, T., Farinacci, D., and P. Traina,
             "Generic Routing Encapsulation over IPv4 networks",
             RFC 1702, NetSmiths, Ltd., cisco Systems, October 1994.

   [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March, 1997.

   [RFC2408] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and J.
             Turner, "Internet Security Association and Key
             Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November
             1998.

David Meyer                                                     [Page 8]

Internet Draft       draft-meyer-gre-update-02.txt         January, 2000

14.  Authors' Addresses

   Dino Farinacci
   Procket Networks
   3850 No. First St., Ste. C
   San Jose, CA 95134
   Email: dino@procket.com

   Tony Li
   Procket Networks
   3850 No. First St., Ste. C
   San Jose, CA 95134
   +1 408 954 7903 (w)
   +1 408 987 6166 (f)
   Email: tony1@home.net

   Stan Hanks
   Enron Communications
   Email: stan_hanks@enron.net

   David Meyer
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA, 95134
   Email: dmm@cisco.com

   Paul Traina
   Juniper Networks
   Email: pst@juniper.net

David Meyer                                                     [Page 9]