LURK Extension version 1 for (D)TLS 1.3 Authentication
draft-mglt-lurk-tls13-04
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Daniel Migault
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LURK D. Migault
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track January 25, 2021
Expires: July 29, 2021
LURK Extension version 1 for (D)TLS 1.3 Authentication
draft-mglt-lurk-tls13-04
Abstract
This document describes the LURK Extension 'tls13' which enables
interactions between a LURK Client and a LURK Server in a context of
authentication with (D)TLS 1.3.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 29, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. TODO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. LURK Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. secret_request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. session_id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.4. freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.5. ephemeral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.5.1. shared_secret_provided: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.5.2. secret_generated: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.5.3. no_secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.6. selected_identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.7. certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.7.1. presence or absence of certificate message . . . . . 18
6.7.2. certificate field validation . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.7.3. generation of the certificate message . . . . . . . . 19
6.8. tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.9. secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.10. signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. LURK exchange on the TLS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.1. s_init_early_secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2. s_init_cert_verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.3. s_hand_and_app_secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.4. s_new_tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. LURK exchange on the TLS client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.1. c_init_cert_verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.2. c_init_post_hand_auth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.3. c_post_hand_auth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.4. c_init_ephemeral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.5. c_init_early_secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.6. c_hand_and_app_secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.7. c_register_tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12. Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12.1. LURK state diagrams on TLS client . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12.1.1. LURK client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
12.1.2. Cryptographic Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
12.2. LURK state diagrams on TLS server . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12.2.1. LURK client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12.2.2. Cryptographic Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12.3. TLS handshakes with Cryptographic Service . . . . . . . 41
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12.4. TLS 1.3 ECDHE Full Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
12.4.1. TLS Client: ClientHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
12.4.2. TLS Server: ServerHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
12.4.3. ecdhe generated on the CS (#cs_generated} . . . . . 45
12.4.4. ecdhe generated by the TS server . . . . . . . . . . 46
12.4.5. TLS client: client Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
12.5. TLS 1.3 Handshake with session resumption . . . . . . . 51
12.5.1. Full Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
12.5.2. TLS server: NewSessionTicket . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
12.5.3. TLS client: NewSessionTicket . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
12.5.4. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
12.6. TLS 1.3 0-RTT handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
12.6.1. TLS client: ClientHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
12.6.2. TLS server: ServerHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12.6.3. TLS client: Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12.7. TLS client authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12.8. TLS Client:Finished (CertificateRequest) . . . . . . . . 60
12.9. TLS Client Authentication (PostHandshake) . . . . . . . 60
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1. TODO
1. When information is missing in the handshake, LURK requires the
length to be set to the appropriated format. This ease the use
of a parser. TLS1.3 seems to consider the length as of the value
of the expected field.
4.2.11.2. PSK Binder
[...]
The length fields for the message (including
the overall length, the length of the extensions block, and the
length of the "pre_shared_key" extension) are all set as if binders
of the correct lengths were present.
2. Introduction
This document defines a LURK extension for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].
This document assumes the reader is familiar with TLS 1.3 the LURK
architecture [I-D.mglt-lurk-lurk].
Interactions with the Cryptographic Service (CS) can be performed by
the TLS Client as well as by the TLS Server.
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LURK defines an interface to a CS that stores the security
credentials which include the PSK involved in a PSK or PSK-ECDHE
authentication or the key used for signing in an ECDHE
authentication. In the case of session resumption the PSK is derived
from the resumption_master_secret during the key schedule [RFC8446]
section 7.1, this secret MAY require similar protection or MAY be
delegated as in the LURK extension of TLS 1.2 [I-D.mglt-lurk-tls12].
The current document extends the scope of the LURK extension for TLS
1.2 in that it defines the CS on the TLS server as well as on the TLS
client and the CS can operate in non delegating scenarios.
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terms defined [RFC8446] and
[I-D.mglt-lurk-tls12].
4. LURK Header
LURK / TLS 1.3 is a LURK Extension that introduces a new designation
"tls13". This document assumes that Extension is defined with
designation set to "tls13" and version set to 1. The LURK Extension
extends the LURKHeader structure defined in [I-D.mglt-lurk-lurk] as
follows:
enum {
tls13 (2), (255)
} Designation;
enum {
capabilities(0),
ping(1),
s_init_cert_verify(2),
s_new_ticket(3),
s_init_early_secret(4),
s_hand_and_app_secret(5),
c_binder_key(6),
c_init_early_secret(7),
c_init_hand_secret(8),
c_hand_secret(9),
c_app_secret(10),
c_cert_verify(11),
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c_register_ticket(12),
c_post_hand(13), (255)
}TLS13Type;
enum {
// generic values reserved or aligned with the
// LURK Protocol
request (0), success (1), undefined_error (2),
invalid_payload_format (3),
invalid_psk
invalid_freshness
invalid_request
invalid_key_id_type
invalid_key_id
invalid_signature_scheme
invalid_certificate_type
invalid_certificate
invalid_certificate_verify
invalid_secret_request
invalid_handshake
invalid_extension
invalid_ephemeral
invalid_idnetity
too_many_identities
}TLS13Status
struct {
Designation designation = "tls13";
int8 version = 1;
} Extension;
struct {
Extension extension;
select( Extension ){
case ("tls13", 1):
TLS13Type;
} type;
select( Extension ){
case ("tls13", 1):
TLS13Status;
} status;
uint64 id;
unint32 length;
} LURKHeader;
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5. Overview
The CS is not expected to perform any policies such as choosing the
appropriated authentication method. These are performed by the TLS
client or TLS server that instruct the LURK client accordingly.
On the other hand, some CS MAY be optimized by implementing a subset
of the specified possibilities described in this document. Typically
some implementations MAY not implement the session resumption or the
post handshake authentication to avoid keeping states of a given
session once the handshake has been performed. These capabilities of
the CS MAY also in return impact the policies of the TLS client or
TLS server.
These limitations are mentioned throughout the document, and even
represented in the state diagrams, the recommendation is that the CS
SHOULD NOT impact the policies of the TLS client or TLS server.
Instead they SHOULD be able to optimize the CS to their policies via
some configuration parameters presented in section Section 12.1.
Such parameters are implementation dependent and only provided here
as informative.
This document defines the role to specify whether the CS runs on a
TLS client or a TLS service. The CS MUST be associated a single
role.
From a LURK client perspective, the purpose of the LURK exchange is
to request secrets, a signing operations, or ticket
(NewSessionTicket) as summed up in Table Figure 1.
+--------+-----------------------+------------------------+
| Role | LURK exchange | secret | sign | ticket |
+--------+-----------------------+------------------------+
| server | s_init_early_secret | yes | - | - |
| server | s_init_cert_verify | yes | yes | - |
| server | s_hand_and_app_secret | yes | - | - |
| server | s_new_ticket | yes | - | yes |
| client | c_binder_key | yes | - | - |
| client | c_init_early_secret | yes | - | - |
| client | c_init_hand_secret | yes | - | - |
| client | c_hand_secret | yes | - | - |
| client | c_app_secret | yes | - | - |
| client | c_cert_verify | yes | yes | - |
| client | c_register_ticket | yes | - | yes |
| client | c_post_hand | - | yes | - |
+--------+-----------------------+------------------------+
Figure 1: Operation associated to LURK exchange
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The number of operations are limited, but the generation of secrets,
tickets as well as signing heavily rely on the knowledge of the TLS
handshake messages and in turn impacts these TLS handshake messages.
As a result, these operations are highly inter-dependent. This is
one reason multiple sequential exchanges are needed between the LURK
client and the CS as opposed to independent requests for secrets,
signing or tickets. This especially requires the necessity to create
a session between the LURK client and the CS. In addition, the LURK
client and the CS need to synchronize the TLS handshake. First it is
a necessary component for the CS to generate the secrets, signature
and tickets. Second, elements are respectively generated by the LURK
client and by the CS.
While all these messages do share a lot of structures, they also
require different structure that make them unique.
6. Structures
This section describes structures that are widely re-used across the
multiple LURK exchanges.
6.1. secret_request
secret_request is a 16 bit structure described in Table Figure 2 that
indicates the requested key or secrets by the LURK client. The
secret_request structure is present in the request of any exchange
except for a c_post_hand exchange. The same structure is used across
all LURK exchanges, but each LURK exchange only permit a subset of
values described in Table Figure 3.
A LURK client MUST NOT set secret_request to key or secrets that are
not permitted. The CS MUST check the secret_request has only
permitted values and has all mandatory keys or secrets set. If these
two criteria are not met the CS MUST NOT perform the LURK exchange
and SHOULD return a invalid_secret_request error. If the CS is not
able to compute an optional key or secret, the CS MUST proceed the
LURK exchange and ignore the optional key or secret.
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+------+-------------------------------------------+
| Bit | key or secret (designation) |
+------+-------------------------------------------+
| 0 | binder_key (b) |
| 1 | client_early_traffic_secret (e_c) |
| 2 | early_exporter_master_secret (e_x) |
| 3 | client_handshake_traffic_secret (h_c) |
| 4 | server_handshake_traffic_secret (h_s) |
| 5 | client_application_traffic_secret_0 (a_c) |
| 6 | server_application_traffic_secret_0 (a_s) |
| 7 | exporter_master_secret (x) |
| 8 | resumption_master_secret (r) |
| 9-15 | reserved and set to zero |
+------+-------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: secret_request structure
+-----------------------+----------------------------+
| LURK exchange | Permitted secrets |
+-----------------------+----------------------------+
| s_init_cert_verify | h_c*, h_s*, a_c*, a_s*, x* |
| s_init_early_secret | b,e_c*, e_x* |
| s_hand_and_app_secret | h_c, h_s, a_c*, a_s*, x* |
| s_new_ticket | r* |
| c_binder_key | b |
| c_init_early_secret | e_c*, e_x* |
| c_init_hand_secret | h_c, h_s |
| c_hand_secret | h_c, h_s |
| c_app_secret | a_c*, a_s*, x* |
| c_cert_verify | a_c*, a_s*, x* |
| c_register_ticket | r* |
| c_post_hand | |
+-----------------------+----------------------------+
Figure 3: secret_request permitted values per LURK exchange
6.2. handshake
The derivation of the secrets, signing operation and tickets requires
the TLS handshake. The TLS handshake is described in [RFC8446]
section 4 and maintained by the TLS server and the TLS client to
derive the same secrets. As the CS is in charge is deriving the
secrets as well to perform some signature verification, the CS must
be be aware of the TLS handshake. The TLS handshake is not
necessarily being provided by the LURK client to the CS, but instead
is derived some structures provided by the LURK client as well as
other structures generated or modified by the CS.
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When an unexpected handshake context is received, the CS SHOULD
return an invalid_handshake error.
The value of the TLS hanshake is defined in [RFC8446] section 4 and
remainded in Table Figure 4 reminds the TLS handshake values after
each LURK exchange and describes operations performed by the CS in
order to build it.
On the TLS server:
o (a) ServerHello.random value provided by the LURK client requires
specific treatment as described in Section 6.4 before being
inserted in teh TLS handshake variable.
o (b) When the shared secret ( and so the private ECDHE ) is
generated by the CS, the KeyShareServerHello structure cannot be
provided to the CS by the LURK client in a ServerHello and is
instead completed by the CS as described in Section 6.5.
o (c) The TLS server Certificate structure is not provided by the
LURK client as part of the handshake structure. Instead, the CS
generates the Certificate message from the certificate structure
described in Section 6.7. The handshake MUST NOT contain a TLS
Certificate message and CS SHOULD reject a handshake that contains
a TLS Certificate message.
o (d) The Certificate and Finished messages are not provided in a
handshake structure by the LURK client but are instead generated
by the CS as described in Section 6.10.
TO FINALIZE THE TLS CLIENT
On the TLS client:
For s_init_cert_verify (resp. c_init_hand_secret) see Section 6.5
that describes how the KeyShareServerHello (resp.
KeyShareClientHello) structure MAY be affected when the share secret
is generated by the CS.
(e) ClientHello.random value provided by the LURK client requires
specific treatment as described in Section 6.4 before being inserted
in the TLS handshake variable. (f) When the shared secret ( and so
the private ECDHE ) is generated by the CS, the KeyShareClientHello
structure cannot be provided to the CS by the LURK client in a
ServerHello and is instead completed by the CS as described in
Section 6.5. (f)
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Typically, shared secret MAY be generated by the CS ( see Section 6.5
) in which case, the public part that is part of the TLS handshake
is or signatures ( see Section 6.10 are generated by the CS.
structures that represent certificates (see Section 6.7) are provided
in a separate message as to enable compression. In some cases, such
as for s_init_cert_verify and c_cert_verify CertificateVerify and
Finished messages are generated separately by the CS and the LURK
client.
In the c_hand_and_app_secret, the handshake field contains encrypted
messages. These messages are contained in a TLSCiphertext structure,
that contains an TLSInnerPlaintext structure. The type of the
TLSInnerPlaintext structure MUST be set to 'handshake' otherwise an
invalid_handshake error is returned.
psk_proposed, psk_accepted, ....
+-----------------------+------------------------------------+---------------+
| LURK exchange | TLS handshake | CS operations |
+-----------------------+------------------------------------+---------------+
| s_init_cert_verify | ClientHello ... later of | a,b,c,d |
| | server EncryptedExtensions / | |
| | CertificateRequest | |
| s_init_early_secret | ClientHello | a |
| s_hand_and_app_secret | ServerHello ... later of | b, |
| | server EncryptedExtensions / | |
| | CertificateRequest | |
| s_new_ticket | earlier of client Certificate / | |
| | client CertificateVerify / | |
| | Finished ... Finished | |
| c_binder_key | - | |
| c_init_cert_verify | ClientHello...server Finished | e,f |
| c_init_post_hand_auth | ClientHello ... ServerHello | e |
| | CertificateRequest | |
| c_post_hand_auth | CertificateRequest | |
| c_init_ephemeral | Partial ClientHello | |
| c_init_early_secret | Partial ClientHello | |
| c_hand_and_app_secret | ServerHello, {EncryptedExtensions} | |
| | ... later of { server Finished } / | |
| | EndOfEarlyData | |
| c_register_ticket | - | |
+-----------------------+------------------------------------+---------------+
Figure 4: handshake values per LURK exchange
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6.3. session_id
The session_id is a 32 bit identifier that identifies a LURK session
between a LURK client and a CS. Unless the exchange is sessionless,
the session_id is negotiated at the initiation of the LURK session
where the LURK client (resp. the CS) indicates the value to be used
for inbound session_id in the following LURK exchanges.
For other LURK exchanges, the session_id is set by the sender to the
inbound value provided by the receiving party. When the CS receives
an unexpected session_id the CS SHOULD return an invalid_session_id
error.
Table Figure 5 indicates the presence of the session_id.
+-----------------------+------------+
| LURK exchange | session_id |
+-----------------------+------------+
| s_init_cert_verify | * |
| s_init_early_secret | y |
| s_hand_and_app_secret | y |
| s_new_ticket | y |
| c_binder_key | - |
| c_init_early_secret | y |
| c_init_hand_secret | - |
| c_hand_secret | y |
| c_app_secret | y |
| c_cert_verify | y |
| c_register_ticket | y |
| c_post_hand | y |
+-----------------------+------------+
y indicates the session_id is present
- indicates session_id may be absent
* indicates session_id may be present
Figure 5: session_id in LURK exchanges
The session_id structure is defined below: ~~~ uint32 session_id ~~~
6.4. freshness
The freshness function implements perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and
prevents replay attack. On the TLS server, the CS generates the
ServerHello.random of the TLS handshake that is used latter to derive
the secrets. The ServerHello.random value is generated by the CS
using the freshness function and the ServerHello.random provided by
the LURK client in the handshake structure. The CS operates
similarly on the TLS client and generates the ClientHello.random of
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the TLS handshake using the freshness function as well as the
ClientHello.random value provided by the LURK client in the handshake
structure.
If the CS does not support the freshness, the CS SHOULD return an
invalid_freshness error. In this document the freshness function is
implemented by applying sha256.
Table {table:freshness} details the exchanges that contains the
freshness structure.
+-----------------------+-----------+
| LURK exchange | freshness |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| s_init_cert_verify | y |
| s_init_early_secret | - |
| s_hand_and_app_secret | y |
| s_new_ticket | - |
| c_init_early_secret | y |
| c_init_hand_secret | y |
| c_hand_secret | - |
| c_app_secret | - |
| c_cert_verify | - |
| c_register_ticket | - |
| c_post_hand | - |
+-----------------------+-----------+
y indicates freshness is present
- indicates freshness is absent
Figure 6: freshness in LURK exchange
The extension data is defined as follows:
enum { sha256(0) ... (255) } Freshness;
When the CS is running on the TLS server, the ServerHello.random is
generated as follows:
server_random = ServerHello.random
ServerHello.random = freshness( server_random + "tls13 pfs srv" );
When the CS is running on the TLS client, the ClientHello.random is
generated as follows:
client_random = ClientHello.random
ClientHello.random = freshness( client_random + "tls13 pfs clt" );
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The server_random (resp client_random) MUST be deleted once it has
been received by the CS.
In some cases, especially when the TLS client enables post handshake
authentication and interacts with the CS via a
(c_init_post_hand_auth) exchange, there might be some delay between
the ClientHello is sent to the server and the Handshake context is
shared with the CS. The client_random MUST be kept until the post-
handshake authentication is performed as the full handshake is
provided during this exchange.
6.5. ephemeral
The Ephemeral structure carries the necessary information to generate
the (EC)DHE shared secret used to derive the secrets. This document
defines the following ephemeral methods to generate the (EC)DHE
shared secret:
o secret_provided: Where (EC)DHE keys and shared secret are
generated by the TLS server and provided to the CS
o secret_generated: Where the (EC)DH keys and shared secret are
generated by the CS.
o no_secret: where no (EC)DHE is involved, and PSK authentication is
performed.
6.5.1. shared_secret_provided:
When ECDHE shared secret are generated by the TLS server, the LURK
client provides the shared secret value to the CS. The shared secret
is transmitted via the SharedSecret structure, which is similar to
the key_exchange parameter of the KeyShareEntry described in
[RFC8446] section 4.2.8.
The CS MUST NOT return any data.
struct {
NamedGroup group;
opaque shared_secret[coordinate_length];
} SharedSecret;
Where coordinate_length depends on the chosen group. For secp256r1,
secp384r1, secp521r1, x25519, x448, the coordinate_length is
respectively 32 bytes, 48 bytes, 66 bytes, 32 bytes and 56 bytes.
Upon receiving the shared_secret, the CS MUST check group is proposed
in the KeyShareClientHello and agreed in the KeyShareServerHello.
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6.5.2. secret_generated:
When the ECDHE public/private keys are generated by the CS, the LURK
client requests the CS the associated public value. Note that in
such cases the CS would receive an incomplete Handshake Context from
the LURK client with the public part of the ECDHE missing. Typically
the ServerHello message would present a KeyShareServerHello that
consists of a KeyShareEntry with an empty key_exchange field, but the
field group is present.
The CS MUST check the group field in the KeyShareServerHello, and get
the public value of the TLS client from the KeyShareClientHello. The
CS performs the same checks as described in [RFC8446] section 4.2.8.
The CS generates the private and public (EC)DH keys, computes the
shared key and return the KeyShareEntry server_share structure
defined in [RFC8446] section section 4.2.8 to the LURK client.
6.5.3. no_secret
With PSK authentication, (EC)DHE keys and shared secrets are not
needed. The CS SHOULD check the PSK authentication has been agreed,
that is pre_shared_key and psk_key_exchamge_modes extensions are noth
present in the ClientHello and in the ServerHello
When the ephemeral method or the group is not supported, the CS
SHOULD return an invalid_ephemeral error.
+-----------------------+-----------+
| LURK exchange | ephemeral |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| s_init_early_secret | - |
| s_init_cert_verify | y+ |
| s_hand_and_app_secret | y |
| s_new_ticket | - |
| c_init_early_secret | no secret_provided | c_init_ephemeral no secret_generated
| c_init_hand_secret | y+ |
| c_hand_secret | y |
| c_app_secret | - |
| c_cert_verify | - |
| c_register_ticket | - |
| c_post_hand | - |
+-----------------------+-----------+
y indicates ephemeral is present
y+ indicates ephemeral is present with ephemeral_method different from no_secret.
- indicates ephemeral is absent
Figure 7: Ephemeral field in LURK exchange
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The extension data is defined as follows:
enum { no_secret (0), secret_provided(1), secret_generated(2) (255)} EphemeralMethod;
EphemeralRequest {
EphemeralMethod method;
select(method) {
case secret_provided:
SharedSecret shared_secret<0..2^16>;
}
}
EphemeralResponse {
select(method) {
case secret_generated:
KeyShareEntry server_share
}
}
6.6. selected_identity
The selected_identity indicates the identity of the PSK used in the
key schedule. The selected_identity is expressed as a (0-based)
index into the identities in the client's list. The client's list is
provided in the pre_shared_key extension as expressed in [RFC8446]
section 4.2.11.
The LURK client MUST provide the selected_identity only when PSK or
PSK-authentication is envisioned and when the PSK has not been
provided earlier. These exchanges are s_init_early_secret on the TLS
server and c_init_early_secret and c_init_hand_secret on the TLS
client side.
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+-----------------------+-----+------+
| LURK exchange | req | resp |
+-----------------------+-----+------+
| s_init_early_secret | M | - |
| s_init_cert_verify | - | - |
| s_hand_and_app_secret | - | - |
| s_new_ticket | - | - |
| c_init_early_secret | - | - |
| c_init_hand_secret | - | - |
| c_hand_secret | - | - |
| c_app_secret | - | - |
| c_cert_verify | - | - |
| c_register_ticket | - | - |
| c_post_hand | - | - |
+-----------------------+-----+------+
M indicates the field is mandatory
M* indicates the field is mandatory but psk may be void
- indicates the field MUST NOT be provided
Figure 8: psk_id in LURK exchange
The extension data is defined as follows:
uint16 selected_identity; //RFC8446 section 4.2.11
The CS retrieve the PSK identity from the ClientHello and SHOULD send
an invalid_psk error if an error occurs. If the PSK is not provided,
a default PSK is generated as described in [RFC8446] section 7.1. If
the default PSK is not allowed then an invalid_psk is returned.
6.7. certificate
The certificate field is used by the LURK client to indicate the
presence with associated value or absence of certificate in the TLS
exchange. When necessary, the CS is expected to generate the
appropriated message for the Handshake Context.
Upon receiving a certificate field, the CS MUST: 1. ensure the
presence or absence of certificate is coherent with the handshake
messages (see Section 6.7.1 ). 2. when the certificate is provided
the CS checks the value corresponds to an acceptable pre-provisionned
value ( see Section 6.7.2 ). 3. when the certificate is provided,
the CS MUST generate the appropriated corresponding message ( see
Section 6.7.3 ).
If the CS is not able to understand the lurk_tls13_certificate field,
it SHOULD return an invalid_certificate error.
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Table Figure 9 indicates the presence of that field in the LURK
exchanges. The
+-----------------------+-----+------+--------------------+
| LURK exchange | req | resp | certificate type |
+-----------------------+-----+------+--------------------+
| s_init_early_secret | - | - | |
| s_init_cert_verify | M | - | server certificate |
| s_hand_and_app_secret | - | - | |
| s_new_ticket | M* | - | client certificate |
| c_init_early_secret | - | - | |
| c_init_hand_secret | - | - | |
| c_hand_secret | - | - | |
| c_app_secret | M | - | server certificate |
| c_cert_verify | - | - | |
| c_register_ticket | M* | - | client certificate |
| c_post_hand | - | - | |
+-----------------------+-----+------+--------------------+
(*) indicates the field MAY be emtpy.
M indicates the field is mandatory
- indicates the field MUST NOT be provided
Figure 9: tag per LURK exchange
There are different ways the LURK client can provide the certificate
message:
enum { empty(0), finger_print(1), uncompressed(2), (255)
}; LURKTLS13CertificateType
struct {
LURKTLS13CertificateType certificate_type;
select (certificate_type) {
case empty:
// no payload
case finger_print
uint32 hash_cert;
case uncompressed:
Certificate certificate; // RFC8446 section 4.4.2
};
} LURKTLS13Certificate;
empty indicates there is no certificates provided by this field.
fingerprint a 4 bytes finger print length that represents the
fingerprinting of the TLS Certificate message. Fingerprinting is
described in [RFC7924] and takes as input the full handshake
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message - that is a message of message type certificate with that
contain the Certificate as its message_data. In this document
only the 4 most left bytes of the output are considered.
uncompressed
indicates the Certificate message as defined in [RFC8446] is
provided. compressed
indicates the CompressedCertificate
[I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression]
6.7.1. presence or absence of certificate message
The absence of the certificate is indicated by a
lurk_certificate_type set to 'empty'. The presence is indicated by a
lurk_certificate_type set to 'uncompressed', 'compressed' or
'finger_print'. The absence of a server Certificate message is only
acceptable when PSK or PSK-ECDHE authentication are used which is
indicated by the presence of a psk_key_exchange_modes and a
pre_shared_key extension in the ServerHello and ClientHello message.
If the lurk_certificate_type is set to empty and these extensions are
not found an invalid_certificate error SHOULD be raised. If the
lurk_certificate_type is not set to empty and these extensions are
found a invalid_certificate error SHOULD be raised.
The presence of a client Certificate message is only acceptable when
a CertificateRequest message is found in the ServerHello message. If
the lurk_certificate_type is set to empty and a CertificateRequest is
present in the ServerHello an invalid_certificate error SHOULD be
raised. If the lurk_certificate_type is not set to empty and a
CertificateRequest is not present in teh ServerHello message, an
invalid_certificate error SHOULD be raised.
6.7.2. certificate field validation
The certificate field can be used for client certificate or for
server certificate. That certificate is called the designated
certificate.
The LURK Client indicates the certificate material either by
providing the uncompressed certificate or via a finger_print.
The LURK client MAY provide a certificate field of type uncompressed
to either carry the Certificate data of the designated certificate or
the necessary data to derive the Certificate data. Typically,
providing Certificate as defined in [RFC8446] will enable to CS to
generate Certificate messages as defined in [RFC8446].
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The LURK client MAY provide a certificate field of type finger_print
in conjunction of additional information shared between the LURK
client and the CS. The finger_print is a 4 byte hint derived from
the 4 most significant bytes of the fingerprint as defined in
[RFC7924].
As a result, the certificate field will be validated if one of the
following condition applies: 1. the certificate_type is set to
'uncompressed' or 'compressed' and the stored certificate is as
described in [RFC8446]. 2. the certificate_type is set to
'finger_print' and the designated certificate has been provisioned.
6.7.3. generation of the certificate message
The TLS exchange carries the certificate information either in a
unaltered Certificate message [RFC8446], or in a
CompressedCertificate message [I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression].
The CompressedCertificate message is decompressed and the
uncompressed Certificate message is considered ni the TLS handshake.
As a result, on a CS point of view the use of a CompressedCertificate
message does not impact the handshake transcript.
6.8. tag
This field provides extra information. Currently, this fields is
used by the LURK client or the CS to indicate the session is ended.
Table Figure 10 indicates the tag values and Table Figure 11 the LURK
messages that contains the tag field.
When the LURK client knows this will be the last LURK exchange
performed within a given session, the LURK client sets the
last_exchange bit. When the CS receives a last_exchange set, the CS
answers normally but clear the session right after the response has
been sent. Similarly, when the CS knows no further LURK exchanges
will be accepted within a session, the CS sets the last_exchange bit
in the response. Upon receiving the response, the LURK client does
not proceed to additional LURK exchange.
+------+----------------+
| Bit | description |
+------+----------------+
| 0 | last_exchange |
| 1-7 | RESERVED |
+------+----------------+
Figure 10: tag description
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+-----------------------+-----+------+
| LURK exchange | req | resp |
+-----------------------+-----+------+
| s_init_early_secret | - | - |
| s_init_cert_verify | M | M |
| s_hand_and_app_secret | M | M |
| s_new_ticket | M | M |
| c_init_early_secret | M | M |
| c_init_hand_secret | M | M |
| c_hand_secret | M | M |
| c_app_secret | M | M |
| c_cert_verify | M | M |
| c_register_ticket | M | M |
| c_post_hand | M | M |
+-----------------------+-----+------+
M indicates the field is mandatory
- indicates the field MUST NOT be provided
Figure 11: tag per LURK exchange
6.9. secret
The Secret structure is used by the CS to send the various secrets
derived by the key schedule described in [RFC8446] section 7.
enum {
binder_key (0),
client_early_traffic_secret(1),
early_exporter_master_secret(2),
client_handshake_traffic_secret(3),
server_handshake_traffic_secret(4),
client_application_traffic_secret_0(5),
server_application_traffic_secret_0(6),
exporter_master_secret(7),
esumption_master_secret(8),
(255)
} SecretType;
struct {
SecretType secret_type;
opaque secret_data<0..2^8-1>;
} Secret;
secret_type: The type of the secret or key
secret_data: The value of the secret.
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6.10. signature
The signature requires the signature scheme, a private key and the
appropriated context. The signature scheme is provided using the
SignatureScheme structure defined in [RFC8446] section 4.2.3, the
private key is derived from the lurk_tls13_certificate Section 6.7
and the context is derived from the handshake Section 6.2 and
lurk_tls13_certificate Section 6.7.
Signing operations are described in [RFC8446] section 4.4.3. The
context string is derived from the role and the type of the LURK
exchange as described below. The Handshake Context is taken from the
key schedule context.
+--------------------+-------------------------------------+
| type | context |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------+
| s_init_cert_verify | "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify" |
| c_cert_verify | "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify" |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------+
struct {
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; //RFC8446 section 4.4.3.
} Signature;
7. LURK exchange on the TLS server
This section describes the LURK exchanges that are performed on the
TLS server. Unless specified used structures are described in
Section 6 The state diagram is provided in section Section 12.2
7.1. s_init_early_secret
s_init_early_secret initiates a LURK session when the server is
authenticated by the PSK or PSK-ECDHE methods. This means the
ClientHello received by the TLS server and ServerHello responded by
the TLS server MUST carry the pre_shared_key and
psk_key_exchange_modes extensions.
selected_identity indicates the selected PSK
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struct{
uint32 session_id
FreshnessFunct freshness
uint16 selected_identity
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> //RFC8446 section 4
uint16 secret_request;
}SInitEarlySecretRequest
struct{
uint32 session_id
Secret secret_list<0..2^16-1>;
}SInitEarlySecretResponse
The binder_key MUST be requested, since it is used to validate the
PSK. The TLS client MAY indicate support for early application data
via the early_data extension. Depending on the TLS server policies,
it MAY accept early data and request the client_early_traffic_secret.
The TLS server MAY have specific policies and request
early_exporter_master_secret.
The CS MUST check pre_shared_key and psk_key_exchange_modes
extensions are present in the ClientHello message. If these
extensions are not present, a invalid_handshake error SHOULD be
returned. The CS MUST ignore the client_early_traffic_secret if
early_data extension is not found in the ClientHello. The
Cryptographic Service MAY ignore the request for
client_early_traffic_secret or early_exporter_master_secret depending
on configuration parameters.
7.2. s_init_cert_verify
s_init_cert_verify initiates a LURK session when the server is
authenticated with ECDHE. The ClientHello received by the TLS
server, and the ServerHello and optionally the HelloRetryRequest MUST
carry a key_share extension.
If the LURK client is configured to not proceed to further exchange,
it sets the last_exchange bit of the tag. When this bit is set, the
session_id is ignored. The CS sets the last_exchange bit if the
last_Exchange bit has been set by the LURK client or when it has been
configured to not accept further LURK exchange.
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struct{
uint8 tag;
select tag.last_exchange){
case False:
uint32 session_id;
}
FreshnessFunct freshness;
Ephemeral ephemeral;
Handshake handshake<0..2^32>; //RFC8446 section 4
LURKTLS13Certificate certificate;
uint16 secret_request;
SignatureScheme sig_algo; //RFC8446 section 4.2.3.
}SInitCertVerifyRequest
struct{
uint8 tag;
select tag.last_exchange){
case False:
uint32 session_id;
}
Ephemeral ephemeral;
Secret secret_list<0..2^16-1>;
Signature signature;
}SInitCertVerifyResponse
sig_algo SignatureScheme is defined in [RFC8446] section 4.2.3.
7.3. s_hand_and_app_secret
The s_hand_and_app_secret is necessary to complete the ServerHello
and always follows an s_init_early_secret LURK exchange. Such
sequence is guaranteed by the session_id. In case of unknown
session_id or an invalid_request error SHOULD be returned.
The LURK client MUST ensure that PSK or PSK-ECDHE authentication has
been selected via the presence of the pre_shared_key extension in the
ServerHello. In addition, the selected identity MUST be the one
provided in the pre_shared_key extension of the previous
s_init_early_secret exchange. The CS MUST also check the selected
cipher in the ServerHello match the one associated to the PSK. The
CS generates the Finished message as described in [RFC8446] section
4.4.4. Which involves the h_s secret. The LURK client MAY request
the exporter_master_secret depending on its policies. The CS MAY
ignore the request based on its policies.
If the LURK client is configured to not proceed to further exchange,
it sets the last_exchange bit of the tag. The CS sets the
last_exchange bit if the last_exchange bit has been set by the LURK
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client or when it has been configured to not accept further LURK
exchange.
struct{
uint8 tag
uint32 session_id
Ephemeral ephemeral
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> //RFC8446 section 4
uint16 secret_request;
} SHandAndAppSecretRequest
struct{
uint8 tag
uint32 session_id
Ephemeral ephemeral
Secret secret_list<0..2^16-1>;
} SHandAndAppSecretResponse
7.4. s_new_tickets
new_session ticket handles session resumption. It enables to
retrieve NewSessionTickets that will be forwarded to the TLS client
by the TLS server to be used later when session resumption is used.
It also provides the ability to delegate the session resumption
authentication from the CS to the TLS server. In fact, if the LURK
client requests and receives the resumption_master_secret it is able
to emit on its own NewSessionTicket. As a result s_new_ticket LURK
exchanges are only initiated if the TLS server expects to perform
session resumption and the CS responds only if if session_resumption
is enabled.
The CS MAY responds with a resumption_master_secret based on its
policies.
The LURK client MAY perform multiple s_new_ticket exchanges. The
LURK client and CS are expected to advertise by setting the
last_exchange bit in the tag field.
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struct {
uint8 tag
uint32 session_id
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> //RFC8446 section 4.
LURKTLS13Certificate certificate;
uint8 ticket_nbr;
uint16 secret_request;
} SNewTicketRequest;
struct {
uint8 tag
uint32 session_id
Secret secret_list<0..2^16-1>;
NewSessionTicket ticket_list<0..2^16-1>; //RFC8446 section 4.6.1.
} SNewTicketResponse;
ticket_nbr: designates the requested number of NewSessionTicket. In
the case of delegation this number MAY be set to zero. The CS MAY
responds with less tickets when the value is too high.
8. LURK exchange on the TLS client
This section describes the LURK exchanges that are performed on the
TLS server. The state diagram is provided in section Section 12.1
The LURK exchanges on the TLS client are determined by the following
parameters 1. the ability of the TLS client to authenticate with a
CertificateVerify 2. the ability of the TLS client to perform post
handshake authentication (indicated by a post_handshake_auth
extension in the ClientHello) 3. the authentication methods chosen by
the server (PSK, PSK-ECDHE, ECDHE) 4. the owner of the private key of
the shared secret (TLS client, CS) 5. the owner of the session
resumption secret (TLS client or CS)
When the TLS client does not provide the ability to authenticate
itself (no CertificateVerify nor post handshake authentication) , the
CS does not hold the credentials of the TLS client ( a PSK or a
private key ). In this case, the only method to authenticate the
server is ECDHE. The owner of the private can be CS or the TLS
client. When the owner of the private key is the TLS client, it will
be able to generate the shared secret (with its private key) and
derive all necessary secrets . As a result, no interaction is needed
between the TLS client and the CS. The TLS client owns the session
resumption secret and so further credential will not be protected,
and thus fall outside the scope of this document. When the owner of
the private key is the CS, the TLS client will need to retrieve the
public key via c_init_ephemeral LURK exchange to complete its
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ClientHello. Then additional secrets are necessarily computed by the
CS - as the keyschedule takes the shared secret as input - and
retrieved by the TLS client via the c_hand_and_app_secret LURK
exchange. If the CS allows the retrieval by the TLS client of the
session resumption secret the credentials used for the next sessions
will not be protected by the CS and thus fall outside the scope of
this document. On the other hand, if the CS does not allow the
retrieval of the session secret, then session resumption requires the
TLS client to provide the NewSessionTicket provided by the TLS server
to the CS via the c_register LURK exchange and the credentials (PSK)
are protected by the CS for the next sessions.
When the TLS the TLS client provides the ability to authenticate
itself. This can be achieved via a certificate or through a PSK.
Note that the two authentications can be done together for example a
post handshake authentication combined with a PSK or PSK-ECDHE.
We assume the private key associated to the client certificate is
protected by the CS. The ability to perform a post handshake
authentication (c_init_post_hand or c_post_hnad) ensures that the
owner of the private key is aware of the handshake.
Note that it does not provides protection of PFS via the guarantee of
ephemeral secrets - instead PFS is provided by preventing the
exchange to be replayed.
NOTE: REDO the ANALYSE. SECURE/UNSECURE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT AS
THERE ARE: * protection of the credentials (PSK, private key) -> PSK
is in the CS if 'r' secret is not provided. * protection associated
to the session ** GUARANTEE OF EPHEMERAL SECRETS: makes sure the
ephemeral secrets are deleted. Recording the ecdhe private
information enables the key schedule to be performed for ECDHE. Adds
additional randomness for PSK-ECDHE ** AWARENESS OF THE HANDSHAKE.
Someone else may also use that exchange... but I do not see exactly
how. ** ...
+-----------+ | MiM unprotected |<---------------------------------+
+-----------+ | | | | | | | | | NO | c_init_ephemeral ->
c_hand_and_app_secret + ( session resumption )-+<-+ | |
enabled | | | | | YES | | | c_init_early_secret | ( r not provided
)--+ | | c_init_hand_and_app_secret | | YES | | | c_register ---+ | |
v | | +-----+ +-> ( post handshake )----+ | | | c_init_post_hand
c_post_hand | v +--------------+ | | | MiM protected
(PSK) |<---------------------+--------+ +--------------+
c_init_hand_and_app_secret (eph=provided) -> (c_post_hand.
c_register_ticket ) c_init_ephemeral (eph=generated)->
c_hand_and_app_secret -> (c_post_hand. c_register_ticket )
c_init_early_secret (prov, gen) ^
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c_init_post_hand : unable to bind the handshake messages to the key
used to generates the hash. SHOUDL we consider this ?
8.1. c_init_cert_verify
The c_init_hand_and_app_secret LURK exchange used under the three
following conditions: TLS client authenticates the TLS server using
ECDHE, the TLS client has generated the ECDHE private key - as
opposed to the CS -, and the TLS server requires the TLS client to
authenticate with a CertificateVerify during the TLS key exchange.
The last_message is set as defined in Section 6.8 but with the
additional condition that a post handshake authentication may be
performed. More precisely, the TLS client sets the last_exchange
only if a post handshake authentication may be performed in the
future. The CS sets the last_message only if post handshake is
enabled by the CS and the post_handshake_authentication extension is
present in the ClientHEllo.
The freshness is handled as described in Section 6.4.
The Ephemeral MUST be set to 'secret_provided' as the TLS client has
generated the ECDHE private key. The CS treats the ephemeral as
describe din Section 6.5.
The handshake MUST NOT contain any of the pre_shared_key and
psk_key_exchange_modes extensions in the ServerHello. If these
extensions are found, an invalid_handshake error is returned. The
handshake MUST contain the key_share extensions in the ClientHello
and the ServerHello and returns an invalid handshake error otherwise.
The handshake MUST contain a CertificateRequest and returns a
invalid_handshake error otherwise.
No secret are generated. The TLS client has all the necessary
material for the key schedule and as such can proceed to session
resumption.
This exchange is followed by a c_post_hand_auth exchange.
When the exchange is not terminal, i.e. the las_exchange is unset,
the CS generates the client Finished message.
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struct{
uint8 tag;
select tag.last_exchange){
case False:
uint32 session_id;
}
Freshness freshness
Ephemeral = provided
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> //RFC8446 section 4 (clear)
SignatureScheme sig_algo;
LURKTLS13Certificate cert;
}CInitCertVerifypRequest
struct{
uint8 tag;
select tag.last_exchange){
case False:
uint32 session_id;
}
FreshnessFunct freshness;
Signature signature
}CInitCertVerifyResponse
8.2. c_init_post_hand_auth
The c_init_post_hand_auth happens when the TLS client is
authenticating using a post handshake authentication and all previous
key exchanges messages with the TLS server did not result in the
creation of a session. As mentioned in Section 6.4 the creation of
an earlier session with the CS will end up in the TLS client not
knowing the value of the client_random, making this exchange
impossible. As a result, this exchange is expected under the
following conditions. The TLS client is authenticating the TLS
server via ECDHE (or PSK /PSK-ECDHE with an unprotected PSK), the TLS
client has generated the ephemerals private key and derived all
secrets. As the TLS client may need to perform multiple
authentications, the c_init_post_hand_auth exchange may be followed
by additional c_post_hand_auth.
Upon receiving the request, the CS checks the presence of the
post_handshake_auth extension in the ClientHello. The CS also checks
the presence of a CertificateRequest message after the client
Finished message. If the extension or message is not found, and
invalid_handshake error is returned.
The ephemeral mode MUST be secret_provided or no_secret. If other
methods are found, an invalid_ephemeral is returned.
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struct{
Tag tag
Freshness freshness
Ephemeral = provided
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> //RFC8446 section 4 (clear) clientHello...client finished CertificateRequest
SignatureScheme sig_algo;
LURKTLS13Certificate cert;
}CInitPostHandAuthRequest
struct{
Tag tag
Signature signature
}CInitPostHandAuth
8.3. c_post_hand_auth
The c_post_hand_auth exchange enables a TLS client to perform post
handshake authentication. It follows a c_init_post_hand_auth,
c_init_cert_verify a c_hand_and_app or c_register_ticket.
struct{
Tag tag
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> // CertificateRequest
SignatureScheme sig_algo;
LURKTLS13Certificate cert;
}CInitPostHandAuthRequest
struct{
Tag tag
Signature signature
}CInitPostHandAuth
8.4. c_init_ephemeral
The c_init_ephemeral LURK exchange is performed when the TLS client
authenticates the TLS server using ECDHE with an ephemeral value
generated by the CS.
The ephemeral method MUST be set to 'secret_generated' otherwise an
invalid_ephemeral error is returned. The Handshake value is a
partial ClientHello with a key_share extension that doe not contain a
ECHDE public value. The Client Hello MUST not have pre_shared_key or
psk_key_exchange_mode. If any of these condition is not met a
invalid_handshake error is returned.
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struct{
uint32 session_id
Freshness freshness
Ephemeral ephemeral
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> //RFC8446 section 4
}CInitEphemeral
struct{
uint32 session_id
Ephemeral ephemeral
}CInitEphemeral
8.5. c_init_early_secret
The c_init_early_secret LURK exchange initiates a LURK session when
the TLS client proposes at least one of PSK for PSK or PSK-ECDHE
authentication method.
This exchange differs to the s_init_early_secret in two aspects:
First, a partial ClientHello ( as described in [RFC8446] section
4.2.11.2 ) with a potentially partial key_share extension ( as
described in Section 6.5. As a result, the CS needs to complete it
to derive the full ClientHello. Second, the CS does not generate the
secrets for a single chosen psk identity (selected_identity), but for
all PSK identities specified in the PreSharedKeyExtension.identities.
The shared secret of the exchange can be absent when PSK only is
proposed in which case the ephemeral method is set to 'no_secret'.
When PSK-ECDHE or ECDHE is proposed, the private key associated to
the shared secret can be derived by the CS or the TLS client. When
derived by the CS, the ephemeral_method is set to 'secret_generated'.
When generated by the TLS client, the ephemeral method is set to
'no_secret' as teh shared secret cannot be provided yet and will be
provided once the ServerHello has been received by the TLS client.
The handshake is a partial ClientHello as described in [RFC8446]
section 4.2.11.2. The CS checks PSK or PSK-ECDHE is proposed and
returns an invalid_handshake error otherwise. The CS computes the
secrets associated to each identity. The secret_list_list contains
the list of secret_lists associated to each identity in the same
order as these identities. If an identity is unknown an
invalid_handshake error is returned. The CS SHOULD limit the number
of identities and if that number is exceeded, an too_many_identities
SHOULD be returned. Secrets are generated as described in
Section 6.1.
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struct{
uint32 session_id
Freshness freshness
Ephemeral ephemeral
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> //RFC8446 section 4
uint16 secret_request;
}CInitEarlySecretRequest
SecretList secret_list<0..2^16-1>;
struct{
uint32 session_id
Ephemeral ephemeral
SecretList secret_list_list<0..2^16-1>;
}CInitEarlySecretResponse
8.6. c_hand_and_app_secret
The c_hand_and_app LURK exchange always follows a c_init_early_secret
or a c_init_ephemeral LURK exchange.
The tag field may have the last_exchange bit set to indicate that no
further exchange is expected. No further exchange means that the TLS
client does not intend to perform session resumption nor to perform
post handshake authentication. A TLS client SHOULD NOT set the
last_exchange bit if a post_handshake_auth extension is present in
its ClientHello.
If the LURK exchange follows a c_init_ephemeral, the ECDHE private
key was generated by the CS during the c_init_ephemeral_exchange.
The CS checks the ephemeral_method is set to 'no_secret'.
If the LURK exchange follows a c_init_early_secret, the
ephemeral_method had been set to 'no_secret' or 'secret_generated'.
If the TLS server is authenticated using PSK or if the
ephemeral_method was previously set to 'secret_generated', the CS
checks the ephemeral_method is set to 'no_secret'. If the TLS server
is authenticated using PSK-ECDHE or ECDHE or if the ephemeral_method
was previously set to 'no_secret', the CS checks the ephemeral_method
is set to 'secret_provided'. If a mismatch is found between the
ephemeral_method and the selected authentication method, an
invalid_ephemeral
The handshake field contains the ServerHello and other encrypted
messages. Upon receiving a request the CS determines which secrets
needs to be generated as described in Section 6.1. The generation of
these secret requires the shared secret to be generated - including
the default value for the PSK authentication. The derivation of the
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handshake secrets (h_s, h_c) do not need to decrypt the encrypted
messages.
However, the derivation of the application secrets (a_s, a_c), export
secret (x) or resumption secret (r) do. If these secrets are
requested, the CS needs to generate the handshake secrets, the
server_handshake_traffic_secret as described in [RFC8446] section 7.3
to decrypt the encrypted messages. The CS can then generate all
secrets except the resumption secret.
If session resumption or post handshake is not explicitly prohibited,
by setting the last_exchange of the tag field, the CS generates all
missing messages until the client Finished. Otherwise, the client
Finished message MAY not be generated.
If a CertificateRequest is present, the Certificate and
CertificateVerify needs to be generated. Unlike on the TLS server,
where the TLS server indicates the certificate to chose as well as
the signature scheme to select, on the TLS client, such decision is
left to the CS. The choice of the signature algorithm and
certificate is performed by the CS as described in [RFC8446] section
4.4.2.3.
The Certificate, respectively CertificateVerify and Finished message
are generated as described in [RFC8446] section 4.4.2, section 4.4.3,
and section 4.4.4.
struct{
uint8 tag
uint32 session_id
Ephemeral ephemeral
Handshake handshake<0..2^32> //RFC8446 section 4
uint16 secret_request;
}CHandAndAppRequest
struct{
uint8 tag
uint32 session_id
LURKTLS13Certificate certificate;
SignatureScheme sig_algo
Signature signature
Secret secret_list<0..2^16-1>;
}CHandAndAppRequest
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8.7. c_register_tickets
The c_register_ticket is only used when the TLS client intend to
perform session resumption. The LURK client MAY provide one or
multiple NewSessionTickets. These tickets will be helpful for the
session resumption to bind the PSK value to some identities.
struct {
uint8 tag
uint32 session_id
NewSessionTicket ticket_list<0..2^16-1>; //RFC8446 section 4.6.1.
} RegisterTicketRequest;
struct {
uint8 tag
uint32 session_id
} RegisterTicketResponse;
9. Security Considerations
Security credentials as per say are the private key used to sign the
CertificateVerify when ECDHE authentication is performed as well as
the PSK when PSK or PSK-ECDHE authentication is used.
The protection of these credentials means that someone gaining access
to the CS MUST NOT be able to use that access from anything else than
the authentication of an TLS being established. In other way, it
MUST NOT leverage this for: * any operations outside the scope of TLS
session establishment. * any operations on past established TLS
sessions * any operations on future TLS sessions * any operations on
establishing TLS sessions by another LURK client.
The CS outputs are limited to secrets as well as NewSessionTickets.
The design of TLS 1.3 make these output of limited use outside the
scope of TLS 1.3. Signature are signing data specific to TLS 1.3
that makes the signature facility of limited interest outside the
scope of TLS 1.3. NewSessionTicket are only useful in a context of
TLS 1.3 authentication.
ECDHE and PSK-ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy which prevents
past session to be decrypted as long as the secret keys that
generated teh ECDHE share secret are deleted after every TLS
handshake. PSK authentication does not provide perfect forward
secrecy and authentication relies on the PSK remaining sercet. The
Cryptographic Service does not reveal the PSK and instead limits its
disclosure to secrets that are generated from the PSK and hard to be
reversed.
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Future session may be impacted if an attacker is able to authenticate
a future session based on what it learns from a current session.
ECDHE authentication relies on cryptographic signature and an ongoing
TLS handshake. The robustness of the signature depends on the
signature scheme and the unpredictability of the TLS Handshake. PSK
authentication relies on not revealing the PSK. The CS does not
reveal the PSK. TLS 1.3 has been designed so secrets generated do
not disclose the PSK as a result, secrets provided by the
Cryptographic do not reveal the PSK. NewSessionTicket reveals the
identity (ticket) of a PSK. NewSessionTickets.ticket are expected to
be public data. It value is bound to the knowledge of the PSK. The
Cryptographic does not output any material that could help generate a
PSK - the PSK itself or the resumption_master_secret. In addition,
the Cryptographic only generates NewSessionTickets for the LURK
client that initiates the key schedule with CS with a specific way to
generate ctx_id. This prevents the leak of NewSessionTickets to an
attacker gaining access to a given CS.
If an the attacker get the NewSessionTicket, as well as access to the
CS of the TLS client it will be possible to proceed to the
establishment of a TLS session based on the PSK. In this case, the
CS cannot make the distinction between the legitimate TLS client and
teh attacker. This corresponds to the case where the TLS client is
corrupted.
Note that when access to the CS on the TLS server side, a similar
attack may be performed. However the limitation to a single re-use
of the NewSessionTicket prevents the TLS server to proceed to the
authentication.
Attacks related to other TLS sessions are hard by design of TLS 1.3
that ensure a close binding between the TLS Handshake and the
generated secrets. In addition communications between the LURK
client and the CS cannot be derived from an observed TLS handshake
(freshness function). This makes attacks on other TLS sessions
unlikely.
10. IANA Considerations
11. Acknowledgments
12. Annex
12.1. LURK state diagrams on TLS client
The state diagram sums up the LURK exchanges. The notations used are
defined below:
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LURK exchange indicates a LURK exchange is stated by the LURK client
or is received by the CS ---> (resp. <---) indicates a TLS message is
received (resp. received). These indication are informative to
illustrates the TLS state machine.
CAPITAL LETTER indicates potential configuration parameters or policy
applied by the LURK client or the CS. The following have been
considered:
o PSK, PSK-ECDHE, ECDHE that designates the authentication method.
This choice is made by the LURK client. The choice is expressed
by a specific LURK exchange as well as from the TLS Handshake
Context.
o SESSION_RESUMPTION indicates the session resumption has been
enabled on the LURK client or the CS. As a consequence the TLS
client is considered performing session resumption and the TLS
server MUST make session resumption possible.
o POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH indicates that post handshake authentication
proposed by the TLS client in a post_handshake_auth extension is
not ignored by the LURK client or on the CS.
Note that SESSION_RESUMPTION, POST_HANDSAHKE_AUTH are mostly
informative and the current specification does not mandate to have
such configuration parameters. By default, these SHOULD be enabled.
Other potential configuration could be proposed for configuring LURK
client or CS policies. These have not been represented in the state
diagram and the specification does not mandate to have these
parameters implemented.
o CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC indicates that client early traffic MAY be
sent by the TLS client and the notification by the TLS client in
the ClientHello via the early_data extension MUST be considered.
o EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_SECRET indicates whether or not
early_exporter_master_secret MUST be requested by the LURK client
and responded by the CS.
o MASTER_EXPORTER indicates whether or not exporter_master_secret
MUST be requested by the LURK client and responded by the CS.
o SESSION_RESUMPTION_DELEGATION indicates whether or not
session_resumption_master is requested by the LURK client and
responded by the CS.
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o MAX_SESSION_TICKET_NBR indicates the maximum number of tickers
that can be requested or provided by the LURK client and provided
by the CS. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to have such limitations
being configurable.
The analysis of the TLS Handshake Context enables to set some
variables that can be used by the LURK client to determine which LURK
exchange to proceed as well as by the CS to determine which secret
MAY be responded. The following variables used are:
psk_proposed: The TLS Client is proposing PSK authentication by
including a pre_shared_key and a psk_key_exchange_mode extensions in
the ClientHello.
dhe_proposed: The received or to be formed ClientHello contains a
key_share extensions.
psk_accepted: The chosen authentication method is pSK or PSK-ECDHE
which is indicated via the pre_shared_key extension in the
ServerHello.
0rtt_proposed: Indicates the TLS client supports early data which is
indicated by the early_data extension in the ClientHello.
post_handshake_proposed: indicates the TLS client supports post
handshake authentication which is indicated by the presence of a
post_handshake_auth extension in the ClientHello.
finished: indicates that the LURK client or the CS has determined the
session shoudl be closed an ks_ctx are deleted.
The CS contains three databases:
CTX_ID_DB: database that contains the valid ctx_id of type opaque.
PSK_DB: contains the list of PSKs, with associated parameters such as
Hash function. This database includes the session resumption
tickets.
Key_DB: contains the asymetric signing keys with supported signing
algorithms.
12.1.1. LURK client
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TLS Client Policy for authentication
PSK, PSK-ECDHE ECDHE
| |
| |
v |
psk ---> +--------------------+ |
| c_binder_key | |
+--------------------+ |
EARLY_EXPORTER, 0-RTT | |
v | |
/------------------------\ NO |
\------------------------/----+ |
YES v | |
+---------------------+ | |
| c_init_early_secret | | |
+---------------------+ | |
ClientHello | | |
<---- +<-----------------+--------+
ServerHello YES v
----> +-------------------------------------+
| c_init_hand_secret or c_hand_secret |
+-------------------------------------+
|
/--------------------\ NO
| CertificateRequest |------+
\--------------------/ |
YES v v
+-------------------+------------------+
| c_cert_verify | c_app_secret |
+-------------------+------------------+
client Finished | |
<---- +-----------+---------+
|
+--------------------------------------+
| LURK client post handshake exchanges |
+--------------------------------------+
The LURK client post handshake diagram is represented below:
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POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH |
v v
/-------------------------\ NO
| post_hand_auth_proposed |------+
\-------------------------/ |
YES v |
+-----------------------------+ |
| c_register_tickets | |
| (empty NewSessionTickets) | |
+-----------------------------+ |
| |
+<-----------------+
|
+<-----------------------------------------------+
| |
+------------------------------+ |
SESSION_RESUMPTION | POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH | |
client Finished | | CertificateRequest | | |
NewSessionTickets| | | v v |
| v v | /-------------------------\NO |
| /-------------\ NO +---> | post_hand_auth_proposed |--+ |
+----> \-------------/---------+ \-------------------------/ | |
YES v | YES v | |
+-----------------------------+ | +-------------------------+ | |
| c_register_ticket | | | c_post_hand | | |
+-----------------------------+ | +-------------------------+ | |
v v v | |
+-----------------+----------+---+----------------+ |
v |
/--------------------\ NO |
| finished |----------+
\--------------------/
YES v
+-------------------------+
| LURK exchanges Finished |
+-------------------------+
12.1.2. Cryptographic Service
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TLS13Request
|
/---------------------------\NO /-------------------------------\NO
| type is c_init_early_secret|-->| type is c_init_hand_secret |-+
\---------------------------/ \-------------------------------/ |
| | +------------------+
| +------------+ |
| v |
| /-------------------\NO /----------------\NO
| | psk_selected |-+ | session,cookie | +-------+
| \------------------ / | | consistent |---| ERROR |
| YES | | \----------------/ +-------+
+----------------+ | |
PSK, PSK-ECDHE | | ECHDE |
v +-------------+ |
/-------------------\NO +-------+ | |
| psk_key in PSK_DB |---| ERROR | | |
\-------------------/ +-------+ | |
+-------------------------+ |
| |
+-------------+ |
| Init ks_ctx | |
+-------------+ |
| |
+---------------------------+
|
v
+---------------------------+
| process the request |
| update CTX_DB, PSK_DB |
+---------------------------+
12.2. LURK state diagrams on TLS server
12.2.1. LURK client
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TLS Server Policy for authentication
received PSK, PSK-ECDHE, ECDHE
ClientHello | |
----> v v
psk ---->+----------------------+ +----------------------+
| Init ks_ctx | | Init ks_ctx |
+----------------------+ +----------------------+
v |
+---------------------+ |
| s_init_early_secret | |
+---------------------+ |
| |
to be formed YES v v
ServerHello +--------------------------+ +-------------------------+
----> | s_hand_and_app_secret | | s_init_cert_verify |
+--------------------------+ +-------------------------+
| |
+---------------------------+
|
v
+--------------------------------------+
| LURK client post handshake exchanges |
+--------------------------------------+
12.2.2. Cryptographic Service
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TLS13Request
|
/---------------------------\NO /---------------------------\NO
|type is s_init_early_secret|-->| type is s_init_cert_verify |-+
\---------------------------/ \---------------------------/ |
PSK, | +--------------------+
PSK-ECDHE v |
/-------------------\NO +-------+ /----------------\NO
| psk_key in PSK_DB |---| ERROR | | session,cookie | +-------+
\-------------------/ +-------+ | consistent |---| ERROR |
| \----------------/ +-------+
v |
+-------------+ |
| Init ks_ctx | |
+-------------+ |
| |
+-----------------------------+
|
v
+---------------------------+
| process the request |
| update CTX_DB, PSK_DB |
+---------------------------+
12.3. TLS handshakes with Cryptographic Service
This section is non normative. It illustrates the use of LURK in
various configurations.
The TLS client may propose multiple ways to authenticate the server
(ECDHE, PSK or PSK-ECDHE). The TLS server may chose one of those,
and this choice is reflected by the LURK client on the TLS server.
In other words, this decision is out of scope of the CS.
The derivation of the secrets is detailed in {{!RFC8446)) section
7.1. Secrets are derived using Transcript-Hash and HKDF, PSK and
ECDHE secrets as well as some Handshake Context.
The Hash function: When PSK or PSK-ECDHE authentication is selected,
the Hash function is a parameter associated to the PSK. When ECDHE,
the hash function is defined by the cipher suite algorithm
negotiated. Such algorithm is defined in the cipher_suite extension
provided in the ServerHello which is provided by the LURK client in
the first request when ECDHE authentication is selected.
PSK secret: When PSK or PSK-ECDHE authentication is selected, the PSK
is the PSK value identified by the identity. When ECDHE
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authentication is selected, the PSK takes a default value of string
of Hash.length bytes set to zeros.
ECDHE secret: When PSK or PSK-ECDHE authentication is selected, the
ECDHE secret takes the default value of a string of Hash.length bytes
set to zeros. The Hash is always known as a parameter associated to
the selected PSK. When ECDHE authentication is selected, the ECDHE
secret is generated from the secret key (ephemeral_sercet) provided
by the LURK client and the counter part public key in the key_share
extension. When the LURK client is on the TLS client, the public key
is provided in the ServerHello. When the LURK client is on the TLS
Server, the public key is provided in the ClientHello. When ECDHE
secret is needed, ClientHello...ServerHello is always provided to the
CS.
Handshake Context: is a subset of Handshake messages that are
necessary to generated the requested secrets. The various Handshake
Contexts are summarized below:
+------------------------------------+--------------------------------+
| Key Schedule secret or key | Handshake Context |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| binder_key | None |
| client_early_traffic_secret | ClientHello |
| early_exporter_master_secret | ClientHello |
| client_handshake_traffic_secret | ClientHello...ServerHello |
| server_handshake_traffic_secret | ClientHello...ServerHello |
| client_application_traffic_secret_0 | ClientHello...server Finished |
| server_application_traffic_secret_0 | ClientHello...server Finished |
| exporter_master_secret | ClientHello...server Finished |
| resumption_master_secret | ClientHello...client Finished |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
The CS has always the Hash function, the PSK and ECDHE secrets and
the only remaining parameter is the Handshake Context. The remaining
sections will only focus on checking the Handshake Context available
to the CS is sufficient to perform the key schedule.
When ECDHE authentication is selected both for the TLS server or the
TLS client, a CertificateVerify structure is generated as described
in [RFC8446] section 4.4.3.. CertificateVerify consists in a
signature over a context that includes the output of Transcript-
Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate) as well as a context string.
Both Handshake Context and context string depends on the Mode which
is set to server in this case via the configuration of the LURK
server. Similarly to the key schedule, the Hash function is defined
by the PSK or the ServerHello. The values for the Handshake Context
are represented below:
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+-----------+-------------------------+-----------------------------+
| Mode | Handshake Context | Base Key |
+-----------+-------------------------+-----------------------------+
| Server | ClientHello ... later | server_handshake_traffic_ |
| | of EncryptedExtensions/ | secret |
| | CertificateRequest | |
| | | |
| Client | ClientHello ... later | client_handshake_traffic_ |
| | of server | secret |
| | Finished/EndOfEarlyData | |
| | | |
| Post- | ClientHello ... client | client_application_traffic_ |
| Handshake | Finished + | secret_N |
| | CertificateRequest | |
+-----------+-------------------------+-----------------------------+
When ECDHE authentication is selected, the CS generates a Finished
message, which is a MAC over the value Transcript-Hash(Handshake
Context, Certificate, CertificateVerify) using a MAC key derived from
the Base Key. As a result, the same Base Key and Handshake Context
are required for its computation describe din [RFC8466] section
4.4.4..
12.4. TLS 1.3 ECDHE Full Handshake
This example illustrates the case of a TLS handshake where the TLS
server is authenticated using ECDHE only, that is not PSK or PSK-
ECDHE authentication is provided and so session resumption is
provided either.
12.4.1. TLS Client: ClientHello
The TLS client does not provides any PSK and omits the pre_shared_key
as well as the psk_key_exchange_mode extensions. Note that omitting
the psk_key_exchange_mode extension prevents the TLS client to
perform further session resumption.
The TLS client does not need any interaction with the Cryptographic
Service to generate and send the ClientHello message to the TLS
server.
TLS Client TLS Server
Key ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key_share
v + signature_algorithms --------->
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12.4.2. TLS Server: ServerHello
Upon receiving the ClientHello, the TLS server determines the TLS
client requests an ECDHE authentication. The TLS server initiates a
LURK session to provide ECDHE authentication as represented below:
TLS Client TLS Server
ServerHello ^ Key
+ key_share | Exch
{EncryptedExtensions} ^ Server
{CertificateRequest*} v Params
{Certificate} ^
{CertificateVerify} | Auth
{Finished} v
<-------- [Application Data*]
The LURK Client on the TLS server initiates a s_init_cert_verify to
retrieves the necessary secrets to finish the exchange and request
the generation of the signature (certificate_verify) carried by the
CertificateVerify TLS structure.
The s_init_cert_verify request uses a InitCertVerifyRequest structure
which is composed of two substructures: A SecretRequest structure
(OLD_secret_request) is in charge of requesting the necessary secrets
to decrypt and encrypt the TLS handshake as well as the applications
carried over the TLS session. Finally a SigningRequest substructure
(signing_request) is used to request the certificate_verify payload.
The OLD_secret_request carries the requested secrets as well as the
necessary parameters to generate the secrets. In our case, the
requested secrets are the handshake secrets (h_c, h_s) as well as the
application secrets (a_c, a_s). This corresponds to the most
expected use cases, though other use case may require different
secrets to be requested. Theses requests are indicated in the
secret_request. The necessary Handshake Context is provided through
handshake which is set to ClientHello ... EncryptedExtensions. The
ECDHE shared secret is provided in this example via the ephemeral
extension. In our case, the secret key is provided directly thought
other means may be used. In particularly providing the secret key
implies the dhe parameters have been generated outside the CS. The
freshness function is provided through the freshness extension.
The signing_request provides the key_id that identifies the private
key used to generate the signature, the algorithm use dto generate
the signature (sig_algo) as well as the certificate. The certificate
carries information to generate the Certificate structure of the
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ServerHello, and may not be the complete certificate chain but only
an index.
Since there is no session resumption, the requests indicates with the
tag set to last_exchange that no subsequent messages are expected.
As a result, no session_id is provided. The freshness function is
set to sha256, the handshake is constituted with the appropriated
messages with a modified server_random to provide PFS. Th
eCertificate message is also omitted from the handshake and is
instead provided in the certificate structure using a finger_print.
The requested secrets are handshake and application secrets, that is
h_s, h_c, a_s, and a_c. The signature scheme is ed25519.
With authentication based on certificates, there are two ways to
generate the shared secrets that is used as an input to the derive
the secrets. The ECDHE private key and shared secret may be
generated by the CS as described in {cs_generated}. On the other
hand the ECDHE private key and shared secret may be generated by the
TLS server as described in {tls_Server_generated}
12.4.3. ecdhe generated on the CS (#cs_generated}
When the (EC)DHE private key and shared secrets are generated by the
CS, the LURK client set the ephemeral_method to secret_generated.
The (EC)DHE group x25519 is specified in the handshake in the
key_share extension. In return the CS provides the LURK client the
public key so the TLS server can send the ServerHello to the TLS
client.
In this scenario, the CS is the only entity tthat knows the private
ECDHE key and the shared secret, and only the CS is able to compute
the secrets.
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TLS Server
Lurk Client CS
InitCertVerifyRequest
tag=last_exchange -------->
freshness = sha256
ephemeral
ephemeral_method = secret_generated
handshake = handshake (x25519)
certificate = finger_print
secret_request = h_s, h_c, a_s, and a_c
sig_algo = ed25519
InitCertVerifyResponse
ephemeral
ephemeral_method = secret_generated
key
group = x25519,
key_exchange = public_key
secret_list
signature = sig
<---------
12.4.4. ecdhe generated by the TS server
When the (EC)DHE private keys and the shared secrets are generated by
the TLS server, the LURK client provides the shared secret to the CS
as only the shared secret is necessary to generated the signature.
This is indicated by the ephemeral_method set to secret_provided. No
(EC)DHE values are returned by the CS as these have already been
generated by the TLS server. However, the TLS server has all the
necessary material to generate the secrets and the only information
that the CS owns and that is not known to et TLS server is the
private key (associated to the certificate) used to generate the
signature. This means that is session resumption were allowed, since
it is based on PSK authentication derived from teh resumption secret,
these session could be authenticated by the TLS server without any
implication from the CS.
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TLS Server
Lurk Client CS
InitCertVerifyRequest
tag=last_exchange -------->
freshness = sha256
ephemeral
ephemeral_method = secret_provided
key
group = x25519
shared_secret = shared_secret
handshake = handshake
certificate = finger_print
secret_request = h_s, h_c, a_s, and a_c
sig_algo = ed25519
InitCertVerifyResponse
ephemeral
ephemeral_method = secret_provided
secret_list
signature = sig
<---------
Upon receiving the InitCertificateRequest, the CS initiates a context
associated to the newly created LURK session.
The secrets are generated from the TLS 1.3 key schedule describe din
[RFC8446] and requires as input PSK, ECDHE as well as some context
handshake.
The CS determine that ECDHE without specific PSK is used from the
ClientHello and associated extensions. As a result, the default PSK
value is used. The ECDHE share secret is derived, in our case from
the dhe_secret of the TLS server and the public dhe value provided by
the ClientHello shared_key extension.
The CS reads the freshness extension and generates the handshake that
will be used further.
The necessary Handshake Context to generate the handshake secrets is
ClientHello...ServerHello which is provided by the handshake. The CS
uses the freshness function provided in the freshness extension to
derive the appropriated server.random.
The generation of the CertificateVerify is described in [RFC8446]
section 4.4.3. and consists in a signature over a context that
includes the output of Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context,
Certificate) as well as a context string. Both Handshake Context and
context string depends on the Mode which is set to server in this
case via the configuration of the LURK server.
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The necessary Handshake Context to generate the CertificateVerify is
ClientHello ... later of EncryptedExtensions / CertificateRequest.
In our case, this is exactly handshake, that is ClientHello ...
EncryptedExtensions. The Certificate payload is generated from the
information provided in the certificate extension.
Once the certificate_verify value has been defined, the LURK server
generates the server Finished message in order to have the necessary
Handshake Context ClientHello...server Finished to generate the
application secrets.
The LURK server returns the requested keys, the certificate_verify in
a InitCertVerifyResponse structure. This structure is composed of
the two substructures: SecretResponse that contains the secrets and
SigningResponse that contains the certificate_verify.
The TLS server can complete the ServerHello response, that is proceed
to the encryption and generates the Finished message.
As session resumption is not provided, the LURK server goes into a
finished state and delete the ks_ctx. The special case described in
this session does not use LURK session and as such may be stateless.
12.4.5. TLS client: client Finished
Upon receiving the ServerHello message, the TLS client retrieve the
handshake and application secrets to decrypt the messages received
from server as well as to encrypt its own messages and application
data as represented below:
TLS Client TLS Server
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
To retrieves these secrets, the TLS client proceeds successively to
an c_init_hand_secret LURK exchange followed by a c_app_secret LURK
exchange.
The c_init_hand_secret exchange is composed of one substructure:
(OLD_secret_request) to request the secrets. Optionally, a
SigningRequest (signing_request) when the TLS server requests the TLS
client to authenticate itself. The indication of a request for TLS
client authentication is performed by the TLS server by providing a
CertificateRequest message associated to the ServerHello. We
consider that such request has not been provided here so the
SigingRequest structure is not present.
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The OLD_secret_request specifies the secrets requested via the
secret_request. In our case only the handshake secrets are requested
(h_c, h_s). In this example the ECDHE share secret is provided via
the ephemeral extension. In this case the ECDHE secrets have been
generated by the TLS client, and the TLS client chooses to provide
the ephemeral secret (dhe_secret) to the CS via the ephemeral
extension. The TLS client also provides the freshness function via
the freshness extension so the handshake can be appropriately be
interpreted. The handshake context is provided via the handshake and
is set to ClientHello ... ServerHello.
Note that if the TLS client would have like the CS to generate the
ECDHE public and private keys, the generation of the keys would have
been made before the ClientHello is sent, that is in our case during
a c_init_early_secret LURK exchange. If that had been the case a
c_hand_secret LURK exchange would have followed and not a
c_init_hand_secret exchange.
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TLS Client
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
InitHandshakeSecretRequest
OLD_secret_request
secret_request = h_c, h_s
handshake = ClientHello ... ServerHello
ext
ephemeral = dhe_secret
freshness
session_id
------->
InitHandshakeSecretResponse
secret_response
ext
session_id
<-------- keys
TLS Client
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
AppSecretRequest
session_id
cookie
secret_Request
secret_request
handshake
------->
AppSecretResponse
session_id
cookie
secret_response
<-------- keys
Upon receiving the InitHandshakeSecretRequest, the servers initiates
a LURK session context (ks_ctx) and initiates a key schedule. The
key schedule requires PSK, ECDHE as well as Handshake Context to be
complete. As no pre_shared_key and psk_key exchange_modes are found
in the ClientHello the CS determines that ECDHE is used for the
authentication. The PSK is set to its default value. The ECHDE
shared secret is generated from the ephemeral extension as well as
the public value provided in the ClientHello. The CS takes the
freshness function and generates the appropriated handshake context.
The necessary Handshake Context to generate handshake secrets is
ClientHello...ServerHello which is provided by the handshake.
The handshake secrets are returned in the secret_response to the TLS
client. The TLS client decrypt the encrypted extensions and messages
of the ServerHello exchange.
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As no CertificateREquest appears, the LURK client initiates an
app_secret LURK exchange decrypt and encrypt application data while
finishing the TLS handshake.
The AppSecretRequest structure uses session_id and cookies as agreed
in the previous c_init_hand_secret exchange. The AppSecretRequest
embeds a SecretRequest sub structure. The application secrets
requested are indicated by the secret_request (a_s, a_s). The
Handshake Context (handshake) is set to server EncryptedExtensions
... server Finished.
Upon receiving the AppSecretRequest, the CS checks the session_id.
The CS has now the ClientHello ... server Finished which enables it
to compute the application secrets.
As no session resumption is provided, the CS and the LURK client goes
into a finished state and delete their ks_ctx.
12.5. TLS 1.3 Handshake with session resumption
This scenario considers that the TLS server is authenticated using
ECDHE only in the first time and that further TLS handshake use the
session resumption mechanism. The first TLS Handshake is very
similar as the previous one. The only difference is that
psk_key_exchange_mode extension is added to the ClientHello.
However, as no PSK identity is provided, the Full exchange is
performed as described in section Section 12.4.
The only change is that session resumption is activated, and thus
LURK client and LURK servers do not go in a finished state and close
the LURK session after the exchanges are completed. Instead further
exchanges are expected. Typically, on the TLS server side
new_Session_ticket exchanges are expected while
registered_session_ticket are expected on the client side.
When session resumption is performed, a new LURK session is
initiated.
12.5.1. Full Handshake
The Full TLS Handshake use ECDHE authentication. It is very similar
to the logic described in section Section 12.4. The TLS handshake is
specified below for convenience.
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TLS Client TLS Server
Key ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key_share
| + psk_key_exchange_mode
v + signature_algorithms --------->
ServerHello ^ Key
+ key_share | Exch
{EncryptedExtensions} Server Param
{Certificate} ^
{CertificateVerify} | Auth
{Finished} v
<-------- [Application Data*]
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
12.5.2. TLS server: NewSessionTicket
As session resumption has been activated by the
psk_key_exchange_mode, the TLS Server is expected to provide the TLS
client NewSessionTickets as mentioned below:
TLS Client TLS Server
<-------- [NewSessionTicket]
The LURK client and LURK server on the TLS server does not go into a
finished state. Instead, the LURK client continues the LURK session
with a NewTicketRequest to enable the CS to generate the
resumption_master_secret necessary to generate the PSK and generate a
NewTicketSession. ticket_nbr indicates the number of
NewSessionTickets and handshake is set to earlier of client
Certificate client CertificateVerify ... client Finished. As we do
not consider TLS client authentication, the handshake is set to
client Finished as represented below.
TLS Server
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
NewTicketRequest
session_id
cookie
ticket_nbr
handshake=client Finished -------->
NewTicketResponse
session_id
cookie
<--------- tickets
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The necessary Handshake Context to generate the
resumption_master_secret is ClientHello...client Finished. From the
InitCerificateVerify the context_handshake was set to
ClientHello...server Finished. The additional handshake enables the
CS to generate the NewSessionTickets.
Note that the LURK client on the TLS server may send multiple
NewTicketRequest. Future request have an empty handshake.
Upon receiving the NewTicketRequest, the LURK server checks the
session_id and cookie. It then generates the
resumption_master_secret, NewSessionTickets. NewSessionTickets are
stored into the PSK_DB under NewSessionTicket.ticket. Note that PSK
is associated with the authentication mode as well as the Hash
function negotiated for the cipher suite. The CS responds with
NewSessionTickets that are then transmitted back to the TLS client.
The TLS server is ready for session resumption.
12.5.3. TLS client: NewSessionTicket
Similarly, the LURK client on the TLS client will have to provide
sufficient information to the CS the necessary PSK can be generated
in case of session resumption. This includes the remaining Handshake
Context to generate the resumption_master_secret as well as
NewSessionTickets provided by the TLS server. The LURK client uses
the c_register_ticket exchange.
Note that the LURK client may provide the handshake with an empty
list of NewSessionTickets, and later provide the NewSessionTickets as
they are provided by the TLS server. The Handshake Context only
needs to be provided for the first RegisterTicketRequest.
TLS Client
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
NewTicketRequest
session_id
cookie
handshake=client Finished
ticket_list -------->
NewTicketResponse
session_id
cookie
<--------- tickets
Both TLS client and TLS Servers are ready for further session
resumption. On both side the CS stores the PSK in a database
designated as PSK_DB. Each PSK is associated to a Hash function as
well as authentication modes. Each PSK is designated by an identity.
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The identity may be a label, but in our case the identity is derived
from the NewSessionTicket.ticket.
12.5.4. Session Resumption
Session resumption is initiated by the TLS client. Session
resumption is based on PSK authentication and different PSK may be
proposed by the TLS client. The TLS handshake is presented below.
TLS Client TLS Server
ClientHello
+ key_share
+ psk_key_exchange_mode
+ pre_shared_key -------->
ServerHello
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share
{EncryptedExtensions}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
The TLS client may propose to the TLS Server multiple PSKs. Each of
these PSKs is associated a PskBindersEntry defined in [RFC8446]
section 4.2.11.2. PskBindersEntry is computed similarly to the
Finished message using the binder_key and the partial ClientHello.
The TLS server is expected to pick a single PSK and validate the
binder. In case the binder does not validate the TLS Handshake is
aborted. As a result, only one binder_key is expected to be
requested by the TLS server as opposed to the TLS client.
In this example we assume the psk_key_exchange_mode indicated by the
TLS client supports PSK-ECDHE as well as PSK authentication. The
presence of a pre_shared_key and a key_share extension in the
ServerHello inidcates that PSK-ECDHE has been selected.
12.5.4.1. TLS client: ClientHello
To compute binders, the TLS Client needs to request the binder_key
associated to each proposed PSK. These binder_keys are retrieved to
the CS using the BinderKeyRequest. The secret_request is set to
binder_key, and the PSK_id extension indicates the PSK's identity
(PSKIdentity.identity or NewSessionTicket.ticket). No Handsahke
Context is needed and handshake is empty.
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TLS Client
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
BinderKeyRequest
secret_request=binder_key
handshake=""
ext
PSK_id
BinderKeyResponse
<--------- key
Upon receiving the BinderKeyRequest, the CS checks the psk is in the
PSK_DB and returns the binder_key.
With the binder keys, the TLS Client is able to send it ClientHello
message.
We assume in this example that the ECDHE secrets is generated by the
TLS client and not the Cryptographic service. As a result, the TLS
client does not need an extra exchange to request the necessary
parameters to derive the key_shared extension.
12.5.4.2. TLS server: ServerHello
The TLS server is expected to select a PSK, check the associated
binder and proceed further. If the binder fails, it is not expected
to proceed to another PSK, as a result, the TLS server is expected to
initiates a single LURK session.
The binder_key is requested by the TLS server via and
s_init_early_secret LURK exchange. The InitEarlySecretRequest
structure is composed of a SecretRequest structure
(OLD_secret_request).
In our case, only the binder_key is requested so secret_request is
set to binder_key only. Similarly, to the TLS client, the handshake
is not needed to generate the binder_key. However, the EarlySecret
exchange requires the ClientHello to be provided so early secrets may
be computed in the same round during 0-RTT handshake. The chosen PSK
is indicated in the PSK_id extension and the freshness function is
indicated in the freshness extension.
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TLS Server
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
InitEarlySecretRequest
secret_Request
secret_request=binder_key
handshake=ClientHello
ext
freshenss
PSK_id
session_id
InitEarlySecretResponse
secret_response
<--------- key
ext
session_id
To complete to the ServerHello exchange, the TLS server needs the
handshake and application secrets. These secrets are requested via
an s_hand_and_app_secret LURK exchange. The
HandshakeAndAppSecretRequest is composed of SecretRequest structure.
The secret_request is set to handshake (h_c, h_s) and application
secrets (a_s, a_c). The Handshake Context (handshake) is set to
ServerHello ... EncryptedExtensions as their is no authentication of
the TLS client. Finally, the ephemeral ECDHE is provided or
requested via the ephemeral extension. In our case, we assume the
ephemeral secrets is generated by the tLS client is provided to the
CS.
The necessary Handshake Context to generate the handshake secrets is
ClientHello ... ServerHello, so the CS can generate the handshake
secrets. The necessary Handshake Context to generate the application
secrets is ClientHello ... server Finished. So the CS needs to
generate the Finished message before as in the case of the
InitCerificateVerify exchange detailed in Section 12.5.1.
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TLS Server
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
HandshakeAndAppRequest
session_id
OLD_secret_request
secret_request = h_c, h_s, a_c, a_s
handshake = ServerHello ... EncryptedExtensions
ext
ephemeral = dhe_secret -------->
HandshakeAndAppResponse
session_id
secret_response
keys
<---------
The CS returns the necessary secret to the TLS server to complete the
ServerHello response.
The remaining of the TLS handshake is proceeded similarly as
described in the Full Handshake in section Section 12.5.
12.6. TLS 1.3 0-RTT handshake
The 0-RTT Handshake is a PSK or PSK-ECDHE authentication that enables
the TLS client to provide application data during the first round
trip. The main differences to the PSK PSK-ECDHE authentication
described in the case of session resumption is that:
o Application Data is encrypted in the ClientHello based on the
client_early_secret
o Generation of the client_early_secret requires the Cryptographic
Service to be provisioned with the ClientHello which does not need
to be re-provisioned later to generate the handshake secrets
o An additional message EndOfEarlyData needs to be considered to
compute the client Finished message.
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TLS Client TLS Server
ClientHello
+ early_data
+ key_share*
+ psk_key_exchange_modes
+ pre_shared_key
(Application Data*) -------->
ServerHello
+ pre_shared_key
+ key_share*
{EncryptedExtensions}
+ early_data
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data*]
(EndOfEarlyData)
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
12.6.1. TLS client: ClientHello
With 0-RTT handshake, the TLS client builds binders as in session
resumption described in section Section 12.5.4. The binder_key is
retrieved for each proposed PSK with a BinderKeyRequest. When early
application data is sent it is encrypted using the
client_early_traffic_secret. This secret is retrieved using the
c_init_early_secret LURK exchange.
The InitEarlySecretRequest is composed of a SecretRequest
(OLD_secret_request) substructure. The TLS Client sets the
secret_request to client_early_traffic_secret (e_s). The handshake
is set to ClientHello. The PSK is indicated via the the PSK_id
extension, the freshness function is indicated via the freshness
extension. If the TLS client is willing to have the ECDHE keys
generated by the CS an ephemeral extension MAY be added also.
When multiple PSK are proposed by the TLS client, the first proposed
PSK is used to encrypt the application data.
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TLS Client
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
InitEarlySecretRequest
OLD_secret_request
secret_request=e_s
handshake=ClientHello
ex
PSK_id
fresness
session_id
InitEarlySecretResponse
secret_response
<--------- keys=e_s
ext
session_id
Upon receiving the InitEarlySecretRequest, the CS generates the
client_early_traffic_secret.
The TLS client is able to send its ClientHello with associated
binders and application data.
12.6.2. TLS server: ServerHello
If the TLS server accepts the early data. It proceeds as described
in session resumption described in section Section 12.5.4. In
addition to the binder_key, the TLS server also request the
client_early_traffic_secret to decrypt the early data as well as to
proceed to the ServerHello exchange.
12.6.3. TLS client: Finished
The TLS client proceeds as described in handshake based on ECDHE, PSK
or PSK-ECDHE authentications described in Section 12.4 and
Section 12.5. The main difference is that upon requesting handshake
and application secrets, using an HandAndAppRequest the TLS client
will not provide the ClientHello as part as the handshake. The
Client as already been provided during the EarlySercret exchange.
12.7. TLS client authentication
TLS client authentication can be performed during the Full TLS
handshake or after the TLS handshake as a post handshake
authentication. In both cases, the TLS client authentication is
initiated by the TLS server sending a CertificateRequest. The
authentication is performed via a CertificateVerify message generated
by the TLS client but such verification does not involve the CS on
the TLS server.
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12.8. TLS Client:Finished (CertificateRequest)
The ServerHello MAY carry a CertificateRequest encrypted with the
handshake sercets.
Upon receiving the ServerHello response, the TLS client decrypts the
ServerHello response. If a CertificateRequest message is found, the
TLS Client requests the Cryptographic to compute the
CertificateVerify in addition to the application secrets via a
certificate_verify LURK exchange. The CertVerifyRequest is composed
of a Secret Request structure and a SigningRequest structure.
The secret_request is set to the application secrets (a_c, a_s) and
the handshake is set to server EncryptedExtensions ... later of
server Finished/EndOfEarlyData. As the request follows a (BinderKey,
EarlySecret, HandshakeSecret) or HandshakeSecret the Handshake
Context on the CS now becomes: ClientHello ... later of server
Finished/EndOfEarlyData which is the Handshake Context required to
generate the CertificateVerify on the TLS client side and includes
the Handshake Context required to generate the application secrets
(ClientHello...server Finished).
TLS Client
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
CertVerifyRequest
session_id
OLD_secret_request
secret_request
handshake = EncryptedExtensions ...
later of server Finished/EndOfEarlyData
signing_request
CertVerifyResponse
session_id
secret_response
keys
signing_response
<--------- certificate_verify
Upon receiving the CertificateRequest, the CS checks the session_id
and cookie.
12.9. TLS Client Authentication (PostHandshake)
When post-handshake is enabled by the TLS client, the TLS client may
receive at any time after the handshake a CertificateRequest message.
When post handshake is enabled by the TLS client, as soon as the
client Finished message has been sent, the TLS client sends a
RegisteredNewSessionTicketRequest with an empty NewSessionTicket to
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register the remaining Handshake Context to the CS. ctx_id is set to
opaque, handshake is set to earlier of client Certificate client
CertificateVerify ... client Finished.
Upon receiving the RegisteredNewSessionTicketsRequest the
Cryptographic is aware of the full Handshake Context. It updates
ks_ctx.next_request to c_post_hand or c_register_ticket.
TLS Client
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
RegisteredNewSessionTicketRequest
session_id
handshake
ticket_list (empty)
<--------- RegisteredNewSessionTicketResponse
session_id
cookie
When the TLS client receives a CertificateRequest message from the
TLS server, the TLS client sends a PostHandshakeRequest to the
Cryptographic Service to generate certificate_verify. The handshake
is set to CertificateRequest. The index N of the
client_application_traffic_N key is provided as well as the
Cryptographic so it can generate the appropriated key.
TLS Client
Lurk Client Cryptographic Service
PostHandshakeRequest
session_id
handshake=CertificateRequest
app_n=N
PostHandshakeResponse
session_id
<--------- certificate_verify
Upon receiving the PostHandshakeRequest the CS checks session_id and
cookie. The necessary Handshake Context to generate the
certificate_verify is ClientHello ... client Finished +
CertificateRequest. Once the PostHandshakeResponse. Next requests
expected are c_post_hand or c_register_ticket.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
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[I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression]
Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate
Compression", draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-10
(work in progress), January 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7924] Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Cached Information Extension", RFC 7924,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7924, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7924>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8466] Wen, B., Fioccola, G., Ed., Xie, C., and L. Jalil, "A YANG
Data Model for Layer 2 Virtual Private Network (L2VPN)
Service Delivery", RFC 8466, DOI 10.17487/RFC8466, October
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8466>.
13.2. Informative References
[I-D.mglt-lurk-lurk]
Migault, D., "LURK Protocol version 1", draft-mglt-lurk-
lurk-00 (work in progress), February 2018.
[I-D.mglt-lurk-tls12]
Migault, D. and I. Boureanu, "LURK Extension version 1 for
(D)TLS 1.2 Authentication", draft-mglt-lurk-tls12-03 (work
in progress), July 2020.
Author's Address
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
8275 Trans Canada Route
Saint Laurent, QC 4S 0B6
Canada
EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Migault Expires July 29, 2021 [Page 62]