Private Autonomous System (AS) Removal Requirements
draft-mitchell-grow-remove-private-as-03

GROW                                                         J. Mitchell
Internet-Draft                                                    D. Rao
Intended status: Informational                                     Cisco
Expires: October 22, 2015                                      R. Raszuk
                                                          April 20, 2015

          Private Autonomous System (AS) Removal Requirements
                draft-mitchell-grow-remove-private-as-03

Abstract

   This document specifies operator's requirements for implementations
   that remove Private Use Autonomous System (AS) numbers from the AS
   path of routes sent to external Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) peers.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 22, 2015.

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1.  Introduction

   After the original IANA reservation of Autonomous System Numbers
   (ASNs) for Private Use was allocated via [RFC1930] implementation
   specific features were released that removed ASNs from the Border
   Gateway Protocol AS_PATH attribute.  The details of such
   implementations were driven by multiple operators use cases and
   varied accordingly.  At times, implementation differences, mis-
   understanding of feature behavior and mis-configurations have led to
   operators leaking Private Use ASNs to the Internet.  Since an
   additional range of Private Use ASNs has been documented in [RFC6996]
   implementations will likely require update and even more
   implementation variation is possible.

   This document captures operator's requirements across various use
   cases, being cognizant of the operations of current implementations
   that remove Private Use ASNs, and provides a set of requirements for
   Private Use ASN removal implementations in the hopes of reducing
   inconsistencies and variations between implementations.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Basic Requirements

   An implementation that removes Private Use ASNs MUST provide a
   configuration option to remove them from both the AS_PATH attribute
   of [RFC4271] and if Four-Octet AS Support [RFC6793] is present, the
   AS4_PATH attribute of the route.  This configuration option MUST be
   configurable at least at the External Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP)
   peering session level, i.e. per neighbor, and will impact the as path
   attributes associated with any NLRI sent to the router to which is
   configured.  The option SHOULD be configurable per AFI/SAFI so that
   implementations may provide different behaviors per address family.
   The implementation MUST remove all Private Use ASNs from the as path
   attributes up to the first non-Private Use AS in the as path, except
   as dictated by Section 4.  An implementation MAY remove Private Use
   ASNs from the entire as path (past the first ASN in the as path
   attributes), however if it does so, it SHOULD provide an operator
   configurable option to disable this behavior if desired.  The reason
   for this behavior is that operators would prefer visibility to which
   network is leaking Private Use ASNs to the global Internet (or any
   other network) so the behavior can be corrected directly by the
   upstream network providing connectivity to the Private Use ASN rather

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   than hiding the issue, which may not fully correct the problem if the
   downstream network has multiple providers.

4.  Loop Prevention when using Private Use ASN Removal

   Implementations of the Private Use ASN removal feature MAY provide
   basic loop prevention to prevent a dual-homed network utilizing a
   Private Use ASN which connects to a single ASN from receiving an
   update with it's own (Private) ASN removed that was sent back to the
   non-originating connection if the ASN to which it is connected has
   configured the feature towards it's other location.  The
   implementation SHOULD validate that the peer ASN does not appear in
   the as path prior to removing Private ASNs from the path.  If the
   peer ASN does appear, the Private Use removal feature should not
   manipulate the path.  Otherwise, due to the standard BGP path
   selection process described in Section 9.1.2.2 of [RFC4271] EBGP
   routes will be preferred over IBGP routes which may have been from
   within the AS, so without further attribute manipulation, this can
   pose a risk of a routing information loop to some networks.
   Therefore a router SHOULD NOT remove Private Use ASN's from an
   AS_PATH or AS4_PATH attribute if it encounters the EBGP AS of the
   neighbor on which it is configured in the AS_PATH or AS4_PATH that
   would be removed.

5.  Unnecessary Restrictions on Local or Peer AS

   Implementations of this feature SHOULD NOT have any unnecessary
   restrictions on Private Use ASN use on either the local ASN of the
   router that is configuring the feature or the peer ASN that will be
   receiving the routes.  Both use cases are prevalent in some networks
   as Private Use ASN removal features have sometimes been used in
   network mergers or other situations where masking the Private Use
   ASN's behind a particular AS, which may also be a Private Use ASN, is
   necessary to avoid conflict with Private Use ASN's inside the
   neighboring network.  In these cases, as long as both the router with
   the feature configured and the peer have a unique Private ASN from
   each other, all routes originated from behind their networks
   containing Private ASN's can be masked to be their ASN.  In the case
   where the AS where the feature is configured is a Private Use ASN and
   the router also has policy configured to prepend the local AS to the
   as path, an implementation SHOULD NOT remove the ASN's that have been
   locally prepended as per policy configuration, as it is expected that
   the local ASN cannot be removed from the path with the feature, and
   prepending is utilized by operators for various traffic engineering
   scenarios.

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6.  Private ASN Replacement Alternative

   Implementations of this feature MAY include the capability to
   alternatively replace Private Use ASN's, or for that matter any
   arbitrary set of ASN's, in the AS Path with the local router ASN,
   thereby maintaining the original as path length when advertising the
   update to upstream networks.  If this capability exists, it SHOULD
   NOT be the default behavior of the Private ASN removal feature and
   therefore MUST be operator configurable.

7.  Behavior Towards other Special-Use ASNs

   Implementations of this feature SHOULD NOT remove Documentation ASNs
   [RFC5398] as this may encourage their use by operators.  These ASNs
   are not reserved for Private Use and use of them is likely the result
   of a misconfiguration.  Due to historical reasons and lack of
   operator guidance on Last ASNs prior to [RFC7300] implementations MAY
   remove Last ASNs, which are deployed in some networks as if they are
   Private Use ASNs, even though this is not recommended to operators
   for the reasons specified in that document.  If the implementation
   supports this, the behavior towards Last ASNs SHOULD be consistent
   with the behavior of the implementation towards Private Use ASNs as
   specified in this document.

8.  Operational Considerations

   It should be noted that removing items from the AS_PATH or AS4_PATH
   poses some risk and could introduce the chance of a routing loop.
   Further operational considerations for the use of Private Use ASNs
   are documented in [RFC6996].

9.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA actions required by this document.  Current Private
   Use, Documentation and Last ASN registrations discussed in this
   document are located in the IANA AS Numbers registry [IANA.AS].

10.  Security Considerations

   There are no new security concerns in relation to the feature
   described in this document.  General BGP security considerations are
   discussed in [RFC4271] and [RFC4272].  Identification of the
   originator of a route with a Private Use ASN in the AS path would
   have to be done by tracking the route back to the neighboring
   globally unique AS in the path or by inspecting other attributes.

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11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC5398]  Huston, G., "Autonomous System (AS) Number Reservation for
              Documentation Use", RFC 5398, December 2008.

   [RFC6793]  Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet
              Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793, December
              2012.

   [RFC6996]  Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
              Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, July 2013.

   [RFC7300]  Haas, J. and J. Mitchell, "Reservation of Last Autonomous
              System (AS) Numbers", BCP 6, RFC 7300, July 2014.

11.2.  Informative References

   [IANA.AS]  IANA, , "Autonomous System (AS) Numbers", April 2015,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/>.

   [RFC1930]  Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
              selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
              BCP 6, RFC 1930, March 1996.

   [RFC4272]  Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", RFC
              4272, January 2006.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   JM - Placeholder.

Authors' Addresses

   Jon Mitchell
   Cisco

   Email: jrmitche@puck.nether.net

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   Dhananjaya Rao
   Cisco
   170 West Tasman Dr.
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: dhrao@cisco.com

   Robert Raszuk

   Email: robert@raszuk.net

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