Best Current Practices for Securing Internet of Things (IoT) Devices
draft-moore-iot-security-bcp-00

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Network Working Group                                           K. Moore
Internet-Draft                                          Network Heretics
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         R. Barnes
Expires: May 4, 2017                                             Mozilla
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                             ARM Limited
                                                        October 31, 2016

  Best Current Practices for Securing Internet of Things (IoT) Devices
                  draft-moore-iot-security-bcp-00.txt

Abstract

   In recent years, embedded computing devices have increasingly been
   provided with Internet interfaces, and the typically-weak network
   security of such devices has become a challenge for the Internet
   infrastructure.  This document lists a number of minimum requirements
   that vendors of Internet of Things (IoT) devices need to take into
   account during development and when producing firmware updates, in
   order to reduce the frequency and severity of security incidents in
   which such devices are implicated.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Moore, et al.              Expires May 4, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              IoT Security BCP                October 2016

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Note about version -00 of this document . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  General security design considerations  . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.1.  Threat analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.2.  Use of Standard Cryptographic Algorithms  . . . . . .   6
       2.1.3.  Use of Standard Security Protocols  . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.4.  Security protocols should support algorithm agility .   7
     2.2.  Authentication requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.1.  Resistance to keyspace-searching attacks  . . . . . .   7
       2.2.2.  Protection of authentication credentials  . . . . . .   7
       2.2.3.  Resistance to authentication DoS attacks  . . . . . .   8
       2.2.4.  Unauthenticated device use disabled by default  . . .   8
       2.2.5.  Per-device unique authentication credentials  . . . .   8
     2.3.  Encryption Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.3.1.  Encryption should be supported  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.3.2.  Opportunistic encryption discouraged  . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.3.  Encryption algorithm strength . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.4.  Man in the middle attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.4.  Firmware Updates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.4.1.  Automatic update capability . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.4.2.  Enable automatic firmware update by default . . . . .   9
       2.4.3.  Backward compatibility of firmware updates  . . . . .  10
       2.4.4.  Automatic updates should be phased in . . . . . . . .  10
       2.4.5.  Authentication of firmware updates  . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.5.  Private key management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.6.  Operating system features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.6.1.  Use of memory compartmentalization  . . . . . . . . .  10
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