A Standard Format for Key Compromise Attestation
draft-mpalmer-key-compromise-attestation-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Matt Palmer | ||
Last updated | 2023-12-16 (Latest revision 2023-06-14) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a profile for a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) that attests with reasonable confidence that the key which signed the CSR has been compromised. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mpalmer-key-compromise- attestation/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/pwnedkeys/key-compromise-attestation-rfc.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)