Skip to main content

Security Events for Revocation of Agent Delegations
draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Suhas Nandakumar , Cullen Fluffy Jennings
Last updated 2026-11-19
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-00
Web Authorization Protocol                                 S. Nandakumar
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                             C. Jennings
Expires: 23 May 2027                                       Cisco Systems
                                                        19 November 2026

          Security Events for Revocation of Agent Delegations
            draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-00

Abstract

   When a person withdraws a task from an agent, or a delegating agent
   is compromised, every credential delegated below that point has to
   stop working, and the agents holding those credentials have to stop
   the work they were doing under them.  Token status lists and token
   introspection tell a verifier that asks whether one token is still
   valid.  They do not tell the agents further down a delegation chain,
   which may be in other organizations and which the revoking party may
   not know.  This document defines a Security Event Token that revokes
   a delegation and everything delegated from it, a subject identifier
   format that names a delegation token, the parties entitled to issue
   the event, how agents propagate it down the chain, and how verifiers
   check the status of a whole chain so that revocation reaches them
   even when the event does not.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-
   revocation/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization
   Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:oauth@ietf.org), which is
   archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.
   Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  The delegation Subject Identifier Format  . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  The Delegation Revoked Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Who May Revoke  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Issuers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Verifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.3.  Holders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.4.  Relaying the Event  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.5.  Delivery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Chain Status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Relationship to Other Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.1.  OAuth URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.2.  Subject Identifier Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 2]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

1.  Introduction

   Agents delegate to agents.  A user's assistant delegates a task to a
   planning agent, which delegates parts of it to agents run by other
   organizations, which delegate again.  Each hop is represented by a
   credential: a token issued by an authorization server with an act
   claim [RFC8693] [ACTOR-PROFILE], a Delegation Token
   [DELEGATION-TOKENS], or a Delegate SD-JWT [DELEGATE-SD-JWT].

   Revocation has to reach the whole subtree below the revoked hop:

   *  The revoking party knows the hop it is revoking, but in peer
      delegation it does not know the agents further down, which were
      chosen by the agents it delegated to.

   *  A verifier that caches a chain may hold a status answer for a
      token for its time to live, so that a revoked token remains usable
      for that window (Section 9.5 of [DELEGATION-TOKENS]).

   *  An agent that holds a revoked delegation is in the middle of work.
      Learning about the revocation only when its next request is denied
      leaves work running, and children of its own still delegated.

   Shared Signals [SSF] and CAEP [CAEP] push events about sessions,
   credentials, and accounts, and [AIMS] describes their use for agents.
   No event type identifies a delegation, and none states that its
   effect extends to every token delegated from it.

   This document defines:

   *  the delegation subject identifier format (Section 3), which names
      a delegation token by its issuer and identifier;

   *  the delegation revoked event (Section 4), a Security Event Token
      [RFC8417] whose effect is the revocation of the named token and of
      every token whose chain contains it;

   *  who may issue the event (Section 5);

   *  how receivers act on it and pass it on to the holders of tokens
      they delegated (Section 6); and

   *  how verifiers check the status of a whole chain, so that
      revocation reaches them even when a party in the middle of the
      chain does not relay the event (Section 7).

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 3]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Terminology

   Delegation token:  A credential that conveys authority from a
      delegator to a delegatee, such as an access token with an act
      claim, a Delegation Token [DELEGATION-TOKENS], or a Delegate SD-
      JWT [DELEGATE-SD-JWT].

   Chain:  The sequence of delegation tokens from the root grant to a
      given token.  For tokens issued by token exchange, the chain is
      the sequence of tokens exchanged one for the next, possibly at
      different authorization servers.

   Descendant:  A token whose chain contains a given token, other than
      that token.

   Holder:  The party whose key a delegation token's cnf claim [RFC7800]
      confirms.

2.  Overview

   Revocation travels two ways, and a verifier needs only one of them to
   work:

  Revoking party                         Status mechanism
  (issuer, ancestor, designee, holder)   of each token
       |                                        ^
       | (1) delegation revoked event           | (3) status of every
       v                                        |     token in the chain
  Holder --(2) relays, wrapped--> Holder --> ... Verifier
  stops work                      stops work

           Figure 1: Push down the chain, pull chain status

   1.  A party entitled to revoke (Section 5) issues a delegation
       revoked event naming one token, and revokes the token in its
       status mechanism (Section 6.1).

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 4]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   2.  Each holder stops acting under the revoked tokens and relays the
       event, with the original signature, to the holders of the tokens
       it delegated (Section 6.3, Section 6.4).  This is fast, but
       depends on every holder.

   3.  Verifiers check the status of every token in the chain, within a
       staleness bound (Section 7).  This is slower, but depends on no
       holder, and bounds how long a revocation can go unnoticed.

3.  The delegation Subject Identifier Format

   The delegation subject identifier format identifies one delegation
   token.  A subject identifier in this format is a JSON object with
   these members:

   format:  REQUIRED. delegation.

   iss:  REQUIRED.  The iss claim of the token.

   jti:  REQUIRED.  The jti claim of the token.

   Other claims of the token, such as a context claim
   [AGENT-DELEGATION], are not included: a holder of the token already
   has them, and they would reveal the token's purpose to a party that
   does not.

   {
     "format": "delegation",
     "iss": "https://planner.example",
     "jti": "dt-7f3a9c"
   }

   A token is identified by the pair (iss, jti).  Issuers of delegation
   tokens that are to be revocable with this document MUST include jti
   and MUST NOT reuse a jti.

4.  The Delegation Revoked Event

   The event type is:

   urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked

   The SET [RFC8417] is signed with JWS [RFC7515], has typ secevent+jwt,
   and carries iss, iat, jti, aud, events, and sub_id [RFC9493], a
   subject identifier in the delegation format (Section 3) that names
   the revoked token.  Its iss is the party revoking the token
   (Section 5), or, when relayed, the holder that relays it
   (Section 6.4).

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 5]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   The event payload is a JSON object with these members:

   revoked_at:  REQUIRED.  A NumericDate [RFC7519] from which the token
      and its descendants are revoked.

   reason:  OPTIONAL.  One of principal_request (the principal withdrew
      the task), task_complete, compromise (a key or agent in the chain
      is believed compromised), or policy.  Receivers MUST ignore values
      they do not recognize.

   original:  OPTIONAL.  The original SET, in JWS Compact Serialization,
      when this SET relays it (Section 6.4).

   {
     "iss": "https://assistant.example",
     "iat": 1794643200,
     "jti": "set-0b51",
     "aud": "https://planner.example",
     "sub_id": {
       "format": "delegation",
       "iss": "https://assistant.example",
       "jti": "dt-41c2"
     },
     "events": {
       "urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked": {
         "revoked_at": 1794643200,
         "reason": "principal_request"
       }
     }
   }

   The effect of the event is the same as revoking, through the token's
   own status mechanism, the named token and each of its descendants.  A
   revocation cannot be undone; a delegator that wants to restore
   authority issues a new token.

5.  Who May Revoke

   A receiver MUST accept the event only if the SET verifies under a key
   of one of these parties:

   1.  The issuer of the named token.  For a token issued by an
       authorization server, this is that server.  For a Delegation
       Token or Delegate SD-JWT with delegator binding
       [AGENT-DELEGATION], it is the delegator, and the key is the one
       confirmed by the parent token's cnf.

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 6]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   2.  The issuer of any ancestor of the named token, determined in the
       same way.  A party that could revoke an ancestor, and with it the
       whole subtree, can revoke a part of that subtree.

   3.  A party that the issuer of the root token designates for its
       chains, such as the authorization server or principal's server
       that issued it.  How the designation reaches receivers, for
       example by configuration or in the issuer's metadata, is outside
       this document.

   4.  The holder of the named token, giving up its own delegation.  Its
       event revokes the token and its descendants, and gives it no
       authority over any other token.  It sends the event to the
       token's issuer, which revokes the token in its status mechanism
       (Section 6.1), and to the holders of the tokens it delegated from
       it (Section 6.4).

   A receiver resolves the key for the first, second, and fourth cases
   from the chain it holds.  A receiver that does not hold the chain of
   the named token has no token to revoke and no descendants of it, and
   ignores the event.

6.  Processing

6.1.  Issuers

   The event supplements the token's status mechanism (Section 7), such
   as a Token Status List [STATUS-LIST]; it does not replace it.  A
   party that issues the event and is also the issuer of the named
   token, or operates its status mechanism, MUST also revoke the token
   there, so that verifiers that miss the event still learn of the
   revocation within their staleness bound.  Any other issuer of the
   event (Section 5) SHOULD also send it to the issuer of the named
   token, which then MUST revoke the token in its status mechanism.

   An issuer that issues an event for a token it issued, or receives
   one, SHOULD send it to the verifiers that subscribe to its events
   (Section 6.5).

6.2.  Verifiers

   A verifier, such as a resource server or an enforcement point, that
   receives a valid event:

   *  MUST deny, from revoked_at, any request authorized by the named
      token or by any chain that contains it; and

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 7]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   *  MUST NOT continue to rely on a cached status answer for those
      tokens.

   A verifier that caches chains therefore indexes them by the (iss,
   jti) of every token in each chain, not only by the presented token.

6.3.  Holders

   A holder of the named token or of a descendant that receives a valid
   event:

   1.  MUST stop acting under the revoked tokens from revoked_at;

   2.  MUST send the event on to the holder of each token it issued
       itself from a revoked token, as Section 6.4 describes, so that
       the event reaches the end of the chain even when no single party
       knows every holder.  Tokens that an authorization server issued
       from a revoked token are handled by that server (Section 7);

   3.  MUST stop work that depends on the revoked tokens, for example by
       ending the dialogs it controls under them, as the application
       protocol defines; and

   4.  SHOULD tell the verifiers it used the revoked tokens with, where
       it has a channel to them.

   A holder that cannot obtain the current status of its chain, within
   the staleness bound its policy sets, SHOULD suspend work under the
   chain until it can, so that a lost event does not leave it working
   under revoked authority.

   Processing is idempotent.  A holder that has already processed an
   event for the same token, or for an ancestor of it, processes it
   again only to retry delivery.

6.4.  Relaying the Event

   A holder passes the event on unchanged, with the original signature,
   inside a SET of its own:

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 8]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   {
     "iss": "https://planner.example",
     "iat": 1794643202,
     "jti": "set-77e0",
     "aud": "https://researcher.example",
     "sub_id": {
       "format": "delegation",
       "iss": "https://assistant.example",
       "jti": "dt-41c2"
     },
     "events": {
       "urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked": {
         "revoked_at": 1794643200,
         "reason": "principal_request",
         "original": "eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3Qi..."
       }
     }
   }

   The relaying SET has the same sub_id, revoked_at, and reason as the
   original.  The original member (Section 4) carries the SET that
   revoked the token, never a relaying SET: a holder that relays an
   event it received by relay copies its original unchanged.  The
   receiver validates the original SET under Section 5 and checks that
   the relaying SET's sub_id equals the original's.  The relaying SET
   tells the receiver that the event reached it through its delegator,
   but the authority to revoke comes from the original.

   Across a trust boundary:  When the token below the boundary was
      issued by an authorization server at the boundary, for example by
      identity chaining, the parties below hold only that server's
      tokens and do not hold the named token.  The original event would
      tell them the issuer and identifier of a token upstream, which the
      boundary is meant to keep from them.  The authorization server
      therefore does not relay it.  It revokes the tokens it issued from
      the revoked token (Section 7) and sends, for each, a new event
      that it issues itself, naming that token and without original, to
      the token's holder.  It is the issuer of those tokens, so the new
      events are accepted under Section 5 item 1.

6.5.  Delivery

   SETs can be delivered with push [RFC8935] or poll [RFC8936] delivery,
   through a Shared Signals stream [SSF], or in the messages of the
   application protocol that the agents already use, such as the dialogs
   that depend on the revoked delegation.  The delivery mechanism does
   not affect the authority to revoke, which comes only from the
   signature.

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                  [Page 9]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   A verifier that needs to learn of a revocation sooner than its
   staleness bound (Section 7) allows SHOULD subscribe to events from
   the issuers of the tokens in the chains it accepts, for example with
   a Shared Signals stream [SSF].  A verifier that does not subscribe
   still learns of the revocation through chain status, within its
   staleness bound; events only let it learn sooner.

   A delegator SHOULD retry delivery to each holder of a token it
   delegated until the delivery mechanism reports success or the token
   expires.

7.  Chain Status

   Relaying (Section 6.4) depends on every holder in the chain being
   reachable and willing to pass the event on.  A holder that is
   offline, compromised, or simply slow leaves the parties below it
   uninformed.  Verifiers therefore do not depend on relaying for
   safety.  Relaying makes revocation fast; checking the status of the
   whole chain bounds how long a revocation can go unnoticed.

   In this section, a token's status mechanism is a Token Status List
   [STATUS-LIST] referenced by its status claim, token introspection
   [RFC7662] at its issuer, or another mechanism through which its
   issuer reports that it is no longer valid.  A token is revoked in its
   status mechanism when its status is set to INVALID in a Token Status
   List, or when introspection reports it inactive.

   A verifier that relies on a chain of delegation tokens:

   1.  MUST check the status, through each token's status mechanism, of
       every token in the chain that carries a status reference, not
       only of the token presented to it.  A revoked token anywhere in
       the chain revokes the chain.

   2.  MUST define a staleness bound for the status answers it relies
       on, and MUST reject requests that rely on the chain while it has
       no status answer for every such token that is fresher than that
       bound.  This is not a revocation: once the verifier obtains a
       current answer showing the tokens valid, it accepts the chain
       again.  For a Token Status List, freshness is measured from the
       iat of the Status List Token, not from when the verifier fetched
       it; the verifier MUST NOT rely on a Status List Token past its
       exp, and SHOULD NOT cache one for longer than its ttl.  A
       verifier that cannot trust its own clock cannot measure
       staleness, and MUST treat its status answers as stale until it
       can; a secure time source such as Roughtime [ROUGHTIME] can
       provide this.

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   A verifier that also receives events applies them as Section 6.2
   describes.

   Issuers of delegation tokens that are to be revocable with this
   document SHOULD give each token a status mechanism.  When the root
   token has one, its status entry is the single point at which the
   whole tree can be revoked: its issuer revokes it there, and every
   verifier that checks the chain sees the revocation no later than the
   issuer's publication delay plus the verifier's staleness bound,
   whether or not any holder in the chain relayed the event.  A token
   without a status mechanism can be revoked, for verifiers that miss
   the event, only by its expiry.

   These rules need the verifier to see the chain.  A verifier receives
   every link of a Delegation Token chain [DELEGATION-TOKENS]
   [AGENT-DELEGATION].  A verifier of a token issued by token exchange
   [RFC8693] sees only that token: nested act claims identify prior
   actors but carry no reference to their tokens or to their status, and
   Section 4.1 of [RFC8693] makes them informational only.  This
   document does not add such references.  Verifiers of these tokens
   rely on the authorization server, which takes the verifier's place:

   *  An authorization server that issues a token by token exchange MUST
      record the (iss, jti) of the subject_token and of any actor_token
      it was issued from.  When it revokes a token, or learns by an
      event or by its status that one has been revoked, it MUST also
      revoke, in their status mechanism, every token it issued from that
      token, directly or indirectly, and SHOULD send an event of its own
      for each to its holder (Section 6.4).

   *  An authorization server SHOULD limit the lifetime of a token it
      issues by token exchange to the remaining lifetime of the tokens
      it was issued from.

   *  An authorization server that issues a token by exchanging a token
      from another issuer cannot learn of that token's revocation from
      its own records.  It SHOULD check the status of the tokens it was
      issued from at least as often as its own staleness bound, and
      revoke their descendants when one is revoked.  It MAY also receive
      delegation revoked events from that issuer, for example through a
      Shared Signals stream [SSF].

8.  Relationship to Other Work

   Token Status List [STATUS-LIST]:  Remains the authoritative status of
      each token.  This document adds push, subtree effect, and
      propagation to holders.

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   Delegation Tokens [DELEGATION-TOKENS]:  Its Section 8 provides
      revocation per token through status lists.  Its Section 9.5
      describes the window between revocation and a verifier's next
      status refresh; this document narrows it for verifiers that
      receive events.

   Bounded Work [BOUNDED-WORK]:  Ends the authority of a unit of work at
      the authorization server.  The event in this document can carry
      that ending to agents that delegated further without the server.

   Cross-organization delegation [CROSS-ORG]:  Its requirements for
      timely revocation across organizations are met by propagation
      along the chain, with chain status as the backstop.

   Revocation closure [REVOCATION-CLOSURE]:  Distinguishes invalidating
      tokens from closing the authority they conveyed, and defines
      authority epochs, delegation lineage, admission fencing, and
      closure states such as CLOSED, PARTIAL, and UNKNOWN.  The event
      and chain status in this document are invalidation mechanisms:
      they can supply evidence toward closure, and the lineage that
      Section 7 requires of authorization servers parallels its lineage
      requirement, but they do not by themselves establish that work
      admitted under the revoked authority has stopped.

9.  Security Considerations

   Forged events:  A forged event can stop legitimate work.  Receivers
      accept events only under Section 5, and MUST verify the signature
      before acting.

   Suppressed events:  A delegator that does not relay an event, because
      it is unreachable, compromised, or uncooperative, leaves its
      delegatees acting under revoked tokens until they next check
      status or contact a verifier.  Verifiers do not depend on relaying
      (Section 7), so for a chain whose tokens have status mechanisms
      and that the verifier sees, the exposure is bounded by the
      issuer's publication delay plus the staleness bound, not by the
      reachability of the delegators.

   Chains a verifier cannot see:  When a verifier sees only the last
      token of a chain, revocation of an earlier token reaches it only
      through the authorization server that issued the last token.
      Across issuers, the exposure is bounded by how often that server
      checks the status of the tokens it exchanged, and by token
      lifetimes (Section 7).

   Replay:  Replaying a valid event has no effect beyond the first,

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

      since revocation is permanent.  Receivers MAY discard SETs whose
      jti they have seen.

   Denial of service:  Receivers SHOULD rate-limit events from each
      issuer, and ignore an event for a token whose chain they do not
      hold before doing any further work (Section 5).

   Revocation of the root:  Revoking the root token revokes the whole
      tree.  Parties named under Section 5 item 3 hold that power for
      every chain of the root; root issuers SHOULD designate them
      narrowly.

10.  Privacy Considerations

   The subject identifier reveals the token issuer and identifier, which
   are linkable across verifiers that see the same token, and nothing
   else about the token (Section 3).  Events SHOULD be sent only to
   parties that hold the chain.  Across a trust boundary, the boundary's
   authorization server sends events of its own instead of relaying the
   original (Section 6.4), so parties below the boundary learn nothing
   about tokens above it.  A token whose sub is a pseudonym
   [AGENT-DELEGATION] keeps the principal hidden in the event as in the
   token.

11.  IANA Considerations

11.1.  OAuth URI

   This document registers the following in the "OAuth URI" registry
   [RFC6755]:

   *  URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked

   *  Common Name: Delegation revoked security event

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document: Section 4

11.2.  Subject Identifier Formats

   This document registers the following in the "Subject Identifier
   Formats" registry [RFC9493]:

   *  Format Name: delegation

   *  Format Description: A delegation token, identified by its issuer
      and token identifier

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document: Section 3

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [DELEGATION-TOKENS]
              Asor, R., "Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent
              Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-asor-
              wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03, 27 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-asor-wimse-
              agent-delegation-chain-03>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6755]  Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace
              for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6755>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8417]  Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari,
              "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8417>.

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   [RFC8693]  Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
              and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.

   [RFC9493]  Backman, A., Ed., Scurtescu, M., and P. Jain, "Subject
              Identifiers for Security Event Tokens", RFC 9493,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9493, December 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9493>.

   [STATUS-LIST]
              Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
              List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              status-list-21>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [ACTOR-PROFILE]
              McGuinness, K., "OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-
              profile-01, 8 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-
              oauth-actor-profile-01>.

   [AGENT-DELEGATION]
              Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Delegator-Bound
              Delegation Chains for AI Agents", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-
              chains-00, November 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-
              delegator-bound-chains/>.

   [AIMS]     Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B.,
              Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management
              System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              wimse-aims-01, 2 November 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              aims-01>.

   [BOUNDED-WORK]
              Liu, D. and K. McGuinness, "OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work
              Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00, 17 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-
              mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00>.

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   [CAEP]     OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Continuous Access Evaluation
              Profile 1.0", 2025,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-caep-1_0.html>.

   [CROSS-ORG]
              Reece, M., "Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload
              and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross-
              org-delegation-02, 31 August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reece-wimse-
              cross-org-delegation-02>.

   [DELEGATE-SD-JWT]
              Oliver, G. and C. Bormann, "Delegate SD-JWT", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-
              jwt-00, 30 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              delegate-sd-jwt-00>.

   [REVOCATION-CLOSURE]
              Watts, D., "Revocation Closure and Authority Epochs for
              Agent Delegation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure-03, 31 October
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-
              oauth-agent-revocation-closure-03>.

   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662>.

   [RFC8935]  Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari,
              M., and A. Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET)
              Delivery Using HTTP", RFC 8935, DOI 10.17487/RFC8935,
              November 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8935>.

   [RFC8936]  Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari,
              M., and A. Nadalin, "Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET)
              Delivery Using HTTP", RFC 8936, DOI 10.17487/RFC8936,
              November 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8936>.

   [ROUGHTIME]
              Ladd, W. and M. Dansarie, "Roughtime", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-19, 17 March
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              ntp-roughtime-19>.

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft        Delegation Revocation Events         November 2026

   [SSF]      OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Shared Signals Framework
              Specification 1.0", 2025, <https://openid.net/specs/
              openid-sharedsignals-framework-1_0.html>.

Acknowledgments

   This document builds on the revocation sections of
   [DELEGATION-TOKENS] and on the Shared Signals work of the OpenID
   Foundation.

Authors' Addresses

   Suhas Nandakumar
   Cisco
   Email: snandaku@cisco.com

   Cullen Jennings
   Cisco Systems
   Email: fluffy@cisco.com

Nandakumar & Jennings      Expires 23 May 2027                 [Page 17]