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Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents
draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Suhas Nandakumar , Cullen Fluffy Jennings
Last updated 2026-11-16
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draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00
Workload Identity in Multi System Environments             S. Nandakumar
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                             C. Jennings
Expires: 20 May 2027                                       Cisco Systems
                                                        16 November 2026

            Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents
            draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00

Abstract

   Attenuated delegation chains let a verifier check, without contacting
   any server, that no hop of a chain of AI agents holds more authority
   than the root granted.  They do not show that each hop was granted by
   the agent before it: a child token can be signed by any key the
   verifier accepts.  This document defines an extension that requires
   each child token to be signed with the key that its parent token
   confirms, so that every hop provably granted the next, with no
   authorization server in the path.  The extension also defines a per-
   chain pseudonym for the principal, a rule that rejects chains in
   which an agent appears twice, a rule that keeps a child's audience
   within its parent's, and a claim that binds a chain to the dialog or
   transaction it was issued for.  The extension builds on an existing
   attenuated delegation token format and can be mapped to other
   chained-token formats.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-
   bound-chains/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Workload Identity in
   Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list
   (mailto:wimse@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  An Example Chain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Delegator Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Issuing a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Verifying a Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.4.  What This Establishes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Originator Pseudonym  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Cycle Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Audience Attenuation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Context Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Applying the Rules to Delegate SD-JWT . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Relationship to Other Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

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     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   When an agent delegates part of a task to another agent, which
   delegates further, the agent at the end of the chain receives a
   credential and has to decide whether to act on it.  It needs to know
   that:

   *  the authority comes, hop by hop, from a principal who granted it;

   *  no hop widened that authority;

   *  each hop was granted by the agent before it, not asserted by a
      third party; and

   *  the chain does not loop.

   Where the agents are in different organizations and delegate directly
   to each other, the receiver usually has to check this without an
   authorization server in the path (see [CROSS-ORG] and Section 4.4 of
   [UCREQ]).

   Several designs address parts of this:

   *  Delegation Tokens [DELEGATION-TOKENS] define attenuation
      precisely: a closed authorization detail with subsumption rules, a
      parent hash that prevents splicing, a principal that stays the
      same at every hop, and an offline verification algorithm.  The
      verifier checks the root token against a trusted key and checks
      the signature of every other token, but the specification does not
      say which key must sign a child token.  A chain therefore shows
      that each hop is no broader than its parent, not that the holder
      of the parent granted it.

   *  Delegate SD-JWT [DELEGATE-SD-JWT] chains key-binding JWTs so that
      each hop is signed with the key the previous hop confirms.  It
      defines no rule for comparing authority between hops.

   *  The OAuth Actor Chain [ACTOR-CHAIN] records an actor proof signed
      by each new actor, accepted by an authorization server at every
      step.

   *  The OAuth Actor Profile [ACTOR-PROFILE] makes nested act claims
      the issuer's assertion of history and invites companion profiles
      that carry independently verifiable evidence for each hop.

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   This document is one such companion profile: it gives each hop of a
   Delegation Token chain [DELEGATION-TOKENS] verifiable evidence that
   the hop before it granted it.  It extends Delegation Tokens with five
   things:

   1.  Delegator binding (Section 3): each child token is signed with
       the key confirmed by its parent token, and names the parent's
       acting agent as its issuer.

   2.  Originator pseudonym (Section 4): the principal can be a per-
       chain pseudonym that only the root issuer can resolve.

   3.  Cycle detection (Section 5): a chain in which an acting agent
       appears twice is rejected.

   4.  Audience attenuation (Section 6): a child token's audience is
       limited to that of its parent.

   5.  Context binding (Section 7): a chain can name the dialog or
       transaction it was issued for.

   Section 2 walks through a three-hop chain before the rules.
   Section 8 maps the same rules onto Delegate SD-JWT [DELEGATE-SD-JWT].

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Terminology

   This document uses the terms Delegation Token, Delegation Chain,
   Principal, Acting Agent, Authority, and Verifier from
   [DELEGATION-TOKENS].  DT_0 is the root token and DT_i, for i > 0, is
   the child of DT_{i-1}.

   Delegator:  The Acting Agent of DT_{i-1} when it issues DT_i.

   Delegator-bound chain:  A Delegation Chain whose root carries
      del_bind with the value delegator (Section 3).

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2.  An Example Chain

   A person asks a travel agent, agent-a, to book a trip.  Agent-a
   delegates the hotel booking to agent-b, which delegates the payment
   to agent-c.  Agent-c then pays at a payment service.  Figure 1 shows
   the three tokens of the chain and the claims of [DELEGATION-TOKENS]
   that matter at each hop.  The values are illustrative:
   authorization_details is shown as a summary of its one
   agent_delegation object, and par_hash as the token it hashes.

    +---------------------------------------+
    | DT_0                                  |
    |   iss:        as.example              |
    |   client_id:  agent-a                 |
    |   cnf:        key A ------------------+---+
    |   aud:        hotel, pay              |   |
    |   authorization_details:              |   |
    |     book a trip, up to 2000           |   |
    +---------------------------------------+   |
                                                | key A signs DT_1
    +---------------------------------------+   |
    | DT_1                                  |   |
    |   iss:        agent-a  <--------------+---+
    |   client_id:  agent-b                 |
    |   cnf:        key B ------------------+---+
    |   aud:        hotel, pay              |   |
    |   authorization_details:              |   |
    |     book a hotel, up to 900           |   |
    |   par_hash:   hash of DT_0            |   |
    +---------------------------------------+   |
                                                | key B signs DT_2
    +---------------------------------------+   |
    | DT_2                                  |   |
    |   iss:        agent-b  <--------------+---+
    |   client_id:  agent-c                 |
    |   cnf:        key C ------------------+---+
    |   aud:        pay                     |   |
    |   authorization_details:              |   |
    |     pay the hotel, up to 900          |   |
    |   par_hash:   hash of DT_1            |   |
    +---------------------------------------+   |
                                                | agent-c proves key C
                                                v
                                       Payment service (verifier)

    In every token: sub = pseudonym P, del_bind = delegator

                     Figure 1: A Delegator-Bound Chain

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   What changes at each hop:

   *  iss is the agent that issued the token, and the key that signs it
      is the key the previous token confirms in cnf.  DT_1 is signed
      with key A because DT_0 names agent-a and confirms key A.

   *  client_id and cnf name the next agent and its key.

   *  authorization_details and aud can only narrow: the trip becomes a
      hotel, then a payment for that hotel; aud drops hotel.

   *  ctx names the dialog each token was issued for; each delegation
      here is a new dialog.

   What stays the same: sub, the per-chain pseudonym P of the person
   (Section 4), and del_bind, which makes every hop follow these rules
   (Section 3).

   The payment service verifies DT_0 under the root issuer's key, then
   for each later token:

   1.  its signature, with the key the previous token confirms;

   2.  that its iss equals the previous token's client_id;

   3.  that its authorization_details and aud are within the previous
       token's (Section 6);

   4.  that sub, sub_kind, and del_bind are unchanged, and that no
       client_id appears twice (Section 5); and

   5.  that its par_hash matches the previous token.

   Finally, it checks that agent-c holds key C, the key DT_2 confirms.
   A chain that passes shows that the person's issuer granted agent-a,
   agent-a granted agent-b, and agent-b granted agent-c, each within the
   authority it held, with no server in the path after the root.

3.  Delegator Binding

3.1.  Claims

   del_bind:  OPTIONAL in DT_0.  When present with the value delegator,

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      every child in the chain MUST satisfy the rules of this section.
      A child MUST carry del_bind with the same value as its parent.  A
      verifier MUST reject a chain in which a child omits or changes
      del_bind. delegator is the only value this document defines; a
      verifier MUST reject a chain whose del_bind has any other value.
      Because the claim is in DT_0 and in every child, a delegator
      cannot remove the requirement for later hops.

3.2.  Issuing a Child

   A delegator that issues DT_i in a delegator-bound chain:

   *  MUST sign DT_i with the private key that corresponds to the cnf
      claim [RFC7800] of DT_{i-1}, using an asymmetric digital signature
      algorithm;

   *  MUST set iss of DT_i to the client_id of DT_{i-1};

   *  MUST include in the JWS protected header the public key used to
      sign DT_i as a jwk header parameter [RFC7515] when the cnf of
      DT_{i-1} carries only a thumbprint (jkt); and

   *  follows every other rule of [DELEGATION-TOKENS], including
      attenuation, the parent hash, and the principal invariant.

   Issuing a child therefore requires only the delegator's own key.  No
   authorization server takes part.

3.3.  Verifying a Chain

   A verifier of a delegator-bound chain performs the algorithm of
   Section 6 of [DELEGATION-TOKENS] and, as part of its step 1, the
   following for each DT_i with i > 0:

   1.  Determine the public key confirmed by DT_{i-1}: the jwk member of
       its cnf; or, if its cnf has a jkt member, the jwk header
       parameter of DT_i, whose JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint [RFC7638] MUST
       equal that jkt.  Deny if the cnf has neither member, or confirms
       a symmetric key.

   2.  Verify the signature of DT_i with that key, under an asymmetric
       algorithm.  Deny on failure.

   3.  Verify that iss of DT_i equals client_id of DT_{i-1}. Deny on
       failure.

   DT_0 is verified under a trusted root key, as in [DELEGATION-TOKENS].

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3.4.  What This Establishes

   For a delegator-bound chain that verifies, a verifier knows, in
   addition to what Section 6.1 of [DELEGATION-TOKENS] establishes, that
   each child was issued by the holder of the key that its parent
   confirmed, and therefore by the Acting Agent that the parent named.
   Only the root rests on a trust anchor; every later hop rests on the
   previous hop.  This is the property that [UCREQ] asks for when it
   requires that the credential presented to an agent was issued by the
   agent that delegated to it, and the chain traces back to the original
   authorization.

   The key that signs DT_i is also the key that DT_{i-1} binds for proof
   of possession (Section 7 of [DELEGATION-TOKENS]).  A deployment that
   wants separate keys for signing children and for presenting tokens
   uses a separate delegation key and does not use this extension.

4.  Originator Pseudonym

   [DELEGATION-TOKENS] carries the Principal in sub, identical at every
   hop.  Every agent in the chain, and every enforcement point, then
   learns the Principal's identifier.  When that is not acceptable, the
   issuer of DT_0 sets sub to a pseudonym and marks it:

   sub_kind:  OPTIONAL in DT_0; when present, it MUST be present with
      the same value in every child, and a verifier MUST reject a chain
      in which a child omits or changes it.  The value pseudonym means
      that sub is a pseudonym computed as below.  The value identifier,
      or absence, means that sub identifies the Principal directly.

   The pseudonym is

   sub = BASE64URL(HMAC-SHA-256(K, principal-id || 0x00 || jti_0))

   where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in [RFC2104] and [RFC6234], K is a
   secret key held by the issuer of DT_0, principal-id is the UTF-8
   encoding of the issuer's identifier for the Principal, jti_0 is the
   UTF-8 encoding of the jti of DT_0, || is concatenation, and BASE64URL
   is base64url encoding without padding.  The pseudonym differs for
   every chain, so chains for the same Principal cannot be linked by
   sub, and the principal invariant of [DELEGATION-TOKENS] still holds
   within a chain.  The issuer of DT_0 can resolve the pseudonym, for
   example for audit or revocation.

   An issuer MUST NOT place in sub an identifier that another issuer
   directed to a specific audience, such as a pairwise subject
   identifier, because the identifier would then reach parties it was
   not directed to.

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5.  Cycle Detection

   [DELEGATION-TOKENS] bounds the length of a chain with del_max_depth.
   A bound limits the damage of a loop but does not detect one.  In a
   delegator-bound chain:

   *  A delegator MUST NOT issue a child whose client_id equals the
      client_id of any token already in the chain.

   *  A verifier MUST deny a chain in which two tokens carry the same
      client_id.  An agent that receives a chain to act under is such a
      verifier: it refuses a chain in which its own identifier appears
      as the client_id of any token other than the last.

   The rule detects cycles only among identifiers that are the same
   string.  An agent that uses a different client_id per chain can take
   part in a cycle without detection; the depth bound then still
   applies.

6.  Audience Attenuation

   [DELEGATION-TOKENS] requires aud in every token of a chain, but the
   Enforcement Point checks it only in DT_n, and nothing relates the
   audience of a child to that of its parent.  A delegator could
   therefore issue a child usable at a resource that its own grant did
   not name.

   In a delegator-bound chain, the audience attenuates like the rest of
   the authority:

   *  A delegator MUST NOT issue DT_i whose aud contains a value that is
      not in the aud of DT_{i-1}.

   *  A verifier MUST deny a chain in which the aud of any DT_i, i > 0,
      contains a value that is not in the aud of DT_{i-1}.

   With this rule, the audience check applied to DT_n also holds for
   every earlier token: a chain is usable only where every delegator in
   it allowed it to be used.  Values are compared as strings, as
   Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7519] specifies.  A chain that crosses a trust
   domain boundary through an authorization server is re-issued there
   with the audience that server sets, and this rule applies to the new
   chain from that point.

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7.  Context Binding

   A chain is often issued for one dialog or transaction: an agent
   dialog [DIALOG-BINDING] or a Transaction Token's txn [TXN-TOKENS].
   Binding the chain to it lets a receiver reject a chain presented in a
   different one.

   ctx:  OPTIONAL.  A JSON object with members type, a string naming the
      kind of context, and id, its identifier.  A delegator MAY add ctx
      to a child, or change it, because a child is often issued for a
      new dialog that continues the parent's; the parent's ctx remains
      in the chain for audit.

   This document defines two values of type:

   dialog:  id is an agent dialog identifier, such as the dlg of
      [DIALOG-BINDING] or the dialog identifier of another agent dialog
      protocol.

   txn:  id is the txn of a Transaction Token [TXN-TOKENS].

   A receiver that knows the context in which a chain is presented, and
   finds a different ctx in the last token, MUST reject the chain.  A
   receiver that does not know its context, or does not recognize the
   type, ignores ctx.

8.  Applying the Rules to Delegate SD-JWT

   Delegate SD-JWT [DELEGATE-SD-JWT] already signs each hop with the key
   confirmed by the previous hop, so it provides delegator binding by
   construction.  To apply the remaining rules of this document, a
   deployment:

   *  carries the authority of each hop as one agent_delegation
      authorization detail of [DELEGATION-TOKENS] in the hop's
      delegate_payload, and applies its subsumption rules between hops;

   *  carries sub, sub_kind, client_id, aud, and ctx in each
      delegate_payload, with the meaning defined here; and

   *  applies Section 4, Section 5, Section 6, and Section 7 to those
      claims.

   A verifier rejects a Delegate SD-JWT chain under this profile if any
   hop's delegate_payload lacks these claims or fails these rules.

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9.  Relationship to Other Work

   The OAuth Actor Profile [ACTOR-PROFILE] defines act as the issuer's
   assertion: inner actors are history, not inputs to access control.  A
   delegator-bound chain is evidence that each hop made: it can
   accompany an access token whose act describes the same chain, in its
   own claims, as that profile's companion-profile provision allows.

   The OAuth Actor Chain [ACTOR-CHAIN] records a proof by each new actor
   and an authorization server's acceptance at every step.  A delegator-
   bound chain records the grant by each delegator and needs no server
   after the root.  The two answer different questions, which actor took
   part and who granted whom, and can be combined.

   Identity chaining [ID-CHAINING] and cross-domain Transaction Tokens
   [TXN-CHAINING] remain the right choice where every domain boundary
   has an authorization server.  This extension is for agents that
   delegate directly to each other.

   An agent dialog protocol can use delegator-bound chains for dialogs
   that cross administrative domains without an authorization server,
   with ctx of type dialog naming the parent dialog.

   An earlier proposal by the authors defined a separate delegation
   assertion format with similar properties.  This document replaces it
   by extending [DELEGATION-TOKENS], so that attenuation is defined
   once.

10.  Security Considerations

   Key compromise:  An attacker who obtains the key confirmed by DT_i
      can issue children within DT_i's authority.  Delegator binding
      does not change this, which holds for any proof-of-possession
      token; it does attribute such children to DT_i's acting agent.
      Short lifetimes and status lists [STATUS-LIST] limit the exposure.

   Root trust:  Delegator binding moves trust from every hop to the
      root.  How the verifier obtains and trusts the root key is outside
      this document, as it is for [DELEGATION-TOKENS].

   Pseudonym key:  Anyone who holds K can link pseudonyms to Principals.
      The issuer of DT_0 MUST protect K as it protects its signing keys
      and SHOULD rotate it.

   Audience widening:  Without Section 6, any delegator in a chain could
      make it usable at resources the principal never named; the
      audience check of DT_n alone would not detect this.

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   Revocation:  Revoking DT_i invalidates every chain through it.  A
      verifier SHOULD deny a chain when it cannot obtain current status
      for a token that carries a status claim within its configured
      staleness bound.

11.  Privacy Considerations

   A delegation chain discloses the client_id of every hop to each later
   hop and to the enforcement point.  When agents in one organization
   must not be visible to another, the delegator at the boundary can
   obtain a new root from an authorization server, ending the chain, as
   [TXN-CHAINING] does.  Within a chain, per-chain client_id values
   reduce linkability at the cost of cycle detection (Section 5).  The
   originator pseudonym (Section 4) prevents the Principal from being
   linked across chains.

12.  IANA Considerations

   This document registers the following claims in the "JSON Web Token
   Claims" registry.

   *  Claim Name: del_bind

   *  Claim Description: Delegation binding mode of a delegation chain

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Reference: Section 3

   *  Claim Name: sub_kind

   *  Claim Description: Whether sub is an identifier or a per-chain
      pseudonym

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Reference: Section 4

   *  Claim Name: ctx

   *  Claim Description: Dialog or transaction a delegation was issued
      for

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Reference: Section 7

13.  References

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13.1.  Normative References

   [DELEGATION-TOKENS]
              Asor, R., "Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent
              Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-asor-
              wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03, 27 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-asor-wimse-
              agent-delegation-chain-03>.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7638]  Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
              Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7638>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

13.2.  Informative References

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   [ACTOR-CHAIN]
              Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., Addepalli, S., and S.
              Krishnan, "OAuth Actor Chain: Protocol and
              Interoperability", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-03, 1 November 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mw-oauth-
              actor-chain-03>.

   [ACTOR-PROFILE]
              McGuinness, K., "OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-
              profile-01, 8 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-
              oauth-actor-profile-01>.

   [CROSS-ORG]
              Reece, M., "Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload
              and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross-
              org-delegation-02, 31 August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reece-wimse-
              cross-org-delegation-02>.

   [DELEGATE-SD-JWT]
              Oliver, G. and C. Bormann, "Delegate SD-JWT", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-
              jwt-00, 30 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              delegate-sd-jwt-00>.

   [DIALOG-BINDING]
              Reddy.K, T. and Z. Sarker, "Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE
              and OAuth Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00, 30 October
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-
              wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00>.

   [ID-CHAINING]
              Schwenkschuster, A., Kasselman, P., Burgin, K., Jenkins,
              M. J., Campbell, B., and A. Parecki, "OAuth Identity and
              Authorization Chaining Across Domains", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17, 19
              July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17>.

   [STATUS-LIST]
              Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
              List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-

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              oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              status-list-21>.

   [TXN-CHAINING]
              Fletcher, G., Kasselman, P., and S. O'Dell, "Transaction
              Token JWT Authorization Grant Profile for OAuth Identity
              and Authorization Chaining", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-fletcher-oauth-txn-token-chaining-profile-01,
              26 October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-fletcher-oauth-txn-token-chaining-profile-01>.

   [TXN-TOKENS]
              Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman,
              "Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11, 30 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              transaction-tokens-11>.

   [UCREQ]    Reddy.K, T., Sarker, Z., and K. Yao, "Agentic AI Use Cases
              and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07, 2 November
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07>.

Acknowledgments

   This document extends the Delegation Token design of
   [DELEGATION-TOKENS] and draws on the requirements of [CROSS-ORG].

Authors' Addresses

   Suhas Nandakumar
   Cisco
   Email: snandaku@cisco.com

   Cullen Jennings
   Cisco Systems
   Email: fluffy@cisco.com

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