Combiner function for hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms (Hybrid KEMs)
draft-ounsworth-cfrg-kem-combiners-05
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Mike Ounsworth , Aron Wussler , Stavros Kousidis | ||
| Last updated | 2024-08-03 (Latest revision 2024-01-31) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The migration to post-quantum cryptography often calls for performing multiple key encapsulations in parallel and then combining their outputs to derive a single shared secret. This document defines a comprehensible and easy to implement Keccak- based KEM combiner to join an arbitrary number of key shares, that is compatible with NIST SP 800-56Cr2 [SP800-56C] when viewed as a key derivation function. The combiners defined here are practical split- key PRFs and are CCA-secure as long as at least one of the ingredient KEMs is.
Authors
Mike Ounsworth
Aron Wussler
Stavros Kousidis
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)