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Composite Public and Private Keys For Use In Internet PKI

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
Authors Mike Ounsworth , Massimiliano Pala
Last updated 2022-01-13 (Latest revision 2021-07-12)
RFC stream (None)
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


With the widespread adoption of post-quantum cryptography will come the need for an entity to possess multiple public keys on different cryptographic algorithms. Since the trustworthiness of individual post-quantum algorithms is at question, a multi-key cryptographic operation will need to be performed in such a way that breaking it requires breaking each of the component algorithms individually. This requires defining new structures for holding composite keys, for use with composite signature and encryption data. This document defines the structures CompositePublicKey, CompositePrivateKey, which are sequences of the respective structure for each component algorithm. This document makes no assumptions about what the component algorithms are, provided that they have defined algorithm identifiers. The only requirement imposed by this document is that all algorithms be of the same key usage; i.e. all signature or all encryption. This document is intended to be coupled with corresponding documents that define the structure and semantics of composite signatures and encryption.


Mike Ounsworth
Massimiliano Pala

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)