Global Token Revocation
draft-parecki-oauth-global-token-revocation-05

Web Authorization Protocol                                    A. Parecki
Internet-Draft                                                      Okta
Intended status: Standards Track                            28 July 2025
Expires: 29 January 2026

                        Global Token Revocation
             draft-parecki-oauth-global-token-revocation-05

Abstract

   Global Token Revocation enables parties such as a security incident
   management tool or an external Identity Provider to send a request to
   an Authorization Server to indicate that it should revoke all of a
   user's existing tokens and require that the user re-authenticates
   before issuing new tokens.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at
   https://drafts.aaronpk.com/global-token-revocation/draft-parecki-
   oauth-global-token-revocation.html.  Status information for this
   document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
   parecki-oauth-global-token-revocation/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization
   Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:oauth@ietf.org), which is
   archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.
   Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/aaronpk/global-token-revocation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 January 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Token Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Revocation Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Revocation Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Revocation Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Revocation Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.4.1.  Successful Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.4.2.  Error Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Revocation of Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Authentication of Revocation Request  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Enumeration of User Accounts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.3.  Malicious Authorization Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  OAuth Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Relationship to Related Specifications . . . . . . .  11
     A.1.  RFC7009: Token Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.2.  OpenID Connect Front-Channel Logout . . . . . . . . . . .  12

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

     A.3.  OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout  . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     A.4.  Shared Signals Framework  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix B.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   An OAuth Authorization Server issues tokens in response to a user
   authorizing a client.  A party external to the OAuth Authorization
   Server may wish to instruct the Authorization Server to revoke all
   tokens belonging to a particular user, and prevent the server from
   issuing new tokens for that user until the user re-authenticates.

   For example, a security incident management tool may detect anomalous
   behaviour on a user's account, or if the user logged in through an
   enterprise Identity Provider, the Identity Provider may want to
   revoke all of a user's tokens in the event of a security incident or
   upon the employee's termination.

   This specification describes a new API endpoint on an Authorization
   Server that can accept requests from external parties to revoke all
   tokens associated with a given user.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.1.  Terminology

   This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization
   Code", "Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Server" (AS),
   "Client", "Client Authentication", "Client Identifier", "Client
   Secret", "End-User", "Grant Type", "Protected Resource", "Redirection
   URI", "Refresh Token", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server" (RS) and
   "Token Endpoint" defined by [RFC6749], and the terms "OpenID
   Provider" (OP) and "ID Token" defined by [OpenID].

   This specification uses the term "Identity Provider" (IdP) to refer
   to the Authorization Server or OpenID Provider that is used for End-
   User authentication.

   TODO: Replace RFC6749 references with OAuth 2.1

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 3]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

2.2.  Roles

   In a typical OAuth deployment, the OAuth client obtains tokens from
   the authorization server when a user logs in and authorizes the
   client.  In many cases, the method by which a user authenticates at
   the authorization server is through an external identity provider.

   For example, a mobile chat application is an OAuth Client, and
   obtains tokens from its backend server which stores the chat
   messages.  The mobile chat backend plays the OAuth roles of "Resource
   Server" and "Authorization Server".

   In some cases, the user will log in to the Authorization Server using
   an external (e.g. enterprise) Identity Provider.  In that case, when
   a user logs in to the chat application, the backend server may play
   the role of an OAuth client (or OpenID or SAML "relying party") to
   the Identity Provider in a new authorization or authentication flow.

3.  Token Revocation

   A revocation request is an HTTP POST request containing a subject
   identifier to the Global Token Revocation endpoint, which starts the
   process of revoking all tokens for the identified subject.

3.1.  Revocation Endpoint

   The Global Token Revocation endpoint is a URL at the authorization
   server which accepts HTTP POST requests with parameters in the HTTP
   request message body using the application/json format.  The Global
   Token Revocation endpoint URL MUST use the https scheme.

   If the authorization server supports OAuth Server Metadata
   ([RFC8414]), the authorization server SHOULD include the URL of their
   Global Token Revocation endpoint in their authorization server
   metadata document using the global_token_revocation_endpoint
   parameter as defined in Section 5.

   The authorization server MAY alternatively register the endpoint
   directly with tools that will use it.

3.2.  Revocation Request

   The request is a POST request with an application/json body
   containing a single property sub_id, the value of which is a Security
   Event Token Subject Identifier as defined in "Subject Identifiers for
   Security Event Tokens" [RFC9493].

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 4]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   In practice, this means the value of sub_id is a JSON object with a
   property format, and at least one additional property depending on
   the value of format.

   The request MUST also be authenticated, the particular authentication
   method and means by which the authentication is established is out of
   scope of this specification, but may include OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
   [RFC6750] or a client authentication JWT [RFC7523].

   The following example requests that all tokens for a user identified
   by an email address be revoked using the Email Identifier Format as
   defined in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC9493]:

   POST /global-token-revocation
   Host: example.com
   Content-Type: application/json
   Authorization: Bearer f5641763544a7b24b08e4f74045

   {
     "sub_id": {
       "format": "email",
       "email": "user@example.com"
     }
   }

   If the user identifier at the authorization server is known by the
   system making the revocation request, the request can use the "Opaque
   Identifer" format as defined in Section 3.2.4 of [RFC9493] to provide
   the user identifier:

   POST /global-token-revocation
   Host: example.com
   Content-Type: application/json
   Authorization: Bearer f5641763544a7b24b08e4f74045

   {
     "sub_id": {
       "format": "opaque",
       "id": "e193177dfdc52e3dd03f78c"
     }
   }

   If it is expected that the authorization server knows about the user
   identifier at the IdP, the request can use the "Issuer and Subject
   Identifier" format as defined in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC9493]:

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 5]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   POST /global-token-revocation
   Host: example.com
   Content-Type: application/json
   Authorization: Bearer f5641763544a7b24b08e4f74045

   {
     "sub_id": {
       "format": "iss_sub",
       "iss": "https://issuer.example.com/",
       "sub": "af19c476f1dc4470fa3d0d9a25"
     }
   }

3.3.  Revocation Expectations

   Upon receiving a revocation request, authorizing the request, and
   validating the identified user, the Authorization Server:

   *  MUST revoke all active refresh tokens

   *  SHOULD invalidate all access tokens, although it is recognized
      that it might not be technically feasible to invalidate access
      tokens (see Section 4 below)

   *  MUST re-authenticate the user before issuing new access tokens or
      refresh tokens

3.4.  Revocation Response

   This specification indicates success and error conditions by using
   HTTP response codes, and does not define the response body format or
   content.

3.4.1.  Successful Response

   To indicate that the request was successful and revocation of the
   requested set of tokens has begun, the server returns an HTTP 204
   response.

3.4.2.  Error Response

   The following HTTP response codes can be used to indicate various
   error conditions:

   *  *400 Bad Request*: The request was malformed, e.g. an unrecognized
      or unsupported type of subject identifier.

   *  *401 Unauthorized*: Authentication provided was invalid.

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 6]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   *  *403 Forbidden*: Insufficient authorization, e.g. missing scopes.

   *  *404 User Not Found*: The user indicated by the subject identifier
      was not found.

   *  *422 Unable to Process Request*: Unable to log out the user.

4.  Revocation of Access Tokens

   OAuth 2.0 allows deployment flexibility with respect to the style of
   access tokens.  The access tokens may be self-contained (e.g.
   [RFC9068]) so that a resource server needs no further interaction
   with an authorization server issuing these tokens to perform an
   authorization decision of the client requesting access to a protected
   resource.  A system design may, however, instead use access tokens
   that are handles (commonly referred to as "reference tokens")
   referring to authorization data stored at the authorization server.

   While these are not the only options, they illustrate the
   implications for revocation.  In the latter case of reference tokens,
   the authorization server is able to revoke an access token by
   removing it from storage.  In the former case, without storing
   tokens, it may be impossible to revoke tokens without taking
   additional measures.  One such measure is to use
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list] to maintain a distributed and easily-
   compressed list of token revocation statuses.

   For this reason, revocation of access tokens is optional in this
   specification, since it may pose too significant of a burden for
   implementers.  It is not required to revoke access tokens to be able
   to return a success code to the caller.

5.  Authorization Server Metadata

   The following authorization server metadata parameters [RFC8414] are
   introduced to signal the server's capability and policy with respect
   to Global Token Revocation.

   "global_token_revocation_endpoint":  The URL of the authorization
      server's global token revocation endpoint.

   "global_token_revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":  OPTIONAL.
      JSON array containing a list of client authentication methods
      supported by this introspection endpoint.  The valid client
      authentication method values are those registered in the IANA
      "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
      [IANA.oauth-parameters] or those registered in the IANA "OAuth
      Access Token Types" registry [IANA.oauth-parameters].  (These

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 7]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

      values are and will remain distinct, due to Section 7.2 of
      [RFC8414].)  If omitted, the set of supported authentication
      methods MUST be determined by other means.

6.  Security Considerations

6.1.  Authentication of Revocation Request

   While Section 3.2 requires that the revocation request is an
   authenticated request, the specifics of the authentication are out of
   scope of this specification.

   Since the revocation request ultimately has wide-reaching effects (a
   user is expected to be logged out of all devices), this presents a
   new Denial of Service attack vector.  As such, the authentication
   used for this request SHOULD be narrowly scoped to avoid granting
   unnecessary privileges to the caller.

   For example, if using OAuth Bearer Tokens, the token SHOULD be issued
   with a single scope that enables it to perform only the revocation
   request, and no other type of token issued should include this scope.

   If the authorization server is multi-tenant (supports multiple
   customers) through different identity providers, each identity
   provider SHOULD use its own scoped credential that is only authorized
   to revoke tokens for users within the same tenant.

6.2.  Enumeration of User Accounts

   Typically, an API that accepts a user identifier and returns
   different statuses depending on whether the user exists would provide
   an attack vector allowing enumeration of user accounts.  This
   specification does require a "User Not Found" response, so would
   normally fall under this category.  However, requests to the endpoint
   defined by this specification are required to be authenticated, so
   this is not considered a public endpoint.

   If the tool making the request is compromised, and the attacker can
   impersonate the requests from this tool (either by coercing the tool
   to make the request, or by extracting the credentials), then the
   attacker would be able to enumerate user accounts.  However, since
   the request is not just testing the presence of a user account, but
   actually revoking the tokens associated with the user if successful,
   this would likely be easily visible in any audit logs, as many users'
   tokens would be revoked in a short period of time.

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 8]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   To mitigate some of the concerns of providing such a powerful API
   endpoint, the users that a particular client can request revocation
   for SHOULD be limited, and the authentication of the request SHOULD
   be used to scope the possible user revocation list to only users
   authorized to the client as described in Section 6.1.

   For example, a multi-tenant identity provider that uses different
   signing keys for users associated with different tenants, can also
   use the same signing keys to authenticate revocation requests, such
   as creating a JWT to use as client authentication as described in
   [RFC7523].  This enables the authorization server receiving the
   request to only accept revocation requests for users that are
   associated with the particular tenant at the identity provider.

6.3.  Malicious Authorization Server

   From the point of view of an identity provider that supports
   integrations with multiple downstream applications, there is an
   opportunity for a downstream application to maliciously set up a
   Global Token Revocation endpoint to harvest user identifiers and
   authentication of the revocation requests.

   Similarly as described in Section 6.1 above, each integration SHOULD
   be using separate authentication credentials, and each credential
   SHOULD be scoped as narrowly as possible, such that a malicious
   server that receives this authentication cannot replay it anywhere
   else to perform any actions on other systems.

7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  OAuth Authorization Server Metadata

   IANA has (TBD) registered the following values in the IANA "OAuth
   Authorization Server Metadata" registry of [IANA.oauth-parameters]
   established by [RFC8414].

   *Metadata Name*: global_token_revocation_endpoint

   *Metadata Description*: URL of the authorization server's global
   token revocation endpoint.

   *Change Controller*: IESG

   *Specification Document*: Section X of [[ this specification ]]

   *Metadata Name*:
   global_token_revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026                [Page 9]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   *Metadata Description*: OPTIONAL.  Indicates the list of client
   authentication methods supported by this endpoint.

   *Change Controller*: IESG

   *Specification Document*: Section X of [[ this specification ]]

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [IANA.oauth-parameters]
              IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8414]  Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
              Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.

   [RFC9493]  Backman, A., Ed., Scurtescu, M., and P. Jain, "Subject
              Identifiers for Security Event Tokens", RFC 9493,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9493, December 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9493>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list]
              Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
              List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              oauth-status-list-12, 7 July 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              status-list-12>.

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026               [Page 10]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   [OpenID]   Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
              C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
              errata set 2", December 2023,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750>.

   [RFC7009]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
              2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
              August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7009>.

   [RFC7523]  Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and
              Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7523>.

   [RFC9068]  Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
              Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October
              2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9068>.

Appendix A.  Relationship to Related Specifications

A.1.  RFC7009: Token Revocation

   OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation [RFC7009] defines an endpoint for
   authorization servers that an OAuth client can use to notify the
   authorization server that a previously-obtained access or refresh
   token is no longer needed.

   The request is made by the OAuth client.  The input to the Token
   Revocation request is the token itself, as well as the client's own
   authentication credentials.

   This differs from the Global Token Revocation endpoint which does not
   take a token as an input, but instead takes a user identifier as
   input.  It is not called by OAuth clients, but is instead called by
   an external party such as a security monitoring tool or an identity
   provider that the user used to authenticate at the authorization
   server.

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026               [Page 11]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

A.2.  OpenID Connect Front-Channel Logout

   OpenID Connect Front-Channel Logout (https://openid.net/specs/openid-
   connect-frontchannel-1_0.html) provides a mechanism for an OpenID
   Provider to log users out of Relying Parties by redirecting the user
   agent.

   While the logout request is the same direction as this draft
   describes, this relies on the redirection of the user agent, so is
   only applicable when the user is actively interacting with the
   application in a web browser.

   The Global Token Revocation request works regardless of whether the
   user is actively using the application, and is also applicable to
   non-web based applications.

A.3.  OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout

   OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout (https://openid.net/specs/openid-
   connect-backchannel-1_0.html) provides a mechanism for an OpenID
   Provider to log users out of a Relying Party by making a back-channel
   POST request containing the user identifier of the user to log out.

   This is the most similar existing logout specification to Global
   Token Revocation.  However, there are still a few key differences
   that make it insufficient for the use cases enabled by Global Token
   Revocation.

   OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout requires Relying Parties to clear
   state of any sessions for the user, but doesn't mention anything
   about access tokens.  It also says that refresh tokens issued with
   the offline_access scope "SHOULD NOT be revoked".  This is a
   concretely different outcome than is described by Global Token
   Revocation, which requires the revocation of all refresh tokens for
   the user regardless of whether the refresh token was issued with the
   offline_access scope.

   OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout also assumes that the Relying
   Party implements OpenID Connect, which creates implementation
   challenges to use it when the Relying Party actually integrates with
   the identity provider using other specifications such as SAML.

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026               [Page 12]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   Additionally, OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout identifies the user
   using the sub claim of an ID token.  This limits the applicability,
   since there is no mechanism to identify the user by email address or
   other identifier that might be known between the identity provider
   and authorization server.  Global Token Revocation instead relies on
   Security Event Token Subject Identifiers ([RFC9493]) which provide
   multiple options for identifying the user.

   Global Token Revocation works regardless of the protocol that the
   user uses to authenticate, so works equally well with OpenID Connect
   and SAML integrations.

A.4.  Shared Signals Framework

   The Shared Signals Framework at the OpenID Foundation provides two
   specifications that have functionality related to session and token
   revocation.

   Continuous Access Evaluation Profile (CAEP)
   (https://openid.net/specs/openid-caep-specification-1_0.html) defines
   several event types that can be sent between cooperating parties.  In
   particular, the "Session Revoked" event can be sent from an identity
   provider to an authorization server when the user's session at the
   identity provider was revoked.  The main difference between this and
   the Global Token Revocation request is that the CAEP event is a
   signal that may or may not be acted upon by the receiver, whereas the
   Global Token Revocation request is a command that has a defined list
   of expected outcomes.

   Risk Incident Sharing and Coordination (RISC)
   (https://openid.net/specs/openid-risc-profile-specification-1_0.html)
   defines events that have somewhat stronger defined meanings compared
   to CAEP.  In particular, the "Account Disabled" event has clear
   meaning and strongly implies that a receiver should also disable the
   specified account.  However, RISC also has a mechanism for a user to
   opt out of sending events for their account, so it does not provide
   the same level of assurance as a Global Token Revocation request.

   Lastly, it is more complex to set up a receiver for CAEP and RISC
   events compared to a receiver for the Global Token Revocation
   request, so if the receiver is only interested in supporting the
   revocation use cases, it is much simpler to support the single POST
   request described in this draft.

Appendix B.  Document History

   (( To be removed from the final specification ))

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026               [Page 13]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

   -05

   *  Editorial clarifications

   *  Added specific references to subject identifier formats

   -04

   *  Edits for clarity

   *  Fixed prose description renaming subject to sub_id

   -03

   *  Renamed property from subject to sub_id for consistency with JWT
      claim name defined in RFC9493

   *  Added reference to draft-ietf-oauth-status-list

   *  Added additional security considerations for authentication of the
      revocation request and malicious authorization servers

   -02

   *  Added security consideration around enumeration of user accounts

   *  Added an appendix describing the differences between this and
      related logout specifications

   -01

   *  Clarified revocation expectations

   *  Better definition of endpoint

   *  Added section defining endpoint in Authorization Server Metadata

   -00

   *  Initial Draft

Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their
   contributions and reviews of this specification: Apoorva Deshpande,
   George Fletcher, Karl McGuinness, Mike Jones.

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026               [Page 14]
Internet-Draft           Global Token Revocation               July 2025

Author's Address

   Aaron Parecki
   Okta
   Email: aaron@parecki.com
   URI:   https://aaronparecki.com

Parecki                  Expires 29 January 2026               [Page 15]