Remote Attestation Procedures for virtualized NSFs (vNSFs) through the I2NSF Security Controller
draft-pastor-i2nsf-vnsf-attestation-00

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Last updated 2015-10-19
Replaced by draft-pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation
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Network Working Group                                          A. Pastor
Internet-Draft                                                  D. Lopez
Intended status: Experimental                             Telefonica I+D
Expires: April 20, 2016                                 October 18, 2015

 Remote Attestation Procedures for virtualized NSFs (vNSFs) through the
                       I2NSF Security Controller
                 draft-pastor-i2nsf-vnsf-attestation-00

Abstract

   This document describes the procedures a user can follow to assess
   the trust on a virtualized NSF and its user-defined configuration
   through the I2NSF Security Controller.  The procedure to assess
   trustworthiness is based on a remote attestation between the user and
   the vNSF.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2016.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  User Expectations about Trust  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  First Step: User-Agnostic Attestation  . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Second Step: User-Specific Attestation . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Application of Trusted Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Applying Trusted Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Trusted vNSF Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Requeriments for a Trusted vNSF Platform . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.1.1.  Trusted Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.1.2.  Remote Attestation Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.1.3.  Secure Boot  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Remote Attestation Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.1.  Trusted Channel with the Security Controller . . . . . . . 11
     5.2.  Security Controller Attestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.3.  Platform Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

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1.  Introduction

   As described in [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-merged-use-cases], when
   virtualization is applied to the NSF environment (vNSF) it implies
   several additional concerns in security.  The most relevant threats
   associated with a security virtual platform are:

   o  An unknown/unauthorized user can try to impersonate another user
      that can legitimately access virtualized NSF services.  This
      attack may lead to accessing the policies and applications of the
      attacked user or to generate network traffic outside a the
      security functions with a falsified identity.

   o  An authorized user may misuse assigned privileges to alter the
      network traffic processing of other users in the virtualization
      platform.  This can become especially serious when such a user has
      administration privileges granted by the virtualization provider,
      the ISP or the local network operator.
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