Endpoint authentication for AODV Route Messages
draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00

Mobile Ad Hoc Networks [manet]                                C. Perkins
Internet-Draft                                                 Futurewei
Intended status: Standards Track                           March 3, 2016
Expires: September 4, 2016

            Endpoint authentication for AODV Route Messages
                 draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00.txt

Abstract

   This document specifies a new message TLV for AODVv2 and,
   potentially, other reactive protocols.  The new message TLV allows
   the endpoints of a newly discovered route to be assured that they
   were the originator of the RREQ and responder producing the RREP
   respectively.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2016.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Algorithm for computing the Message TLV authenticator data  .   2
   4.  Format for the E2E Authenticator Message TLV  . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     6.1.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   Hop-by-hop security for AODV relies on transitive trust between the
   nodes during route discovery.  In case that some of the nodes may
   become compromised, it would be useful for the source and destination
   nodes for the discovered routes to be assured that they both
   participated in the route discovery process, and thus that a route
   was indeed established between them.  This does not guarantee a
   functioning route because malicious intermediate nodes might still
   misdirect or drop traffic.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

   This document also uses some terminology from [RFC5444] and AODVv2
   [I-D.ietf-manet-aodvv2].

3.  Algorithm for computing the Message TLV authenticator data

   The authentication algorithm uses HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC4868] to
   compute authentication data.  The input data for the computation is
   the the concatenation of the following information contained in an
   AODVv2 [I-D.ietf-manet-aodvv2] message:

   o  OrigAddr
   o  TargAddr
   o  PrefixLengthList if present in the message
   o  OrigSeqNum if present in the message
   o  TargSeqNum if present in the message
   o  MetricType

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   The output of the computation is a 128-bit authenticator value which
   is used for the value field of the E2E Authenticator Message TLV.

4.  Format for the E2E Authenticator Message TLV

   The format for the E2E Authenticator Message TLV is shown in
   Figure 1.

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |      Type     |    Flags      |           Reserved            |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       :                   Authenticator (128 bits)                    :
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 1: Format for E2E Authenticator Message TLV

   Type
      The E2E Authenticator Message TLV type

   Flags
      MUST be transmitted as zero and ignored on reception.

   Authenticator
      128 bits authentication data computed as described in Section 3.

5.  Security Considerations

   This document introduces a security mechanism to enable the two
   endpoints of a route discovery operation to verify that they are
   using the same immutable data elements as were supplied by the node
   generating the Route Discovery message (i.e., RREQ or RREP).  This
   should provide additional security to protect against creation of
   routes to a destination when no such route exists.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document specifies the designation of a new Message TLV Type to
   be allocated from the "Message TLV Types" namespace defined in
   [RFC5444].

6.1.  Acknowledgement

   This document has benefitted from comments by Vicky Mercieca and from
   other discussion with the AODVv2 author team.

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7.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-manet-aodvv2]
              Perkins, C., Ratliff, S., Dowdell, J., Steenbrink, L., and
              V. Mercieca, "Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector Version 2
              (AODVv2) Routing", draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 (work in
              progress), January 2016.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4868]  Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
              384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.

   [RFC5444]  Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
              "Generalized Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Packet/Message
              Format", RFC 5444, DOI 10.17487/RFC5444, February 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5444>.

Author's Address

   Charles E. Perkins
   Futurewei Inc.
   2330 Central Expressway
   Santa Clara, CA  95050
   USA

   Phone: +1-408-330-4586
   Email: charliep@computer.org

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