Messaging Use Cases for STIR
draft-peterson-stir-messaging-00
Network Working Group J. Peterson
Internet-Draft Neustar
Intended status: Informational C. Wendt
Expires: May 6, 2021 Comcast
November 2, 2020
Messaging Use Cases for STIR
draft-peterson-stir-messaging-00
Abstract
Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) provides a means of
attesting the identity of a telephone caller via a signed token in
order to prevent impersonation of a calling party number, which is a
key enabler for illegal robocalling. Similar impersonation is
leveraged by bad actors in the text messaging space. This document
considers the applicability of STIR's Persona Assertion Token
(PASSporT) and certificate issuance framework to instant text and
multimedia messaging use cases, both for messages carried or
negotiated by SIP, and for non-SIP messaging.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Applicability to Messaging Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. PASSporTs and Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. PASSporTs Conveyance with Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Certificates and Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. PASSporT Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] describes widespread problems
enabled by impersonation in the telephone network, including illegal
robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting. As telephone services
are increasingly migrating onto the Internet and using Voice over IP
(VoIP) protocols such as SIP [RFC3261], it is necessary for these
protocols to support stronger identity mechanisms to prevent
impersonation. [RFC8224] defines a SIP Identity header field capable
of carrying PASSporT [RFC8225] objects in SIP as a means to
cryptographically attest that the originator of a telephone call is
authorized to use the calling party number (or, for native SIP cases,
SIP URI) associated with the originator of the call.
The problem of bulk, unsolicited commercial communications is not
however limited to telephone calls. Increasingly, spammers and
fraudsters are turning to messaging applications to deliver undesired
content to consumers. In some respects, mitigating these unwanted
messages resembles the email spam problem: textual analysis of the
message contents can be used to fingerprint content that is generated
by spammers, for example. However, encrypted messaging is becoming
more common, and analysis of message contents may no longer be a
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