Tunneling Internet protocols inside QUIC
draft-piraux-quic-tunnel-02

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QUIC Working Group                                             M. Piraux
Internet-Draft                                            O. Bonaventure
Intended status: Experimental                                  UCLouvain
Expires: January 14, 2021                                    A. Masputra
                                                              Apple Inc.
                                                           July 13, 2020

                Tunneling Internet protocols inside QUIC
                      draft-piraux-quic-tunnel-02

Abstract

   This document specifies methods for tunneling Ethernet frames and
   Internet protocols such as TCP, UDP, IP and QUIC inside a QUIC
   connection.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Piraux, et al.          Expires January 14, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 QUIC Tunnel                     July 2020

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Reference environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  The datagram mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Connection establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Joining a tunneling session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Coordinate use of the Packet Tag in datagram mode . . . .   8
   7.  Messages format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  QUIC tunnel control TLVs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       7.1.1.  New Session TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       7.1.2.  Session ID TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       7.1.3.  Join Session TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       7.1.4.  Access Report TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.1.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.2.  Ingress Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.1.  Registration of QUIC tunnel Identification String . . . .  13
     9.2.  QUIC tunnel control TLVs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       9.2.1.  QUIC tunnel control TLVs Types  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.3.  QUIC tunnel control Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.4.  QUIC tunnel Access Report Signal Codes  . . . . . . . . .  14
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     A.1.  Since draft-piraux-quic-tunnel-01 . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     A.2.  Since draft-piraux-quic-tunnel-00 . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   Mobile devices such as laptops, smartphones or tablets have different
   requirements than the traditional fixed devices.  These mobile
   devices often change their network attachment.  They are often
   attached to trusted networks, but sometimes they need to be connected
   to untrusted networks where their communications can be eavesdropped,
   filtered or modified.  In these situations, the classical approach is
   to rely on VPN protocols such as DTLS or IPSec.  These VPN protocols