Constraining Kerberos Names in X.509 Certificates
draft-rabinovich-krb-wg-x509-name-constraints-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Paul Rabinovich | ||
| Last updated | 2007-09-24 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document specifies mechanisms for constraining Kerberos names in X.509 certificates. These mechanisms are defined within the name constraints framework standardized in RFC 3280 [2] and apply to Kerberos names in X.509 certificates compliant with RFC 4556 [4].
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)