A Layered Requirements Mapping for Cross-Organization Agent Delegation
draft-rampalli-cross-org-delegation-mapping-02

Network Working Group                                        K. Rampalli
Internet-Draft                                           Glyphzero, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                               6 July 2026
Expires: 7 January 2027

 A Layered Requirements Mapping for Cross-Organization Agent Delegation
             draft-rampalli-cross-org-delegation-mapping-02

Abstract

   This document records a comparative mapping of two evidence layers
   for cross-organization AI agent delegation: a per-hop delegation
   chain (PEDIGREE) and a named-human authorization root (the EMILIA
   Protocol binding and evidence-graph drafts), evaluated against the
   nine requirements of draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation under a
   no-shared-operator assumption.  It also records a verifier-facing
   composition model in which key possession, delegated authority, and
   pre-execution human authorization are diagnostically separate inputs
   with independent failure behavior, joined by action digest.  The
   mapping was developed on the WIMSE mailing list; corrections continue
   there.

Status of This Mapping

   This document is a point-in-time record of a mailing-list discussion.
   Verdicts apply to the specific draft revisions cited and do not carry
   forward to later revisions automatically.  The canonical venue for
   corrections is the WIMSE mailing list; agreed corrections will be
   folded into future revisions of this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 January 2027.

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Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Assumptions and Verdict Discipline  . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Combined Requirements Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Summary Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Row Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Verifier-Facing Composition: Diagnostically Separate
           Inputs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  The Delegation-Chain Row, Stated Explicitly . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  The Human-Authorization Row, Stated by Its Supplier . . .   9
     3.3.  Template Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Changes Since -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Changes Since -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Requirements R1 through R9 of [I-D.reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation]
   describe what cross-organization delegation of authority to AI agents
   must provide when the relying party and the originating organization
   share no operator, no runtime, and no bilateral agreement specific to
   the interaction.  During the July 2026 discussion of those
   requirements on the WIMSE mailing list, two candidate mechanisms were
   mapped against them independently and were then found to occupy
   different layers of the same problem:

   *  a delegation-chain layer, in which authority conveyed by a root
      principal is narrowed at every hop and re-verified end-to-end by
      the relying party ([I-D.rampalli-pedigree]); and

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   *  a human-authorization root layer, in which a named human, or an
      M-of-N quorum of distinct humans, authorizes a specific action,
      and that evidence is bound into agent-action records and evaluated
      with fail-closed verdicts
      ([I-D.schrock-human-authorization-binding],
      [I-D.schrock-ep-action-evidence-graph]).

   Neither layer claims the other's property.  The chain proves that
   authority was conveyed and attenuated; the root layer proves that an
   accountable human authorized the act.  Where the two meet, they join
   by digest equality, and digest equality is a join key, not a claim of
   sufficiency.

   This document records the combined mapping (Section 2) and the
   verifier-facing composition model that the discussion converged on
   (Section 3).  It defines no protocol and no new evidence format.

1.1.  Assumptions and Verdict Discipline

   The no-shared-operator assumption applies throughout.  Each verdict
   states what holds offline and unconditionally versus what depends on
   a named assumption, following the conditional form requested in the
   originating thread.  Several entries are not clean passes and are
   marked as such; deployments should read a "met" verdict together with
   its stated condition, never without it.

2.  Combined Requirements Mapping

2.1.  Summary Table

   "Chain" is the delegation layer ([I-D.rampalli-pedigree]).  "Root" is
   the human-authorization layer
   ([I-D.schrock-human-authorization-binding],
   [I-D.schrock-ep-action-evidence-graph]).  The composition column
   states how the layers relate on that row.

   +=====+===================+================+=======================+
   | Req | Chain (PEDIGREE)  | Root (EP)      | Composition           |
   +=====+===================+================+=======================+
   | R1  | Met; inline       | Out of layer   | Chain-only property   |
   |     | conveyance        | by design      |                       |
   |     | condition         |                |                       |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+
   | R2  | Conditional: met  | Pinned issuer  | Same shape: the       |
   |     | only via a        | keys (B3);     | anchor-trust          |
   |     | general anchor-   | provisioning   | mechanism is the      |
   |     | trust mechanism;  | mechanism      | load-bearing part;    |
   |     | bilateral         | unspecified:   | shared open item      |

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   |     | provisioning      | open           |                       |
   |     | fails R2          |                |                       |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+
   | R3  | Met offline given | Met offline    | Both fail closed      |
   |     | conveyance        | (deterministic | rather than fetch     |
   |     |                   | policy replay) |                       |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+
   | R4  | Deferred to       | Not addressed  | Shared gap: neither   |
   |     | transport (proof  |                | layer proves          |
   |     | of possession at  |                | possession; WIMSE-    |
   |     | the wire)         |                | native answers at the |
   |     |                   |                | wire are WPT and HTTP |
   |     |                   |                | message signatures;   |
   |     |                   |                | composed stack:       |
   |     |                   |                | possession at the     |
   |     |                   |                | wire, attenuation     |
   |     |                   |                | along the chain,      |
   |     |                   |                | human authorization   |
   |     |                   |                | at the root           |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+
   | R5  | Invariance along  | Native to the  | Root proves who;      |
   |     | the chain (re-    | artifact       | chain proves nobody   |
   |     | verification)     | (single or     | swapped them          |
   |     |                   | quorum); B2    |                       |
   |     |                   | ties it to the |                       |
   |     |                   | host record    |                       |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+
   | R6  | Conjunction       | Policy         | Entitlements stay     |
   |     | native;           | identity plus  | relying-party data    |
   |     | entitlements      | replay;        |                       |
   |     | relying-party     | entitlements   |                       |
   |     | local             | relying-party  |                       |
   |     |                   | local          |                       |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+
   | R7  | Lifetime bound    | Normative      | Root layer closes the |
   |     | offline; fail-    | fail-closed: a | gap the chain layer   |
   |     | closed on stale   | stale verdict  | names                 |
   |     | revocation data   | never          |                       |
   |     | is an admitted    | authorizes; B4 |                       |
   |     | revision item     |                |                       |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+
   | R8  | Signed hops;      | Evidence       | Join by digest: scope |
   |     | SCITT capsule     | graph;         | versus act, neither   |
   |     | binding for the   | unbacked edges | claims the other's    |
   |     | post-execution    | poison; signed | property              |
   |     | half              | Reliance       |                       |
   |     |                   | Result         |                       |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+

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   | R9  | Met (JWT/JOSE,    | Met (JSON/JCS, | No new formats on     |
   |     | pluggable policy) | maps onto      | either side           |
   |     |                   | existing host  |                       |
   |     |                   | formats)       |                       |
   +-----+-------------------+----------------+-----------------------+

                     Table 1: Combined R1-R9 Mapping

   The R5 and R4 cells reflect corrections agreed on-list on 2026-07-05:
   the named-human and quorum property is native to the receipt and
   quorum artifacts themselves, with binding requirement B2 tying the
   artifact's action binding to the host record; and R4's composition
   cell carries the constructive composed-stack line alongside the
   shared-gap statement.

2.2.  Row Notes

   The full per-layer mappings live in the originating thread; these
   notes carry only what the one-line verdicts compress too much.

   R1, recursive attenuation:
      The chain meets it from conveyed material alone: per-hop scope
      subsetting and mandate narrowing are re-checked at verification,
      not only at mint, and the verifier re-verifies every parent token.
      The condition is inline conveyance of parents.  The root layer
      does not narrow scope, and should not: it names the human and
      binds the action.  A division of labor, not a gap.

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   R2, cross-organizational verification:
      Reframed in this revision per a correction from the requirements
      author: pinning the originating organization's anchor relocates
      the assumption rather than discharging it, and the load-bearing
      part is how the relying party comes to trust the pinned anchor.
      If the anchor is obtained through a general mechanism any party
      can use without per-counterparty negotiation (a public
      transparency log, an open federation, a verifiable credential from
      a recognized issuer, or a trust-domain discovery mechanism), R2 is
      met and the row should name the mechanism.  If the anchor is
      established through an arrangement set up in advance between the
      two organizations, the bilateral agreement R2 forbids has moved
      into the provisioning step.  Against that test: the chain layer
      names a general discovery channel as one conforming way to obtain
      the anchor but does not require it, and admits static
      provisioning, so its verdict is conditional on the deployment
      pinning a general mechanism, the same profile move as R1's inline
      conveyance; self-certifying identifiers narrow the question to the
      root anchor but do not answer it.  The root layer requires pinning
      but leaves the provisioning mechanism out of scope, so its cell is
      an open item.  Both cells record open items, not satisfied
      assumptions.

   R4, proof of possession:
      The one row where the layers do not cover each other: neither
      proves possession.  The chain binds the holder's key and defers
      the presentation-time proof to the transport (a WPT
      [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol], HTTP message signatures [RFC9421],
      or a context-bound per-request token); the root layer addresses
      evidence binding, not possession.  A deployment composing both
      layers still needs a possession-proving transport underneath,
      which is why the transport profile holds a first-class seat in the
      composition model of Section 3.

   R5, principal binding and invariance:
      The mirror image of R1.  The root layer is native here: an
      accountable named human, or a quorum, signs, and the artifact's
      action binding must agree with the host record.  The chain's
      contribution is preservation: re-verification of every hop means
      an intermediary cannot alter the principal without breaking a
      signature it cannot forge.  The root proves who authorized; the
      chain proves nobody swapped them en route.

   R7, authentic bounded-staleness revocation:
      On the chain side, staleness is bounded by lifetime, offline and
      unconditionally; event-driven cascade revocation rides a channel
      assumption; and fail-closed behavior on stale revocation data is
      an admitted gap, scheduled for the next PEDIGREE revision.  On the

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      root side the discipline is already normative: freshness bounds
      are policy inputs, the verdict set is closed with precedence
      unverifiable over conflicted over stale over missing_evidence over
      admissible, and the absence of evidence is insufficient rather
      than a default.  The root layer closes, by construction, exactly
      the gap the chain layer names.  When the chain layer states the
      same rule normatively, this row becomes two independent
      enforcements of one rule rather than one layer covering for the
      other.

   R8, tamper-evident composable audit:
      The chain proves scope: every hop is a signed object, and post-
      execution composition binds per-action authorization and
      provenance references into SCITT Agent Action Capsules
      ([I-D.rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-binding]), with the
      anchored tier assuming a transparency service.  The evidence layer
      proves the act: a content-addressed graph in which an edge the
      bytes do not back poisons the verdict, plus a signed Reliance
      Result that adds accountability, never authority.  They join by
      digest equality.

   R3, R6, R9:
      As the table states; the per-layer mappings in the originating
      thread carry the detail.

3.  Verifier-Facing Composition: Diagnostically Separate Inputs

   The same list discussion, on a parallel thread about condition-
   bounded credentials, converged on a verifier-facing structure in
   which the inputs to an authorization decision are conjunctive for the
   final decision but diagnostically separate, so that each input class
   has its own failure path:

   *  enrolled key, actor, workload, and environment binding;

   *  live key possession at connection time;

   *  local condition failure and key unavailability;

   *  external lifecycle or policy events, such as a Shared Signals /
      CAEP-class channel;

   *  authorization inputs: audience, scope, operation, and time bounds;

   *  an inherited delegation-chain input, where PEDIGREE or another
      chain mechanism supplies the authority path; and

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   *  pre-execution human authorization: a named human, or an M-of-N
      quorum of distinct humans, authorized this exact operation, bound
      to the same action digest the other rows join on.

   A live key with a valid, sufficiently scoped chain still fails closed
   if a required human authorization is absent, stale, or bound to
   different action bytes; a valid chain whose holder cannot prove
   possession fails as a presentation failure; a valid key whose
   terminal scope does not cover the operation fails as an authorization
   failure.  No row inherits or grants another row's guarantees.

3.1.  The Delegation-Chain Row, Stated Explicitly

   The mapping-table rules of
   [I-D.bu-agentproto-security-principal-binding] require that an
   inherited mechanism state its dependency and failure behavior before
   it counts as a guarantee.  The delegation-chain row, with PEDIGREE as
   the supplier, in those terms:

   Claim:  authority for this exact operation was conveyed from the root
      principal and narrowed at every hop; the terminal scope covers the
      operation.

   Carrier:  the per-hop delegation tokens, conveyed inline with the
      request.

   Verifier and rule:  the relying party, offline: re-verify each hop's
      signature against its issuer key, check per-hop scope subsetting
      and mandate narrowing, take effective expiry as the minimum over
      hops, and require the operator-ceiling conjunct.

   Binding and freshness:  bound to the root principal and to the
      holder's key; staleness bounded by chain lifetime; cascade
      revocation rides a Shared Signals / CAEP-class channel where one
      exists.

   Failure behavior:  any hop signature failure, subset violation, or
      expiry fails the request as an authorization failure,
      independently of key possession and of human authorization.  A
      revocation feed older than the configured bound must fail closed;
      making that normative is a scheduled PEDIGREE revision item.

   Dependency:  the originating organization's trust anchor (root only;
      intermediate hops use self-certifying identifiers), inline
      conveyance of parent tokens, and the possession row at the
      transport for holder proof.

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   Stated that way, nothing is inherited implicitly: the chain row
   supplies the authority path and its attenuation, and it explicitly
   depends on the possession row rather than assuming it.

3.2.  The Human-Authorization Row, Stated by Its Supplier

   Iman Schrock contributed the human-authorization row on-list on
   2026-07-05, stated in the same template terms as the chain row.  It
   is included here with only editorial normalization.

   Claim:  a named, accountable human, or an M-of-N quorum of distinct
      humans, optionally ordered, authorized this exact operation before
      execution; asserted as human authority, not organizational policy,
      and the row names which.

   Carrier:  the authorization receipt (EP-RECEIPT-v1, or EP-QUORUM-v1
      for multi-party), a self-contained signed JSON artifact conveyed
      inline or referenced by digest from the host record.

   Verifier and rule:  the relying party, offline, with no account:
      Ed25519 over the canonical action bytes (JCS [RFC8785]) against a
      pinned issuer key; for a quorum, threshold met by distinct
      principals over the same digest, with order enforced when
      declared.  Verified and accepted remain separate results, and
      neither implies sufficiency.

   Binding and freshness:  bound to the action digest (the shared join
      key; digest equality is a join key, never authorization) and to
      the named principal, with a validity window on the artifact.  One-
      time use is enforcement-point state, not offline-verifiable; the
      state holder is named in the dependency, so the offline part and
      the enforcement part stay visible separately.

   Failure behavior:  missing, invalid, stale, replayed, or out-of-scope
      evidence fails the request as a human-authorization failure,
      independently of key possession and of chain attenuation.  The
      refusal is machine-readable (an HTTP 428 challenge [RFC6585]
      naming the missing evidence), so a refusal is itself evidence, not
      silence.

   Dependency:  relying-party key pinning (a binding from an unpinned
      issuer must not be accepted); an enforcement point for one-time
      consumption, deployed by the resource owner; and holder proof at
      presentation rides the possession row at the transport, the same
      shared dependency recorded at R4.  The row makes no possession
      claim of its own.

   Evidence:  public vectors, positive and negative (receipt and quorum

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      suites in the EP reference repository), reproducible with the ep-
      verify tool.

   One asymmetry, stated rather than papered over: the chain row of
   Section 3.1 does not yet cite public evidence vectors, and its
   evidence entry is open until vectors are published.  An evidence
   column is only useful if an empty cell is allowed to say so.

3.3.  Template Compatibility

   Each row of Table 1 and each input class above is kept expressible in
   the mapping-table template of
   [I-D.bu-agentproto-security-principal-binding] (claim, carrier,
   verifier and rule, binding and freshness, failure behavior,
   dependency, evidence reference).  If the working group settles on
   that shared shape for comparative tables, moving this document into
   it is a re-rendering rather than a rewrite.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document defines no protocol elements and introduces no new
   attack surface.  Its risks are risks of misreading:

   *  A conditional verdict read as unconditional.  Every "met" in
      Table 1 carries its stated condition; a deployment that drops the
      condition (for example, accepting a chain without inline
      conveyance of parents, or trusting an unpinned issuer) does not
      have the property the verdict names.

   *  Implicit inheritance across layers.  The layers compose by digest
      and by conjunction; neither inherits the other's guarantees, and
      Section 3 exists precisely to keep their failure classes separate.
      In particular, neither layer proves possession (R4); a deployment
      without a possession-proving transport is open to replay of
      captured material regardless of how strong the chain and the root
      evidence are.

   *  Version drift.  Verdicts apply to the cited revisions only.  A
      future revision of any mapped draft can invalidate a row without
      notice; the mailing-list thread, not this document, is the
      canonical record of corrections between revisions.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

6.  Informative References

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   [I-D.bu-agentproto-security-principal-binding]
              Bu, S., "Security Principal and Verifier Binding for Agent
              Communication Protocols", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-bu-agentproto-security-principal-binding-01,
              June 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              bu-agentproto-security-principal-binding-01>.

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol]
              IETF WIMSE Working Group, "WIMSE Workload-to-Workload
              Authentication", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              s2s-protocol>.

   [I-D.rampalli-pedigree]
              Rampalli, K., "PEDIGREE: Per-Agent Delegation Identity
              with Governance-Enforced Execution", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-rampalli-pedigree-01, July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rampalli-
              pedigree-01>.

   [I-D.rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-binding]
              Rampalli, K., "Binding Delegation Authorization and
              Provenance References into SCITT Agent Action Capsules",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-rampalli-scitt-
              capsule-provenance-binding-00, July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rampalli-
              scitt-capsule-provenance-binding-00>.

   [I-D.reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation]
              Reece, M., "Requirements for Cross-Organization Delegation
              of Authority to AI Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-00, June
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reece-
              wimse-cross-org-delegation-00>.

   [I-D.schrock-ep-action-evidence-graph]
              Schrock, I., "Action Evidence Graphs and Evidence Policy
              Replay for High-Risk Agent Actions (EP-AEG)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-schrock-ep-action-
              evidence-graph-00, July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-schrock-ep-
              action-evidence-graph-00>.

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   [I-D.schrock-human-authorization-binding]
              Schrock, I., "Binding Named-Human Authorization Evidence
              into Agent-Action Records", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-schrock-human-authorization-binding-00, July
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              schrock-human-authorization-binding-00>.

   [RFC6585]  Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
              Codes", RFC 6585, DOI 10.17487/RFC6585, April 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6585>.

   [RFC8785]  Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
              Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.

   [RFC9421]  Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
              Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
              February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421>.

Changes Since -01

   *  Reframed R2 per a correction from the requirements author:
      verdicts are now conditional on the anchor-trust mechanism, and
      unspecified anchor provisioning is recorded as an open item rather
      than a satisfied assumption.

Changes Since -00

   *  Added Section 3.2: the human-authorization row as contributed on-
      list by Iman Schrock, in the same template terms as the chain row.

   *  Stated the open evidence entry on the chain row explicitly.

   *  Added informative references for JCS and HTTP status code 428.

Acknowledgments

   This mapping is a record of a discussion, and the discussion did the
   work.  Morgan Reece framed the requirements and asked for the
   conditional form, and corrected the R2 verdicts for this revision.
   Iman Schrock proposed the two-layer frame, reviewed the EP column of
   the combined table, contributed the pre-execution human-authorization
   input class, and supplied the human-authorization row of Section 3.2
   in template terms.  Songbo Bu proposed the diagnostically-separate-
   rows structure and the mapping-table discipline this document keeps
   itself expressible in.  Thanks also to the participants in the WIMSE
   mailing-list threads in which this mapping developed.

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Author's Address

   Karthik Rampalli
   Glyphzero, Inc.
   Email: karthik@glyphzerolabs.com

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