Oblivious Relay Feedback
draft-rdb-ohai-feedback-to-proxy-03

ohai                                                            T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                    Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Wing
Expires: 6 January 2023                                           Citrix
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                                R. Polli
                                       Team Digitale, Italian Government
                                                             5 July 2022

                        Oblivious Relay Feedback
                  draft-rdb-ohai-feedback-to-proxy-03

Abstract

   To provide equitable service to clients, servers often rate-limit
   incoming requests, for example, based upon the source IP address.
   However, oblivious HTTP removes the ability for the server to
   distinguish amongst clients so the server can only rate-limit traffic
   from the oblivious relay.  This harms all clients behind that
   oblivious relay.

   This specification enables a server to convey rate-limit information
   to an oblivious relay, which can use it to apply rate-limit policies
   on clients.  Cooperating oblivious relays can thus provide more
   equitable service to their distinguishable clients without impacting
   on all clients behind that oblivious relay.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 January 2023.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Providing RateLimit Information to an Oblivious Proxy . . . .   4
   4.  The ohttp-target Quota Policy Parameter . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  ohttp-target Parameter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Processing the ohttp-target Parameter . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  The attack-severity Quota Policy Parameter  . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Use of The ohttp-target Quota Policy Parameters: An
           Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Ohttp-Outside-Encap Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Client and Oblivous Proxy Collusion . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.2.  Attack Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  RateLimit Parameter Value Registrations . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Registration of new HTTP Header Field . . . . . . . . . .  11
       9.2.1.  Ohttp-Outside-Encap Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Oblivious HTTP [OHTTP] requires three parties to exchange HTTP
   messages: the client, the relay, and the target (formally, the
   Oblivious Gateway Resource and Oblivious Target Resource).  Oblivious
   HTTP enables a client to send requests to a target in such a way that
   the target cannot tell whether two requests came from the same
   client, and the relay cannot see the contents of the requests.

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   Since clients are located behind a relay, a target cannot distinguish
   between well-behaving and malicious clients: an unexpected behavior
   from one or more clients can then impact on all the intermediated
   clients, as described in Section 8.2.1 of [OHTTP].  This can be
   problematic when the target implements rate limiting policies based
   on an information masked by the intermediary, such as the source IP
   address.

   This document defines a mechanism that allows Oblivious gateway and
   target resource to provide rate-limit information to an Oblivious
   relay via the RateLimit fields defined in [RATELIMIT].  This is
   useful when such servers identify traffic anomalies or unexpected
   request volumes.  The Oblivious relay can then use this information
   to apply rate-limit policies on clients.

   While [RATELIMIT] provides enough information to generic clients to
   shape their request policy and avoid being throttled out, this
   specification allows an Oblivious gateway and target resource to
   indicate their RateLimit information is intended for the Oblivious
   relay (rather than to the client).

   How an Oblivious relay can use this information to avoid being
   throttled out or shape its request policy is outside the scope of
   this specification.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The terms "content", "receiver", "request", and "response" are to be
   interpreted as described in [HTTP].

   The terms "Encapsulated request", "Encapsulated response", "Oblivious
   relay resource", "Oblivious gateway resource", "Oblivious target
   resource", and "Client" are to be interpreted as described in
   [OHTTP].

   The collective term "Oblivious resource" indicates either an
   "Oblivious gateway resource" or an "Oblivious target resource".

   The terms "quota policy", "service limit", "expiring limit", and
   "RateLimit fields" are to be interpreted as described in [RATELIMIT].

   This document uses the Integer type from [STRUCTURED-FIELDS].

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3.  Providing RateLimit Information to an Oblivious Proxy

   An Oblivious resource that uses RateLimit fields [RATELIMIT] to
   return service limit information MAY add the "ohttp-target" quota
   policy parameter defined in Section 4 to signal to the receiver that
   the associated quota policy is intended for an Oblivious relay.  For
   example, when an Oblivious target identifies a high frequency or high
   volume anomalies in the HTTP requests it would include the "ohttp-
   target" parameter.

   The term "Oblivious Relay Feedback" denotes both the mechanism
   described in this specification and the complete set of RateLimit
   fields together with the "ohttp-target" parameter.

   To know whether the RateLimit fields provides Oblivious Relay
   Feedback (see Section 3.1), an Oblivious relay MUST:

   1.  Identify the quota policy associated to the expiring limit.

   2.  Check whether the "ohttp-target" parameter is present and its
       syntax is correct.

   In the example shown in Figure 1, the expiring limit value is "100",
   so the associated quota policy is the second one.  This quota policy
   includes the "ohttp-target" parameter: this indicates that the
   RateLimit fields are intended for an Oblivious relay.

      RateLimit-Limit: 100, 10;w=1, 100;w=60;ohttp-target=1
      RateLimit-Remaining: 8
      RateLimit-Reset: 15

             Figure 1: An Example of Oblivious Proxy Feedback.

4.  The ohttp-target Quota Policy Parameter

4.1.  ohttp-target Parameter

   The following quota policy parameter is defined for the RateLimit-
   Limit field [RATELIMIT]:

   ohttp-target:  Indicates that the associated quota policy provides
      Oblivious Relay Feedback.  This parameter is OPTIONAL.

   The "ohttp-target" parameter has the following syntax:

   ohttp-target = sf-integer

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   Its value MUST be an Integer (Section 3.3.1 of [STRUCTURED-FIELDS])
   and indicates whether the quota policy is applicable to all the
   clients that are serviced by the Oblivious relay or applicable only
   to a specific client.  The "ohttp-target" parameter MUST have one of
   the following values:

   1:  Indicates that RateLimit fields are applicable to all the clients
      that are serviced by the same Oblivious relay.

   2:  Indicates that RateLimit fields are applicable only to the
      offending client.  For example, this value is used if the client
      is attacking the server (e.g., the client is using an abnormal
      header that matches an attack pattern).

      The Oblivious relay does not immediately act to rate-limit the
      traffic from the client but starts maintaining a count of
      responses to the client with "ohttp-target" parameter value set to
      "2" marked as "potential malicious requests" and responses without
      the parameter marked as "legitimate requests".

      The Oblivious relay can rate-limit requests from the offending
      client for a certain duration only when the client has a high
      ratio of "potential malicious requests" to "legitimate requests".
      In other words, the Oblivious relay will rate-limit requests from
      a client if the target has seen an attack pattern in multiple
      requests from that same client.  A malicious client sends
      malformed HTTP requests, whereas a benign client sends valid HTTP
      requests.  The malformed HTTP requests are linkable whereas the
      valid HTTP requests are not linkable.  Most importantly, the
      target will not be able to partition the anonymity set of
      legitimate clients.

   Other values MUST cause the parameter to be ignored.

   The "ohttp-target" parameter MUST NOT appear more than once in a
   quota policy.  If the parameter is malformed or its value is invalid,
   it MUST be ignored, and the receiving Oblivious relay MUST NOT
   attempt to fix neither the parameter nor its value.  That is, the
   RateLimit fields must not be considered as providing Oblivious Relay
   Feedback.

4.2.  Processing the ohttp-target Parameter

   An Oblivious relay receiving RateLimit fields providing Oblivious
   Relay Feedback will do the following:

   1.  It MUST remove the RateLimit fields from the response, since they
       are not intended to be forwarded to clients.

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   2.  It MAY add a new set of RateLimit fields that are intended to be
       forwarded to a client.

   An Oblivious gateway resource receiving RateLimit fields providing
   Oblivious Relay Feedback MUST proceed as follows:

   1.  Remove the RateLimit fields from the HTTP response, since they
       are not intended to be forwarded to the client.  It, then,
       encapsulates the HTTP response.

   2.  Add the above RateLimit fields to the response containing the
       encapsulated response sent to the Oblivious relay, so that the
       Oblivious relay can access them.

   If the RateLimit fields along with the "ohttp-target" parameter are
   generated by the Oblivious gateway resource before removing the
   protection (including being unable to remove the encapsulation for
   any reason)(Section 6.2 of [OHTTP]), it will result in the RateLimit
   fields added in the response being sent without protection in
   response to a POST request from a client.

   While this specification does not mandate specific traffic shaping
   actions for Oblivious proxies in addition to the ones indicated in
   [RATELIMIT], an Oblivious relay failing to reshape traffic from a
   specific client or from all the clients according to the received
   Oblivious Relay Feedback can experience different levels of service
   denial by the Oblivious gateway and target resources.  There is no
   explicit mechanism for an Oblivious relay to indicate to the server
   that the rate-limit information was processed or was ignored.

5.  The attack-severity Quota Policy Parameter

   The following quota policy parameter is defined for the RateLimit-
   Limit field defined in [RATELIMIT]:

   attack-severity:  Is used by the Oblivious resource to convey the
      likeliness that an HTTP request is malicious.  This parameter is
      OPTIONAL.

   attack-severity = sf-string

   Note that sf-string is defined in Section 3.3.3 of
   [STRUCTURED-FIELDS].

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   The value of the "attack-severity" parameter is a String
   (Section 3.3.3 of [RFC8941]) that takes one of the values defined in
   [SEVERITY].  This parameter MUST NOT appear more than once in a quota
   policy.  If the parameter is malformed or its value is invalid, the
   parameter MUST be ignored, and the relays MUST NOT attempt to fix
   neither the parameter nor the value.

6.  Use of The ohttp-target Quota Policy Parameters: An Example

   The example depicted in Figure 2 illustrates the use of the "ohttp-
   target" parameter.  An oblivious target resource receives a malformed
   request and uses the source IP address to identify that it was an
   encapsulated request decapsulated by an oblivious gateway resource.
   The Oblivious target resource generates a 400 response and adds the
   RateLimit fields along with the "ohttp-target" quota policy
   parameter.  The oblivious gateway resource proceeds as follows:

   1.  Copy the RateLimit fields from the original response.

   2.  Remove them from the original response before encapsulating it.

   3.  Generate a single 200 response containing the encapsulated
       response for the oblivious relay resource along with the copied
       RateLimit fields.

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+----+            +----------+       +----------+    +----------+
| C  |            | Relay    |       | Gateway  |    | Target   |
|    |            | Resource |       | Resource |    | Resource |
+-+--+            +----+-----+       +-----+----+    +-----+----+
  |                    |                   |               |
  | Encapsulated       |                   |               |
  +------------------->|                   |               |
  |  Request           |                   |               |
  |                    | Encapsulated      |               |
  |                    +------------------>|               |
  |                    |  Request          |               |
  |                    |                   | Request       | .---------.
  |                    |                   +-------------->| | Identify|
  |                    |                   |               +-+malformed|
  |                    |                   |               | | request |
  |                    |                   |  400 response | '---------'
  |                    |                   |<--------------+
  |                    |                   |               |
  |                    | 200 response with |               |
  |                    | RateLimit-Limit   |               |
  |                    | field and the     |               |
  |                    | ohttp-target      |               |
  |                    | parameter         |               |
                       |<------------------+               |
.--------------------. | Encapsulated 400  |               |
| Process            | |    response       |               |
| ohttp-target       +-+                   |               |
| and rate-limit     |  |                  |               |
| requests from the  |  |                  |               |
| offending client   |  |                  |               |
'--------------------'  |                  |               |
                        |                  |               |
  |                     |                  |               |
  | Encapsulated 400    |                  |               |
  |<--------------------+                  |               |
  |     response        |                  |               |
  |                     |                  |               |

         Figure 2: An Example of Ratelimit Feedback to Proxy

   The response that is generated by the Oblivious gateway resource is
   depicted in Figure 3.  This response includes an unregistered,
   informative "comment" quota policy parameter providing the rationale
   for the "attack- severity".

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   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
     Date: Wed, 27 March 2022 04:45:07 GMT
     Cache-Control: private, no-store
     RateLimit-Limit: 10,10;ohttp-target=2;attack-severity="high";\
   comment="abnormal header matching a WAF rule"
     Content-Type: message/ohttp-res
     Content-Length: 38 <content is the encapsulated 400 response>
     ...encrypted content...

                      Figure 3: Example of a Response

7.  Ohttp-Outside-Encap Header

   The "Ohttp-Outside-Encap" header is defined in this specification
   (Section 9.2.1).  Its purpose is to signal which HTTP headers will be
   removed by the Oblivious gateway.

   When an Oblivious gateway resource sends an HTTP request to an
   Oblivious taget, it adds the "Ohttp-Outside-Encap" header to indicate
   which headers will be removed from the response.

   On receipt of an HTTP response from the Oblivious target resource,
   the Oblivious gateway resource copies the header fields signaled in
   the associated request and removes those headers from the HTTP
   response.  The Oblivious gateway then encapsulates the HTTP response.
   The Oblivious gateway resource adds the copied header fields and
   values to the response containing the encapsulated response, so that
   the Oblivious relay can access and act on them.

   The "Ohttp-Outside-Encap" header is useful in deployments where the
   Oblivious gateway resource and Oblivious target resource are managed
   by separate entities.

   Figure 4 describes the syntax using Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
   of the header field, using the grammar defined in [RFC5234] and the
   rules defined in Section 5 of [RFC9110].  The field values of the
   header field conform to the same rules.

     Ohai-Outside-Encap =  header-field *( OWS "|" OWS header-field)
     header-field = token

                Figure 4: Ohttp-Outside-Encap Header Syntax

   Optional white space (OWS) is used as defined in Section 5.6.3 of
   [RFC9110].

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   An example is illustrated below:

Ohttp-Outside-Encap: RateLimit-Limit|RateLimit-Remaining|RateLimit-Reset

8.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations for the Oblivious HTTP protocol
   (Section 8 of [OHTTP]) as well as the ones for RateLimit-Limit fields
   (Section 6 of [RATELIMIT]) apply.  The following sub-sections discuss
   security considerations specific to this specification.

8.1.  Client and Oblivous Proxy Collusion

   While Oblivious HTTP relies upon an Oblivious relay to prevent
   leaking the client identity to the Oblivious resources, it might be
   the case that the Oblivious relay colludes with clients in attacking
   Oblivious resources.  RateLimit fields might disclose operational
   capacity information useful to design denial of service attacks or to
   circumvent defensive measures put in place by the Oblivious resources
   (Section 6.2 of [RATELIMIT]).  The Oblivious target and gateway
   resources SHOULD convey Oblivious Relay Feedback only to trusted
   Oblivious proxies.

8.2.  Attack Categories

   Attacks against the Oblivious Gateway and Target Resources can be
   classified into three primary categories:

   1.  A client deliberately sends a malformed encapsulated request
       causing decryption failure or decryption overload failure on the
       oblivious gateway resource.  This causes the oblivious gateway
       resource to send an error status code back to the oblivious
       relay.

   2.  A client deliberately sends an HTTP request that causes an HTTP
       error on the oblivious target resource.  This might be a
       malformed HTTP request, or request for a missing resource.

   3.  A botnet performing an application layer denial of service attack
       (e.g.  HTTP flood) against an Oblivious resource.  Because each
       bot in a botnet makes seemingly legitimate network requests the
       traffic may appear "normal" in origin, nonetheless as a whole it
       not only can saturate the Oblivious resources, but also makes
       appear the Oblivious relay as an attacker.  This might be too
       many requests from a single client, too many requests from the
       clients behind the same oblivious relay or too many requests from
       all clients on the Internet.

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9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  RateLimit Parameter Value Registrations

   This specification requests IANA to add the following parameters to
   the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) RateLimit Parameters"
   registry defined in [RATELIMIT].

  +=================+=================+================+===============+
  | Field Name      |Parameter Name   |Description     |Specification  |
  +=================+=================+================+===============+
  | RateLimit-Limit |ohttp-target     |ohttp ratelimit |Section 3 of   |
  |                 |                 |                |this document  |
  | RateLimit-Limit |attack-severity  |ohttp ratelimit |Section 5 of   |
  |                 |                 |                |this document  |
  +-----------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+

9.2.  Registration of new HTTP Header Field

9.2.1.  Ohttp-Outside-Encap Header

   This section describes a header field for registration in the
   Permanent Message Header Field Registry [RFC3864].

   Header field name
      Ohttp-Outside-Encap

   Applicable protocol
      http

   Status
      Standard

   Author/Change controller
      IETF

   Specification document(s)
      RFC XXXX

   Related information
      This header field is only used for Oblivious HTTP.

10.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Lucas Pardue, Rich Salz, Martin Thomson, Christopher A.
   Wood and Brandon Williams for the discussion and comments.

11.  References

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11.1.  Normative References

   [HTTP]     Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Semantics", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              httpbis-semantics-19, 12 September 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
              semantics-19>.

   [OHTTP]    Thomson, M. and C. A. Wood, "Oblivious HTTP", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-01, 15
              February 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-01>.

   [RATELIMIT]
              Polli, R. and A. M. Ruiz, "RateLimit Fields for HTTP",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpapi-
              ratelimit-headers-03, 7 March 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpapi-
              ratelimit-headers-03>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3864]  Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
              Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8941]  Nottingham, M. and P-H. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
              HTTP", RFC 8941, DOI 10.17487/RFC8941, February 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8941>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.

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   [STRUCTURED-FIELDS]
              Nottingham, M. and P-H. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
              HTTP", RFC 8941, DOI 10.17487/RFC8941, February 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8941>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [SEVERITY] IANA, "Incident Object Description Exchange Format v2
              (IODEF)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iodef2/
              iodef2.xhtml#businessimpact-severity>.

Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Akamai
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore 560071
   Karnataka
   India
   Email: kondtir@gmail.com

   Dan Wing
   Citrix Systems, Inc.
   4988 Great America Pkwy
   Santa Clara, CA 95054
   United States of America
   Email: danwing@gmail.com

   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   35000 Rennes
   France
   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com

   Roberto Polli
   Team Digitale, Italian Government
   Email: robipolli@gmail.com

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