Integrity Protection for Network Service Header (NSH) and Encryption of Sensitive Metadata
draft-rebo-sfc-nsh-integrity-00

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SFC                                                         M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft                                                    Orange
Intended status: Standards Track                                T. Reddy
Expires: May 3, 2020                                              McAfee
                                                        October 31, 2019

Integrity Protection for Network Service Header (NSH) and Encryption of
                           Sensitive Metadata
                    draft-rebo-sfc-nsh-integrity-00

Abstract

   This specification adds integrity protection and optional encryption
   directly to Network Service Headers (NSH) used for Service Function
   Chaining (SFC).

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2020.

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Boucadair & Reddy          Expires May 3, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        Intgerity Protection for NSH          October 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Assumptions & Basic Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Mandatory to Implement AEAD Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  New NSH Variable-Length Context Headers . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Key Identifier Context Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Sequence Number Context Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.3.  MAC and Encrypted Metadata Context Header . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Processing Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  Generic Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  MAC NSH Data Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.3.  Encrypted NSH Metadata Generation . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.4.  Sequence Number Validation for Replay Attack  . . . . . .  11
     7.5.  NSH Data Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.6.  Decryption of NSH Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  A Deployment Example with KMS  . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   Many advanced Service Functions (e.g., Performance Enhancement
   Proxies, NATs, firewalls, etc.) are invoked for the delivery of
   value-added services, particularly to meet various service objectives
   such as IP address sharing, avoiding covert channels, detecting and
   protecting against ever increasing Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks,
   network slicing, etc.  Because of the proliferation of such advanced
   SFs together with complex service deployment constraints that demand
   more agile service delivery procedures, operators need to rationalize
   their service delivery logics and master their complexity while
   optimising service activation time cycles.  The overall problem space
   is described in [RFC7498].

   [RFC7665] presents an architecture addressing the problematic aspects
   of existing service deployments, including topological dependence and
   configuration complexity.  It also describes an architecture for the
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