Secure EVPN
draft-sajassi-bess-secure-evpn-01

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BESS Workgroup                                           A. Sajassi, Ed.
INTERNET-DRAFT                                               A. Banerjee
Intended Status: Standards Track                               S. Thoria
                                                               D. Carrel
                                                                 B. Weis
                                                                   Cisco
                                                                        
Expires: September 11, 2019                               March 11, 2019

                              Secure EVPN 
                   draft-sajassi-bess-secure-evpn-01 

Abstract

   The applications of EVPN-based solutions ([RFC7432] and [RFC8365])
   have become pervasive in Data Center, Service Provider, and
   Enterprise segments. It is being used for fabric overlays and inter-
   site connectivity in the Data Center market segment, for Layer-2,
   Layer-3, and IRB VPN services in the Service Provider market segment,
   and for fabric overlay and WAN connectivity in Enterprise networks.
   For Data Center and Enterprise applications, there is a need to
   provide inter-site and WAN connectivity over public Internet in a
   secured manner with same level of privacy, integrity, and
   authentication for tenant's traffic as IPsec tunneling using IKEv2.
   This document presents a solution where BGP point-to-multipoint
   signaling is leveraged for key and policy exchange among PE devices
   to create private pair-wise IPsec Security Associations without IKEv2
   point-to-point signaling or any other direct peer-to-peer session
   establishment messages.     

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as
   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 

Sajassi et al.         Expires September 11, 2019               [Page 1]
INTERNET DRAFT                Secure EVPN                 March 11, 2019

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Copyright and License Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.1 Tenant's Layer-2 and Layer-3 data & control traffic  . . . .  7
     2.2 Tenant's Unicast & Multicast Data Protection . . . . . . . .  7
     2.3 P2MP Signaling for SA setup and Maintenance  . . . . . . . .  7
     2.4 Granularity of Security Association Tunnels  . . . . . . . .  7
     2.5 Support for Policy and DH-Group List . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3  Solution Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1 Inheritance of Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2  Distribution of Public Keys and Policies  . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.2.1  Minimal DIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.2.2  Multiple Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
         3.2.2.1  Multiple DH-groups  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
         3.2.2.2  Multiple or Single ESP SA policies  . . . . . . . . 11
     3.3  Initial IPsec SAs Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.4  Re-Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.5  IPsec Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   4 Encapsulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.1 Standard ESP Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.2 ESP Encapsulation within UDP packet  . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5 BGP Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15