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Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home Address Options

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Author Pekka Savola
Last updated 2002-12-02
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


All IPv6 nodes must be able to process Routing Header [IPV6] and Home Address [MIPV6] Options. With these, packet filter access lists can be tricked (among other things) as the destination and source addresses, respectively, are being rewritten as the packet traverses the network. Some of the security considerations of these features are analyzed, and a few possible solutions presented. It will be shown that with the current architecture, the network-based security does not seem to scale to the requirements of Mobile IPv6; it seems possible that unless security is taken seriously when implementing the nodes, the new Mobile IPv6 requirements might not be allowed to be used at all in some circumstances.


Pekka Savola

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)