The ACPKM internal re-keying mechanism for block cipher modes of operation
draft-smyshlyaev-re-keying-00

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Network Working Group                                 S. Smyshlyaev, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                               E. Alekseev
Intended status: Informational                                 I. Oshkin
Expires: April 24, 2017                                  L. Ahmetzyanova
                                                          E. Smyshlyaeva
                                                               CryptoPro
                                                        October 21, 2016

    The ACPKM internal re-keying mechanism for block cipher modes of
                               operation
                     draft-smyshlyaev-re-keying-00

Abstract

   This specification presents an approach to increase the security of
   block cipher operation modes based on re-keying (with no additional
   keys needed) during each separate message processing.  It provides an
   internal re-keying mechanism called ACPKM.  This mechanism doesn't
   require additional secret parameters or complicated transforms - for
   key update only the base encryption function is used.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2017.

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   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Smyshlyaev, et al.       Expires April 24, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft      Cryptographic Algorithms for GOST       October 2016

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Basic Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  CTR and GCM Block Cipher Modes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  CTR Block Cipher Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  GCM Block Cipher Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  ACPKM re-keying mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  ACPKM internal re-keying mechanism for CTR encryption
           mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  ACPKM internal re-keying mechanism for GCM encryption
           mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix A.  Test examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   An important problem related to secure functioning of any
   cryptographic system is the control of key lifetimes.  Regarding
   symmetric keys, the main concern is constraining the key exposure.
   It could be done by limiting the maximal amount of data processed
   with one key.  The restrictions can come either from combinatorial
   properties of the used cipher modes of operation (for example,
   birthday attack [BDJR]) or from particular cryptographic attacks on
   the used block cipher (for example, linear cryptanalysis [Matsui]).
   Moreover, most strict restrictions here follow from the need to
   resist side-channel attacks.  The adversary's opportunity to obtain
   an essential amount of data processed with a single key leads not
   only to theoretic but also to real vulnerabilities (see [BL]).
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