Design Discussion and Comparison of Protection Mechanisms for Replay Attack and Withdrawal Suppression in BGPsec
draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-07

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Secure Inter-Domain Routing                                    K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Informational                                   US NIST
Expires: April 21, 2017                                 October 18, 2016

  Design Discussion and Comparison of Protection Mechanisms for Replay
              Attack and Withdrawal Suppression in BGPsec
          draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-07

Abstract

   In the context of BGPsec, a withdrawal suppression occurs when an
   adversary AS suppresses a prefix withdrawal with the intension of
   continuing to attract traffic for that prefix based on a previous
   (signed and valid) BGPsec announcement that was earlier propagated.
   Subsequently if the adversary AS had a BGPsec session reset with a
   neighboring BGPsec speaker and when the session is restored, the AS
   replays said previous BGPsec announcement (even though it was
   withdrawn), then such a replay action is called a replay attack.  The
   BGPsec protocol should incorporate a method for protection from
   Replay Attack and Withdrawal Suppression (RAWS), at least to control
   the window of exposure.  This informational document provides design
   discussion and comparison of multiple alternative RAWS protection
   mechanisms weighing their pros and cons.  This is meant to be a
   companion document to the standards track I-D.-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
   rollover that will specify a method to be used with BGPsec for RAWS
   protection.

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Sriram & Montgomery      Expires April 21, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft  Protections for RAWS - Design Discussion    October 2016

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Description and Scenarios of Replay Attacks and Withdrawal
       Suppression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Classification of Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Expiration Time Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Key Rollover Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Periodic Key Rollover Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Event-driven Key Rollover Method  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.2.1.  EKR-A: EKR where Update Expiry is Enforced by CRL . .  10
       5.2.2.  EKR-B: EKR where Update Expiry is Enforced by
               NotAfter Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       5.2.3.  EKR with Separate Key for Each Incoming-Outgoing
               Peering-Pair  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Summary of Pros and Cons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   11. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   In BGP or BGPsec, prefix or route withdrawals happen, and a
   withdrawal can be explicit (i.e. route simply withdrawn) or implicit
   (i.e. a new route announcement replaces the previous).  In the
   context of BGPsec, a withdrawal suppression occurs when an adversary
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