AS Hijack Detection and Mitigation
draft-sriram-sidrops-as-hijack-detection-07
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Kotikalapudi Sriram , Doug Montgomery | ||
| Last updated | 2024-07-27 (Latest revision 2024-01-24) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document proposes a method for detection and mitigation of AS hijacking. In this mechanism, an AS operator registers a new object in the RPKI called 'ROAs Exist for All Prefixes (REAP)'. REAP is digitally signed using the AS holder's certificate. By registering a REAP object, the AS operator is declaring that they have Route Origin Authorization (ROA) coverage for all prefixes originated by their AS. A receiving AS will mark a route as Invalid if the prefix is not covered by any Validated ROA Payload (VRP) and the route origin AS has signed a REAP. Here Invalid means that the route is determined to be an AS hijack.
Authors
Kotikalapudi Sriram
Doug Montgomery
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)