Origin Validation Policy Considerations for Dropping Invalid Routes
draft-sriram-sidrops-drop-invalid-policy-02

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SIDROPS Working Group                                          K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                               O. Borchert
Intended status: Best Current Practice                     D. Montgomery
Expires: April 25, 2019                                         USA NIST
                                                             J. Snijders
                                                      NTT Communications
                                                        October 22, 2018

  Origin Validation Policy Considerations for Dropping Invalid Routes
              draft-sriram-sidrops-drop-invalid-policy-02

Abstract

   Deployment of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and Route
   Origin Authorizations (ROAs) is expected to occur gradually over
   several or many years.  During the incremental deployment period,
   network operators would wish to have a meaningful policy for dropping
   Invalid routes.  Their goal is to balance (A) dropping Invalid routes
   so hijacked routes can be eliminated, versus (B) tolerance for
   missing or erroneously created ROAs for customer prefixes.  This
   document considers a Drop Invalid if Still Routable (DISR) policy
   that is based on these considerations.  The key principle of DISR
   policy is that an Invalid route can be dropped if a Valid or NotFound
   route exists for a subsuming less specific prefix.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Sriram, et al.           Expires April 25, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Dropping Invalid Routes            October 2018

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Drop Invalid if Still Routable (DISR) Policy  . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Motivation for the DISR Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Algorithm for Implementation of DISR Policy . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   Deployment of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6481] and
   Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482] is expected to occur
   gradually over several or many years.  ROA-based BGP Origin
   Validation (OV) process and the OV states are defined in [RFC6811].
   During the incremental deployment period, network operators would
   wish to have a meaningful policy for dropping Invalid routes.  Their
   goal is to balance (A) dropping Invalid routes so hijacked routes can
   be eliminated, versus (B) tolerance for missing or erroneously
   created ROAs for customer prefixes.  This document considers a Drop
   Invalid if Still Routable (DISR) policy that is based on these
   considerations.  The key principle of DISR policy is that an Invalid
   route can be dropped if a Valid or NotFound route exists for a
   subsuming less specific prefix.

   The DISR policy applies in addition to (1) preferring Valid when more
   than one route exists for the same prefix, and (2) always including
   NotFound routes in the best path selection process.  Note that for a
   router performing OV, the existence of a NotFound route excludes the
   possibility of an alternate Valid or Invalid route for the same
   prefix or a subsuming less specific prefix.

   This document also provides an algorithm for best path selection
   policy that considers Origin Validation (OV) outcome and includes the
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