Usage of OPAQUE with TLS 1.3
draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00

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Last updated 2019-03-11
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Network Working Group                                        N. Sullivan
Internet-Draft                                                Cloudflare
Intended status: Standards Track                             H. Krawczyk
Expires: September 12, 2019                                 IBM Research
                                                                O. Friel
                                                               R. Barnes
                                                                   Cisco
                                                          March 11, 2019

                      Usage of OPAQUE with TLS 1.3
                      draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00

Abstract

   This document describes two mechanisms for enabling the use of the
   OPAQUE password-authenticated key exchange in TLS 1.3.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Sullivan, et al.       Expires September 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               TLS 1.3 OPAQUE                   March 2019

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  OPAQUE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Password Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Implementing EnvU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  TLS extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Use of extensions in TLS handshake flows  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  OPAQUE-3DH, OPAQUE-HMQV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  OPAQUE-Sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Integration into Exported Authenticators  . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Summary of properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Example OPRF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  OPRF_1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.2.  OPRF_2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Privacy considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   Note that this draft has not received significant security review and
   should not be the basis for production systems.

   OPAQUE [opaque-paper] is a mutual authentication method that enables
   the establishment of an authenticated cryptographic key between a
   client and server based on a user's memorized password, without ever
   exposing the password to servers or other entities other than the
   client machine and without relying on PKI.  OPAQUE leverages a
   primitive called a Strong Asymmetrical Password Authenticated Key
   Exchange (Strong aPAKE) to provide desirable properties including
   resistance to pre-computation attacks in the event of a server
   compromise.

   In some cases, it is desirable to combine password-based
   authentication with traditional PKI-based authentication as a
   defense-in-depth measure.  For example, in the case of IoT devices,
   it may be useful to validate that both parties were issued a
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