Remote Attestation Architecture
draft-thaler-rats-architecture-01
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Dave Thaler | ||
| Last updated | 2020-05-07 (latest revision 2019-11-04) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-thaler-rats-architecture-01.txt
Abstract
In network protocol exchanges, it is often the case that one entity (a relying party) requires evidence about the remote peer (and system components [RFC4949] thereof), in order to assess the trustworthiness of the peer. This document describes an architecture for such remote attestation procedures (RATS), which enable relying parties to decide whether to consider a remote system component trustworthy or not.
Authors
Dave Thaler (dthaler@microsoft.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)