Remote Attestation Architecture
draft-thaler-rats-architecture-01

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Network Working Group                                          D. Thaler
Internet-Draft                                                 Microsoft
Intended status: Informational                         November 04, 2019
Expires: May 7, 2020

                    Remote Attestation Architecture
                   draft-thaler-rats-architecture-01

Abstract

   In network protocol exchanges, it is often the case that one entity
   (a relying party) requires evidence about the remote peer (and system
   components [RFC4949] thereof), in order to assess the trustworthiness
   of the peer.  This document describes an architecture for such remote
   attestation procedures (RATS), which enable relying parties to decide
   whether to consider a remote system component trustworthy or not.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Thaler                     Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       Remote Attestation Architecture       November 2019

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Network Endpoint Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Confidential Machine Learning (ML) Model Protection . . .   5
     3.3.  Confidential Data Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Critical Infrastructure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.5.  Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Provisioning  . . . .   6
     3.6.  Hardware Watchdog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Serialization Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Architectural Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Passport Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Background-Check Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.2.1.  Variation: Verifying Relying Party  . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.2.2.  Variation: Out-of-Band Evidence Conveyance  . . . . .  10
     5.3.  Combinations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Conceptual Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.1.  Evidence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  Endorsements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.3.  Attestation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   11. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   In network protocol exchanges, it is often the case that one entity
   (a relying party) requires evidence about the remote peer (and system
   components [RFC4949] thereof), in order to assess the trustworthiness
   of the peer.  Remote attestation procedures (RATS) enable relying
   parties to establish a level of confidence in the trustworthiness of
   remote system components through the creation of attestation evidence
   by remote system components and a processing chain towards the
   relying party.  A relying party can then decide whether to consider a
   remote system component trustworthy or not.

   To improve the confidence in a system component's trustworthiness, a
   relying party may require evidence about:
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