Robust Scheduling against Selective Jamming in 6TiSCH Networks
draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01
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6TiSCH Working Group M. Tiloca
Internet-Draft RISE AB
Intended status: Standards Track S. Duquennoy
Expires: June 20, 2019 Yanzi Networks AB
G. Dini
University of Pisa
December 17, 2018
Robust Scheduling against Selective Jamming in 6TiSCH Networks
draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01
Abstract
This document defines a method to generate robust TSCH schedules in a
6TiSCH (IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4-2015) network, so as
to protect network nodes against selective jamming attack. Network
nodes independently compute the new schedule at each slotframe, by
altering the one originally available from 6top or alternative
protocols, while preserving a consistent and collision-free
communication pattern. This method can be added on top of the
minimal security framework for 6TiSCH.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 20, 2019.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Tiloca, et al. Expires June 20, 2019 [Page 1]
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Properties of TSCH that Simplify Selective Jamming . . . . . 3
3. Selective Jamming Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Attack Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Building Robust Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Adaptation to the 6TiSCH Minimal Security Framework . . . . . 9
5.1. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Effectiveness of Schedule Shuffling . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Renewal of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. Static Timeslot Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.4. Network Joining Through Randez-vous Cells . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Permutation Key Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Permutation Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Nodes in a 6TiSCH network communicate using the IEEE 802.15.4-2015
standard and its Timeslotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode. Some
properties of TSCH make schedule units, i.e. cells, and their usage
predictable, even if security services are used at the MAC layer.
This allows an external adversary to easily derive the communication
pattern of a victim node. After that, the adversary can perform a
selective jamming attack, by covertly, efficiently, and effectively
transmitting over the only exact cell(s) in the victim's schedule.
This document describes a method to counteract such an attack. At
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