Robust Scheduling against Selective Jamming in 6TiSCH Networks
draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-12-17
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
6TiSCH Working Group                                           M. Tiloca
Internet-Draft                                                   RISE AB
Intended status: Standards Track                            S. Duquennoy
Expires: June 20, 2019                                 Yanzi Networks AB
                                                                 G. Dini
                                                      University of Pisa
                                                       December 17, 2018

     Robust Scheduling against Selective Jamming in 6TiSCH Networks
                draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01

Abstract

   This document defines a method to generate robust TSCH schedules in a
   6TiSCH (IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4-2015) network, so as
   to protect network nodes against selective jamming attack.  Network
   nodes independently compute the new schedule at each slotframe, by
   altering the one originally available from 6top or alternative
   protocols, while preserving a consistent and collision-free
   communication pattern.  This method can be added on top of the
   minimal security framework for 6TiSCH.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 20, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Tiloca, et al.            Expires June 20, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Robust Scheduling in 6TiSCH Networks     December 2018

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Properties of TSCH that Simplify Selective Jamming  . . . . .   3
   3.  Selective Jamming Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Attack Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Building Robust Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Adaptation to the 6TiSCH Minimal Security Framework . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  Effectiveness of Schedule Shuffling . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Renewal of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.3.  Static Timeslot Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.4.  Network Joining Through Randez-vous Cells . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.1.  Permutation Key Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  Permutation Cipher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Nodes in a 6TiSCH network communicate using the IEEE 802.15.4-2015
   standard and its Timeslotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode.  Some
   properties of TSCH make schedule units, i.e. cells, and their usage
   predictable, even if security services are used at the MAC layer.

   This allows an external adversary to easily derive the communication
   pattern of a victim node.  After that, the adversary can perform a
   selective jamming attack, by covertly, efficiently, and effectively
   transmitting over the only exact cell(s) in the victim's schedule.

   This document describes a method to counteract such an attack.  At
Show full document text