Robust scheduling against selective jamming in 6TiSCH networks
draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-00

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6TiSCH Working Group                                           M. Tiloca
Internet-Draft                                              S. Duquennoy
Intended status: Standards Track                               RISE SICS
Expires: December 31, 2018                                       G. Dini
                                                      University of Pisa
                                                           June 29, 2018

     Robust scheduling against selective jamming in 6TiSCH networks
                draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-00

Abstract

   This document defines a method to generate robust TSCH schedules in a
   6TiSCH (IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4-2015) network, so as
   to protect network nodes against selective jamming attack.  Network
   nodes independently compute the new schedule at each slotframe, by
   altering the one originally available from 6top or alternative
   protocols, while preserving a consistent and collision-free
   communication pattern.  This method can be added on top of the
   minimal security framework for 6TiSCH.

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Tiloca, et al.          Expires December 31, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Robust scheduling in 6TiSCH networks         June 2018

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Properties of TSCH that simplify selective jamming  . . . . .   3
   3.  Attack example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Building robust schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Adaptation to the 6TiSCH minimal security framework . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Effectiveness of schedule shuffling . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Renewal of key material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  Static timeslot allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.4.  Network joining through randez-vous cells . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Nodes in a 6TiSCH network communicate using the IEEE 802.15.4-2015
   standard and its Timeslotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode.  Some
   properties of TSCH make schedule units, i.e. cells, and their usage
   predictable, even if security services are used at the MAC layer.

   This allows an external adversary to easy derive the communication
   pattern of a victim node.  After that, the adversary can perform a
   selective jamming attack, by efficiently and effectively transmitting
   over the only exact cell(s) in the victim's schedule.

   This document describes a method to counteract such an attack.  At
   each slotframe, every node autonomously computes a TSCH schedule, as
   a pseudo-random permutation of the one originally available from 6top
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol] or alternative protocols.

   The resulting schedule is provided to TSCH and used to communicate
   during the next slotframe.  In particular, the new communication
   pattern results unpredictable for an external adversary.  Besides,
   since all nodes compute the same pseudo-random permutation, the new
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