Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
draft-tls-westerbaan-mldsa-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tim Hollebeek , Sophie Schmieg , Bas Westerbaan | ||
| Last updated | 2024-11-15 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-tls-westerbaan-mldsa-00
Network Working Group T. Hollebeek
Internet-Draft DigiCert
Intended status: Informational S. Schmieg
Expires: 19 May 2025 Google
B. Westerbaan
Cloudflare
15 November 2024
Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
draft-tls-westerbaan-mldsa-00
Abstract
This memo specifies how the post-quantum signature scheme ML-DSA
(FIPS 204) is used for authentication in TLS 1.3.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://bwesterb.github.io/tls-mldsa/draft-tls-westerbaan-mldsa.html.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-westerbaan-mldsa/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/bwesterb/tls-mldsa.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2025.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. ML-DSA SignatureSchemes Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
ML-DSA [FIPS204] is a post-quantum signature schemes standardised by
NIST. It is a module-lattice based scheme.
This memo specifies how ML-DSA can be negotiated for authentication
in TLS 1.3 via the "signature_algorithms" and
"signature_algorithms_cert" extensions.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. ML-DSA SignatureSchemes Types
As defined in [RFC8446], the SignatureScheme namespace is used for
the negotiation of signature scheme for authentication via the
"signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions.
This document adds three new SignatureSchemes types for the three ML-
DSA parameter sets as follows.
enum {
mldsa44(0x0904),
mldsa65(0x0905),
mldsa87(0x0906)
} SignatureScheme;
These correspond to ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 defined in
[FIPS204] respectively. Note that these are the pure versions and
should not be confused with prehashed variants such as HashML-DSA-44
also defined in [FIPS204].
Similarly, the context parameter defined in [FIPS204] Algorithm 2/
Algorithm 3 MUST be the empty string.
The signature MUST be computed and verified as specified in
Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446].
The corresponding end-entity certificate when negotiated MUST use id-
ML-DSA-44, id-ML-DSA-65, id-ML-DSA-87 respectively as defined in
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates].
The schemes defined in this document MUST NOT be used in TLS 1.2
[RFC5246]. A peer that receives ServerKeyExchange or
CertificateVerify message in a TLS 1.2 connection with schemes
defined in this document MUST abort the connection with an
illegal_parameter alert.
4. Security Considerations
TODO Security
5. IANA Considerations
This document requests new entries to the TLS SignatureScheme
registry, according to the procedures in Section 6 of [TLSIANA].
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+=================+=============+=============+================+
| Value | Description | Recommended | Reference |
+=================+=============+=============+================+
| 0x0904 (please) | mldsa44 | N | This document. |
+-----------------+-------------+-------------+----------------+
| 0x0905 (please) | mldsa65 | N | This document. |
+-----------------+-------------+-------------+----------------+
| 0x0906 (please) | mldsa87 | N | This document. |
+-----------------+-------------+-------------+----------------+
Table 1
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[FIPS204] "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard",
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.204, August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.204>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]
Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Algorithm Identifiers for ML-DSA", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-
05, 4 November 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
dilithium-certificates-05>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
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[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[TLSIANA] Salowey, J. A. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for
TLS and DTLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-10, 3 November 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8447bis-10>.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Alicja Kario and John Mattsson for their review and
feedback.
Authors' Addresses
Tim Hollebeek
DigiCert
Email: tim.hollebeek@digicert.com
Sophie Schmieg
Google
Email: sschmieg@google.com
Bas Westerbaan
Cloudflare
Email: bas@cloudflare.com
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