A Threat Model for Pervasive Passive Surveillance
draft-trammell-perpass-ppa-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Brian Trammell , Daniel Borkmann , Christian Huitema | ||
| Last updated | 2014-05-17 (Latest revision 2013-11-13) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document elaborates a threat model for pervasive surveillance. We assume an adversary with an interest in indiscriminate eavesdropping that can passively observe network traffic at every layer at every point in the network between the endpoints. It is intended to demonstrate to protocol designers and implementors the observability and inferability of information and metainformation transported over their respective protocols, to assist in the evaluation of the performance of these protocols and the effectiveness of their protection mechanisms under pervasive passive surveillance.
Authors
Brian Trammell
Daniel Borkmann
Christian Huitema
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)