Signalling Authoritative DoT support in DS records, with key pinning
draft-vandijk-dprive-ds-dot-signal-and-pin-00
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Peter van Dijk
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Robin Geuze
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Emmanuel Bretelle
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2020-05-19
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dprive P. van Dijk
Internet-Draft PowerDNS
Intended status: Standards Track R. Geuze
Expires: 20 November 2020 TransIP
E. Bretelle
Facebook
19 May 2020
Signalling Authoritative DoT support in DS records, with key pinning
draft-vandijk-dprive-ds-dot-signal-and-pin-00
Abstract
This document specifies a way to signal the usage of DoT, and the
pinned keys for that DoT usage, in authoritative servers. This
signal lives on the parent side of delegations, in DS records. To
ensure easy deployment, the signal is defined in terms of (C)DNSKEY.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 November 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
van Dijk, et al. Expires 20 November 2020 [Page 1]
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Document work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Generating and placing the (C)DNSKEY/DS records . . . . . 4
6. Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Authoritative server changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. Validating resolver changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.3. Stub resolver changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.4. Zone validator changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.5. Domain registry changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. PoC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
Even quite recently, DNS was a completely unencrypted protocol, with
no protection against snooping. In the past few years, this
landscape has shifted. The connections between stubs and resolvers
are now often protected by DoT, DoH, or other protocols that provide
privacy.
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This document introduces a way to signal, from the parent side of a
delegation, that the name servers hosting the delegated zone support
DoT, and with which TLS/X.509 keys. This proposal does not require
any changes in authoritative name servers, other than (possibly
through an external process) actually offering DoT on port 853
[RFC7858]. DNS registry operators (such as TLD operators) also need
to make no changes, unless they filter uploaded DNSKEY/DS records on
acceptable DNSKEY algorithms, in which case they would need to add
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