Quantum Relief with TLS and Kerberos
draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-06

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Network Working Group                                        R. Van Rein
Internet-Draft                                               T. Vrancken
Intended status: Informational                          InternetWide.org
Expires: July 25, 2020                                  January 22, 2020

                  Quantum Relief with TLS and Kerberos
                        draft-vanrein-tls-kdh-06

Abstract

   This specification describes a mechanism to use Kerberos
   authentication within the TLS protocol.  This gives users of TLS a
   strong alternative to classic PKI-based authentication, and at the
   same introduces a way to insert entropy into TLS' key schedule such
   that the resulting protocol becomes resistant against attacks from
   quantum computers.  We call this Quantum Relief, and specify it as
   part of a more general framework to make it easier for other
   technologies to achieve similar benefits.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 25, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Van Rein & Vrancken       Expires July 25, 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   TLS-KDH                    January 2020

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Quantum Relief as a General Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Peer-to-Peer Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  TLS-KDH for Quantum Relief through Kerberos . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Injecting Kerberos-derived Entropy  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Client-to-Server Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Peer-to-Peer Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  New Data Types and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Quantum Relief Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Ticket-based Encryption Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Kerberos Ticket and TGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.4.  Certificate Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Changes to TLS Messages and Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  ClientHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  ServerHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.3.  Server-sent CertificateRequest  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.4.  Server-sent Certificate and CertificateVerify . . . . . .  11
     5.5.  Client-sent Certificate and CertificateVerify . . . . . .  12
     5.6.  Length of Finished  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.7.  Selection of Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.8.  Tickets and Connection Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Cryptographic Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Quantum Relief for Encryption in TLS 1.3  . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Quantum Relief for Encryption in TLS 1.2  . . . . . . . .  14
     6.3.  Kerberos Ticket as Certificate and CertificateVerify  . .  14
   7.  KDH-Only Application Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.1.  Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.2.  Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.3.  Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   10. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
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