Just Another Measurement of Extension header Survivability (JAMES)
draft-vyncke-v6ops-james-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Éric Vyncke , Raphaël Léas , Justin Iurman | ||
| Last updated | 2022-03-04 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-vyncke-v6ops-james-00
IPv6 Operations E. Vyncke
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Informational R. Léas
Expires: 5 September 2022 J. Iurman
Université de Liège
4 March 2022
Just Another Measurement of Extension header Survivability (JAMES)
draft-vyncke-v6ops-james-00
Abstract
In 2016, [RFC7872] has measured the drop of packets with IPv6
extension headers. This document presents a slightly different
methodology with more recent results. It is still work in progress.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://evyncke.github.io/v6ops-james/draft-vyncke-v6ops-james.html.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vyncke-v6ops-james/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the IPv6 Operations
Working Group mailing list (mailto:v6ops@ietf.org), which is archived
at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/v6ops/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/evyncke/v6ops-james.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Vantage Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Tested Autonomous Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. Tested Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. Drop attribution to AS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. Routing Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. Hop-by-Hop Options Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.3. Destination Options Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.4. Fragmentation Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.5. No drop at all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Summary of the collaborating parties measurements . . . . 12
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
In 2016, [RFC7872] has measured the drop of packets with IPv6
extension headers on their transit over the global Internet. This
document presents a slightly different methodology with more recent
results. Since then, [I-D.draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering] has
provided some recommendations for filtering transit traffic, there
may be some changes in providers policies.
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
It is still work in progress, but the authors wanted to present some
results at IETF-113 (March 2022).
2. Methodology
In a first phase, the measurement is done between collaborating IPv6
nodes, a.k.a. vantage points, spread over the Internet and multiple
Autonomous Systems (ASs). As seen in Section 3.1.1, the
source/destination/transit ASs include some "tier-1" providers per
[TIER1], so, they are probably representative of the global Internet
core.
Relying on collaborating nodes has some benefits:
* propagation can be measured even in the absence of any ICMP
message or reply generated by the destination;
* traffic timing can be measured accurately to answer whether
extension headers are slower than plain IP6 packets;
* traffic can be captured into .pcap [I-D.draft-ietf-opsawg-pcap]
file at the source and at the destination for later analysis.
Future phases will send probes to non-collaborating nodes with a much
reduced probing speed. The destination will include [ALEXA] top-n
websites, popular CDN, as well as random prefix from the IPv6 global
routing table. A revision of this IETF draft will describe those
experiments.
3. Measurements
3.1. Vantage Points
Several servers were used worldwide (albeit missing Africa and China
as authors were unable to find IPv6 servers in these regions).
Table 1 lists all the vantage points together with their AS number
and country.
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
+========+===================+==============+===================+
| ASN | AS Name | Country code | Location |
+========+===================+==============+===================+
| 7195 | Edge Uno | AG | Buenos Aires |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 12414 | NL-SOLCON SOLCON | NL | Amsterdam |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 14061 | Digital Ocean | CA | Toronto, ON |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 14061 | Digital Ocean | USA | New York City, NY |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 14601 | Digital Ocean | DE | Francfort |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 14601 | Digital Ocean | IN | Bangalore |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 14601 | Digital Ocean | SG | Singapore |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 16276 | OVH | AU | Sydney |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 16276 | OVH | PL | Warsaw |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 44684 | Mythic Beasts | UK | Cambridge |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 47853 | Hostinger | US | Ashville, NC |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 60011 | MYTHIC-BEASTS-USA | US | Fremont, CA |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
| 198644 | GO6 | SI | Ljubljana |
+--------+-------------------+--------------+-------------------+
Table 1: All vantage AS
3.1.1. Tested Autonomous Systems
During first phase (traffic among fully meshed collaborative nodes),
our probes have collected data on the following ASs:
+===========+======================================+==========+
| AS Number | AS Description | Comment |
+===========+======================================+==========+
| 174 | COGENT-174, US | Tier-1 |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 1299 | TWELVE99 Twelve99, Telia Carrier, SE | Tier-1 |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 2914 | NTT-COMMUNICATIONS-2914, US | Tier-1 |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 3320 | DTAG Internet service provider | Tier-1 |
| | operations, DE | |
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 3356 | LEVEL3, US | Tier-1 |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 4637 | ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL Telstra Global, | Regional |
| | HK | Tier |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 4755 | TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications | |
| | formerly VSNL is Leading ISP, IN | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 5603 | SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 6453 | Tata Communication | Tier-1 |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 6762 | SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE | Tier-1 |
| | S.p.A., IT | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 6939 | HURRICANE, US | Regional |
| | | Tier |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 7195 | EDGEUNO SAS, CO | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 8447 | A1TELEKOM-AT A1 Telekom Austria AG, | |
| | AT | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 9498 | BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd., IN | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 12414 | NL-SOLCON SOLCON, NL | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 14061 | DIGITALOCEAN-ASN, US | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 16276 | OVH, FR | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 21283 | A1SI-AS A1 Slovenija, SI | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 34779 | T-2-AS AS set propagated by T-2 | |
| | d.o.o., SI | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 44684 | MYTHIC Mythic Beasts Ltd, GB | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 60011 | MYTHIC-BEASTS-USA, GB | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
| 198644 | GO6, SI | |
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----------+
Table 2: All AS (source/destination/transit)
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
The table attributes some tier qualification to some ASs based on the
Wikipedia page [TIER1], but there is no common way to decide who is a
tier-1. Based on some CAIDA research, all the above (except GO6,
which is a stub network) are transit providers.
While this document lists some operators, the intent is not to build
a wall of fame or a wall of shame but more to get an idea about which
kind of providers drop packets with extension headers and how
widespread the drop policy is enforced and where, i.e., in the access
provider or in the core of the Internet.
3.1.2. Tested Extension Headers
In the first phase among collaborating vantage points, packets always
contained either a UDP payload or a TCP payload, the latter is sent
with only the SYN flag set and with data as permitted by section 3.4
of [RFC793] (2nd paragraph). A usual traceroute is done with only
the UDP/TCP payload without any extension header with varying hop-
limit in order to learn the traversed routers and ASs. Then, several
UDP/TCP probes are sent with a set of extension headers:
* hop-by-hop and destination options header containing:
- one PadN option for an extension header length of 8 octets,
- one unknown option with the "discard" bits for an extension
header length of 8 octets,
- several PaDN options for an extension header length of 256
octets,
- one unknown option (two sets with "discard" and "skip" bits)
for an extension header length of 256 octets,
- one unknown option (two sets with "discard" and "skip" bits)
for an extension header length of 512 octets.
* routing header with routing types from 0 to 6 inclusive (except
for type 3);
* atomic fragment header (i.e., M-flag = 0 and offset = 0) of
varying frame length 512, 1280, and 1500 octets;
* non-atomic first fragment header (i.e., M-flag = 1 and offset = 0)
of varying frame length 512, 1280, and 1500 octets;
* authentication header with dummy SPI followed by UDP/TCP header
and a 38 octets payload.
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
In the above, length is the length of the extension header itself
except for the fragmentation header where the length is the IP packet
length (i.e., including the IPv6, and TCP/UDP headers + payload).
For hop-by-hop and destination options headers, when required
multiple PadN options were used in order to bypass some Linux kernels
that consider a PadN larger than 8 bytes is an attack, see section
5.3 of [BCP220], even if multiple PadN options violates section
2.1.9.5 of [RFC4942].
Next phases will also include packets without UDP/TCP transport
header but with Next-Header being:
* 59, "no next header" see section 4.7 of [RFC8200];
* 143, "ethernet" see section 4.9 of [RFC8986].
3.1.3. Drop attribution to AS
Comparing the traceroutes with and without extension headers allows
the attribution of a packet drop to one AS. But, this is not an easy
task as inter-AS links often use IPv6 address of only one AS (if not
using link-local per [RFC7704]). This document uses the following
algorithm to attribute the drop to one AS for packet sourced in one
AS and then having a path traversing AS#foo just before AS#bar:
* if the packet drop happens at the first router (i.e., hop limit ==
1 does not trigger an ICMP hop-limit exceeded), then the drop is
assumed to this AS as it is probably an ingress filter on the
first router (i.e., the hosting provider in most of the cases -
except if collocated with an IXP).
* if the packet drop happens in AS#foo after one or more hop(s) in
AS#bar, then the drop is assumed to be in AS#foo ingress filter on
a router with an interface address in AS#foo
* if the packet drop happens in AS#bar after one or more hop(s) in
AS#bar before going to AS#foo, then the drop is assumed to be in
AS#foo ingress filter on a router with an interface address in
AS#bar
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
In several cases, the above algorithm was not possible (e.g., some
intermediate routers do not generate an ICMP unreachable hop limit
exceeded even in the absence of any extension headers), then the drop
is not attributed. Please also note that the goal of this document
is not to 'point fingers to operators' but more to evaluate the
potential impact. I.e., a tier-1 provider dropping packets with
extension headers has a much bigger impact on the Internet traffic
than an access provider.
Future revision of this document will use the work of [MLAT_PEERING].
3.2. Results
This section presents the current results out of phase 1
(collaborating vantage points) testing. About 4860 experiments were
run, one experiment being defined by sending packets between 2
vantage points with hop-limit varying from 1 to the number of hops
between the two vantage points and for all the extension headers
described in Section 3.1.2.
3.2.1. Routing Header
The following table lists all routing header types and the percentage
of experiments that were successful, i.e., packets with routing
header reaching their destination:
+=====================+===========================================+
| Routing Header Type | %-age of experiments reaching destination |
+=====================+===========================================+
| 0 | 80.9% |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| 1 | 99.5% |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| 2 | 99.5% |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| 3 | not tested |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| 4 | 69.0% |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| 5 | 99.5% |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| 6 | 99.3% |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 3
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
The table below lists the few ASs that drop packets with the routing
header type 0 (the original source routing header, which is now
deprecated).
+===========+================+
| AS Number | AS description |
+===========+================+
| 6939 | HURRICANE, US |
+-----------+----------------+
Table 4
It is possibly due to a strict implementation of [RFC5095] but it is
expected that no packet with routing header type 0 would be
transmitted anymore. So, this is not surprising.
The table below lists the few ASs that drop packets with the routing
header type 4 (Segment Routing Header [RFC8754]).
+===========+================+
| AS Number | AS description |
+===========+================+
| 16276 | OVH, FR |
+-----------+----------------+
Table 5
This drop of SRH was to be expected as SRv6 is specified to run only
in a limited domain.
Other routing header types (1 == deprecated NIMROD [RFC1753], 2 ==
mobile IPv6 [RFC6275], and even 5 == CRH-16 and 6 == CRH-
32[I-D.draft-bonica-6man-comp-rtg-hdr]) can be transmitted over the
global Internet without being dropped (assuming that the 0.5% of
dropped packets are within the measurement error).
3.2.2. Hop-by-Hop Options Headers
Many ASs drop packets containing either hop-by-hop options headers
per table below:
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
+===============+========+======================+
| Option Type | Length | %-age of experiments |
| | | reaching destination |
+===============+========+======================+
| Skip | 8 | 5.8% |
+---------------+--------+----------------------+
| Discard | 8 | 0.0% |
+---------------+--------+----------------------+
| Skip one | 256 | 1.9% |
| large PadN | | |
+---------------+--------+----------------------+
| Skip multiple | 256 | 0.0% |
| PadN | | |
+---------------+--------+----------------------+
| Discard | 256 | 0.0% |
+---------------+--------+----------------------+
| Skip | 512 | 1.9% |
+---------------+--------+----------------------+
| Discard | 512 | 0.0% |
+---------------+--------+----------------------+
Table 6
It appears that hop-by-hop options headers cannot reliably traverse
the global Internet; only small headers with 'skippable' options have
some chances. If the hop-by-hop option has the 'discard' bits, it is
dropped per specification.
3.2.3. Destination Options Headers
Many ASs drop packets containing destination options headers per
table below:
+========+===============+======================+
| Length | Multiple PadN | %-age of experiments |
| | | reaching destination |
+========+===============+======================+
| 8 | No | 99.2% |
+--------+---------------+----------------------+
| 256 | No | 2.6% |
+--------+---------------+----------------------+
| 256 | Yes | 2.6% |
+--------+---------------+----------------------+
| 512 | No | 2.6% |
+--------+---------------+----------------------+
Table 7
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
The measurement did not find any impact of the discard/skip bits in
the destination headers options, probably because the routers do not
look inside the extension headers into the options. The use of a
single large PadN or multiple 8-octet PadN options does not influence
the result.
3.2.4. Fragmentation Header
The propagation of two kinds of fragmentation headers was analysed:
atomic fragment (offset == 0 and M-flag == 0) and plain first
fragment (offset == 0 and M-flag == 1). The table below displays the
propagation differences.
+============+===========================================+
| M-flag | %-age of experiments reaching destination |
+============+===========================================+
| 0 (atomic) | 70.2% |
+------------+-------------------------------------------+
| 1 | 99.0% |
+------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 8
The size of the overall IP packets (512, 1280, and 1500 octets) does
not have any impact on the propagation.
3.2.5. No drop at all
Finally, some ASs do not drop transit traffic (except for routing
header type 0) and follow the recommendations of
[I-D.draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering]. This list includes tier-1
transit providers (using the "regional" tag per [TIER1]):
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
+===========+=======================================+===============+
| AS Number | AS Description | Comment |
+===========+=======================================+===============+
| 4637 | ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL Telstra Global, HK | Regional |
| | | Tier |
+-----------+---------------------------------------+---------------+
| 4755 | TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications | |
| | formerly VSNL is Leading ISP, IN | |
+-----------+---------------------------------------+---------------+
| 6762 | SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE | Tier-1 |
| | S.p.A., IT | |
+-----------+---------------------------------------+---------------+
| 14061 | DIGITALOCEAN-ASN, US | |
+-----------+---------------------------------------+---------------+
| 21283 | A1SI-AS A1 Slovenija, SI | |
+-----------+---------------------------------------+---------------+
| 60011 | MYTHIC-BEASTS-USA, GB | |
+-----------+---------------------------------------+---------------+
Table 9
3.3. Summary of the collaborating parties measurements
While the analysis has areas of improvement (geographical
distribution and impact on latency), it appears that:
* authentication and non-atomic fragmentation headers can traverse
the Internet;
* only routing headers types 0 and 4 experiment problems over the
Internet, other types have no problems;
* hop-by-hop options headers do not traverse the Internet;
* destination options headers are not reliable enough especially
large size ones.
Of course, the next phase of measurement with non-collaborating
parties will probably give another view.
4. Security Considerations
While active probing of the Internet may be considered as an attack,
this measurement was done among collaborating parties and using the
probe attribution technique described in
[I-D.draft-vyncke-opsec-probe-attribution].
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc793>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8200>.
[RFC8986] Filsfils, C., Ed., Camarillo, P., Ed., Leddy, J., Voyer,
D., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "Segment Routing over IPv6
(SRv6) Network Programming", RFC 8986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8986, February 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8986>.
6.2. Informative References
[ALEXA] "The top 500 sites on the web", n.d.,
<https://www.alexa.com/topsites>.
[BCP220] Chown, T., Loughney, J., and T. Winters, "IPv6 Node
Requirements", BCP 220, RFC 8504, January 2019.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp220>
[I-D.draft-bonica-6man-comp-rtg-hdr]
Bonica, R., Kamite, Y., Alston, A., Henriques, D., and L.
Jalil, "The IPv6 Compact Routing Header (CRH)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bonica-6man-comp-rtg-hdr-
27, 15 November 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bonica-6man-
comp-rtg-hdr-27>.
[I-D.draft-ietf-opsawg-pcap]
Harris, G. and M. C. Richardson, "PCAP Capture File
Format", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
opsawg-pcap-00, 25 October 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-
pcap-00>.
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
[I-D.draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering]
Gont, F. and W. (. Liu, "Recommendations on the Filtering
of IPv6 Packets Containing IPv6 Extension Headers at
Transit Routers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-08, 3 June 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsec-
ipv6-eh-filtering-08>.
[I-D.draft-vyncke-opsec-probe-attribution]
Vyncke, É., Donnet, B., and J. Iurman, "Attribution of
Internet Probes", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
vyncke-opsec-probe-attribution-01, 3 March 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vyncke-opsec-
probe-attribution-01>.
[MLAT_PEERING]
Giotsas, V., Zhou, S., Luckie, M., and K. Claffy,
"Inferring Multilateral Peering",
DOI 10.1145/2535372.2535390, December 2013,
<https://catalog.caida.org/details/
paper/2013_inferring_multilateral_peering/>.
[RFC1753] Chiappa, N., "IPng Technical Requirements Of the Nimrod
Routing and Addressing Architecture", RFC 1753,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1753, December 1994,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1753>.
[RFC4942] Davies, E., Krishnan, S., and P. Savola, "IPv6 Transition/
Co-existence Security Considerations", RFC 4942,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4942, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4942>.
[RFC5095] Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation
of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5095, December 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5095>.
[RFC6275] Perkins, C., Ed., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
Support in IPv6", RFC 6275, DOI 10.17487/RFC6275, July
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6275>.
[RFC7704] Crocker, D. and N. Clark, "An IETF with Much Diversity and
Professional Conduct", RFC 7704, DOI 10.17487/RFC7704,
November 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7704>.
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft JAMES March 2022
[RFC7872] Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and W. Liu,
"Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7872>.
[RFC8754] Filsfils, C., Ed., Dukes, D., Ed., Previdi, S., Leddy, J.,
Matsushima, S., and D. Voyer, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header
(SRH)", RFC 8754, DOI 10.17487/RFC8754, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8754>.
[TIER1] "Tier 1 network", n.d.,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_1_network>.
Acknowledgments
The authors want to thank Sander Steffann and Jan Zorz for allowing
the free use of their labs. Other thanks to Fernando Gont who
indicated a nice IPv6 hosting provider in South America.
Special thanks as well to Professor Benoit Donnet for his support and
advices. This document would not have existed without his support.
Authors' Addresses
Éric Vyncke
Cisco
De Kleetlaan 64
1831 Diegem
Belgium
Email: evyncke@cisco.com
Raphaël Léas
Université de Liège
Liège
Belgium
Email: raphael.leas@student.uliege.be
Justin Iurman
Université de Liège
Belgium
Email: justin.iurman@uliege.be
Vyncke, et al. Expires 5 September 2022 [Page 15]