TLS Ticket Requests
draft-wood-tls-ticketrequests-01
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(tls WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tommy Pauly , David Schinazi , Christopher A. Wood | ||
| Last updated | 2019-01-17 (Latest revision 2018-10-13) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
TLS session tickets enable stateless connection resumption for clients without server-side per-client state. Servers vend session tickets to clients, at their discretion, upon connection establishment. Clients store and use tickets when resuming future connections. Moreover, clients should use tickets at most once for session resumption, especially if such keying material protects early application data. Single-use tickets bound the number of parallel connections a client may initiate by the number of tickets received from a given server. To address this limitation, this document describes a mechanism by which clients may specify the desired number of tickets needed for future connections.
Authors
Tommy Pauly
David Schinazi
Christopher A. Wood
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)