Security Association for application bootstrapping
draft-yanagiya-apl-boot-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Mayumi Yanagiya | ||
| Last updated | 2005-02-15 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
In [ID-yanagiya-eap-saa-00], [ID-ohba-mip6-boot-arch-dhcp-01], and [ID-yegin-eap-boot-rfc3118-01], it is assumed that a peer and service authenticator execute the authentication or authorization process with a key derived from EAP Keying materials. However, [EAP-Key-04] does not assume that a network element that does not support EAP, such as a DHCP server or Mobile IP home agent, uses the EAP key to authenticate/authorize the user. Thus, it is necessary to define a new security association and key for the application authenticator.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)